THE COLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

VOLUME I
1917-1950
VOLUME II
1950-1960

D. F. FLEMING

The Cold War and it's Origins 1917-1960 - Vol 1 (1917-1950)

D F Fleming

THE COLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

BOOKS BY THE SAMB AUTHOR

The Treaty Veto of the American Senate
The United States and the League of Nations, 1918–1920
The United States and World Organization, 1920–1933
The United States and the World Court
While America Slept
Can We Win the Peace?
The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917–1960

THE COLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

1917–1960

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VOLUME ONE

1917–1950

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NORWICH

To Five of My Teachers
who taught men to search for the facts
and to be governed by reason

LIVINGSTON C. LORD
President, the Eastern Illinois State College, 1898–1933

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Professor of History, the Eastern Illinois State College, 1906–1942

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CONTENTS

PREFACE *page* xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xv

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL FOREWORD xvii

VOLUME ONE

PART I: ENEMIES AND ALLIES, 1917–1945

I. World War and Red Revolution, 1914–1917 3

II. Russian Civil War and Western Intervention, 1917–1921 16

III. Communism Confined and Ostracized, 1921–1934 36

IV. Fascism Appeased, 1934–1938 53

V. The “Phony” War, 1939–1941 84

VI. The Soviet-German Truce, 1939–1941 106

VII. Allies in War, 1941–1945 135

VIII. The Yalta Conference Period, October 1944–April 1945 188

IX. The Struggle for Poland, 1939–1949 219

X. Soviet Objectives in East Europe, 1945 249

PART II: THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE, 1945–1950

XI. After Roosevelt, April–August 1945 265

XII. After Hiroshima, August–November 1945 295

XIII. Rising Tension, November 1945–July 1946 334

XIV. Atomic Impasse, January 1946–July 1949 363

XV. Stabilization, August–December 1946 416

XVI. The Truman Doctrine, January–June 1947 433

XVII. From the Marshall Plan to the Communist Seizure of Czechoslovakia, June 1947–May 1948 477

XVIII. From the Berlin Blockade to NATO, March 1948–August 1949 504

XIX. After the Soviet A-bomb, September 1949–June 1950 521

VOLUME ONE

(issued separately)

PART III: THE COLD WAR IN EAST ASIA, 1945–1955

XX. The Fall of China to Communism, 1927–1950 543

XXI. The Crucifixion of Korea, 1945–1954 589

XXII. Colonialism, Communism and Nationalism in South-East Asia, 1945–1954 661

XXIII. The First Formosa Crisis, January–July 1955 707

XXIV. The First Summit Conference, July l955 737

PART IV: THE SECOND COLD WAR, 1955–1959

XXV. The Failure to Make Peace, July 1955–October 1956 759

XXVI. The Revolutions in Poland and Hungary, October 1956 791

XXVII. Explosions at Suez, October 1956 815

XXVIII. Lessening Tension, April–August 1957 853

XXIX. After the Sputniks, October 1957—April 1958 885

XXX. Trouble in All Directions, April–October 1958 916

XXXI. Berlin II, November 1958—July 1959 947

XXXII. The Turn Toward Peace, July–December 1959 969

XXXIII. The Frustrated Summit at Paris, January–June 1960 989

XXXIV. Why the West Lost the Cold War 1035

XXXV. The Future 1075

INDEX 1117

PREFACE

This book is an account of the great continuing conflict of the twentieth century, the struggle which will determine whether our civilization is to disappear in the nuclear flames of a final war of annihilation or find essential unity in one family of organized nations.

The record here attempted was begun in 1947, when it seemed more than probable that we would go on into a third world war within one lifetime. It is the writer's effort to try to forestall what he has never doubted would be the end of both the American dream and Western civilization. It would have been published much sooner if many developments, some of them international, had not intervened. For example, there was no suitable terminal point while the Korean War lasted, and that was a long time.

As a university student in 1914 I was aware that a big war was likely to break out in Europe at any time, but I was as isolationist as my Mid-Western countrymen until the deepening of the struggle convinced me that our neutrality in World War I could not be maintained.

After 19181 found it difficult to believe that the opportunity to lead a beginning in world organization, against the return of ever more suicidal and destructive wars, was to be lost in the fires of partisan and personal controversy in Washington.

When the incredible happened, and a far worse world war developed, I again did what I could to work for national survival and to gain a second chance for enough world organization to enable humanity to continue and to develop.

It was poignantly evident that such abysmal destructions of human life, values and property could not continue, and that they were the source of the vast expansion of communism in the world. Nothing could be clearer than that.

It is my profound belief that nothing is so revolutionary as these world wars and that there is no rational alternative to relying chiefly on the irresistible force of evolution to modify communism, and all other systems, to bring them into closer harmony with the universal aspirations for a good life which all men share. I have never doubted that we can compete successfully with communism, if we place our main reliance on non-military methods.

However, after World War II our leaders quickly swung all the way over from our isolationist refusal to accept any responsibility in the world and came close to assuming military responsibility for everything everywhere. We heavily and positively over-compensated for our negative failure after 1918.

We do not seem able to learn the lesson of each succeeding world crisis until it is too late. During World War II we repented of our tragic failure to lead the League of Nations and we took our place at the head of a new league.

The lesson of World War I, that we cannot resign from the world, was learned at a sadly late date but once again the mandate of a world war was

disregarded. The lesson of World War II was that the losing side must not plunge the world into another world war in order to restore or improve its position. We had just permitted Germany to do that, with calamitous consequences.

Nevertheless, after 1945 we ourselves at once assumed the position of a loser. Though we were the mightiest nation which had ever stood upon this planet, and though our undamaged strength had increased prodigiously as a result of World War II, we said that we had "lost" East Europe and China, and we rebelled against these two main consequences of the war.

Knowing that world wars can grow out of great myths like this, I was appalled to see the United States move promptly into a new balance of power conflict, while the embers of the last one were still hot, certain that the terribly wounded Soviet Union was out to take over the world.

This was done, also, in the light of the deadly flashes at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which revealed clearly and with finality that another world war would complete the lethal progression of our time toward mutual extermination.

Since August 6, 1945, this process has advanced with relentless speed. Our decision that the Soviets should never possess an A-bomb if international control could prevent it; their prompt acquisition of the weapon; our drive for the H-bomb, with Russian success almost simultaneous; their plunge to leadership in intercontinental jet bombers and global guided missiles—these and other miracles of destruction tumbling on each other's heels leave us little time to make peace.

Yet for fifteen years after 1945 peace was not made and we proceeded doggedly along the same old cycle of international rivalry, crisis after crisis, and ever mounting arms burdens—just as if the most destructive weapon of war was still the machine-gun, and as if we were still in the springtime of 1914, ignorant of the enormous steps toward destroying civilization soon to be made in the two world wars.

Of course we say to ourselves that because it would be so horrible and so senseless it will not happen. Our Civil Defense Administrator has told us that in a surprise attack the Soviets could kill above 40,000,000 Americans, merely with bombers, and if the best possible shelters had been constructed. Yet soon thousands of ICBM's must be expected to stand triggered in the northern forests on both sides. It has been estimated, too, that we could mount a surprise thermonuclear attack on the Soviet Union which would cause deaths in the order of several hundred millions, depending on which way the winds blew.

It is an easy retreat from reality to say that no ruler of a great power would ever be mad or frightened enough to give the order, and no small nation turbulent or rebellious enough to touch off catastrophe. But humane men reasoned in the same way in early 1914, as well as in 1938, and no man can be safe until peace is made, and until some curbs are put upon the power of governments to assert their sovereign wills against each other once too often.

Yet we Americans are currently trying hard to devise new rules for victory, or at least stalemate, in "limited" nuclear wars, without using the city and

nation killers. We strive assiduously to produce “clean” H-bombs and whole families of little ones, in an attempt to restore some shadow of rational possibility to the institution of war, and to the threat of its use as an instrument of diplomacy. These efforts may ease us into the final nuclear holocaust, but they can never take us back into the ages when major wars could be survived. The only way of escape lies forward; toward the elimination of great power wars. The inexorable procession of “ultimate” weapons leaves us no choice but to master them before they destroy us.

It was under the shadow of this infinite and constantly darkening peril that this book was written. That is why I have sought at every stage to present the other side, how it looks to “the enemy”, in the belief that this is essential to the avoidance of the final grand smash.

Of course this has been a difficult undertaking in a time when nearly all of the great organs of public opinion management have been massed to stress the iniquity and wickedness of our opponents. Yet it is only by striving constantly to see the other side that we can hope to survive, in the age of push-button ICBM’s and beyond.

I have tried to set down the facts about each crisis in these forty-three years as I believe them to have been true, knowing well that my work must stand the scrutiny of future decades, if there are to be any. I think it is fair to say that my previous books about the aftermath of World War I have met this test.

In any event, the validity of this study does not depend primarily upon the author’s interpretation of acts and events. A great many people have spoken in these pages, and it is upon the combined weight of their judgments that its impact will depend.

Many of the voices recorded have been bellicose. It is my belief that most of our belligerence has been unnecessary and dangerous, and that a great deal of it has been based upon false premises and information.

I have also told in various places the story of our anti-Red and anti-liberal hysterias, and of the incalculable damage they have done both to our reputation abroad and to our heritage of freedom of thought and expression at home.

The book seeks at many points to analyze the issues, to come to conclusions and to suggest solutions. It gives reasons for our loss of the Cold War. It was written in the belief that no nation can survive in a time of runaway military technologies unless a contemporary hearing can be gained for dissenting views and alternative policies. If the Cold War goes on into a third world war, there will be no leisurely processes of history thereafter to explain how the catastrophe could have been averted.

If another world war breaks out, there is not a government in the world which can perform its primary, basic function of protecting its citizens against foreign attack. The most powerful government on the globe will be pitifully and futilely impotent. In this situation ancient, traditional ways of thinking and acting toward other peoples cannot be effective. New thinking, new attitudes and new policies are required, as President Eisenhower explained so impressively during his 1959 tour. During the last half of that year he changed the whole international climate in the direction to which this book points. Of

course it is my hope that its readers will help to keep the direction changed toward cooperation and "co-survival," to use Secretary of State Herter's expressive term, in spite of the backset at the abortive summit conference in Paris.

No intelligent citizen can escape his share of the responsibility for making competitive co-existence succeed. This is much too important a matter to be left to governments. In his memorable address to the Parliament of India on December 10, 1959, President Eisenhower urged all men everywhere to work against the mistrusts, fixations and tensions of our time. He added that, "All these are the creations of Governments, cherished and nourished by Governments. Nations would never feel them if they were given freedom from propaganda and pressure."

In the years since 1945 all the things which divide us from other great peoples have been magnified fully and too long. Suspicion, hate and fear have ruled our minds. Now it is time to study and emphasize the things which unite us with the other peoples.

We are obliged to learn, for example, that the needs of the vast and dynamic peoples of the Soviet Union and China are as clamant as our fears are. These great nations are now highly organized and marching swiftly into modernity. Either we have to learn to live in reasonable amity with them, or we shall all be atomized together.

During the period covered by this narrative, fighting man has at last reached the end of the road. Hereafter, he will learn to cooperate or he will cease to exist.

Nor will understanding between the nations be enough. It is imperative that we build rapidly both the feeling for the world community and the instrumentalities for its work which alone can give us security against nuclear destruction.

London
June, 1960

D. F. FLEMING

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The usual heartfelt sentence to one's wife would in this case be a wholly inadequate expression of gratitude for constant aid in gathering and digesting material; patience in typing and re-typing so large a manuscript; good judgment on innumerable points of content; comradely interest in the unfolding story; shared concern over the apparently endless series of crises in the nuclear age; years cheerfully devoted to the task at the expense of other interests; and help in making the index.

I am indebted also to the institutions which have provided time and resources for the long development of this study, first to Chancellor Harvie Branscomb, of Vanderbilt University, for making adequate arrangements for timely leaves of absence on three occasions. My share of the ready helpfulness which Dean Leonard B. Beach, of the Vanderbilt Graduate School, accords to all of his faculty, has also been generous. Invaluable, too, has been the support of Director George W. Stocking and the Vanderbilt Institute of Research in the Social Sciences, who have aided with grants at timely intervals from the beginning of the project to its publication.

Two other educational centers supplied ideal facilities for research and writing: one at the beginning of this study, the other at the end. My thanks are due to Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer for the year 1948–1949 at the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton, and to Dr. A. Appadorai for the year 1959–1960 at the Indian School of International Studies in New Delhi.

Many librarians have given their help, especially Clara M. Brown, the reference librarian at the Joint Universities Library in Nashville, whose always willing hands have supplied many a detail in these pages.

Dr. Norman L. Parks, an esteemed former colleague, contributed nearly all of the research and writing for Chapter XX, "The Fall of China to Communism". Anyone who has ever tried to compress so vast a story into one chapter will know what labor that requires. I should add that my own decade of reading the available literature about China confirms in detail what he has written.

I am grateful, also, for assistance in keen thinking and related research to a dozen generations of students in my seminar, and to some hundreds of others in my larger class in world politics. I think no one could have been blessed with more stimulating or rewarding students.

Certainly no one could have been more fortunate in having as his friends, Cyril J. Bath, Stewart Meacham, Nathaniel Micklem and Francis Wormuth. They have sustained the undertaking at many points by their belief in its necessity, and their warm friendship and support have been essential to its completion.

I am grateful to Ken McCormick and George Shively, of Doubleday and Company, and to Philip Unwin and Malcolm Barnes, of George Allen and Unwin Ltd., for their patience and courtesy in considering a manuscript of

this size and in piloting it through to publication. My debt to Shively is unique, never to be forgotten.

My enduring appreciation is due also to the editors of the *Annals* of the *American Academy of Political and Social Science*, the *Journal of Politics* and the *Western Political Quarterly* for publishing throughout a period of national hysteria my articles questioning both the Cold War and the witch hunt. The writing of these articles helped this book and of course my work on it helped them. This was true, also, of my regular articles in the *Classmate* and the *British Weekly*.

It should not be assumed that those who have aided my research would approve or disapprove of what I have written. It is an essential part of our democratic heritage that it is the responsibility of a scholar to vouch for the accuracy of the material which he presents and to come to his own conclusions.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL FOREWORD

The devoted labor of many other authors has inevitably contributed to the substance of this study.

The one book which has been most essential to it is Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, Harper, 1948. It was also published in London under the title, *The White House Papers of Harry Hopkins*, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948–9. This is the best single source of the war-time utterances of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. No one can understand either the history of World War II or the immediate origins of the Cold War without reading this book.

For the appeasement period the authoritative *Life of Neville Chamberlain* by Keith Feiling, New York, Macmillan, 1946, and London, Macmillan, 1947, is as essential. This fair and responsible account of the thoughts and activities of the chief architect of the appeasement policy is indispensable to an understanding of why it was tried and why it failed. The failure is recorded unforgettably in J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's *Munich, Prologue to Tragedy*, London, Macmillan; New York, Duell, Sloane and Pearce, 1948. This is an epic account of the surrender of Central and East Europe to Germany and to Fascism which no one should miss. In the same category is *Betrayal in Central Europe* by G. E. R. Gedye, New York, Harper, 1939, and the sensitive book of Herbert L. Matthews, *The Education of a Correspondent*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1946. Matthews gives insight into the Spanish Civil War not to be found elsewhere. His clear vision on other subjects is also revealed in these pages from his articles and editorials in the *New York Times.*

For the record of events in the interlude of the Soviet-German truce I have relied mainly on the book of captured documents, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941y* edited by James Sontag and J. S. Beddie (Supt. of Documents, Washington); *The Incompatible Allies*, by two German diplomats, Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, New York, Macmillan, 1953; *The Nuremberg Documents*, by Peter de Mendelssohn, London, Allen & Unwin, 1946; and the first-hand report of the Rumanian diplomat Grigore Gafencu, *Prelude to the Russian Campaign*, London, Muller, 1945.

On the war-time period the memoirs of a half-dozen of the leading actors in it are invaluable. The two-volume *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, Macmillan, 1948, London, Hodder, 1948, have been frequently quoted. I have relied on James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947; London, Heinemann, 1947, in many parts of the book, and valuable information has been found in the books of a third Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, *Lend Lease, Weapon of Victory*, New York, Macmillan, 1944, and *Roosevelt and the Russians*, New York, Doubleday, 1949; London, Cape, 1950.1 have drawn on various volumes of Churchill's war memoirs and used those of President Truman extensively, *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman*,

New York, Doubleday, 1955; London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1956. Stimson's memoirs fill significant gaps—Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper, 1947; London, Hutchinson. Dwight D. Eisenhower's *Crusade in Europe*, New York, Doubleday, 1948; London, Heinemann, 1949, gives insight into the politics of the war, as well as its military history. An excellent British version of the same factors is to be found in Chester Wilmot's *The Struggle for Europe*, New York, Harper, 1952; London, Collins.

Two books which survey the main events of the Cold War have contributed both facts and perspective to this study. The volume by Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, New York, Knopf, 1949; London, Cresset, 1950, reveals the main factors in the East-West struggle in East Europe as no other writer has, though he has had worthy competition in the books about this area by Joseph K. Harsch, *The Curtain Isn't Iron*, London, Putnam; Vernon Bartlett, *East of the Iron Curtain*, London, Putnam, 1950; John Gunther, *Behind the Curtain*, New York, Harper, 1949, published in London under the title *Behind Europe's Curtain*, H. Hamilton, 1949; and Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, London, Methuen, 1950. In his *History of the Cold War*$_f$ Kenneth Ingram, New York, Philosophical Library, 1957; London, Darwen, 1955, has had the honor of pioneering where many others will follow, and his thoughtful conclusions will carry weight with his successors. All of them will need to study the long series of annual chronicles written for the Council on Foreign Relations in New York under the title *The United States and World Affairs* and published by Harper. Like all of the studies made by this organization, these volumes advance understanding of the events and subjects discussed. I have used especially those written by John C. Campbell and Richard P. Stebbins (1945–7 and 1953).

For the crises of the Cold War in East Asia I have of course made extensive use of the four-volume 1951 MacArthur *Hearings*. Never before has so much been revealed about great events so soon. Other books which do much to clarify the origins of the Korean War include: George M. McCune, *Korea Today*, Harvard Press, 1950; London, Allen & Unwin, 1950; E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, New York, Kings Crown Press, 1951; and John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur*, New York, Harper, 1951. On the long war in Indo-China the book by Ellen J. Hammer is, I think, definitive. In *The Struggle for Indo-China*, Stanford University Press; Oxford University Press, 1954, she has told the story with such thoroughness and vividness that all who write about it must be deeply indebted to her.

I have drawn inspiration and information from the books of James P. Warburg, Frederick L. Schuman, Edward C. Crankshaw and Isaac Deutscher, all of whom have been able to accept the rise of the Soviet Union as an historic fact and deal with it accordingly. In this category belongs also William Henry Chamberlin's fine history of *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921*, New York and London, Macmillan, 1935, and R. H. Lockart's *Memoirs of a British Agent y* New York and London, Putnam, 1932. Outstanding in the early history of the Soviet Union is George Stewart's *The White Armies of Russia*, New York, Macmillan, 1933. This is the kind of book which must be used by

all future historians, along with William H. McNeill's *The Greek Dilemma*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1946; London, Gollancz, which covers the Greek Civil War of 1944–5.

I have been critical, but I hope also accurate and fair, in discussing the proposals for dealing with the Cold War advanced in three books. In *If Russia Strikes*, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1949, George Fielding Eliot, a noted military critic, described what would happen to the Soviet Union in a war at the top of our atomic monopoly. In his *Russia and America, Dangers and Prospects*, New York, Harper, 1956, Henry L. Roberts accepted a general war more reluctantly, as a means of averting communist world hegemony, and sought many other ways of avoiding it. In *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper, 1957, Henry A. Kissinger argued ably for such a use of nuclear weapons as would win the Cold War without destroying civilization. The reader is invited to go to these books for full and lucid exposition of the policies advocated.

These notes leave unmentioned the work of many able authors whose work I have tried to recognize consistently in the footnotes.

To a large degree this book is also a mirror of the thinking of our ablest newsmen. The invaluable reporting and penetrating comments of James Reston, Arthur Krock and Dana Adams Schmidt of the *New York Times* are constant threads in this narrative. This is true of Cyrus L. Sulzberger, who has been quoted most frequently of all the *Times* writers, along with Anne O'Hare McCormick, Drew Middleton, Harold J. Callender, Thomas H. Hamilton, Harry Schwartz, Harrison Salisbury, M. S. Handler, Sydney Gruson, John McCormac, Sam Pope Brewer, Tillman Durdin and other *Times* writers. Who can measure the great weight of ability, experience, accurate reporting and reflective thinking which these men give to the columns of the *New York Times*? Certainly any contemporary history which did not reflect the contributions of these men would be woefully lacking. It should be added also that the *Times* helps greatly in the maintenance of our essential freedoms by giving these men the right to say what they think under their own names.

I have made frequent use of the competent news articles in the *New York Herald Tribune.* The reader will find many of its editorials to have been penetrating and long sighted. I have also relied often on the excellent national coverage of the two Nashville newspapers, the *Banner* and the *Tennessean.* The latter has been quoted with a frequency approaching that of the *New York Times.*

The able and constructive reports and commentaries of Edward R. Murrow, Howard K. Smith and half a dozen other newsmen on the staff of the Columbia Broadcasting System have constantly informed and influenced my thinking, at the same time that they were doing something to lift American radio out of the sad mediocrity and hucksterism into which it has fallen.

Of the syndicated columnists, Walter Lippmann is preeminent in these pages, on so many of which his wisdom appears. Joseph Alsop has added much life and significance to this record, along with Drew Pearson, Doris Fleeson, Thomas L. Stokes and Samuel Grafton. Others who would be

missed if their keen thinking did not appear in what follows include Marquis Childs of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, Roscoe Drummond of the *New York Herald Tribune*, Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post*, Max Lemer of the *New York Post*, Max Freedman, Alistair Cooke and Victor Zorza of the *Manchester Guardian*, and Henry Brandon of the London *Sunday Times*.

No record of my intellectual indebtedness could be complete without my thanks to *I. F. Stone's Weekly* for demonstrating what the courage and industry of one man can do to make the issues of his time clear and unambiguous. Charles A. Wells has also performed the same function for me, ably and well, in his *Between the Lines.*

Once again I am aware that others might well have been mentioned among the celebrities who have illuminated my work, and I am deeply conscious of the values which a great many articles in periodicals have added to it. I trust that the contributions of these writers will be evident to the reader. He will note, I am happy to say, that the footnotes in this book are where they should be.

PART I

ENEMIES AND ALLIES

1917–1945

CHAPTER I

WORLD WAR AND RED REVOLUTION

1914–1917

Winston Churchill voiced an old idea when he declared that Russia is “an enigma wrapped in a mystery.” Russia has always been a mystery to the western world because: (1) it is a vast country situated in the heart of the world’s largest land mass; (2) its people living on great plains have been invaded so often that they have deep suspicions of foreigners; (3) they have been ruled for centuries by autocrats who did not usually promote foreign observation; and (4) other peoples have studied far too little Russian history.

Today it is easy to say that Soviet Russia has drawn an “iron curtain” around her domain, including half of Europe, and absolve ourselves from the effort of learning about Russia. It is equally easy to accept the proposition that she is an enemy and therefore we do not need to study her history and policies with any sympathy or objectivity.

Each of these ideas is suicidal, for we have reached a point in the evolution of war which precludes its use as a means of settling national rivalries. We cannot conquer or rule the Soviet Union, any more than she can subdue or control North America, but the two of us can destroy western democratic civilization, the very thing we are so anxious to defend. We literally have no alternative except to live on the same constantly shrinking planet with the Soviet Union, and to learn to adjust our differences with her without war. It is a matter of life and death to us and, since it is, we cannot even “defend” our way of life if we have false ideas about Russia and her way of life. This is not to say that any one writer can present the truth about Russia, but it is to say that everyone must strive to present it, for our very self preservation, if for no other reason.

Red Revolution. Our lives are made uneasy now because the Russian Revolution of 1917 resulted in the creation of a rival system to our own. This revolution was the most sweeping in all modern history. We had thought that the French Revolution which began in 1789 was the last word in horror and upheaval. During it many heads rolled and many old privileges were ended. Yet the French revolutionists did not attempt to change everything. They left most of the old institutions unchanged, or only altered somewhat, and the former ruling classes survived to contest the Revolution itself, down to this very day. The *ancien régime* never died in France and it retained enough power to contribute heavily to that perpetual split which finally paralyzed France and created the Vichy regime in 1940.

The French Revolution profoundly affected human life and institutions throughout the western world, but it was a mild affair by comparison with the Russian Revolution. In Russia all the old landmarks were swept away. The autocrat of all the Russias was killed and his throne destroyed. The Church lost all of its wealth and power. The landed nobility ceased to exist. Title to all land went to the state and eventually several hundred thousands of the larger farm owners were ruthlessly killed or deported to hard labor while the land was organized into great collective farms. The old bureaucracy was destroyed. The imperial army was no more. The courts no longer functioned. The intellectual radicals who had mainly led the opposition to Tsarism for generations were killed or scattered. All industrial establishments went into the hands of the state and the profit system was absolutely destroyed. Throughout the giant reaches of the Soviet Union no man can employ another, if he profits from his labor.

Many of these social changes might have been accepted by the world's conservatives in time, but the nationalization of industry, business and the land—never. J. B. Priestley once said that the minds of England's conservatives snapped shut at the height of the Russian Revolution and had never opened again. This world-wide closing of minds was greatly accelerated by the brutalities of the revolution and the civil war. When it was all over thousands of the high born in Russia had been killed and much larger numbers scattered over Europe as living examples of what Red revolution could do. All who had possessed wealth, privileges and power in Russia went out and an entirely new set of rulers drawn from the lower masses took over and ruled solely in the name of the great masses.

This is why the Russian Revolution shook the world as none ever had and divided it as never before. The division is still deep and vital, yet the new system in Russia inevitably began at once to evolve and it is still in motion. Moreover, the older currents of Russian history began to flow again and they continue to run with growing momentum.

Medieval Russia. What are some of these currents and why did an all-out socialist revolution come to Russia, of all places?

Excellent glimpses of the forces which moulded pre-revolutionary Russia are to be found in a small book by a Russian long resident in England, Soloveytchik's ***Russia in Perspective.*** He denies that Russian history is a mystery. For example, a great state flourished around Kiev in the eleventh century, as modern and as European as any of its contemporaries. For 600 years in the Middle Ages also two northern city states, Novgorod and Pskov, developed an essentially democratic kind of government, along with much European commerce. The 300–year sway of the Tartars, beginning in 1224, profoundly influenced Russia, but did not orientalize her completely since the Tartars were content to leave tax collecting to Russian princes.

Serfdom. The role of Peter the Great in westernizing Russia is well known. After he died, in 1725, the enslavement of the peasants and the glorification of their betters both reached ultimate degrees. It would have been difficult to find "a more eccentric, extravagant and profligate society" than during the

reign of Catherine II (1762–96). One's standing was measured by the size of his personal staff. The very rich had from 300 to 800 servants who performed scores of functions, under minute written instructions, the violation of which brought flogging or torture from the masters. There was "little or no protection against their quite pathological abuse of power.' [1]

Competition in great entertainment exploits led to gruelling labor for thousands of hapless serfs, as lakes or mountains were ordered created as backdrops for some new show. Each gentleman had some bizarre specialty in grandeur and all considered their serfs as mere cattle, usually to be whipped and worked to premature graves. One prince gave a party at which an entire Turkish war, with its chief battles was reproduced. Only the gentry could own serfs and they had full power over them. One administered 500 strokes of the rod for absence from holy communion. All possessed the right to send their serfs as convicts to Siberia and to reclaim them at will.[2]

Nineteenth-century Progress. Russia's nineteenth century, from the death of Catherine in 1796, has been aptly called the era of "autocracy tempered by assassination," since three of the five Tsars of the period were killed by their restless subjects. Serfdom was finally ended in 1862 and there was a splendid flowering of literature and art. The Imperial law courts, too, had a good deal of integrity. The Soviets sent as many people to Siberia in a year or two during the liquidation of the Kulaks as the Tsars did in their last century. There was slow progress toward a fréer life. Industrialization also made rapid progress after a delayed start. It is a great mistake to believe that all reform began with the Soviets.

Peasant Degradation. Nevertheless, reform was far too slow. Though legally freed the peasants continued to live in hunger, squalor and ignorance. A representative of the old regime has left this description of village life:

> "The roads are deep in mud, often rendering them impassable. Near the houses there are no trees, no bushes to rest your eyes on. The horse-pond is close to the well, and the dung oozes into it. In the courtyards everything is filthy, the odor quite intolerable. The cattle in their inclosure stand knee-deep in excrement. The entrance room and the living-room are black from neglect, and the living-room is shared with pigs, sheep, geese; sometimes the cow is also placed here to get warm (an English traveler wondered at the low demands of a Russian cow, that it was able to endure such a room). Still, where there are cattle the lowest pitch of poverty had not been reached. In the same room, a baby crawls on the floor with a potato in its hands. Cockroaches, bedbugs, fleas infest the rooms in legions, and the heads, beards, mustaches and even eyebrows of grown-up men are filled with the most hideous insects. 'Well, 'tis nothing'. . . . Everything is so utterly foul, there is not a spot where you could lie down. . . . The mark

[1] **Soloveytchik, *Russia in Perspective*, New York, 1947, p. 103.**

[2] **Bernard Pares, *A History of Russia*, New York, 1944, pp. 247, 251; London, Cape, 2nd rev. ed., 1947.**

of evil taste and barbarism is stamped on everything, on the household, on the devastated natural surroundings."[3]

It was the peasant's lot to balance perpetually between hunger in good crop years and famine in bad ones. Inevitably, says the leading foreign historian observer of Russia under the last Tsars, all ideas of justice left the younger people. They became "eternally drunk, with disfigured features and averted eyes. Covered with rags, they looked like half-tamed beasts. ... No trace of anything human remained."[4]

Church and State. This state of affairs was perpetuated by a tight union of church and state. In the year 1700 the patriarchate had been abolished and thereafter the head of the church was a minister of the state. Each of these two institutions supported the other. The state taught the people to obey the church and the church taught the duty of obeying the "little white father." The church could be depended on to condemn all liberals and liberal movements and to banish to monastic prisons such of its representatives as evinced progressive ideas. The government starved the peasants by merciless taxation. The church rigorously took its share and sanctified the peasants' hunger in frequent fasts. Both church and state had an abiding antipathy to education. The government opposed the efforts of some local Zemstvos to establish schools. The Minister of Public Education sought to nullify such public schools as he could not forcibly destroy "by creating rival church schools which reduced education to the narrowest limits."[5]

A part of the Soviet campaign against the Orthodox Church sprang from the Marxian doctrine that "religion is the opiate of the people," but this slogan was not needed to doom the church as it existed in Tsarist Russia. A clergy which had prostituted itself to the perpetuation of autocracy, and whose priests were universally charged with rapacity, drunkenness and the grossest immorality, could not expect to escape the severest action from any successful revolution.

Urban Squalor. The leadership of the industrial proletariat in any revolution was equally certain. The young industrialism of Russia was in its rawest exploitative stage, comparable to the period in British industrialization when women and children were worked long hours in the coal mines, many of them remaining underground for months and years.

In Moscow fifty years ago living conditions were not much better for the new factory workers. In 1899 the Moscow city administration gathered data about 15,922 flats in which factory workers lived. A total of 174,622 persons lived in these flats, or eleven per flat, yet three-fourths of these "flats" consisted of one room only. Tenants rented stalls, corners, any fraction of space in rooms which the city investigators described as follows: "The air is hot and

[3] M. Menshikov, *Letters to My Neighbors*, 1905, pp. 521–2. Quoted in M. J. Olgin, *The Soul of the Russian Revolution*, New York, Henry Holt, 1917, pp. 26–7.

[4] E. J. Dillon, *Russia Today and Yesterday*, New York, Doubleday, 1930, p. 94; London, Dent, 1929.

[5] Charles E. Smith, "The Internal Situation in Russia," *The Annals*, July 1905, Vol. 62, p. 98.

stale," says one account, "the rooms incredibly crowded. The flat is damp and exceedingly low; a tall man can hardly stand upright. The odor is foul." . . . "The sight of the flat is horrifying," states another investigator; "The plaster has crumbled down, the walls are full of holes and stuffed with rags. Everything is filthy. The stove is a mere ruin. There are legions of cockroaches and bed-bugs. It is cold. The lavatory is in a dangerous position and children are not permitted to go there. All the flats of the house are in a similar condition." ... "The atmosphere is suffocating," remarks a third investigator: "The exhalations of the people, the evaporations of wet clothes and dirty linen fill the air. The walls are wet; cold draughts blow from everywhere. When it is raining, the water covers the floors, two inches deep."[6]

The Russo-Japanese War. Yet the infinite misery of life in both town and country might gradually have been eased had it not been for the wars in which the Tsarist government engaged. It was these wars which made its violent end certain.

This was revealed as clearly as a flash of lightning in the Russo-Japanese war and the revolution which followed it in 1905. The Russian adventure in Manchuria, threatening to expand into Korea, was a purely imperialistic exploit intended to recoup the fortunes of the ruling elements in Russia. Illimitable natural resources lay undeveloped in the huge Russian realm. Conquests in China could enrich a few, but for the people it was a mere colonial exploit. For them it was a matter of being carted 6000 miles to extend a hateful dominion, only to suffer more than usual from official incompetence. Large supplies of food and medical supplies were routed through German ports and dispersed there. The same fate met heavy winter clothing sent over the Siberian railroad in the summer. Boots had paper soles and sugar was carefully mixed with sand and flour.[7]

In the field there was equal incompetence. Officers would not learn to use telescopic sights on artillery. They sent home large sums intended for the pay of troops. The kitchens and harems of the Grand Dukes filled two entire trains. Drunkenness, debauchery and gambling alleviated steady defeats by the despised "little yellow monkeys."

> "Instead of enhancing the prestige and increasing the physical resources of the regime, the war, with its endless misery and disgrace, completely sapped the system's vitality and laid bare its utter rottenness before the eyes of Russia and of the world generally, so that the population, whose needs had been neglected for many years by a corrupt and inefficient government, finally lost patience and fell into a state of indescribable confusion."[8]

These were the words of the Tsar's ablest minister, Count Witte, who had to cope with the consequences.

[6] Olgin, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[7] Carl Joubert, *The Truth About Russia*, London, 1905, p. 55; Georges Michon, *The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891–1917*, New York, Macmillan, 1929, p. 264; London, Allen & Unwin, 1929.

[8] *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, New York, Doubleday, 1921, p. 250.

The Revolution of 1905. The final demonstration of the regime's ineptitude came on Bloody Sunday, January 22, 1905. On that day one of the many unions organized by the secret police attempted to present a petition to the Tsar under the leadership of a daring priest, Father Gapon. The great procession was led by the Cross and pictures of the Tsar. It came singing religious and patriotic songs, after full notice and a written plea that the petition be received.

Its terms were respectful but plain:

> "We the workingmen and inhabitants of St. Petersburg of various classes, our wives and children, our helpless old parents, come to Thee, Sire, to seek defense. We have become beggars; we have been oppressed; we are burdened by toil beyond our powers; we are scoffed at; we are not recognized as human beings; we are treated as slaves who must suffer their bitter fate and keep silence. We are pushed further into the den of beggary, lawlessness and ignorance. We are choked by despotism and irresponsibility—the limit of our patience has been reached. There has arrived for us the tremendous moment when death is better than the continuation of our intolerable tortures."

The petition detailed that it was illegal to ask for higher wages, a shorter day, or to stop death in the work-shops from the "awful draughts, rain and snow." Each of these requests was a legal crime. "In reality," cried out the petition, "in us, as in all Russian people there is not recognized any human right, not even the right of speaking, thinking, meeting, discussing our needs, taking measures for the improvement of our condition. We are deprived of the possibility of organizing ourselves into unions for the defense of our interests."

The petition contained a broad program of social reform, under three heads, and as its main request it urged the calling of a national assembly. Its terms were known all over St. Petersburg, for it had been debated in workmen's gatherings for several days. It was prepared in a time when strikes almost paralyzed the life of the capital. It raised a critical problem for the government which warned the people not to crowd the streets of the city on the day scheduled for its delivery. Many troops had been mobilized, yet nothing was done to stop the gathering of the immense procession, some 250,000 strong. It converged on the Tsar's palace in an ecstacy of religious and patriotic enthusiasm, confident in the belief that the petition would at least be received.

Then when the vast square before the palace was filled soldiers appeared and suddenly fired into the dense mass of people, killing upwards of 1500 and wounding twice as many.

This event shattered the mystical connection which had been created with much success between the Tsar and his people, especially since he lectured the workmen two weeks later, ending with the declaration: "I forgive them their guilt."[9] The strikes, riots and peasant revolts which had already severely shaken the regime increased in violence and number. Some 2000 manor

[9] **Olgin, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–13.**

houses were burned, and in October 1906 a completely effective general strike finally forced the Tsar to promise a responsible parliament. Then it transpired that some units of troops returning from their shameful handling in Manchuria responded to special feeding and treatment and shot down the rebels. Thereafter the revolution was ruthlessly suppressed, with the aid of many pogroms against the Jews organized by the authorities. Soon "the prisons were crammed and typhus finished what the rifle and the hang-rope had left undone."

Tsarism Subsidized by the Democracies. The suppression of the Revolution of 1905–6 was made possible by a huge international loan from western Europe to the Tsar's government. Sponsored by his ally, France, which contributed more than half of it, the sum of $450,000,000 was raised in the spring of 1906. This was the largest international loan ever floated up to that time. It was enough to finance the suppression of the revolution and to make the government independent of the new Duma before it could meet. Important voices were raised in France against this financing of bloody repression, but the rightist elements clung firmly to the Russian alliance against Germany. The two leading French newspapers even opposed the new Duma, alleging that the Russian people were not ripe for democratic reforms.[10]

There were many warnings that the huge French "investments" in Russia would be lost unless the Russian people were made partners in the Franco-Russian alliance. After the Duma had been dissolved by the Tsar many of its outlawed members, meeting in Viborg, Finland, warned that fresh loans made without the consent of the Russian people would not be repaid. Maxim Gorky, also holding the loans responsible for the perpetuation of Tsarism, uttered a deeply prophetic warning. He wrote: "If the state of tension in which the nation is living goes on much longer, there will be such an accumulation of hatred and cruelty in the Russian soul that, when the inevitable explosion comes, the outpouring of these pent-up forces will horrify the whole world."[11]

None of these warnings had any effect on the French conservatives, or upon the balance of power politics which bound France to Russia. The savings of French peasants continued to pay the perennial deficits of the Tsar's government down to 1914.

In the moment of its greatest danger the Tsar's government had yielded to the demand for the election of a representative assembly, the Duma. This was the government's opportunity to become constitutional and to move toward democracy, but instead of seizing it the government successively dissolved the Duma, changed the election laws to make it more and more conservative and then largely ignored it. It did continue to serve as one place in the land where the governmental abuses could be denounced, but it could do little more.

The First World War. In the first half of 1914 it appeared that the "inevitable explosion" in Russia was about to occur. During 1911 only 8000 workmen participated in political strikes in Russia, but in 1912 and again in 1913 the

[10] **Michon, *op. cit.*, pp. 172–3.**
[11] ***Ibid.*, pp. 154, 160–1.**

number exceeded 500,000. Then it jumped to more than 1,000,000 in early 1914.[12]

These strikes were one of the factors which convinced Austria and Germany that Russia probably would not fight for Serbia in August 1914. They may also have tempted the Tsar to divert his people with war, but the evidence is to the contrary. When his ministers demanded general mobilization Nicholas at first assented, then cancelled the order and refused to see any of his ministers for many hours. When at length he signed another mobilization order he was pale and shaken. Weak as he was, he had intelligence enough to know that he was probably signing the death warrant of his dynasty.

Not being able to trust the people, the Tsarist bureaucracy had to undertake the entire management of the war itself. Within its lights it made a tremendous effort, but the job was beyond it. Expecting a short war, it sent the none too numerous skilled workers to the army and replaced them with impulsive, undisciplined people. Attempting to compensate for the lack of arms and equipment, it mobilized 15,000,000 men in an effort to overwhelm the Central Powers with mere animal strength. These hordes of men, mainly illiterate peasants, overflowed all depots, barracks and transportation systems, crowded, stepping on each other, cursing, and unhappy. The Minister of War, General Sukhomlinov, who directed all these men, could not even listen calmly to the words "modem warfare." He declared in the Military Academy that "for twenty-five years I have not read a single military book."[13] The people around him were of the same kind. For months they even declined offers of help from private factories.[14]

In spite of this kind of leadership the Russian armies made an immense contribution to the final allied victory. Thrusting two armies into East Prussia with unexpected speed, they contributed to the first victory at the Marne. In the south they swept to the Carpathians, aided by mass surrenders of Slavs in the Austrian armies. It required German strength and leadership to drive them back in 1915. Thereafter they still held a continuous line 800 miles long, even after the deluded Tsar had replaced the Grand Duke Nicholas, who had proved himself an able strategist, as supreme commander-in-chief. In 1916 General Brusilov made a feint toward Galicia and the Austrian front again "broke like a pie crust" along a front of 200 miles, costing Austria-Hungary 1,500,000 men and once more requiring great German aid.

It is difficult to see how France and Britain could have withstood the combined might of the Central Powers on the Western front without Russia's immense sacrificial diversion in the East until American aid arrived. As it was, France almost fell out of the war in 1917. What would the situation have been if the Eastern front had not constituted an enormous drain on German and Austrian resources? How many westerners remember what Russia did for them in the First World War?

[12] Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution,* Vol. I, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1932, p. 34; London, Gollancz.

[13] V. M. Chernov, *Great Russian Revolution,* translated and abridged by Philip E. Mosely, New Haven, 1936, p. 164.

[14] Pares, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

Hopelessness in the Armies. The effort of the Tsarist regime to smother the Central Powers with myriads of half-armed men was colossal in its effects as well as in its size. Even illiterate men knew that something was wrong when they went into battle with only one rifle to three men, or when they fought armed only with oaken clubs. The effect of throwing these hosts of peasants suddenly against the perfectly armed and commanded Germans was bound to be profound. All kinds of awesome German weapons defeated the almost defenseless Russians. At the end of the first ten months of war the Russian losses already amounted to 3,800,000 men.[15] As early as November 1914, General Yanushkevich reported that "Ruzsky and his assistants have suddenly lost faith in their troops." Surrenders en masse had begun wherever the officers were killed off. As early as December 1914, General Kuropatkin recorded in his diary that "they are all hungry for peace."[16] Whole battalions of troops ordered to counter-attack went up to the German trenches and raised their weapons in token of surrender.

The officer corps, mainly recruited from the upper classes, was insufficient to staff the huge levies from the start, and as the older officers, fighting intrepidly, were rapidly killed, more and more officers had to be drawn from the masses in the army. Desertion was rife from the beginning. By 1917, 2,000,000 deserters drifted about the country. The conviction spread, says Rodzianko, a very conservative Russian, that even victories were of no avail, that "all the fighters' superhuman efforts and sacrifices were at bottom fruitless because of unfortunate and clumsy orders."[17]

Efforts to enforce discipline under these conditions became more and more barbaric, "degrading the soldier and trampling his self respect in the dirt." In 1915 flogging was officially introduced. An effort was made to combat "finger wounds" by the death penalty, but when the mass of soldiers had lost all faith in its commanders, flogging and the firing squad only made matters worse. By the summer of 1917 the largest army ever put into the field by any nation had become, in the words of a military report, "an enormous, exhausted, badly clothed, badly fed, embittered mob of people, united by thirst for peace and general disillusionment." Chamberlin, a strong opponent of the Soviets, adds that "in the breakdown of the whole army the role of the Bolsheviki seems to have been relatively subsidiary."[18]

Despair in the Villages. Behind the front conditions were not notably better. The tremendous drafts of the strongest men, a large part of which could not be used to any effect in the army, threw an increasingly heavy burden upon those left behind. A writer who was in the monarchist camp during the civil war wrote of one of the later mobilizations that the first and second class reservists had already gone, men over forty, many gray bearded. When still another call came "a groan went up from the villages. Excitement rose ominously. Everywhere new, audacious words were heard. 'What does this mean, do they want to bury us all, to have room for them?'"[19]

[13] ***Ibid.,*** **p. 458.** [16] **Chernov,** ***op. cit.,*** **pp. 158–9.** [17] ***Ibid.,*** **p. 161.**

[18] **William Henry Chamberlin,** ***The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921,*** **Vol. I, New York, Macmillan, 1935, pp. 223, 236.**

[19] **Nazhivin in his** ***Notes on the Revolution,*** **quoted in Chernov,** ***op. cit.,*** **p. 156.**

The deep resentment of the villages was increased by the government's handling of the prisoners of war. These were liberally farmed out to the large landowners for a pittance wage of three rubles a month. The gentry thus had plenty of labor, enough to enable them to carry out many capital improvements, while the women, children and old people in the villages were "bent, overstrained and even crippled by work exhausting for the muzhik in the flower of his strength." This, too, was not the only difference which the war brought to the village and the manor. The latter was now independent of the village and need not aid it because of dependence on its labor.[20]

Corruption at the Top. To complete the people's loss of faith in the regime the Tsar, playing commander at the front, left the government in the hands of the Tsarina and her dissolute mentor, the monk Rasputin, whose rule reached into every branch of the administration. Rasputin certainly dictated drastic orders interfering with transport and the food supply. All sorts of unclean elements and financial adventurers gathered around him and used him. His political aims were reactionary and he was opposed to the war from the beginning, until he was murdered by an imperial Prince on December 30, 1916.21

By that time the government was without friends. General Denikin, leading anti-Red general in the civil war, wrote that: "Owing to the unrestrained orgy of power in which the successive rulers, appointed at Rasputin's suggestion, had indulged during their short terms of office, there was in 1917 no political party, no class upon which the Czarist Government could rely."[22]

In these circumstances the only possible hope of preventing revolution lay in the Duma, but the Tsar would not allow it to meet. Early in March 1917 he prorogued it once again, and once too often. The Duma refused to obey, just at the time when economic discontent came to a head.

Economic Disintegration. With all classes of people turned against the Monarchy, the economic effects of the war were bound to be decisive. The army had evacuated all Jews from the front areas at the start of the war, under a vague fear of spies. Later it uprooted and drove to the rear great numbers of people in an effort to depopulate and devastate areas about to be occupied by the Germans. These masses of wretched evacuees were thereafter a source of economic weakness.[23] The giant mobilizations of men who could not be armed or led drained the labor supply. Casualties and disease aming them put the nation into mourning. Wages and prices soared to fantastic heights as the printing presses poured out money. Machinery and rolling stock wore out. The railroads were more crippled each day. Goods of all kinds became scarce, and the number of men who laid down their tools reached ominous proportions. The supply of food in the nation was perhaps sufficient, but it could not be distributed properly, due partly to the breakdown of transport

[20] **Chernov, *op. cit.*, pp. 149–50.**
[21] **Pares, *op. cit.*, pp. 463–8.**
[22] **George Stewart, *The White Armies of Russia*, New York, Macmillan, 1933, p. 4.**
[23] **Chernov, *op. cit.*, p. 415. See also, General William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920*, New York, P. Smith, 1941, p. 11.**

and partly to the free use of their power by military commanders to go into a district and forbid any shipment of food except to the army.

The March Revolution, 1917. It was only a question of time until food riots would develop in the cities. On March 8, 1917, long queues besieged the bakers' shops in Petrograd. The next day the police fired on the crowds. Then all factories and schools stopped work and everyone was on the streets. The soldiers began to go over to the people, but one regiment exacted heavy casualties from them on March 11. During that night its members decided to shoot no more, and in the morning led the bulk of the garrison over to the side of the people. The rest of the country was taken by telephone and telegraph.

The Tsarist government simply ceased to exist. It was succeeded largely by a vacuum, but on March 12, 1917, two efforts were made to fill it. The very conservative Duma which the Tsar's government finally permitted to exist, after two dissolutions and much purging of leftist elements, set up a Provisional Government, in which a lawyer, Alexander Kerensky, came to be the principal leader. The other body was a Soviet or Council of Delegates hastily elected from the factories and barracks of the Petrograd area, of which Kerensky was also Vice-President.

Similar Soviets were soon formed in all parts of the country, the delegates from peasant groups predominating in the rural areas. In Petrograd the local Soviet rivaled the Provisional Government from the start, often in friendly fashion. It grew to be a large, unwieldy body of 2500 delegates, yet it pulsated with life and had direct and swift contact with a great number of bodies of citizens. There was a rough democracy in these bodies, if it be granted that they voiced mainly the views of the leftist parties—the Social Revolutionaries, the Mensheviki, and the Bolsheviki. The latter were not important in the Soviets for many weeks. It was a month before the famous sealed carriage brought Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek and other Bolshevik leaders across Germany, by agreement with the German General Staff. Trotsky came from Canada still later.

Toward Red Revolution in November. The revolution, which began so bloodlessly in March, with something like 2000 casualties, swept on in the hearts and minds of the ill-prepared people. In the villages the peasants took things into their own hands, disposing of the landlords and taking the land, until by December no squires remained. Division of the land was not equal: each one took what he could and the resulting scramble added to the wave of desertions from the armies at the front.

In the cities the number of declassed people with no prospects or hope had been vastly increased by the war which had hurled so many millions out of their accustomed places into others where life was still more precarious. These people were open to the appeals of the Bolsheviks, who denied the contention of the Mensheviks that socialism could not be established in Russia until industrialization had progressed much further. The tireless zeal and singleness of mind of the Bolshevik leaders steadily won converts in the Soviets everywhere, though the main leaders remained in the capital. During the late

summer Bolshevik minorities rapidly turned into majorities in the Soviets all over the land. Local elections were held in Moscow for ward councils in July, the Social Revolutionaries polling 58 per cent of the vote and the Bolsheviki 11 per cent. Similar elections in October gave the Social Revolutionaries 14 per cent and the Bolsheviki 50 per cent.[24]

Kerensky's one hope of getting a solid basis under his increasingly powerless government was to get elected the Constituent Assembly which had been provided for as the ultimate repository of authority at the time the royal family abdicated. Yet in September he made the fatal blunder of postponing the election of the Assembly from September 30 to November 25, that body to meet on December 12.

The Kerensky government was doomed not only because it was a moderate group, but above all because it tried to carry on the war. Under the prodding of Russia's allies, the Western democracies, another offensive against the Austrians at Tamopol was actually opened on July 1. The enthusiasm of a few officers made a breach in the Austrian lines, but whole regiments quit marching when they felt tired, and presently a last great Russian rout was in progress. The nation was already deeply disgusted with the war before the revolution. After it the revolution was the main interest of the people, not the war. The Red slogan "Peace, Bread and Land!" was far more effective than any appeals to continue the endless agony and humiliation of the war.

Yet with all these advantages the Bolsheviki might have failed to seize power had it not been for the inflexible will of Lenin. The Petrograd Soviet had elected a Central Executive Committee and it in turn had created a Presidium. Similar national organs were also set up. None of these major bodies was controlled by the Bolsheviki until they won a majority in the Petrograd Soviet on September 22. The same thing happened in widely scattered Soviets about the same time.

Even then the Bolshevik leaders held back. Kamenev and Zinoviev opposed drastic action. On September 28 the Bolshevik Party Central Committee rejected a call for revolt by Lenin and instead took measures to see that no outbreak occurred. Lenin discerned, however, that the abortive effort of General Kornilov to seize power from the Right had opened the way for a similar attempt by the Left. He saw, too, that the effort must be made soon or the heat of revolutionary activity would cool and the election of a Constituent Assembly would remove the occasion for a seizure of power. He therefore hammered incessantly for a quick stroke, aided ably by Trotsky and, after a tremendous propaganda drive, the capital was taken over by well organized and directed action on November 5–7, 1917. Resistance melted away before overwhelming odds and only half a dozen lives were lost.[25]

The decisive strategy had been Lenin's. Chamberlin characterizes him as "a supreme genius of revolutionary leadership" and adds that "one must go

[24] **P. N. Milyukov, *History of the Second Russian Revolution,* Vol. I, Part III, p. 80.**

[25] **Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 277–83. See also E. H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia,* Vol. I (The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–23), New York, 1951, pp. 82,95; London, Macmillan, 1950.**

back a full two centuries in Russian history before a personality among the rulers of the country fit to stand comparison with Lenin can be found."[26]

War-bred Communism. The length of the First World War made it inevitable that the Tsarist government would be overthrown. The near success of the revolution of 1905–6, after the lesser sufferings and humiliations of the Russo-Japanese War, made it certain that the prolonged agony and disintegration of 1914–17 would produce an upheaval. It was not foreordained, though, that a small band of able extremists should take over the revolution and create the first communist state in a land where even Marxist theory taught that the soil was sterile. Only a combination of able leadership playing upon immense numbers of people liberated and yet made desperate by the war could have done that.

Revolution was overdue in Russia and it probably would have come soon in some form. Yet in a state of peace the army would have been a powerful bulwark for the regime and every other conservative force could have made itself felt. The pressure for reform could also have achieved increasing results without revolution. Above all, if it finally came there would have been infinitely greater chances of keeping it within democratic channels, on the Western European model. It was the First World War which produced communism in Russia. Without the chaos created by the war it is difficult even to imagine circumstances under which a small band of extreme socialists could have taken control of a vast benighted peasant country, ruled by a powerful autocracy. The war brought communism to the largest state on the globe.

This is a mountainous fact which should be pondered deeply by all those who greatly fear communism and who are tempted to think that another war would scotch it.

[26] **Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 121, 122.**

CHAPTER II

RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR AND WESTERN INTERVENTION

1917–1921

The Bolshevik Revolution was not entirely bloodless. There was fighting in Moscow and several hundred people were killed. Yet for the first seven or eight months there was less violence than might have been expected to accompany a sweeping social revolution.

Had this trend continued, the revolution in Russia might have taken a far milder course than it did. However, four developments combined to usher in one of the most terrible civil conflicts in history, with the end result a totalitarian, one-party state. These events were: (1) the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, January 18, 1917; (2) the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between Germany and Russia, March 3, 1918; (3) the Soviet clash with the Czech legionnaires, May 14, 1918; and (4) a series of political assassinations beginning June 20, 1918, and culminating in the shooting of Lenin on August 30, though he was not killed.

Constituent Assembly Dissolved. After the November revolution the often postponed Constituent Assembly was promptly elected by universal suffrage, the Socialist Revolutionaries polling about 21,000,000 votes, the Bolsheviks 9,000,000, the Cadets and other conservative groups 4,500,000 and other socialist parties nearly 2,000,000. All but 13 per cent of the vote was cast for socialist parties, mostly for the Right SR's, who elected 370 delegatei out of 700, while the Bolsheviks got only 175 and their Left SR allies 40.

The election registered a general unwillingness to accept the Red regime, except in the major cities, where the real power lay. The Assembly met in Petrograd on January 18, 1918, and was dissolved the next day, without any important protest from the country. The Red policy on the two engrossing questions, land and food, had robbed the Assembly of most of its interest and there was no solid foundation under the Assembly in the country—no traditions of backing democratic assemblies, no strong middle class, not even the ability to read. This is why, says Chamberlin, the alternative to Tsarism was Bolshevism, and the alternative to the latter not constitutional democracy but a military dictator.[1]

Nevertheless, the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly embittered the moderate intelligentsia in the cities and to the outside world it was a ruthless and lawless act.

George F. Kennan has written an unforgettable account of the relentless

[1] **Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution*, Vol. I, p. 371.**

way in which the Reds smothered the Assembly with a heavily fortified armed ring a mile deep around the meeting place, through which the delegates had to pass with jeers and threats in their ears along the way, while large demonstrations in their favor were broken up with bloodshed. Once inside the hall the session was postponed from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. by the Bolsheviki, who filled the place with din and disorder when their opponents—a strong majority—tried to speak. The Social Revolutionary majority courageously stuck it out, until after the Bolsheviki had left at midnight, and passed a series of constitutional resolutions amid mounting menace from their sailor guards who earlier had been fired to frenzy against the Assembly. It adjourned at 4:40 a.m., having operated all day and night without food, only to be dissolved by the Reds the same morning.

There was "an element of finality" in the events of that night in creating a breach between the new regime in Russia and the Western world.[2]

Peace with Germany. Yet the peace of Brest-Litovsk stirred far more feeling against the Red government. It had not been achieved without a long struggle inside the Party. Lenin was adamant for it. He proposed to accept the harsh German terms in late January, but was voted down twice. Then Trotsky tried his dramatic walkout on the Germans, "no war, no peace," only to have the Germans advance and exact still harsher terms. The final treaty was indeed humiliating. It took a third of Russia's crop area, over half of her industrial strength and 62,000,000 people.

The ratification of the treaty was inescapable. It was impossible to renew the war against Germany. The people would not support it. Only by gaining peace at any price could the Red regime survive. Yet in addition to the dangerous Party crisis which accompanied ratification, two other grave consequences ensued: a rupture with the Left SR's and growing conflict with the Allies. Losing the SR's left the government purely Bolshevik and the hostility of the Allies provided munitions and other aid for a civil war of all the dissenting elements against the Reds.

Czech-Soviet Break. Yet the war might not have occurred had not a strange circumstance existed. There were in Russia some 45,000 to 60,000 Czech deserters from the Austrian armies, who had been fighting with the Russians. These men, nearly all democrats by conviction, were organized by Thomas A. Masaryk for return to the Western front. Other routes seeming impracticable, it was decided to move them out over the 5000–mile railroad to Vladivostock, and the first contingent reached that port safely. In western Siberia suspicion developed between the Soviets and the Czechs, fed by rumors rife in the outer world that the Soviets were arming Austrian and Hungarian war prisoners in Siberia. The rumors had no real basis, but in any event the antipathy between Czechs and Hungarians was enougFto cause friction when several train loads of returning Austrian and Hungarian prisoners passed a detachment of Czechs at Chelyabinsk on May 18, 1918. One of the Hungarians hit a Czech with a missile and was promptly killed.

[2] **George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920:* Vol. I, *Russia Leaves the War,* Princeton, 1956, pp. 343–52; London, Faber, 1956.**

This led Trotsky rashly to order all the Czechs to be disarmed on pain of being shot on sight. Their National Council ordered them to comply, but instead the men defied the authority of the Soviets and very soon controlled much of the Ural region and nearly all of the Trans-Siberian railroad. “British, French and American agents encouraged them,” and under their protection two anti-Soviet governments were set up, representing relatively democratic elements.[3]

The seizure of effective power in Siberia by the Czechs was received with great satisfaction in Allied governmental circles. The Czechs could be used to prevent the return of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war to the Central Powers, no small item in May and June 1918.

In the wake of this gain it soon became apparent that the Soviet-Czech clash supplied the one element necessary for an international war against the Reds, with the hope of military success. With such a vast area apparently tom from Soviet hands, it seemed feasible to the Allies to arm White forces for assaults on the central Red area.

At the same time all of the anti-Red elements in Russia took heart. These included the dispossessed landowners, the nobility, many army and navy officers, most of the professional classes—including the great majority of the liberals—the church, manufacturers, some of the kulaks, or richer peasants, and a part of the pious illiterate peasants who had not yet been affected by Red propaganda.

It must be emphasized that the vast bulk of the peasants were too poor and benighted to comprise a political force. They were glad to have possession of the land and to be free for a time from the heavy hand of any central government. Beyond this they reacted only to local stimuli. They fought Red grain collectors and when famine came they joined the latter in despoiling those better off, but as a political force the vast bulk of the Russian people did not exist. They were too ignorant to count. In the end they largely determined the course of the civil war by turning against the Whites, but only by local action. They were too inchoate to organize or be organized.

To all these anti-Red elements, comparatively small in numbers but strong intellectually, must be added the various socialist parties, all of whom came into opposition to the dictatorial Reds. If anything could exceed the hatred of the dispossessed ruling classes for the Reds it was the fury of their socialist cousins, who felt that the Reds had prostituted and disgraced the faith. Like all defenders of orthodoxy, in all ages, they regarded the heretics as far worse than the non-believers. This cleavage between socialists and communists continues to the present, and is a phenomenon little understood in the United States.

Terror. In mid-1918 the Left SR’s, most radical of the non-Bolshevik socialists, began a campaign of assassination, along with many small revolts. On June 20 the government propaganda chief was killed. The German Ambassador fell next, on July 6, then the German commander in the Ukraine.

[3] **F. L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*New York, Knopf, 1946, p. 146; London, Hale, 1948.**

These crimes marked the break of the Left SR's with the government, in which they even had strong units in the new Cheka, or secret police. Finally, on August 30, Michael Uritsky, President of the Petrograd Cheka, was slain and Lenin was shot twice, though not dangerously wounded.[4]

These shootings unleashed a Red terror against all enemies of the regime. The Cheka was developed until in many parts of the country it superseded the Soviets. Zinoviev at once ordered 500 hostages in Petrograd shot, and the taking and shooting of hostages was common. From then on it was war without quarter on both sides.

Chamberlin estimates that 50,000 persons were killed by the Red Terror during the three years of civil war. The story circulated widely over the world that it had claimed 1,700,000 lives he regards as "a wild exaggeration," devoid of proof. The Cheka struck especially at people of wealth, education or social standing, though often it destroyed quite ordinary people, especially resisting peasants. It was accompanied by revolting torture and a great deal of corruption, since criminals and sadists were glad to enlist in the Cheka.

The charge of corruption did not apply "to the majority of the men at the top" of the Cheka, especially to Felix Dzerzhinsky, "an old revolutionary of the most unimpeachable idealism," whose colleagues all paid tribute to his "personal modesty and austerity." On both sides the stakes were very nearly absolute: either all power or death—at best a dreary exile. Chamberlin adds that "one reason why no government could have survived in Russia in those years without the use of terrorism was that the national morale was completely shattered by the World War. No one, except under extreme compulsion, was willing to perform any state obligation." Neither side could get orders obeyed without using force.[5]

An excellent picture of the White Terror is to be found in George Stewart's ***The White Armies of Russia***, based mainly on Russian language sources. Describing the White Terror in Siberia, he notes that "the slightest resistance brought upon a family execution and robbery—dozens executed simply because they were unenthusiastic about the regime at Omsk." "Systematic pillage, murder and incendiarism" constituted the plan of campaign of Semenov, one of Kolchak's chiefs. On August 19, 1919, Colonel Stephanov's command slaughtered fifty-two car-loads of prisoners. Again, "hundreds of innocent peasants, townsmen, laborers, and railroad employees who were neither Red nor bandits nor disturbers of the peace and who were in no sense a danger to the White cause were murdered." In another district "women were ripped open, children bayoneted, and men flayed alive. Brutality made Bolsheviks where none had been before." Stewart concludes that "the Civil War had loosed men from every restraint of culture, religion, or common decency. Life for all hung by a thread; hundreds were shot on mere suspicion."[6]

On every front the Whites were apt to slay prisoners of war and all others

[4] ***Ibid.*, p. 149.**

[5] **Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 66–82.**

[6] **George Stewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 253, 287–8: "The Whites throughout the civil war suffered from a political short-sightedness which made no provision for a middle view, considering all who were not avowedly White as Bolsheviks and as such deserving of death" (p. 141).**

suspected of being Reds as mere vermin, and the Reds pursued a similar policy.

Kolchak's Defeat. Stewart's chronicle of the civil war, a conflict made long and deadly by large-scale Allied intervention, is one of the most depressing volumes this writer has ever read. It should be read by all American policy makers. Until the Nazis made wholesale murder a scientific business, the campaign of Admiral Kolchak in Siberia resulted in the most gigantic tragedy of all recent times.

On November 18, 1918, Kolchak overthrew the somewhat democratic regime at Omsk and made himself the supreme ruler of Russia. This assumption of dictatorship was an unpleasant surprise to the democratic Czechs, whose military power had made it possible. It deterred the Allies also from an imminent recognition of Kolchak. The presence of reactionary and absolutist officers around him counseled caution and led to a lengthy catechism by the Allies which, for the record, formally pledged him to democratic ways. Military aid was then advanced generously.

There are several things to note about this intervention in behalf of Admiral Kolchak.

1. It was done six months after the armistice—six months after any justification for it as a war measure could have been claimed.
2. It was done to a country with which no one of the four nations (Britain, France, Japan, and America) was at war.
3. It constituted an official, open and avowed attack on the Soviet government of Moscow.
4. Even if both the Soviet government and the Kolchak government were to be considered as factions equally entitled or equally not entitled to national control—even then the support of the Allies (in favor of one faction) constituted an intervention in a civil war, a subsidy of the one side against the other.[7]

In support of the Allied attempt to defeat and destroy the Bolshevik Government the British Government gave Kolchak seventy-nine shiploads of supplies, arms and equipment for 100,000 men,[8] and for a time his armies advanced toward Moscow, only to be defeated and driven back thousands of miles along the Siberian railway in one of the most disastrous retreats of all time. Napoleon's famous retreat from Moscow, in which he lost 70,000 men, was by comparison an orderly and successful disengagement. In Novonikolayevsk 60,000 people died of typhus and 30,000 lay unburied at one time. At Taiga over 50,000 were slain by hunger and disease. Most of the defeated army and its refugee trains had to retreat by foot in the bitter cold of the Siberian winter. On the 1500 mile trek from the River Tobol to Lake Baikal alone 1,000,000 men, women and children perished, along with innumerable horses, which starving people ate until the arctic cold added them to the long trail of corpses in the snow.

[7] ***The United States and The Soviet Union,*** **New York, The American Foundation, 1933, p. 126.**

» *Ibid.*, pp. 253, 319.

The stricken horde was driven on only by the knowledge that the avenging Red army was in hot pursuit, so close on their heels that Kolchak was captured and shot at Irkutsk and the great gold reserve of the Imperial Government captured.

This immense debacle was not due, either, to lack of Allied aid. Lloyd George declared in the House of Commons: "We have given real proof of our sympathy for the men of Russia who have helped the Allied cause, by sending one hundred million sterling worth ($500,000,000) of material and support in every form."[9]

Kolchak's effort to suppress the Reds had been aided by the presence of British, French, American and Japanese troops east of Lake Baikal, based on Vladivostock. The decision of the Allies to send troops to Vladivostock was made in July 1918. On July 2 the Allied Supreme War Council decided for intervention and on the 17th Washington notified the Allies that though opposed to a policy of armed intervention the United States would join the Japanese in landing troops at Vladivostock.

At first all of the Allied troops, including small British and French contingents, fought the Reds, but the American General Graves soon decided to adhere strictly to his rigid instructions forbidding any active help to either side. Thereafter his 7,000 troops aided Kolchak only by guarding parts of the railway and incurred his deep wrath by their antipathy to the unspeakable atrocities of his supporters, Semenov and Kalminkov. These villains were protected by the Japanese, who poured 72,000 troops into Siberia, in violation of their pledges to the United States, and conducted themselves in a manner that the Soviet peoples never forgot, until they smashed Japan's armies in Manchuria in 1945. The American troops remained in Siberia from mid-1918 to earlv 1920, but the Japanese stayed two years longer, only gradually giving up their hope of an empire in Siberia.[10]

[9] ***Ibid.*, p. 321.**

[10] **One of the principal reasons advanced for American intervention in Siberia was the hope of President Wilson to restrain and minimize Japanese intervention. This was a factor, though the relief of the Czechs was the chief reason advanced in his instructions to General William S. Graves, the American commander in Siberia. These instructions, carried personally to Graves by Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, reaffirmed Wilson's belief that "It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia, rather than cure it."—U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia,* Vol. II, Washington, 1931, p. 245.**

This premonition was so amply proved true that General Graves afterwards wrote: "I do not know what the United States was trying to accomplish by military intervention." Graves was sure that "as early as May 18, 1918, there was no intention of sending the Czechs to the Western front."—William S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure,* New York, 1941, pp. 49–50, 354.

Wilson did not yield to the heavy pressure of his allies for intervention in Siberia until April 1918, and he held out until July 17 against sending troops to Murmansk, ostensibly to stop the Germans in this area.—L. I. Strakhovsky, *The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918,* Princeton, 1937, p. 98.

It was not until June 1918 when the British undertook an extensive occupation of North Russia that the Bolsheviks showed open hostility to the Allies.—James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, April-December 1918,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1936, p. 131.

Allied Intervention in South Russia. In South Russia the intervention of France was still more inglorious. The French government sent 140,000 men to the Odessa region and the Crimea,[11] in an effort to recover some part of the great sums by means of which they had bolstered the Tsarist regime for more than twenty years.

On April 4, 1919, General Denikin, the White leader, was informed that the French would control everything in their zone of occupation, including "operations against the Bolsheviks." It transpired, however, that the French troops which had survived Verdun and the Marne had no desire to die in Russia. Bolshevik propaganda made great headway among them, and no White military strength was in evidence. Accordingly, the French commander received an order to evacuate Odessa in three days, and he acted with such alacrity that the last French ship left the roadstead on April 8, 1919, pushed out by an irregular band of Red Partisans and leaving thousands of tearful people on the docks. On April 16, Sebastopol was evacuated with almost as much haste. The same spoliation and wholesale destruction of goods occurred under the French as under the Red and White troops. Damage committed by the French in their four months of occupation was estimated as 125,000,000 rubles.[12]

British intervention in South Russia was concentrated in the Caucasus provinces of Turkestan, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Denikin was forbidden to undertake any operations in the oil regions thus taken under British control, but unrest in Ireland and India compelled the British gradually to relax their hold on their investments in this area, though they clung to Batum until July 1920.[13] The presence of British troops in Batum in September 1918 did not prevent the capture of the city by a force of Turks and Tartars, who massacred 30,000 Armenians and indulged in a wholesale orgy of murder, rape, arson and pillage.[14] It would not be strange if all these events in the Caucasus had something to do with demands by Russia after the Second World War for the recovery of Kars and Batum from Turkey.

In December 1918 the British and French Governments made a special agreement dividing European Russia into two zones of occupation and influence, the British zone including the Cossack regions, the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia and Kurdistan. The French zone comprised the Ukraine, Crimea, and east to the Don River. In this area the French made agreements

[11] On March 28,1919, Stephen Pichon, French Foreign Minister, listed the Allied troops employed in South Russia as follows:

French	**140,000**
Rumanian	**190,000**
British	**140,000**
Italian	**40,000**
Serbs	**140,000**
Greeks	**200,000**

Stephen Pichon, "Allied Policy in Russia," *Current History*, Vol. 10, Pt. 1, No. 2, May 1919, pp. 280–1.

[12] Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

[13] Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 167–8.

[14] Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

with the White leaders giving them "control of Russian railways for fifty years and of economic and military policy for five years."[15]

British contributions to Denikin's armies were summarized by Winston Churchill as follows:

> "A quarter million rifles, two hundred guns, thirty tanks and large masses of munitions and equipment were sent through the Dardanelles and the Black Sea to the port of Novorossiisk; and several hundred British officers and non-commissioned officers, as advisers, instructors, store-keepers, and even a few aviators furthered the organization of his armies."[16]

The French material contribution to Denikin, while less than the British, was also large. In Washington Ambassador Bakhmetev was permitted to use considerable credits granted to the Kerensky Government just before its fall.[17]

Denikin's Debacle. The immense military stores thus provided enabled the White forces in South Russia to make a really dangerous threat to Moscow. Large battles were repeatedly won and heavy booty in supplies and prisoners taken from the Reds. By September 1919 Denikin's armies had taken Odessa, Kharkov, Kiev, Kursk and Orel. Beyond Orel they were only 200 miles from Moscow, but their nearly 1000–mile front was too long and when Trotsky struck at a weak point in October disaster ensued.

Another long tragic retreat began, in which thousands of refugees from every city joined. Before the desperate savage multitude reached Novorossiisk more than 200,000 people had died of typhus and exposure. Whole trains on the railroad became silent, with every person aboard dead, including the crews. When the survivors reached the port, in March 1920, a raging "Borah" wind covered the sidewalks with blue bodies, largely stripped by the survivors. Typhus and smallpox continued their deadly work while, as at Odessa, people fought for places on the transports. Some 50,000 embarked, but many more were left behind.

In the Crimea, General Wrangel brought some order out of chaos and in May and June 1920 his 40,000 fit troops defeated the Reds in Taurida, just north of the Isthmus, in a series of sanguinary battles, but after the Russo-Polish war was ended, on October 12, 1920, the Red Army swept the White forces into the sea. Some 126 ships carried 146,000 people away from the Crimea to exile and penury abroad. Behind them their native land lay filled with ruined cities, wrecked railroads, hungry, plague-stricken people and unburied corpses—fit soil for the apocalyptical famine of 1921–2.

Though led by able, honest and liberal commanders at the top, the White movement in South Russia had been discredited "by violence, flogging, plundering and drunkenness"; by "dissolute officials who brought to the new

[13] Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 157; K. Zilliacus, *Mirror of the Past*, New York, A. A. Wyn, 1946, pp. 191–2; London, Meridian Books Ltd., 1946; Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 153–4; Bunyan, *op. cit.*,p. 54; J. A. White, *The Siberian Intervention*, Princeton, 1950, pp. 215—16, 20.

[16] Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, New York, Scribners, 1931, pp. 246–50; London, Butterworth, 1929.

[17] Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 170.

posts their old vices, the old incompetence, laziness and self assurance"; by unending quarrels, jealousies and disputes; by "orgies among officers, many high in power," which had been followed by drunkenness, debauchery and corruption among the mass.[18]

No tolerable kind of civil authority was ever created. The untrained people were left to dissipate themselves in "an orgy of talk" without any of the zealous educational direction supplied by the Reds. The large proportion of the old governing classes in the Army repelled the people, and, above all, the landlords were restored to their estates of which the Revolution had deprived them.

The Polish Invasion. Immediately after the defeat of Denikin's great advance toward Moscow the Red Army was confronted with a major war with Poland. From December 22, 1919, to February 4, 1920, the Soviet Government addressed three separate appeals for peace negotiations to Poland, offering a boundary well to the west of the racial and linguistic frontiers. Poland, too, needed peace badly, having been one of the main battlegrounds on the Eastern front. While hunger and disease were not as rife as in Russia, they were bad enough. However, the Polish colonels and aristocrats who gathered around General Pilsudski had other ideas. They aspired to "the permanent weakening of Russia" by seizing all the territory between the newly independent states of the Caucasus and the Baltic, cutting Russia off from both the Baltic and Black Seas and depriving her of most of her agricultural and mineral wealth. What the defeated Germans had sought to do the Polish leaders would now carry through.[19]

They were obliged to wait until Denikin's offensive had failed, since the Whites would oppose their ambitions even more surely than the Reds. Then moving swiftly in late April 1920, Polish troops occupied Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine on May 8, and all protests by Allied powers were rebuffed. In August 1920, U.S. Acting Secretary of State Norman H. Davis vainly warned the Poles to accept the Curzon line which the Paris Peace Conference had fixed as a fair boundary between the Polish and Russian peoples.[20]

By that time the Red Army had driven Pilsudski's troops back to the gates of Warsaw, assisted by a revival of national patriotism led by the offer of the services of General Brussilov and many other Tsarist officers. Accepting these offers the Reds still sought to make the war one against the Polish ruling classes, in the hope of gaining a communist Poland. For the Reds the war became an intense crusade to create in Poland a friendly communist neighbor, to which they proposed to give a boundary more favorable than the Curzon line.

This dream was ended by a patriotic rising of the Poles, working men included, by the insubordination of the young Red General Tukhachevsky, "who led his army westward, instead of obeying the first principles of strategy by joining with Budenny in encircling Warsaw,"[21] and by the arrival of aid to Poland from the West.

[18] **Stewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 346–52. Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 179–180.**

[19] **Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 301.**

[21] **Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 372.**

Faced with a spread of the Red flood into Poland the British poured munitions through Danzig and the French sent General Weygand with 400 officers to reorganize the Polish forces. The result was a crushing defeat of the Red armies, which sent them reeling back into Russia with heavy losses.

The treaty of peace, signed at Riga, March 18, 1921, gave the Poles much less territory than Moscow had offered them earlier, but much more than the Allies thought wise. A broad strip of land inhabited predominantly by White Russians and Ukrainians was included in Poland and remained there until recovered by Russia in 1939. The White Ambassador Bakhmetev, in Washington, warned prophetically in 1921 that "restored Russia will never approve a treaty of dismemberment forcibly imposed in times of adversity; nor will the peasant population, predominantly Orthodox, of the Western provinces of Russia acquiesce in the domination of Polish Catholic landlordism."[22]

In the years before 1939 it was the certainty that the huge landed estates created in this area after 1921 would be ended by any Russian occupation which made it impossible for the Polish colonels to accept Russian aid against Germany. After 1939, too, the loss of their estates made it impossible for them to cooperate with Russia against Germany, or with her in organizing the new Poland.

(intervention in the Baltic. While the Red Army was massing for its decisive battles with Denikin's forces the White forces in the Baltic under General Yudenitch made a spectacular dash for Petrograd. Early in 1919 Red forces had thoroughly alienated the Baltic peoples by occupying most of their important cities, looting and killing thousands before they were driven out by volunteer and German forces, leaving starvation behind them. Small White forces gradually increased in number and were assured of munitions by British General Gough. These arrived in Reval on August 2, 1919.

In the meantime, the food crisis had been alleviated by the American Relief Administration, which saved hundreds of thousands of lives in the stricken region. On June 8, 1919, Major R. R. Powers of the A.R.A. arrived in Reval and at once "informed himself of the amount of food necessary to secure the successful occupation of Petrograd by the Whites." An important conference, on the 11th, resulted in the promise of American food supplies by the army. It was later agreed, also, that food might be sold at a price greater than cost, to finance the White forces, and American flour was sold to the population at a price six times above that distributed by the Esthonian authorities. Early in August, after the British munitions arrived, General Yudenitch appealed to the A.R.A. for gasoline and received a telegram from Herbert Hoover in Paris promising 50,000 gallons of gas at Reval on September 1, and requesting to be kept informed as to "relative front powers."[23]

The political situation was then cleared up by drastic action on the part of the British. Since the Reds had recognized the independence of Esthonia

[22] **Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 181.**

[23] **Stewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 226; E. A. Ross, *The Russian Soviet Republic*, New York, 1923, p. 258.**

while the Whites refused to do so, General F. A. Marsh invited the White leaders to a conference on August 10, 1919, and gave them forty minutes to form a government, with a slate of ministers supplied by him, and to recognize Esthonia's independence. Esthonia at once agreed to cooperate with Yudenitch and the drive on Petrograd was announced. Early in September his forces advanced while Allied ships maintained a naval blockade of the city. Some 500 Red seamen lost their lives when Admiral Cowan's guns sank three of their torpedo boats.[24]

On land the four tanks included in the British armaments and manned by British crews almost won the campaign.[25] The raw Red levies had never seen such monsters and retreated in panic before them. Later, the Putilov works in Petrograd hastily improvised a few tanks to show the terrorized recruits what these weapons were like. Nevertheless, Yudenitch swept to the suburbs of the city at a most crucial moment. Lenin favored abandoning it rather than divert troops from the southern front, but Trotsky rushed to the city and rallied the defenders, both for offensive effort and for a last ditch street defense, should the Whites break into the city. The determination of the young Reds whom he scraped together "astounded Whites and Reds alike" and Petrograd was saved.

The retreat of Yudenitch began late in October and repeated on a smaller scale all the heart-rending agonies of the other White debacles. Back in the Baltic states his troops were disarmed and treated harshly by the Esthonians, who now feared Red reprisals. Yudenitch escaped in an automobile under the British flag, leaving behind him 1200 troops suffering from spotted typhus and 21,000 starving refugees attached to his army. Typhus had killed 14,000 of his men during the retreat.

Intervention in North Russia. The Allied intervention in North Russia began with the consent of the Bolshevik Government. A German division under General von der Goltz had landed at Hango, Finland, April 3, 1918, and combined with White Finns to drive the Reds out of Finland and advance to within twenty-five miles of Petrograd, also endangering the Murmansk region. The Murmansk Soviet was accordingly authorized to accept Allied aid. After the danger to Petrograd had lessened, the Soviet Government became alarmed at the growing Allied forces in Murmansk and on June 30 ordered the local Soviet to expel them. It refused to do so and instead concluded a treaty with the Allies which made a complete breach between them and the Soviet Government.[26]

By the middle of July Allied plans for the occupation of Archangel were ready. On July 25 the Allied Ambassadors, who had fled from Petrograd to Vologda went on to Archangel, which had been prepared for revolt against the Reds by various Allied intrigues. A week later the British General Poole arrived with troops. President Wilson had not agreed to the sending of American forces until July 17, 1918, and the first of 5,500 American troops did not arrive until August 3, the day after Archangel had fallen.

[24] **Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 236.**
[25] **Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 261–2; Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 272–5.**
[26] **Strakhovsky, *The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918*, pp. 6, 16, 98.**

The new government which replaced the Red authorities was still too Red for the military men, so all but two of the Cabinet were kidnapped and imprisoned. However, the Ambassadors were shocked by this event, and when strikes and peasant discontent agitated the region they insisted that the leading minister be restored under pledge to make his Cabinet more conservative. Finding themselves in an intolerable position, the ministers resigned and thereafter the region was ruled by the military, in alliance with Russian General Miller, an avowed monarchist.

When the war with Germany ended, November 11, 1918, various official explanations were given for continuing the Allied occupation: the ice would soon close the port, and the pro-Ally Russians who had been induced to take the field against the Reds could not be left to certain vengeance. “Thus, little by little, the Allies were entangled in the Russian morass.”[27]

The Allies had taken the offensive, fanning out in five directions. After winter set in they went on the defensive, but the Reds attacked and bitter campaigns continued all winter. Serious frictions developed between all the national contingents represented and with the natives, who resented the reactionary character of the regime supported by the Allies and also looked askance at “the interest which the British showed in the resources of North Russia.” The natives felt also that the exchange rate was unfairly manipulated against them, and the dishonesty of many of the Allied troops offended the people, especially the peasants. Thieving from government stores flourished, the troops trading the stolen supplies for furs, or rum. The Russians charged them with stealing like common thieves and became less and less enthusiastic about the continued hardships of the war. For their part the Allied troops could not understand why they continued to be there, after the Armistice, and they were oppressed by the dreadful cold, the long Arctic nights and the grim solitude of the forests.

At home both the British and American Governments had increasing difficulty in defending the continued presence of the troops in Russia and evacuation of the Americans began at the end of May 1919.

On the British side the evacuation took a strange turn. The ships which carried the Americans away brought British reinforcements, “preparatory to evacuation,” and on May 4 War Minister Churchill directed General Ironside to prepare for an offensive in the direction of Kotlas, with the object of making a junction with Kolchak. Reinforcements for this purpose poured in during June and July. These troops “were among the best in the British Army and were exceedingly well equipped.” Allied troops now numbered 37,000, outnumbering the Reds, but as the summer advanced the defeat of Kolchak destroyed any hope of the junction which it was expected would lead to the capture of Petrograd.[28]

Then it became evident that the British evacuation which had been promised since the spring would have to be carried out. Pulling out, however, proved to be a far more difficult operation than going in. Lord Rawlinson, one of the top British commanders, was sent out in August to direct the

Stewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–95
***Ibid.*. d. 199: K. Zilliacus.**

withdrawal and further British reinforcements followed him. After hard fighting all summer, the Allies managed to disengage themselves and by September 27, 1919, the evacuation of Archangel was complete, great military stores being turned over to the puppet General Miller, with the advice to evacuate Archangel and concentrate all his strength on Murmansk, the evacuation of which was completed by the Allies on October 12, after several near disasters. Miller preferred to try to hold both ports and lost them in February 1920, 500 of his officers being shot by the Reds at one time.

American casualties during the northern occupation numbered 2,845. British losses were less, but the expedition had cost them over $50,000,000.[29]

Reasons for Intervention. The Allied motives in this great series of interventions had been mixed. Some of the leading reasons were: (1) before the Armistice immense military stores at Murmansk-Archangel, sent to Russia for her armies, were thought to be in danger of falling into the hands of the Germans. (2) Even after the Reds renounced the war a need was urgently felt for reconstituting the Eastern Front in someway, to halt the large transfers of German troops to France. If the Reds could be overthrown maybe the Whites would re-enter the war. (3) The Poles and Japanese had great imperialistic ambitions. To a lesser extent similar dreams beckoned the British, especially in the oil region of the Caucasus, and the French. (4) After the Armistice, Bolshevism was the great fear which haunted the controlling elements in the democracies. War upon it seemed urgent, with the great hope of crushing it in its lair before it spread further.

Of all these motives there can hardly be any doubt that the last one became the dominant purpose of the British and French Governments. President Woodrow Wilson had embarked on the two small American ventures in intervention with the greatest reluctance. He sought in each case to set up safeguards to avoid taking part in the Civil War and in a large measure he succeeded, especially in Siberia. In London and Paris there were no such scruples about Russia's future, though there was vacillation on the part of the more moderate conservatives in Britain, led by Lloyd George and Balfour. These more moderate men were carried along by the hard shelled conservatives in the British Government, led by War Minister Churchill, who increasingly directed the intervention.

Intervention Limited by Mounting Domestic Resistance. The entire intervention effort, vast as it was, was still a half-way affair. Before the end of the war with Germany it had necessarily to be limited. After November 1918 the French and British leaders saw plenty of reason for helping the Whites, but they were held back and frustrated by the war weariness of their own peoples and by the impossibility of inducing their troops to fight a new war.

In Britain the Labor Party Executive asked the Government immediately after the Armistice to define its intentions toward Russia, but received no reply. In the following June a Labor Party Conference passed a resolution, by 1,893,000 votes to 935,000, demanding an immediate end to intervention

[29] **Stewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–204.**

and for “the unreserved use of both political and industrial power” to enforce the demand. In the autumn of 1919 there were great street demonstrations against the intervention and in May 1920, at the height of the Polish offensive against Russia, dock workers’ strikes stopped the sending of munitions to Poland.

When the Poles were defeated and the Reds marched on Warsaw, Premier Lloyd George hinted war on July 21, and the.British fleet was alerted in the Baltic. On August 7, Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon sent a note to the Soviet Government threatening war if the Red Army did not stop. This brought nation-wide labor demonstrations and on August 9 a meeting of all labor leaders unanimously warned the Government that “the whole industrial power of the workers will be used to defeat this war.” A national conference was called and a Council of Action set up with full powers to order all labor union members to down tools.[30]

In the face of increasingly resolute opposition by labor, and by public opinion generally, the British Government was unable to intervene decisively in Russia. One by one the White movements reached their climax and collapsed. In the main, London and Paris had to confine their later intervention efforts to the sending of huge quantities of supplies to the Whites, accompanied by some technical assistance.

In addition the Allied Supreme War Council maintained a hostile naval blockade of Red Russia until January 16, 1920, and this was an important factor. The Soviets did not have the use of a single seaport. They were thrown completely on their own and survived only by what strength they could generate in the heart of Russia.

Each one of the great interventions attempted suffered from the inability of Western Governments to go all out. The Whites always had larger hopes than were fulfilled, though both Kolchak and Denikin received enough military supplies to have achieved great results if they had been able to use them wisely. None of the White movements had first-rate leadership and none of them demonstrated to the people that they had anything better to offer than a return of landlordism and the crushing of the Reds. The latter succeeded in winning over more and more people to the very end of the fighting. The strength of the Red regime increased with each assault upon it.

Growth of the Red Army. Recognition must be given, too, to the great feat of the Red leaders in creating a new army. Beginning almost from scratch after the disintegration of the Imperial armies, their forces had little military value at first, often descending to brigandage. After the break with the Czechs in Siberia and the advance of White forces to Kazan it became a matter of life and death to create a real military force. Conscription and military training were established by degrees: the former officers were cajoled and coerced into serving again, with liberal rewards for distinction or good service and drastic action against families or shooting for the disloyal; short course officers’ schools were successful; discipline was enforced; and the size of the army rapidly expanded. It was almost doubled during August 1918

[30] **Zilliacus, *op. cit.*, pp. 278–82**

and reached 800,000 by the end of the year. By 1920 the figure was 3,000,000 and during 1920 it grew to 5,500,000.

Arms were not available for more than 500,000 and there were 2,846,000 deserters during 1919 and 1920. Nearly all were recovered by one means or another. The incessant activity of the Communist Party in propagandizing and teaching the recruits could not make them like the army, but it did fire enough with revolutionary fervor to win the Civil War. About half of the members of the Party went into the army and their fanatical zeal stiffened the others.

The hero of the war on the Red side was unquestionably the Commissar for War, Leon Trotsky. Under his administration nearly 50,000 former officers were restored to the army and as many more trained. He did not attempt the military direction of the sixteen armies which held the fronts at the height of the war, but his armored train, in which he carried everything from a printing press to automobiles, was constantly on the move, especially to points of emergency. It was Trotsky who "drove the heterogeneous masses of the Red Army to final victory by a combination of ruthless fanaticism, abounding energy and never failing resourcefulness."[31]

The Failure of Intervention. When the last of the White debacles came to its tragic close, what did the West have to show for its intervention in Russia? It is difficult to point to any constructive gain, aside from the possible holding of some German troops in Finland during the early stages of the Northern intervention. Otherwise the five great campaigns had all ended in defeat. For a while the Red regime was in desperate straits, ringed into an area of a few hundred miles surrounding Moscow, but always it won in the end.

The costs, however, were staggering. When it was all over Russia was devastated throughout her vast expanses, from Poland to the Pacific and from the Arctic to the Caucasus. Millions of poor civilians had died of abuse, hunger and famine, which was soon to claim millions more. Everything was in a far worse state than at the time of the March revolution, bad as that was. Hatred and degradation filled the land. The upper classes in whose behalf the war had been fought had been humiliated and broken in labor battalions, killed and scattered abroad to live in bitter exile.

The results of the Allied intervention have been tellingly summarized by Bruce Lockhart, who was the British Agent to the Soviets after formal diplomatic intercourse was interrupted. His conclusions are that by June 1918 there was no danger of Russia being overrun by Germany, that it was a mistake to intervene at all, that the consequences were "disastrous both to our prestige and to the fortunes of those Russians who supported us" and that they regarded the intervention "as an attempt to overthrow Bolshevism."[32]

It is well to remember also that after the Armistice the Soviets made persistent efforts to make peace with the Allies, on almost any terms. Between November 1918 and February 1919 the Soviet Government addressed seven

[31] Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 37. See also pp. 25–41.

[32] R. H. Bruce Lockhart, *Memoirs of a British Agent*, New York, Putnam, 1932, pp. 311 12; London, Putnam, 1932.

peace proposals, “couched in the most conciliatory language,” to the Entente Powers and to the United States.[33]

Was Bolshevism Checkmated? One negative dividend can be claimed for the great sums which the Allies expended in backing the Whites. In his fine history of ***The Russian Revolution*** Chamberlin reminds us that much of Central and Eastern Europe was in such a state of disintegration as to be fertile ground for Bolshevik agitation. He cites the undoubted passion of the Red leaders of the time for world revolution and comments that nothing but lack of strength prevented them from supporting militarily Bela Kun’s Red regime in Hungary as energetically as Britain supported Kolchak and Denikin. Therefore, if there had been no intervention, or if it had stopped after the Armistice, the Russian Civil War “would almost certainly have ended much more quickly in a decisive victory of the Soviets. Then a triumphant revolutionary Russia would have faced a Europe that was fairly quivering with social unrest and upheaval.”[34] In other words, the interventions of the West had the negative advantage of preventing the Bolshevizing of Europe and of pushing the frontier of communism farther East.

This is a tenable thesis, yet the arguments against it are weighty. Without the arming and financing of the White revolts by the West those in the North and the Baltic would not have occurred at all and the Siberian and South Russian movements would not have been formidable. Indeed it is difficult to see how they could have been any serious threat to the Soviet Government. In that situation there would accordingly have been no dire necessity to organize a great Red army. There was more than enough to do in establishing the new Red heaven, without pouring all the energies of the infant regime into forging a mighty army, in a land already sick and tired of war. It was not until the crisis developed that the Reds turned away from Utopia and concentrated on war. They had paid the highest price in humiliation and loss of territory to get out of World War I. Peace was their platform and, having surrendered a broad belt of land in the West to get it they showed no tendency to reconquer it by force after Germany’s collapse. Their doctrines of anti-imperialism and cultural freedom for all nationalities militated strongly against such an adventure. Far from attempting to recover Poland they freely offered a generous frontier. It was only after Poland sought to carve out a huge Empire in Russia that the Reds tried to carry the Revolution to Poland.

From the first it was the West which was on the offensive, not the Soviets. When the first important gathering of monarchists occurred at Rostov, in South Russia, during December 17, its leaders were at once offered $100,000,000 by the British Government and 100,000,000 rubles by the French to make war on the Soviet Government. Dewitt C.. Poole, American Consul-General in Moscow, also went quickly to see the White rebel leaders and reported, on January 26, that the United States should support the anti-Soviet cause.[35] It is difficult to conclude that the originally pacifist Reds would or could have created a powerful new war machine without the early

[33] **Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 156.** [34] **Ibid., Vol. II, p. 171.**

[35] **Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 143–4. General Graves deeply resented the interventionist activity of the U.S. Consul-General in Siberia, E. H. Harris.—Graves, *op. cit.*, p. 49.**

and persistent intervention of the West. When they were encircled with Western-armed forces on all sides there was nothing to do except to go to war, and to make the war total.

Within the limits of the exhaustion and chaos which lay all around them the Reds waged the first total war. They had to do so in order to survive. In the fires of this grim testing time they also hammered out the machinery of the totalitarian state—organized terror by the secret police, the planned use of all national resources, nationalization of all industry, class war in the villages in order to feed the starving cities (which later ended in the forced collectivization of the land), a monolithic, highly disciplined Party controlling and unifying all activity, military or civil, and a powerful army, taught and schooled with every means at command.

These pillars of totalitarian state power might well have been erected under the Soviet State in the course of time, without the compelling whip of the Civil Wars. They may all have been implicit in Marxism, but it is altogether unlikely that they would have been built as quickly and strongly. Evolution in the Soviet Union would have proceeded much more slowly and, in all probability, with much greater moderation, without the scourging compulsion of Western intervention.

Continuing Effects of the Interventions on World Politics. Yet the biggest effect of the West's intervention has yet to be considered, the effect upon the minds of the Russian people and the Red leaders. When war again engulfed the vast reaches of Russia, on the heels of the First World War, it put a strain upon humanity seldom borne before. For another two and a half years the people had to endure coercion, looting, killing and worse, from both sides. Already impoverished and weary, they had to go through endless agonies of plague and famine in which millions died. In the United States few even remember that terrible time and most Americans never heard of it, but the Russians cannot be expected to forget. Such an experience is burned into the very soul of a nation.

The Red leaders, especially, were given every reason to believe that the Western world sought their extermination and that it would be only a question of time until the capitalist powers would be back to finish the job. They were presented also with a telling argument with which to justify all their oppressive regimentations of the Soviet peoples—"If you do not work and obey, the terrible times will come again!"

The continuing effects of the West's intervention on world politics are self-evident. The will of the governing classes in the West to stamp out the communist experiment in Russia was expressed in deeds which the Red leaders cannot forget as easily as we can. To them it was a long ordeal of fire and blood. To us it was a far-away incident undertaken with mixed motives and soon forgotten.

American Public Opinion Poorly Informed. Indeed the American people never knew with any accuracy what was transpiring in Russia during this decisive period, except very imperfectly after the event. On August 11, 1920, the ***New Republic*** published a remarkable analysis of the news coverage of

the events here described by the ***New York Times***, then as now one of our most objective sources of news. The article was written by Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz in a wholly constructive spirit, after studying the news dispatches in the ***Times*** about Russia from March 1917 to March 1920. The report covers forty-two pages which make up a deeply disturbing document.[36]

It disclosed that the hopes and fears of the men on the ***Times*** organization determined the color and character of the news about Russia. From March 1917 until the Bolshevik revolution the news, especially in captions and emphasis, was so optimistic as to be misleading. From November 1917 until the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the news was "handled in a rather uncritically pro-Bolshevik fashion," on the assumption that the Soviets would refuse to make peace with Germany. Then under the stress of disappointment and danger, "organized propaganda for intervention penetrates the news" intensely for a month until President Wilson announced, in early April 1918, that there would be no intervention and, after a month's interval, there was another sustained campaign for intervention until the President approved it on July 12.

Up until the Armistice the Red Peril had played an insignificant role, but at once it filled the news and served as a new motive for continuing intervention. Lippmann and Merz considered this "one of the most significant things about" the drive for intervention. "The notion of a fundamental antagonism between the Soviet Government and the American is not insisted upon until after American troops are on Russian soil." Up until then it was a simple matter of preventing German domination of Russia. Then suddenly the tune changed and our "troops went to fight Germany and remained to fight Russians." On December 13, 1918, the ***Times*** asked editorially: "Having entered Russia for a purpose, why not carry out that purpose?"—and argued that our armies in Russia should be reinforced to "drive the Bolsheviki out of Petrograd and Moscow."[37]

The Lippmann-Merz study granted the patriotism of the editors and newsmen, but in this period found "passionate argument masquerading as news," in headlines as well as articles. "The Russian policy of the editors of the ***Times*** profoundly and crassly influenced their news columns." "For subjective reasons," also, the ***Times*** staff "accepted and believed most of what they were told by the State Department, the so-called Russian Embassy in Washington, the Russian Information Bureau in New York, the Russian Committee in Paris and the agents and adherents of the old regime all over Europe."

The two investigators concluded that "from the point of view of professional journalism the reporting of the Russian Revolution is nothing short of

[36] Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, "A Test of the News," *New Republic*, August 4, 1920, Vol. II, after p. 288.

[37] In Great Britain the need of the conservative mind to justify intervention led to the most passionate conviction that the Red leaders were paid agents of Germany. To justify adding a new war to the great one already in existence it was essential to couple the Reds in the public mind with the already accepted enemy, the Germans. It was insisted incessantly that intervention had nothing whatever to do with the Bolshevik social revolution and was directed entirely toward winning the war with Germany and restoring democracy in Russia.—Zilliacus, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–200.

a disaster. On the essential questions the net effect was almost always misleading, and misleading news is worse than none at all." Thus in the two years following November 1917 it was stated no less than ninety-one times that "the Soviets were nearing their rope's end, or actually had reached it." Collapse was reported fourteen times. The effect was to postpone from month to month insistence by the people that "the Allied statesmen must re-evaluate their policy of indecision, intervention and blockade."

Instead there was an often repeated search for a "dictator-savior." Kolchak's dictatorial coup was hailed with pleasure. Then it was "Kolchak Triumphant" until after his disastrous retreat was well under way, covered up magnificently by the newswriters until the bitter end. This same cycle was repeated with Denikin. The pro-Denikin dispatches from Harold Williams at the front "were obviously queer at the time and are ridiculous in the light of events."

In the case of Poland's invasion of Russia, Poland was pictured as an exhausted nation on the defensive, about to be inundated by a Red offensive. On January 1, 1919, a dispatch from Warsaw reported that "the Bolsheviki have forced the Poles to take up arms by their advance into Polish territory." The alleged Red offensive never materialized, but a year later, on January 22, 1920, a dispatch from Washington stated flatly that "the strategy of the Bolshevist military campaign during the coming Spring contemplates a massed attack against Poland, as the first step in a projected Red invasion of Europe and a military diversion through Turkestan and Afghanistan toward India."

A week earlier, on January 12, 1920, General Bliss had told a Congressional committee that on December 2, 1919, Polish armies were more than 180 miles deep in Russian territory, yet on February 16, 1920, another firm statement left "no doubt that the Bolsheviki are preparing an enormous offensive against Poland" in the early Spring, one which Poland could not resist. Many other dispatches supported the idea of Poland on the defensive. Actually the Soviet counter offensive against Poland's all-out drive into Russia did not begin until July 1920.

When President Wilson sought to get all the warring factions in Russia together on the Island of Prinkipo, near Constantinople, early in 1919, the Reds accepted the invitation and the Whites all haughtily refused. In our news a partial version of the Soviet reply was published which justified the idea that it was the Soviets who would not suspend hostilities and come to conference. If the full text had been printed it would have disclosed the willingness of the Soviets not only "to secure an agreement that would put an end to hostilities" but to discuss "the question of annexation of Russian territories by the Entente powers" or by "forces which . . . receive financial, technical, military or any other support from them"—in other words, Kolchak and Denikin.[38]

[38] **Zilliacus, *op. cit.*, p. 36. In April 1919 the Soviet Government offered peace through William C. Bullitt on the basis of seven points. In February 1919 the Soviet Government offered to pay the Tsarist debts and give up propaganda if the Allies would end intervention. No reply was received. Premier Lloyd George after discussing the matter with Bullitt asserted in the House of Commons two weeks later that "we have had no approaches of any sort or kind."—*Ibid.*, pp. 264–5.**

Communism Strengthened. This exposé does not leave much on the side of the credit ledger in the books of the Allied intervention in Russia. Aside from very limited indirect military benefit in North Russia there is little to record except the negative virtue of keeping communism on the defensive. All of the five major campaigns of intervention failed disastrously, leaving Russia exhausted and embittered, but with a greatly strengthened Soviet regime firmly committed to totalitarian methods of survival and of ruling. Instead of exorcizing the great Red nightmare the interventions of 1918–20 fixed it in the uneasy slumbers of the West.

CHAPTER III

COMMUNISM CONFINED AND OSTRACIZED

1921–1934

By the operation of a natural paradox the sweeping social revolution in Russia worked against a democratic revolution in Germany. The First World War had largely been fought, at least in the United States, against German autocracy and Prussian militarism. President Wilson would not make peace except with a new democratic government. Yet on November 10, 1918, the day before the Armistice, the Supreme Allied Command issued a decree stating that it would deal in Germany only with the officials of the Imperial Government. Where these had been ousted the Allies later insisted on their reinstatement, under Paragraph V of the Armistice Agreement. They also retained the power to enforce their will by keeping the blockade in force, over President Wilson's protest, until April 1919.[1]

The Old Regime Left in Power in Germany. Internally, also, the fear of Bolshevik revolution operated to prevent a democratic revolution in Germany. Bolshevist ideas had made considerable headway in the German forces in the East and in August 1918, as defeat became certain, the German armies in the West became receptive to Red slogans. The Russian embassy in Berlin was active in aiding the German Reds, called Spartacists, ami the Social Democrats became deeply alarmed during October 1919 by théaefection from their ranks to the Spartacists.

When, therefore, Workers and Soldiers Councils sprang up all over Germany, after the Navy revolt inaugurated the fall of the Monarchy in early November 1918, the Social Democrats thought that they were in great danger of going the way of Kerensky, especially since the Berlin Workers and Soldiers Council showed signs of playing a role analogous to the Petrograd Soviet. The Social Democrat leader Ebert accordingly turned to the Army High Command for armed support against the radicals. On November 10, 1919, he telephoned GHQ at Spa and made a deal with General Groner, who readily persuaded Hindenburg and Ludendorff of the advantages of using the Social Democrats. During the next two months the army was used several times to crush the Communists, sometimes with artillery.

Thus the fears of both the Allies and the very moderate German Socialists combined to save the power of the two war-making classes in Germany, the Junkers and the industrial barons. The Socialists shrank from breaking up

[1] **James P. Warburg, *Foreign Policy Begins at Home*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1944, pp. 78–9. See also H. N. Brailsford, *Our Settlement with Germany*, New York and London, Penguin Books, 1944, pp. 22–3.**

the great estates of the Junkers, and the latter retained not only their great economic power but their hold over the army, the bureaucracy, the courts and the schools. Then they sabotaged the Republic perpetually, because they knew that democratic machinery now existed through which their estates and their power could be liquidated.

Like the Junkers, the industrial magnates felt helpless momentarily when the Imperial Government fell, so they hastened to make a deal with the Socialist leaders of the great trade unions. On November 15, 1918, a momentous pact was concluded in which the employers disavowed any future support to company unions, agreed to workers councils in each plant, accepted the eight-hour day and made other concessions. The Socialists thought they had won a great victory, and the power of the industrialists was consolidated until the day when they would swing it behind Hitler to destroy the Republic.[2]

Having been left with the effective power in their hands, the Reichswehr leaders proceeded to capitalize on the Red fears of the Allies and the Socialists. The Army chiefs alleged that a "Red Army" had suddenly risen out of the ground in the Ruhr, which was due to be demilitarized and evacuated by German troops. On March 20–1, 1920, the German press carried large headlines about "The Fall" of Essen, Mulheim, Duisburg and Düsseldorf. The "Red Army" was in communication with Moscow.

This terrifying phenomenon was investigated by two officers of the Allied control commission, Graff and Wauchope, who went to the scene and observed what happened. The German troops had been ostentatiously evacuated from the "fallen" cities, without a sign of disturbance anywhere beforehand. Then, as reported, some armed bands of communist youths had "roamed at large over the Ruhr, doing a little shooting, a little looting, and a great deal of drinking." One of them directed by agents provocateurs of the Army did set up a "Soviet" in Duisburg which was advertised as controlling the city. For five days the world's press was flooded with stories of the terrible atrocities being committed by the Reds.

Then when Germany and the Western world had been properly terrified, the Reichswehr moved back into the abandoned cities and slaughtered the rowdies whom they had invited to do their worst. "Every man who surrendered was shot, usually by an officer with a revolver." In addition to saving all good Germans from Bolshevism the Army had intended to prove to the Allies that the German armed forces in the Neutral Zone were not sufficient to maintain order. When the maneuver was over, the Army had thirty-four batteries of artillery and thirty battalions of infantry in the area.

This part of the plot failed, due to the excellent intelligence work of Graff and Wauchope, but their report was not published by the Allies and the world believed the tale of the great communist revolt raging through the Ruhr. In Britain especially the notion was deeply planted that unless Germany

[2] **S. W. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*, New York, Crowell, 1946, pp. 101, 109–11, 115–25.**

were "set on her feet" she would "go Red."[3] Lord D'Abemon, the British Ambassador to Germany, was soon flirting with the idea that "a good bargain" might be made with the German military leaders in "cooperating against the Soviet."[4]

Democracy Distrusted. The Allies did try in the Treaty of Versailles to limit the military power of the new Germany, but the very means they chose—an army of 100,000 men recruited by twelve year enlistment—was bound to buttress conservatism in Germany. If this was not actually intended, the British and French Governments had no desire to curb the German war-making classes. Paris and London had been antagonistic to the democratic March Revolution in Russia, which was not very violent, though the Allied ***peoples*** all welcomed it.

The November Revolution was a very different matter. It was bloody and its sweeping goals frightened those who approved of moderate change. Nevertheless, as James P. Warburg has pointed out, "had the Governments of Britain, France, and the United States been confident in the dynamic justice of their own systems of democracy, they need not have been afraid of bolshevism in their own countries, even if the Russian Bolsheviks were to stir up all the trouble they could."[5]

This comment applies equally well to later times. Certainly after 1917 British and French conservatives were acutely aware of the great numbers of underprivileged people beneath them, an awareness which led them through the whole period of appeasement to strive for agreement with the growing fascist forces on the Continent.

An Anti-Red Crusade in the United States. Yet in the post-1917 years many other factors added to the growing hatred of the Reds. The charge that the Red leaders were German agents was widely and stubbornly believed, and the Red peace with Germany was deeply resented.

In the United States these varied factors enabled fear and prejudice to do the rest. The Red Terror was always reported in the press luridly; the White Terror never mentioned. The Red attack upon the Orthodox Church as a political force was interpreted as an extermination of all religion. This offended the majority of Americans keenly. Equally devastating was the story about the nationalization of women. This idea originated in the mind of an obscure woman in a small Russian town and was treated as a joke in a Russian comic paper. Then in Saratov the Bolsheviks sought to discredit a

[3] J. H. Morgan, *Assize of Arms*, New York, Oxford, 1946, pp. 183–99; London, Methuen, 1945; General Morgan was a British representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany from 1919 to 1923. As an incident of the Ruhr hoax the French occupied Frankfurt, as they were entitled to do under the Treaty. Some of the French troops were colored and the Germans staged a campaign to provoke them beyond endurance. This was how "the great imposture of 'The Black Shame' (die schwarze Schande) made its first appearance. Stories, all of them false, of the excesses of the colored troops, and more particularly of 'outrages' by them on German women, began to circulate abroad and found a credulous ear in the Liberal Press of our own country." (pp. 193–4.)

[4] A letter to Sir Maurice Hankey on August 11,1920. See Lord D'Abemon, *The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World*, London, 1931, p. 72.

[5] Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

powerful group of anarchists by attributing to them a fantastic scheme for a Bureau of Free Love. From these beginnings the story grew to a nationalization of all women and for months was assiduously taught to the American people as truth.[6]

During February-March 1919 the Overman Committee of the Senate conducted hearings whose effect was "to picture Soviet Russia as a kind of bedlam inhabited by abject slaves completely at the mercy of homicidal maniacs whose purpose was to destroy all traces of civilization and carry the nation back to barbarism."[7] This theme was hammered into the national consciousness by the strongest language which headline writers and editors could invent. Even the failure of predicted horrors to materialize did not slow the campaign. On October 31,1918, the ***New York Times*** announced in front page capitals that a grand massacre of all Russian bourgeoisie would take place on November 10. When the date came nothing happened, but the widespread characterization of the Red leaders as beasts and perverts continued.

In these circumstances nearly all questioning was terrorized into silence and the stage set for a nation-wide man hunt for all suspected of harboring the terrible Red disease. This grim hysteria was concentrated especially upon recent immigrants. "The hostility to immigrant workers, which had long been smouldering in the country, was now suddenly combined with hostility to heterodox thinkers and burst into a conflagration of hysterical hatred."[8]

Mass Raids. Unfortunately for the poor, confused immigrants, who had fled from oppression in Russia and elsewhere, the Attorney-General of the time, A. Mitchell Palmer, was convinced of the imminence of Red revolution. There was no time to lose. Agents of the Department of Justice were detailed in great numbers to infiltrate into radical and communist groups, becoming vociferous radicals but trying not to actually foment violence and disorder. Then raids were sprung, the greatest on January 1–2, 1920, when all the dragnets were pulled in during a gigantic operation extending from coast to coast and gathering in more than 4000 people.

What happened in New England has been described at length by Judge George W. Anderson in the Colyer Case. The head of the federal agents in Boston commanded a force of 300 to 500 men. Halls were raided, suspects hned up against walls, thoroughly searched and hauled off to police stations. Somewhere between 800 to 1200 persons were taken into custody. In Lynn thirty-nine people, half of them citizens, who had met to discuss the forming of a cooperative bakery, were jailed one night and in Nashua five were put in one cell without a mattress. In Hartford a number of people were arrested at a Communist meeting and when their friends went to the jail to see them they too were promptly locked up as ***prima facie*** communists. At Deer Island, where many were confined and conditions were chaotic, one person killed himself before all the other prisoners and another went insane.

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[6] F. L. Schuman, *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, New York, International Publishers, 1928, pp. 153–4.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–5.

[8] Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States*, Harvard Press, 1942, p. 196.

From all over New England people were shipped into Boston by train, handcuffed together and photographed frequently as they were led through the streets. All were rigorously questioned incommunicado, without benefit of counsel, and a "preliminary record" made up against them. Most of these people, says Judge Anderson, "were perfectly quiet and harmless working people, many of them not long ago Russian peasants." Nearly all were arrested and their premises searched without warrants. Many were held in jail for days until the warrants arrived. In Detroit one hundred men were kept for a week in a "bull pen" twenty-four by thirty feet. Bail was often fixed at $10,000, though the Immigration Rules advised $500.

In the end the Department of Labor and the courts released the great majority of the people arrested, and of those held few were deported—all to the chagrin of Attorney-General Palmer, who wrote contemporaneously that:

> "Like a prairie fire the blaze of revolution was sweeping over every American institution of law and order. ... It was eating its way into the homes of the American workman, its sharp tongues of revolutionary heat were licking the altars of the churches, leaping into the belfry of the school bell, crawling into the sacred comers of American homes seeking to replace marriage vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundations of society."[9]

The comment of our leading authority on civil liberties was that "Mr. Palmer adopted the attitude of the men he denounced. Because the law hindered the result he wished to accomplish and thought desirable, he disregarded the law."[10] Chafee adds that some of the violent crimes which punctured this period may have been the result of the resentment bred by several years of harsh suppression of radical elements, both by government and private organizations.

Reaction Rampant. As an editor of ***Harpers Magazine*** put it:

> "Big navy men, believers in compulsory military service, drys, anti-cigarette campaigners, anti-evolution Fundamentalists, defenders of the moral order, book censors, Jew haters, Negro haters, landlords, manufacturers, utility executives, upholders of every sort of cause good, bad, indifferent, all wrapped themselves in Old Glory and the mantle of the Founding Fathers and allied their opponents with Lenin."[11]

Even the Russian Famine Fund, the National Council of Churches and the Foreign Policy Association were branded as Red. "These people are in our industries, schools and to some extent in our clergy," charged Clayton R. Lusk, the head of the famous Lusk Committee.

One and all, the super-American elements of the year 1920 evinced their disbelief in democracy. They had no faith in the masses of their fellow citizens but regarded them as inflammable material ready to be set on fire by the tinder spark of some agitator. They disbelieved in the essential sanity and

[9] A. Mitchell Palmer, "The Case Against the Reds," *Forum*, No. 2, February 1920, Vol. 63, p. 174.

[10] Chafee, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

[11] Frederick L. Allen, *Only Yesterday*, New York, Harper, 1931, illus., p. 59.

common sense of the average man and thought they had to control his thoughts and opinions by suppression, imprisonment and exile. Knowing little history they were more than willing to defy the dictum of President Wilson, who lay a broken man in the White House during this time of rigorous reaction, that "repression is the seed of revolution."

Then, as later, American conservatives feared that a few communists could suddenly subvert the Republic. In Chicago States Attorney Hoyte announced on the day of the great raids that a gigantic conspiracy had been discovered throughout the United States to overthrow the government. The conspirators "proposed to seize the businesses, the industries and the natural resources of the country by direct action" and to establish a Soviet government.[12]

As May Day 1920 approached, Palmer predicted that on that day the Bolsheviks, hundreds of thousands strong, would try to overthrow the Government and plant the Red flag on the Capitol. The day passed without incident, but on September 16, 1920, a small horse-drawn wagon blew up in Wall Street near the offices of J. P. Morgan Company with a tremendous explosion. This confirmed the Red fears of all the alarmed people, though ten years of frequent efforts to connect the crime with the Reds never succeeded.[13]

Socialist Legislators Expelled. In this atmosphere it was natural that socialism should be assailed. On January 7, 1920, just after the great Red raids, the New York legislature met and the Speaker of the House haled the five Socialist members elected from New York City before him to charge that they had been elected on "a platform absolutely inimical to the best interests of the State of New York" and to invite a resolution of expulsion. This was promptly presented by the Lusk Committee, which for a year had been conducting raids, prosecuting radicals and filling "the press with a flow of terrorizing descriptions of the Red menace," and adopted, the five Socialists being hustled out of the House by the Sergeant at Arms.

In its passion to smite at all things Red the Lusk Committee made no distinction between the gradualist, democratic, legal-process socialists and the totalitarian Reds. All were damned together and 60,000 voters denied the right to advocate socialism by democratic means. Fortunately this extreme action produced a healthy reaction among conservatives. Charles Evans Hughes protested within forty-eight hours, calling it "a most serious mistake to proceed, not against individuals charged with violation of law, but against masses of our citizens combined for political action, by denying them the only recourse of peaceful government; that is, action by the ballot box and through duly elected representatives in legislative bodies."

Under Hughes' leadership the Bar Association of New York City, the ***Tribune***, the National Security League and many other influential groups attacked the action of the legislature, but the New York Assembly paid no attention whatever to these remonstrances. Its Judiciary Committee refused to hear Mr. Hughes and concocted a large omnibus of vague charges which produced the desired expulsion of the Socialists from the Legislature by an

[12] **The *New York Times*, January 2, 1920.**

[13] **George Seldes, *World Panorama, 1918–1937*, Boston, Little Brown, 1943, p. 127.**

overwhelming vote, too late for new elections. Then the Legislature adjourned, Speaker Sweet proclaiming the session "a victory for undivided Americanism."[14]

The Legislature was not amenable to reason. It knew it was heavily supported by public opinion, especially in the rural districts. Even the ***New York Times*** declared that the expulsion of the Socialists was "as clearly and demonstrably a measure of national defense as the declaration of war against Germany."[15] But, concludes Chafee, "the nation was saved. The American people, long bedrugged by propaganda, were shaken out of their nightmare of revolution. The red terror became ridiculous on the lips of Speaker Sweet." People began to laugh at the idea of a legislature trembling before five men. The spell was broken and sanity began to assert itself, especially in Washington.

Repercussions of the French Revolution. Whenever social revolution is on the march in the world frightened American conservatives have been able to mould public opinion against it in the short run by their control and handling of the news. The anti-Red excesses of 1918–20 were no more successful than the Federalist reaction against the French Revolution. As in 1917, the initial feeling of the American people was one of rejoicing and welcome to the revolution. But, as the terror developed in France and extreme theses began to be heard, alarm spread from the top downward. The raw tactlessness of a succession of French Ministers culminating in the insult of the XYZ affair prepared the way for the conclusion that the French Revolution was from the first nothing but a blot on the record of humanity and that only evil would ever result from it. Men of substance feared that "the end of all government and law which had come in France would eventually destroy the United States."[16] Even George Washington favored the repressive legislation which ensued.

The Federalists, who controlled the machinery of government and most of the press were in a strategic position to take full advantage of the attempted bribery of our commissioners to France. The publication of the XYZ insult to our government led quickly to the forming of mobs in the cities and to attacks on the homes of French sympathizers, especially Republican editors. Benjamin Franklin's statue was smeared and wildest rumors of French duplicity were believed. Bowers summarized the picture painted by the rumor-mongers as follows: "The French invasion at hand—slaves armed—masters murdered in their beds—churches burned—women outraged—girls kidnapped—horrors piled on horrors, and all because of democracy."[17]

This atmosphere provided the opportunity for the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The Alien Law provided for the expulsion of undesirable aliens and increased the time required to become a citizen from five to nineteen years, a

[14] Chafee, *op. cit.*, pp. 269–80. "Surely this event ought to free us from the tyranny of this word 'Americanism' which seems like some magic helmet to render the true qualities of the wearer invisible to those around him" (p. 280).

[15] Editorial, April 2, 1920.

[16] Thomas Norton, *The Constitution of the United States*, Cleveland, 1943, p. 200.

[17] Claude Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1925, p. 207.

measure designed to halt the flow of Irish and other immigrants into Jefferson's Republican Party.[18] The Sedition Law forbade the publication of matter intended to defame the Government or to bring its officers into disrepute. These laws resulted in a minor reign of terror during which judges tried to enforce the new laws and citizens resisted the restriction of their civil liberties with defiance, demonstrations and riots. The Federalists replied by enforcing the laws "with ever increasing vigor," in the face of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798–9, denying their validity. Men went to jail and paid heavy fines "for indulgence in a loose tongue regarding persons and policies, the public character of which made them at least fair topics of discussion." The resulting conflict was a leading cause in the defeat of the Federalist Party in the election of 1800.[19]

Should the United States Recognize the Soviet Government? In 1798 there was a Bonaparte to push aside the corrupt and bungling Directory which had aroused so much indignation in the United States. In 1920 no Russian man-on-horseback could suppress the Russian Reds. All the possible candidates had tried and failed. Kornilov, Alexiev, Denikin, Wrangel, Yudenitch, Miller and Kolchak—each had done his best, with immense aid from the West, and all had failed. Failure had involved, too, the growth of a powerful Red Army which was effectively controlled and policed by the Communist Party for the express purpose of preventing the rise of any Bonaparte.

After 1920, therefore, the new government in Russia had either to be recognized or ignored. By the test of international law which usually governed, the test of stability and effective rule, the Soviet Government would need to be recognized. But the American Government could not bring itself to associate with the bloody regime which had defeated all efforts to oust it.

Secretary of State Colby stated the position of the United States on August 10, 1920, in a letter to the Italian Ambassador which said:

> "There can be no mutual confidence or trust, no respect even, if pledges are to be given and agreements made with a cynical repudiation of their obligations already in the mind of one of the parties. We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the agents of a Government which is determined and bound to conspire against our institutions; whose diplomats will be the agitators of dangerous revolt; whose spokesmen say that they sign agreements with no intention of keeping them."[20]

Some months after this rebuff, on March 22, 1921, the Soviet Government asked for a resumption of trade relations with the United States. Secretary Hughes replied by refusing to resume normal trade relations with Soviet Russia until they accepted: (1) the right of private property; (2) freedom of labor; (3) the sanctity of contract; and (4) provided for safety of human

[18] Vcmon Stauffer, *New England and the Bavarian Illuminati*, New York, Columbia U.P., 1918, p. 133; Bowers, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

[19] W. M. Sloane, *Party Government in the United States*, New York, 1914, pp. 72–7.

[20] "Soviet Russia and the United States," *Current History*, Vol. 12, No. 6, September 1920, p. 931.

lives. In his reply, Hughes was supported by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.[21]

These conditions were much stiffer than those laid down by Colby. They practically required the Reds to give up all their totalitarian socialist ways and become good bourgeoisie again. However, this stern attitude did not prevent the American Relief Administration, still under Herbert Hoover's leadership, from doing a magnificent job of famine relief in Russia from September 1921 to July 1923. Some $60,000,000, in part raised by public subscription, was expended under the direct supervision of the A.R.A. and a major proportion of the 20,000,000 famine sufferers was saved.[22]

This work of mercy did not lead to any political recognition of the Soviets. Our Government continued to recognize the Embassy of the Kerensky Government as the representative of Russia in the United States. In March 1922 this Embassy secured the entry into the United States of the notorious bandit leader Gregory Semenoff, who under Japanese sponsorship had turned Eastern Siberia into a bloody horror of terrorism and rapine in 1919. SemenofTs effort to get support here for a "peaceful revolution" in Siberia aroused Senator Borah's ire and led to testimony before a Senate Committee that Semenoff had been responsible for the murder of at least 100,000 people.[23] This publicity was followed by the departure of both Semenoff and Ambassador Bakhmetev, though an agent of his continued to act as the representative of Russia.

On December 6, 1923, President Coolidge discussed the recognition of Russia in his annual message to Congress. In his highly moral manner he declared that we would not "enter into relations with another regime which refuses to recognize the sanctity of international obligations. I do not propose to barter away for the privilege of trade any of the cherished rights of humanity. I do not propose to make merchandise of any American principles. These rights and principles must go wherever the sanctions of our Government go."

Coolidge was willing, however, to make very large concessions for "the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia." This was during the period of the New Economic Policy, restoring a great deal of private trade, which Lenin had been forced to inaugurate in 1921 to prevent the total economic collapse of Russia. Coolidge noted that there were "already encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society," but more were needed. Whenever there appeared "works mete for repentance our country ought to be the first to go to the economic assistance and moral rescue of Russia." He hoped we could act soon.[24]

Overlooking the lofty moral eminence from which President Coolidge spoke, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Chicherin, hastened to send a message to Coolidge, December 16, 1923, expressing his complete readiness to accept

[21] **Brynjolf J. Hovde, "Russo-American Relations 1917–1927," *Current History*, Vol. 27, November 1927, p. 235, and *New York Times*, March 26, 1921.**

[22] **Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, Vol. I, p. 316.**

[23] **Schuman, *American Policy Toward Russia Since 1917*, pp. *227–8.***

[24] **The *New York Times*, December 7, 1923.**

"the principle of mutual non-interference in internal affairs" and to discuss the Kerensky debts, "on the assumption that the principle of reciprocity will be recognized." The Soviet Government was "ready to do all in its power, so far as the dignity and interests of its country permit, to bring about the desired end of renewal of friendship with the United States of America."

This overture was promptly and curtly rejected by Washington, where it was said that there was nothing in the Soviet note or otherwise which would warrant recognition.[25]

British-Soviet Friction. Early in 1924 the new Labor Government in Great Britain recognized the Soviet Government and in April agreed to the principle that Russia was entitled to present against British claims to Tsarist debts her own claims for damage done during the Allied interventions. This treaty failed of ratification when the Conservatives soon returned to power, in the election in which the forged "Zinoviev Letter" played a leading part in their victory.[26]

In 1926 the British Conservatives were further embittered by the abortive effort of Soviet trade unions to aid a British coal-mine strike with $6,000,000 of contributions. On May 12, 1927, British police raided the Soviet trade agency Arcos, in London, in search of stolen documents containing military secrets. The documents were not found, but others seized were declared to justify the severance of diplomatic relations on May 26, 1927, by a vote of 367 to 118 in the House of Commons.[27] Diplomatic relations were restored in late 1929 by a new Labor Government.

American Reasons for Non-Recasutition. The turbulence of British-Soviet relations, featured by frequent charges of Soviet propaganda in Britain, did not encourage the American Government to recognize the Soviet Union. The period of hysterical hatred had passed, but it was believed that the Soviet regime was not a government, certainly not a Russian national government, but a group of international revolutionists who had happened to master Russia and would use it as a base for overthrowing other governments. The fear of communist propaganda was ever present.

At the same time it was reasoned that communism was an unworkable economic system which must break down eventually. To recognize the Red regime would only encourage it to pursue this folly, so real friendship for the Russian people themselves required the continuance of non-recognition until the Soviet Government abandoned its unsound practices. Anyway there could be no peace with a regime which repudiated its debts and denied the rights of private property.[28]

These beliefs were shared by the majority of the American people, including labor leaders. In some they amounted to a conviction that the two economic systems were so incompatible that they could not live together on speaking

[25] ***Ibid.*, December 17, 18, 1923.**

[26] **R. Page Amot, *Soviet Russia and Her Neighbors*, New York, Vanguard, 1927, pp. 74–8.**

[27] **Arthur B. Darling, "The Anglo-Soviet Diplomatic Rupture," *Current History*, Vol. 26, June 1927, pp. 657–60.**

[28] **Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–7.**

terms. The Lenin-Trotsky theory that the world must be all one or the other was accepted. Russia was a pariah and the less contact with her the better. Even the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico, Mme. Alexandra Kollontai, was not allowed to pass through the United States on the way to her post. In November 1926 the State Department ruled that she was an inadmissible alien, actively participating in "the international Communist subversive movement."[29]

This attitude was fostered by the kind of reporting which the ***Chicago Tribune*** did about Russia in these years. Boasting on August 25, 1926, that it "alone among the great American journals" had painfully but successfully defied the "garbling censorship of the Red Government," the ***Tribune*** published a stream of articles which would lead its widespread readers to conclude that there was a never-ending series of revolts in Russia. Beginning in 1925, Schuman collected the following series of headlines in the ***Tribune***:

SOVIETS FIGHT FAMINE AS GRAIN MYTH EXPLODES (October 26, 1925)
CLAIM STARVING POOR THREATEN DOOM OF SOVIET (June 15, 1925)
RUSSIANS FREE! TO ROB, STARVE, MURDER, AND DIE (November 15, 1925)
SIBERIA TRIES TO SHAKE OFF MOSCOW'S YOKE (November 26, 1925)
RUSSIA UNLOADS JEWELS TO SAVE SOVIET REGIME (February 10, 1926)
SECRET REPORT SHOWS RUSSIA NEAR COLLAPSE (March 20, 1926)
UNCOVER SECRET TERRORIST PLOT TO SEIZE RUSSIA (July 30, 1926)
RUMANIA HEARS OF WIDESPREAD RUSSIAN REVOLT (August 7, 1926)
SOVIET PARTY IN CHAOS AS TRADE, INDUSTRY TOTTER (August 4, 1926)
ODESSA TROOPS MUTINY AGAINST MOSCOW REGIME (August 9, 1926)
RUSSIA FERMENTS AS RED FACTIONS GRASP FOR POWER (August 10, 1926)
REDS REINFORCE KREMLIN FORT AS MUTINY GROWS (August 13, 1926)
ECONOMY REGIME IN RUSSIA FAILS: CRISIS IMPENDS (August 21, 1926)
REPORTS REVOLT AGAINST SOVIET BEGINS IN RUSSIA (April 9, 1927)
RED ARMY FIGHTS WITH SOUTH RUSSIANS (April 19, 1927)
RUSSIA CALLS SOLDIERS HOME AS REVOLT RISES (April 21, 1927)
FAMINE STRIKES RUSSIA: POLAND FEARS INVASION (July 27, 1927)
MOSCOW TRAPS CASH OF FOREIGN BUSINESS FIRMS (October 16, 1927)
INDUSTRY FACES SWIFT DISASTER IN RED RUSSIA (October 23, 1927)
TROTSKY'S CLAN FIGHTS SOVIET POLICE: 18 DIE (November 23, 1927)
HUNDREDS DIE IN UKRAINE RIOTS, RUMANIA HEARS (November 26, 1927)

Schuman's comment was that the reports of revolts were "wholly without foundation" and the other articles "differed only in the degree of their inaccuracy."[30]

By that time twenty-one other governments, including Britain, France and Japan, had recognized the Government of the Soviet Union, but that made no difference to the United States. A few radicals and liberals urged that we could not always ignore the government of so vast an area, but the great majority were content with keeping the Red contamination out of the country,

[29] **The *New York Times*, November 5, 1926.**
[30] **Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 325.**

officially at least. A series of economic and political earthquakes was required to change this outlook.

Events Compel Recognition. The first of these world-shaking events was the tremendous explosion of paper values in Wall Street in October 1929. The Coolidge-Hoover boom burst with such titanic force that unemployment, misery and hunger spread around the earth. Not only had great sums of money from all parts of the capitalist world gone up in the smoke of the Wall Street eruption, but the floor of American loans upon which world prosperity was supported was suddenly jerked from under the nations. The American loans had been made recklessly and riotously. Then suddenly the picture changed. Instead of possessing total confidence, we had none. Creditors sought to collect, first in Austria, and couldn't. Result: financial panic sweeping to Germany, then to Britain and back to the United States.

In these years of bitter bread it appeared also that the Soviet Union was not filled with unemploymènt and want. Under the regimentation of the Soviet planned economy everybody had a job and life went on as usual, except for some hardships caused by the disruption of world trade. This phenomenon led multitudes of Americans to develop a great interest in this strange economy which had been supposed to collapse presently, but instead our own had. What made this new system tick? Many people were not so certain that Washington should never speak to Moscow.

Similarly, the world political situation broke up beneath our complacent, politically isolationist feet. The Japanese seized the golden moment of the world economic collapse to take over Manchuria and start on that imperial march through apparently defenseless China which soon carried them to Singapore and beyond. In Germany, too, the great American depression gave the death blow to the facade Republic which the Allies had set up. Hitler's Nazi Party mushroomed suddenly into control of Germany, for purposes which only the blind could ignore.

It was this concatenation of economic and political disaster which led the new Roosevelt Administration to recognize the Soviet Government on November 16, 1933. The League of Nations had not unnaturally failed to restrain Japan, when the two giant neighbors between which she lay were non-members. It was equally certain that Hitler would go unrestrained if the two most powerful countries on earth continued to hold completely aloof from each other. In their exchange of messages both President Roosevelt and President Kalinin found it possible to agree that this was an abnormal situation.

The terms of the American-Soviet agreement expressly waived all Soviet claims for damages due to the American intervention in Russia during 1918–21 and contained the following promises which the Soviets regarded as disavowals of any new American intervention and we accepted as assurances that we would not be subverted by propaganda. Each party agreed:

> To respect the right of the other to order its own life in its own way within its jurisdiction and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.

2. To refrain and restrain all persons in government service from any act liable to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order or security of the other, and especially any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, agitation or propaganda, favoring a change in the political or social order.
3. Not to permit the formation on its territory of any organization having as its aim an attempt on the territorial integrity of the other or to aid or subsidize such organization.
4. Not to permit formation of a group on its territory, and to prevent the activity of such a group, aiming at bringing about a change in the political or social order of the other.[31]

For us the sixteen years of non-recognition of the Soviet Union is a forgotten incident, one of those times when we righteously held aloof from a strange and unproved regime. To the citizens of the Soviet Union, and especially to its continuing leadership, this unique gap in the diplomatic intercourse between great nations must leave a different and deeper meaning, one much more difficult to forget. The memory of long ostracism is likely to persist.

Russo-German Friendship. We have never had any experience in the role of an outcast nation. For both Germany and Russia the experience was bitter in the years after 1920. It was not until April 10, 1922, that they were invited to the important economic conference at Genoa, as poor relations permitted to attend, but "tolerated on a strictly inferior footing."[32] At the Conference Chicherin offered to recognize Russia's pre-war debts, on condition that Russia's counter claims for Allied intervention in Russia be considered. In the bill which he presented these claims amounted to $60,000,000,000. Chicherin pointed out that in 1872 an arbitration tribunal had awarded the United States $15,000,000 damages on account of the losses caused to it by one Confederate ship built in Great Britain. Was not Russia entitled to compensation for the infinitely greater damages wrought on her soil by Allied intervention?

The Allied governments firmly refused to admit that the Soviet arguments had any validity and were dumfounded when the outlaw Germans and Russians went over to the neighboring town of Rapallo and made a treaty, on April 16, 1922, which was the basis of cordial relations between them until Hitler came to power. Their understanding was so close that the German Reichswehr was soon very active in Russia, reorganizing and training the new Red army and at the same time practising with all sorts of new military weapons denied it by the Treaty of Versailles. In this fashion did the German Junkers repay the Allies for leaving them in control of the German army and government. Under their tutelage the Red army became a formidable military force.

Soviet Promotion of Disarmament and Peace Pacts. Though not desired as a member of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union was invited as early as

[31] **The *New York Times*, November 18, 1933.**
[32] **Henry C. Wolfe, *The Imperial Soviets*, New York, 1940, p. 28.**

1927 to the sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. On November 30, 1927, Foreign Minister Litvinov presented a plan for general and complete disarmament, the discussion of which was postponed to the next session. In the following February he offered another plan for total disarmament containing sixty-three articles, but only the German and Turkish representatives supported it. On March 23, 1928, he presented a third plan for partial disarmament but could not get a date set for its discussion.[33]

Soviet Russia was not invited to the conference of August 28, 1928, in Paris which adopted the Kellogg-Briand Pact, since she did not have diplomatic relations with the United States. However, she promptly accepted this pact for the renunciation of war and soon persuaded all of her neighbors to sign the Litvinov Protocol, which put the Pact into effect between them and the Soviet Union. The representatives of Latvia, Esthonia, Poland and Rumania signed on February 9,1929, and Lithuania, Turkey and Persia soon followed.[34]

In the World Disarmament Conference which met in Geneva in 1932, Litvinov recalled Russia's efforts toward disarmament in a speech on February 11, 1932. He declared that the World War should have been the last war and that "what is required of us is to find effective means to put an end to war."[35]

In the summer of 1933, Litvinov drew up a definition of aggression to which the adherence of all countries was invited. The convention declared that "every state has an equal right to independence, security, defense of its territory and free development of its state system." Article II defined an aggressor as any state which should be the first to commit any of the following acts:

1. Declaration of war upon another State;
2. Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
3. Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of another State;
4. Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;
5. Provision of support to armed bands formed on its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take on its own territory all the measures in its power to deprive these bands of all assistance or protection.[36]

This Convention for the Definition of Aggression was signed between Russia and her neighbors, Afghanistan, Esthonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania and Turkey, and was soon accepted by many other governments.[37]

[33] **Eugene A. Korovine, "The U.S.S.R. and Disarmament," *International Conciliation* No. 292, September 1933, pp. 298–300.**

[34] **Malbone W. Graham, Jr., "The Soviet Security System," *Ibid.*, No. 252, September 1929, pp. 88–9.**

[35] **Yakhontoff, *U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy*, New York, 1945, p. 87.**

[36] **Arthur Upham Pope, *Maxim Litvinoff*, New York, L. B. Fischer, 1943, p. 286.**

[37] **James T. Shotwell and Max M. Laserson, *Poland and Russia, 1919–1945*, New York, 1945, p. 18.**

All of these initiatives by Litvinov in the direction of disarmament and limiting aggression were heavily, if not completely, discounted by the Western diplomats. They found it impossible to believe that the dreaded Communist state really had pacific purposes. On his side, Litvinov doubtless knew that some of his disarmament proposals would cause embarrassment without being accepted. Yet there is no reason to question the sincerity of his desire to prevent another war. The Soviet Union had nothing to gain by it and much to lose. The Five Year Plans had provided a promising base for an industrialized Russia, but only the foundation. Both domestic prosperity and military security had still to be attained, and might never be achieved if the Soviet Union were attacked by ambitious aggressive nations from both the West and the East.

Growing Fear of Invasion. It was the fear of a simultaneous assault on the U.S.S.R. by both Japan and Germany which made Litvinov a sincere advocate of collective security. The Soviet leaders had no illusions about their situation. They had read in the Japanese Tanaka memorial about "the inevitability of crossing swords with Russia on the fields of Mongolia." They had pondered Hitler's declaration in ***Mein Kampf*** about reversing "the eternal German migration to the South" and looking Eastwards toward new soil in "Russia and her subject Border States."

The danger in the East led the Soviets to put aside the humiliation of their ejection from China by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 and renew diplomatic relations with China in December 1932. In the West, Litvinov toured the European capitals in early 1933, signing non-aggression and mutual assistance pacts with France, Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, and by the end of the year he had covered 1800 miles of the Soviet Union borders with a contiguous chain of non-aggression pacts.[38] All of these were drawn in strict accordance with the authority and jurisdiction of the League of Nations.[39]

At the London World Economic Conference in June 1933 he collected the signatures of ten states to his definition of aggression. In the same gathering the ***Hugenberg Memorandum*** openly angled for support of German expansion at Russia's expense.[40]

The conference failed, and with it Litvinov's offer to buy a billion dollars worth of goods from the depression wracked West, if the creditors would grant long term credits and accept goods in repayment. Trade experts thought the plan sound. The Soviets had not defaulted on a single commercial payment.[41] However, the nations had so ringed themselves around with tariffs and other economic defenses that they could not easily take a return flow of Russian goods, even if they had not been nervous about Russian "dumping."

For Litvinov the London Economic Conference was a triumph. In addition to the other achievements noted above he had smoothed out a British embargo on Russian trade and prepared the way for American recognition. He had

[38] Miriam Farley, "Russia Warms to the League," *Current History,* July 1934, Vol. 140, pp. 402–5.

[39] Samuel N. Harper, editor, *The Soviet Union and World Problems,* Chicago, 1935, p. 160.

[40] The *New York Times,* June 20, 1933.

[41] *Ibid.,* June 15, 1933.

also given assurances that during recent years the Third International had "much diminished its efforts to bring about a world revolution."

World Revolution Subordinated. This assurance was highly suspect. Actually a historic struggle had been fought out in the Communist Party, of which the world knew little, and it had ended in the defeat of the advocates of world revolution. As early as December 1925 the Fourteenth Congress of the Party had passed a resolution asserting that in Russia there was "every requisite for the building of a complete socialist society." Then Trotsky made a formidable combination with Zinoviev, Kamenev and many other party leaders to oppose the new thesis and to insist upon "permanent revolution." Several reverses abroad during 1927, notably in China, where Chiang Kai-shek dismissed all his Soviet advisers and made war on the Communist wing of the Kuomintang, led the bloc to charge that Stalin had betrayed the World Revolution. A great struggle ensued but the Fifteenth Party Congress supported Stalin by an overwhelming vote and expelled the Left Oppositionists. Trotsky was exiled to Alma Ata in Turkestan. Here, by his own account, he was allowed to exchange 3050 political letters and telegrams before being deported on February 12, 1929.[42]

Trotsky's defeat did not mean that all thought of world revolution in Russia had ended forever, but it did mean that the Party line had changed, that effort would now be concentrated on "building socialism" in Russia. It would have been strange if any other decision had been reached, since the world revolution was simply not getting anywhere. It had been proved a chimera—not a single country in Europe, or elsewhere, had joined the new economic church. If totalitarian socialism were to be "built" anywhere it had to be in Russia alone. For the Russian Communists in 1927–8 it was a case of here and now or never. The world revolution might be cherished as a far-off ideal, but it definitely had to be put in the background. There was every reason why Litvinov's statement that the efforts of the Third International had "much diminished" should be true. The West, however, found this difficult to believe so long as any activity of the Third International could be detected. Many continued to discount the realistic side of Soviet behavior in favor of a fixed idea that the real objects of all Soviet life and activity had been established forever during the early days of the Red revolution.

Nor did the collapse of Western prosperity after 1929 alter this ideological fixation. The number of communists in the West increased somewhat, but the controlling elements plumped for fascism, in terror lest the world revolution might really come about.

The Soviets Approach Geneva. With equal blindness the Kremlin continued to support the German Communists in their fratricidal war with the German Socialists until Hitler mastered both of them. Yet aside from this disastrous detail the Soviet leaders had no illusions abqut their world position. In an interview with Walter Duranty, on December 28, 1933, Stalin hoped that the reasonable elements in Japan would prevail, but the Soviet Union was forced

[42] **Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*, pp. 202–6.**

to prepare "because no nation can respect its government if it does not foresee the danger of attack and prepare for self defense."[43]

In the West the Soviet leaders observed the roaring munitions plants in Germany and drew their own conclusions from Germany's resignation from the League of Nations in October 1933, following that of Japan early in the year. If, said Stalin, the League of Nations is only the tiniest device "somewhat to slow down the drive toward war and help peace, then we are not against the League."[44]

This was Russia's reason for putting aside years of scoffing at the League of Nations as an aggregation of the powers which had intervened in Russia and only wanted to preserve the ***status quo.*** She now ceased to belong to the revisionist group and became a defender of the map of Europe as it existed. At the same time the Pilsudski regime in Poland revived its dreams of gaining territory from Czechoslovakia, Lithuania and the Ukraine and nursed its deep hostility toward Russia. Polish chauvinists convinced themselves that Hitler's field of expansion was really in the Balkans. Why not balance off Germany against Russia, and if the worst came go along with Germany, sharing in the spoils? Negotiations were opened with Germany and a Polish-German non-aggression pact was signed in January 1934. The ring of hostility which completely surrounded Nazi Germany up to this time was broken. Hitler spoke fair words about ending all differences with Poland. French and Russian diplomacy had suffered a smashing defeat, which was only partly repaired by the formation of a Balkan Entente in February 1934, including Turkey.

The real counter-weight to German ambitions was found in Russia's entry into the League of Nations, on September 18, 1934, after severe denunciations by Switzerland, Belgium, Portugal and Argentina.

Of course the Soviet Union did not come to Geneva to save the League of Nations from disintegration and failure. The Soviets came to save themselves from attack, probably on two fronts. At the worst they hoped that friendship and cooperation with the western democracies through the League would keep them from being attacked by Germany in case they were invaded by Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union could best save itself by becoming a loyal member of the League of Nations, by accepting the principles and rules for keeping the peace which the West had originated and set down in the League Covenant, and by trying to secure a better application of the Covenant than had occurred in the past. Soviet interests coincided with those of the League. If the League stiffened and kept the peace, Russia would be saved with it from the disaster of another war. So, too, would everybody.

On its side the West was compelled to accept the Soviet Union as a world power for similar reasons. She might be useful as a counter-weight to the aggressive imperialisms of Japan and Germany.

[43] **The *New York Times*, December 28, 1933.**
[44] ***Ibid.***

CHAPTER IV

FASCISM APPEASED

1934–1938

The U.S.S.R. at Geneva. In his speech of September 18, 1934, accepting membership in the League of Nations, Litvinov plunged to the point of Russia's interest in the League. "War," he said, "must appear to all as the threatening danger of tomorrow. The organization of peace, for which, thus far, very little has been done, must be set against the extremely active organization of war. Everybody knows now that the exponents of the idea of war, open promulgators of a refashioning of the map of Europe and Asia by the sword, are not to be intimidated by paper obstacles." Then he stated in strong terms his belief in the indivisibility of peace and his belief that "any war will bring misfortune to all countries, whether belligerents or neutrals."

What Litvinov said in these years at Geneva was convincing. At Geneva I listened to him in League meetings many times, sharing the impression of others that he was sincere. He spoke in English, so that inflections and emphasis could readily be cpnnected with his words. But did he truly represent his Government? The answer was that he did, because the success of the League and Russia's preservation from aggression were so obviously related. As Sumner Welles put it: "When the Soviet Union entered the League, even the most obstinate were soon forced to admit that it was the only major power which seemed to take the League seriously. The Soviet Government seemed to believe that the Covenant of the League meant what it said."[1]

Barthou Killed. A few days later, October 9, 1934, the one man whose firm policy could have prevented the Second World War was killed at Marseilles, along with King Alexander of Yugoslavia, by a representative of the Croatian Ustaschi, a movement with fascist connections in Rome, Budapest and Berlin. Barthou, as French Foreign Minister, saw clearly that Hitler could not be restrained by words, no matter how appeasing, but only by power. He saw, also, that the necessary power could be obtained only in Moscow. He it was who brought Russia into the League and laid the basis for a Franco-Russian Mutual Assistance Pact. Barthou was a strong man, of the Right in French politics. He might have stopped the decay of France and changed the whole course of world history had he lived.

After him came the shifty Pierre Laval, who, in April 1935, finally did sign a treaty of alliance with Russia, so hedged with reservations that it virtually nullified French aid to Russia. Then he procrastinated in ratifying it, finally throwing the treaty into the Parliament instead of sending it to the President,

[1] **Sumner Welles, *The Time For Decision*, New York and London, Harper, 1944, p. 31.**

thus making it a heated issue of French politics. Ratification was not completed in the Senate until March 13, 1936, after Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland.

Laval preferred the French Rightist view that security would best be attained by concessions to Germany, by cooperating with Britain and especially by friendship with Italy, with whom he had an understanding in January 1935 which opened the way for Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia. A month later Laval collaborated with Sir John Simon, British Foreign Minister, in preparing a disarmament plan which would be acceptable to Germany. Instead of the Eastern Locarno arrangement which Barthou and Litvinov had proposed, a Western Air Pact was advanced, one which would leave Hitler a free hand in the East. Russia was not notified of this project until after it had been widely publicized.[2]

Conscription in Germany. In March 1935, Germany decreed universal military service, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty. In the League Council Litvinov demanded:

> "What is to be done if a country which demands or assumes the right to arm is exclusively led by people who have publicly announced as the programme of their foreign policy a policy which consists, not only in revenge, but in the unrestricted conquest of foreign territory and the destruction of the independence of whole States—under the leadership of people who have publicly announced such a programme and who, far from repudiating it, are ceaselessly disseminating it and educating their people in its spirit?"

Neither from London nor Paris did he receive any answer. A Soviet-Czech Pact of Mutual Assistance, signed May 16, 1935, did a little to restore the balance, but only a little since it was dependent on fulfillment by France of her obligations to Czechoslovakia. On June 18, Hitler achieved a far greater triumph in his naval treaty with Great Britain. In this treaty Hitler agreed to hold his naval construction, except in submarines, to 35 per cent of British strength, ***for all time***, gloated Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell, British First Lord of the Admiralty, triumphantly![3] In submarines Germany was to have 45 per cent of Britain's tonnage, but should the situation change in the opinion of Germany she could increase her U-boat tonnage to 100 per cent.

Anglo-German Naval Treaty. In all the history of an unreal period this is one of the most unbelievable events. When Hitler decreed conscription in March, Britain protested mildly, and before the month was out invited him to negotiate a naval treaty which breached the Treaty of Versailles still further. The idea was to limit the German navy while it was still young, and to oblige, Hitler made a speech on May 21, 1935, denying that he had any territorial designs on any of his neighbors, neither France, Austria nor

[2] C. G. Haines and R. J. S. Hoffman, *The Origins and Background of the Second World War*, New York, Oxford, 1943, p. 363.

[3] Wickham Steed, "The Innocents Abroad," *The Fortnightly*, August 1935, Vol. 144, p. 149.

Czechoslovakia. With such music in their ears the British leaders felt they had done a fine stroke of business in the naval treaty. German submarines had almost starved England out of the First World War, sinking 1,000,000 tons of shipping a month in the Spring of 1918. Only the convoy system and timely American aid had saved her. Yet in June 1935 London cheerfully granted a maniacal German ruler with absolute power in his hands the right to build as many submarines as Britain had, if he saw fit.

Not only that: they made this treaty without consultation with France, who was as much concerned as anyone. Needless to say, there was no thought of conserving Russia's interests. Germany was conceded a navy which would dominate the Baltic Sea completely.

ETHIOPIA ABANDONED

It was after this demonstration of desire, above everything else, to propitiate Hitler and to legalize his aggrandizements, that the Baldwin Government turned to the issue of restraining Italian aggression in Ethiopia.

Mussolini had had his "incident" at Wal Wal in December 1934, and had been pouring troops through the Suez Canal for eight months before Sir Samuel Hoare, new British Foreign Minister, went to Geneva early in September 1935, sternly to lead the League of Nations in imposing economic sanctions on Italy.

Peace Ballot Mandate. How could this miracle be? The answer is to be found in the remarkable unofficial National Declaration, or Peace Ballot, conducted in Britain by the League of Nations Union and dozens of supporting organizations. Ballots containing four questions were distributed to all British voters and 11,640,066, or 38·2 per cent of the total electorate, signed and returned them. This huge poll registered a majority of 95·9 per cent for continued membership in the League of Nations and comparable majorities for arms limitation "by international agreement." On the crucial sanctions question, 86·8 per cent voted for economic sanctions and 58·7 per cent for military sanctions. On this last and most vital of questions 6,833,803 voted for military sanctions, only 366,803 against and 2,381,485 abstained.[4]

This unprecedented expression of popular will placed the Tory Cabinet in a predicament. They had done their best to ridicule and frustrate the National Declaration, but its results, when announced June 28, 1935, were too impressive to be ignored. The Baldwin Government, excepting Anthony Eden, were strongly opposed to collective security, preferring to regulate world politics themselves by power-balancing bargains. On June 18, 1935, they had received the report of the Maffey Commission, an inter-ministerial body which saw no harm in Italian absorption of Ethiopia. Their whole instinct was to go along,

[4] ***The National Declaration on the League of Nations and Armaments*, London, King & Garrett, 1938, p. 16. This ballot was anathema to the Tory leaders when it was taken, and Tory writers usually misrepresent it by alleging that the woolly minded voters were led into voting for mutually contradictory things, i.e. sanctions and disarmament, or for sanctions by "the other nations." But in 1935 no one was in doubt as to the meaning of this term. It meant the nations other than the aggressor, not other than Great Britain. Arms limitation meant real international agreement, not a private deal with Hitler.**

since the last thing they desired was the unseating of Mussolini, that mighty regimenter of the Italian masses. Yet there was the compelling mandate of the National Declaration.[5]

In these circumstances it was decided to proclaim loudly that the League was "the sheet anchor of British policy," as Baldwin did on July 23, and try to buy Mussolini off privately, persuading him to take most of Ethiopia without force. He, however, was determined to have it in no other way. Fifteen years of struttings and rantings about the beauties of force called for some kind of conquest, rough fascist conquest.

Duplicity at Geneva. Sir Samuel Hoare accordingly told the House of Commons, on August 1, that rashness in dealing with the Ethiopian affair "however courageous it might be, would be folly to the point of criminal folly" and went to Geneva to impose such sanctions upon Italy as would not interfere with the conquest of Ethiopia. Public opinion compelled the show of sanctions, but behind the scenes Mussolini would be assured that they would not hurt him and that the British and French would help him get what he wanted.

So at Geneva Hoare agreed privately with Laval, on September 10, that nothing serious was contemplated. Laval told the Chamber of Deputies, on December 28, 1935, that "we found ourselves instantaneously in agreement on ruling out military sanctions, not adopting measures of naval blockade, never contemplating the closure of the Suez Canal—in a word ruling out everything that might lead to war."[6]

Hoare thus gave Laval a veto on any pressures that might really hurt Italy. This was confirmed by Under Secretary Cranbome in the House of Commons, March 2, 1936, when he declared that "His Majesty's Government have repeatedly made it clear that it would not in any event take isolated action." This done, Hoare mounted the rostrum of the League Assembly, September 11, the day after his agreement with Laval, and made a firm, even moving, declaration of loyalty to the League. His Government would be "second to none in the intention to fulfill, within the measure of its capacity, the obligations which the Covenant lays upon it."[7]

Deceit in Britain. All knowledge of Laval's character precludes any doubt that he kept Mussolini informed that there was to be no "war" on him, only dumb show to impress the British voters and enable the London Government to win an election, which it did on November 15,1935, under the slogan "Our Word is Our Bond." The deception was so convincing that the British voters gave an overwhelming majority to a Cabinet which had no use for collective security and no intention of making it work or of permitting it to work. Believing they had installed a strong pro-League government, the British voters had actually placed in power, by a 431 to 184 majority in the House of Commons, a government which would abandon the League at every turn and build up Mussolini and Hitler to the point where they were completely

[5] Schuman, *Europe on the Eve,* New York, Knopf, 1938, pp. 173–4.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 180–1.
[7] The author observed the sessions of the League of Nations in Geneva during this period.

uncontrollable, except at the cost of mobilizing all the military power in the world against them.

The Baldwin electoral victory, so catastrophic for all mankind, having been won, it was found that the Committee of Eighteen in Geneva was moving toward adding oil, coal, iron and steel to the sanction list. Laval secured two postponements of this committee, during which ten League states, including the U.S.S.R. which supplied 74–3 per cent of all Italian imports of oil, expressed approval of the proposed new sanctions.[8] Something had to be done, for unless Ethiopia could be conquered before the long season of rains set in, the oil sanctions alone might frustrate the conquest. Something had to be done since both Britain and France had promised Mussolini "that there was no intention of enforcing sanctions that were 'military'." The oil-coal-iron sanctions, said the Duce, were military. He would regard their enforcement as war. So, says Neville Chamberlain's official biographer, "the spirit of the League pointed to a double policy: to intimidate the aggressor but to attempt conciliation," especially since it was known full well that Laval would never fight Italy.[9]

Hoare-Laval Deal. Hoare was accordingly sent to Paris and on December 8 he made a deal with Laval awarding most of Ethiopia to Italy, which blew him temporarily out of the Cabinet and aroused a storm of indignation around the world. But the oil sanction had also been nullified.

Litvinov's Dissent. On September 6 Litvinov had said to the Council: "I have to make a statement upon a question which does not directly affect the interests of my country but which may have the gravest consequences for the whole of international life, for the fate of the League of Nations, for the cause of general peace and consequently, sooner or later for my country."

This was his consistent position. If the League's law were not defended the consequences would eventually come home to everybody, including his own country. He accordingly asked that the League "stand firm on the principle that there can not be justification for military operations except in self defense." Before the League acted, Russia had also prohibited the export of war materials to Italy and imposed financial sanctions.[10]

When nothing remained except to pronounce funeral orations over Ethiopia, Litvinov said, on July 1, 1936: "We are gathered here to close a page in the history of the League of Nations, the history of international life, which it will be impossible to read without a feeling of bitterness." His Government had from the outset held "a perfectly clear and firm standpoint." He rejected the argument that there was something wrong with the Covenant and maintained that "Article 16 has provided the League of Nations with such a powerful weapon that any aggression could be broken if it were brought into full play." Nor was the League's lack of complete universality an excuse. Was the League to be suited to those who "swear by the principle

[8] Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

[9] Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. 271, 273; London, Macmillan, 1946.

[10] The *New York Times*, September 8, 1935.

of collective security, but in practice are ready to carry it out only when it coincides with the interests of their country?" He did "not want a League that is safe for aggressors." In the Ethiopian case the League had "made a huge step forward in comparison with the past." Let it now be equipped with a strong definition of aggression. Assurance was also needed "that in all cases of aggression, irrespective of the degree of concern in the conflict, sanctions will be applied by all." He "would like to believe that mankind will not have to undergo yet another Armageddon," for "we must recognize that at the present time there is not one State, large or small that is not open to aggression, and that if the next war spares one State or another she must, sooner or later, attract the longing eyes of the victorious aggressor." Now "more than ever before," he concluded, "the League of Nations is an international necessity. It must live. It must be stronger than ever."[11]

This clear conception of the indivisibility of peace was poignantly active in the minds of countless individuals in the summer of 1936. Comparable statements had also been made by officials of the small powers, who had everything to lose by war. But never had any representative of a Great Power stood in the halls of the League and declared in forthright, ringing sentences the principle upon which the life of every nation depended. The principle might be ignored. It might be said that of course some dark, hidden motive was behind such apparently obvious truth, but the indivisibility of peace was certain to be proved in every succeeding month.

London Embittered. Countless British citizens felt as deeply the significance and lessons of the Ethiopian crisis, as I vividly recall from being among them at the time, but not the British Government. Chamberlain's biographer scoffs at the "profound insincerity" of the Covenant, at the idea that "we were pledged to keep by force the frontier of every existing State and to protect an indivisible peace by making every war universal."

Chiseling away in one sentence the whole conception of collective security, Feiling goes on to complain that "as Baldwin openly said, any sanction involved a danger of war. To many minds the implications of the Covenant were morally repugnant." Then he portrays the benighted condition of Ethiopia; explains how natural it was for Mussolini to decide to take Ethiopia; condones Laval's pact with Mussolini ("Was he to be asked to sacrifice this fair future for Abyssinia?"); notes how "with great soldierly endurance the Italians beat down Abyssinia's resistance," without mentioning their dropping poison gas on the helpless natives; and relates how Hitler's march into the Rhineland "flowed from the accursed matter of Abyssinia."[12]

From the standpoint of the men who ruled Britain the Abyssinian affair had been an unrelieved disaster. Public opinion had forced them, publicly and inexorably, to go through the motions of applying sanctions to Italy. Then to prevent the sanctions from succeeding their spokesman had bunglingly brought down on their heads a world explosion of wrath and repulsion, most

[11] ***Against Aggression*, a book of speeches by Litvinov, New York, International Publishers, 1939, pp. 35–45.**

[12] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, pp. 261–78.**

violent of all in Britain. The British Navy had been mobilized in the Mediterranean only to watch the Italian troops pour through Suez, thumbing their noses at it. Chamberlain himself had written privately that "by putting his great army on the other side of the Suez Canal Mussolini has tied a noose around his own neck, and left the end hanging out for anyone with a Navy to pull,"[13] but the chafing British Navy never got the orders to pull it. Yet Italy had been antagonized, maybe spoiled for use against Germany, France was divided and disgruntled, and Hitler emboldened.

MILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND ACCEPTED

From the Tory standpoint the situation could hardly be worse, except that out of it, and under false pretences, they had gotten a new five-year term of office. Hereafter there would be no nonsense about collective security. British gentlemen would decide what was good for the world and arrange it by the old methods of balance of power politics. Had Hitler suddenly smashed both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact by occupying the Rhineland with troops and guns on March 7, 1936? Let him. The British Government would have no more sanctions. Did not Hitler's bayonets carry olive branches offering five new treaties, something for everybody? In the Locarno Treaty Britain was a guarantor, but she now became a mediator and the French Government supinely submitted to the supreme bluff of Hitler's invasion.

All the laws upon which the world's peace rested were on the side of the French. Their army was still far superior, but the French Rightists feared Hitler far less than their own Left or Moscow. Did they not also have their own impregnable Maginot line? Why go beyond it?

In this fashion the last chance to restrain Hitler's Germany at small cost was lost. At once he furiously matched the Maginot line with his West Wall, locking his front door so firmly that the British and French Governments would thereafter be powerless to check him or to prevent him from working his will in Central and Eastern Europe. Were there statesmen in London and Paris who foresaw that with easy resignation? Or was their simplicity of mind so great that they could not see one move ahead in the game they played? Certainly each one of France's small allies in Central Europe knew what Hitler's move meant.

Litvinov's Warning. Litvinov also had no difficulty in assessing the gravity of what was being done. On March 17, 1936, ten days after Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, he spoke to the League Council, meeting in London at the request of the British Government, noting that "in the course of the brief period of eighteen months that the Soviet Union has been a member of the League of Nations this is the third time that her representative on the Council of the League has had occasion to express himself in connection with the violation of international obligations."

The League could not be preserved, continued Litvinov, if we closed our eyes to the violation of treaties, including the Covenant itself, and if it

[13] ***Ibid.*, p. 273.**

"accustomed aggressors to ignore all its recommendations, all its warnings and all its threats."

Taking up Hitler's excuse that the Franco-Soviet Pact was an offensive threat "exclusively directed against Germany," he showed that it could not come into operation unless Hitler committed an act of aggression. Answering Hitler's charge that under the Pact France arrogated to herself the right to decide "who is the aggressor," Litvinov quoted the declaration in Hitler's ***Mein Kampf,*** which urged Germany never to "permit the rise of two continental powers in Europe." It was now "a question of establishing the hegemony of Germany throughout the whole European continent." Certainly "neither the foreign policy of the present German Government nor the ceaseless preaching during the past three years in Germany of aggression and international hatred and the glorification of the war spirit" permitted us to agree that there was any new reason for the militarization of the Rhineland. No one was threatening Germany, making any territorial claims on her, or even publishing any literature to that effect.

The Soviet Union was opposed to everything that would bring war nearer, "if only by one month," but it was "also opposed to hasty decisions dictated by fear and other emotions rather than a sober contemplation of reality, decisions which, while seemingly removing the causes of hypothetical war today, create every condition for actual war tomorrow." After this penetrating description of the appeasement process, Litvinov closed by declaring "on behalf of my Government that it is ready to take part in all measures that may be proposed to the Council of the League by the Locarno Powers and will be acceptable to the other members of the Council."[14]

Buckingham Palace Cold. Litvinov's plea for action was supported by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, but the decisive vote of Britain was cast in the negative. The British had asked that the Council meet in London, rather than in Geneva, partly at the suggestion of King Edward VIII, and the sessions were held in Buckingham Palace, where the King had no difficulty in telling the delegates individually how he felt about the issue. He was definitely opposed to any action against Germany and as definitely opposed to Soviet Russia. His father, King George V, who was a cousin of the murdered Tsar Nicholas II, "could not mention the Bolsheviks without exploding into Royal profanity,"[15] and his son shared his feelings.[16]

The French, who were fairly united on moving their army into the Rhineland, also found the atmosphere in London very hostile to them. British public opinion justly blamed Laval for his leading role in sabotaging the

[14] Litvinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–34. In 1928 Litvinov had read and re-read *Mein Kampf* until he almost memorized it. As late as 1936 an enquiry at Geneva brought out that Benes, Herriot, Daladier, Eden and others had not read it. In October 1938—after Munich—Neville Chamberlain instructed the Foreign Office to translate some excerpts for him. —Pope, *Maxim Litvinov,* pp. 317–18.

[15] Alfred Crofts, Professor of History, University of Denver, in a radio talk "Common Sense About Russia," *Journeys Behind the News*, Vol. 9, No. 40, June 24, 1947, p. 1.

[16] Pope, *op. cit.*, pp. 380–1.

League sanctions against Italy. Now there was a strong tendency to let France stew in her own juice.

All this favored the decision of the British Cabinet, with some dissent from Eden, not to do anything about the Rhineland. This attitude had been confidently and forcibly conveyed to Hitler by Ribbentrop, his Ambassador to London, and had enabled him to convince his generals that the Rhineland coup would succeed.[17]

Hitler's First Triumph. This was not an easy task. When the decision to march into the Rhineland was announced to General Werner von Blomberg, then Chief of Staff, he fainted completely away, and when the American military attaché in Moscow brought the news to the German military attaché the latter turned white.[18] From the military point of view the stroke was foolish. The German troops had inadequate artillery and lacked ammunition. They were, by universal report, under orders to withdraw if they met opposition. But Hitler was sure there would be no opposition. He had correctly taken the measure of his opponents and knew that when the British Government refused to move, the French would not dare to do so. Their own Rightist press was fulminating furiously on Hitler's side, agreeing with him that the Franco-Russian Pact had justified Hitler's blow. German industrialists had also done their work well among their associates in the democracies, especially in Britain, explaining that Hitler's real aim was to suppress communism.

Locarno Liquidated. Thus perished the great Locarno Treaty which had been hailed in 1925 as the shaken-down, sober and sensible answer to Europe's deep longing for security against another war. After the tremendous blow at world confidence in the guarantees of the League which the abstention of the United States from Geneva had caused, the many threatened nations on the Continent sought to stiffen the League with new and tighter guarantees. Both the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance submitted by the 1923 Assembly and the still more famous Geneva Protocol of 1924 had been rejected by Britain and the Dominions as creating too wide-sweeping obligations.

Then under the compulsion of doing something to ward off another war the British and Germans had brought forward the idea of a right and tight little treaty just covering the world's danger spot, the Franco-German frontier. Since Britain would have to fight anyway whenever war came to the Low Countries, she would guarantee not only France, but Germany. Nothing more, however, not Poland or Czechoslovakia or anything outside of her own neighborhood. Just that much. A "realistic" arrangement, yet somewhat comforting to all the nations threatened with another German eruption, especially since the demilitarization of the Rhineland was enshrined in the Locarno Treaty as firmly as in the Treaty of Versailles.

That was in 1925. Now in 1936 the British Government made a distinction between an invasion of France and the militarization of a part of Germany. The famed Locarno guarantee evaporated in the very contingency it was meant to meet. Hitler had dazzled the British Cabinet with suggestions that

[17] **André Simone, *Men of Europe*, New York, 1941, pp. 224–5.**

[18] **Pope, *op. cit.*, p. 378.**

he might now sign the Western Air Pact which the British so much desired and by which they hoped to make Britain as safe in the air as their naval treaty of 1935 with him had made them safe (in their own minds) on the sea. The ***New York Times'*** correspondent reported on March 8 from London that "a chance to obtain a solid counter-value for a hopeless item on the balance sheet appears attractive to practical politicians in London."

Hitler's push-over militarization of the Rhineland removed the last opportunity to stop his career of aggression, by the only means which he would respect. If he had been prevented from fortifying the demilitarized zone he would not have been free to attack all of his Eastern neighbors one at a time. Nor could he have started a war with France across an unfortified Rhineland. His mobility would have been gone, unless he could complete the internal disintegration of France, and even that would have been much more difficult.

SPAIN STRANGLED

French surrender to this militarization of the Rhineland opened wide the fascist assault on France. Having locked his own front door, Hitler, along with Mussolini, now boldly took possession of France's back door and in the process killed what was left of French spirit.

Nor was any time lost. In July 1936 a Rightist revolt was begun against the Popular Front Government of the Spanish Republic. The rebellion was planned in Berlin and Rome, as well as in Spain, and was instantly given military support by both Germany and Italy.

This move into Spain struck straight at the very life of France and equally directly at the imperial interests of both Britain and France. Axis control of Spain threatened Britain's "life line" through the Mediterranean as sharply as it could be done. Spain in the Axis camp also put France in mortal peril of having her communications with her African colonies cut, at the same time that she was surrounded by fascist states on all sides.

In this situation every instinct of self-preservation called for a firm British-French union to defeat this dangerous thrust to their very existence. For France especially the issue was mortal. Yet outwardly it was France in the person of Leon Blum, Socialist Premier of a Popular Front cabinet, which took the first step toward appeasing the Axis with "non-intervention." The voice was the feeble one of Blum, who feared both his determined Rightists and the loss of British support, but the directing hand was Britain's.[19]

"***Non-Intervention***." Britain at once insisted that the Non-Intervention Committee meet in London instead of Geneva. Some twenty-seven European governments were invited to join, and did so. This amounted to organizing a new ***ad hoc*** League of Nations under British control. The committee adopted an attitude of trying to prevent any military help from reaching either side—a completely new departure in international law and usage. The Spanish Government was a democratic one, legally elected by the whole Spanish people. By all past precedent it had the right to buy arms for its defense

[19] **Herbert L. Matthews, *The Education of a Correspondent*, New York, 1946, pp. 92–3.**

anywhere. It would be the insurgents who would have all the difficulties and be discriminated against, but this traditional situation was completely reversed. The Government was reduced to the same level as the rebels. Its fight for survival against its own rebels, plus Italy and Germany, was placed on the same moral basis as that of the rebels and the foreign governments intervening.

Embargoes on arms were laid against both sides. The democracies, with spasmodic exceptions in France, obeyed the rules. The Axis didn't. Italy sent everything she had, including troops totalling upwards of 100,000 men. In the Battle of Guadalajara an entire Italian army of men who had little desire to be in Spain was routed by the Republicans, the world's laughter so enraging the fascist Caesar that he almost bankrupted Italy to avenge his humiliation in Spain. In fact he so impoverished his already poor country that when the big war came he was helpless and had to wait until he could safely pounce upon the back of a stricken France.

Germany sent technicians, equipment of every kind, and troops. The Germans used the Spanish Republicans as guinea pigs upon which to test all of the new arms they were preparing to use on Europe. The bombing of Guernica, on April 26, 1937, was the classic example of this policy. Guernica was a town of several thousand people in the Basque country. It was not on any military front, but it was a sacred place to the Basque people. Its destruction would be a heavy moral blow to them, so the German aviators came on market day, when the town was crowded with peasants and ruthlessly obliterated the whole place. Then as the people fled out on a hub of roads they machine-gunned and bombed the roads. For a time Franco's sympathizers denied the crime. As G. L. Steer, correspondent of the ***New York Times***, wrote, the bombing "led to some of the most horrible and inconsistent lying heard by Christian ears since Ananias."[20]

In high quarters in London there was some embarrassment over this event, but no government leaders saw in it the coming destruction of Coventry, Plymouth, Rotterdam, Belgrade, and many other fair cities. Even toward the close of the Spanish war warnings that "the Ebro flows down Oxford Street" caused no alarm. London clung tenaciously to "Non-Intervention," setting up one device after another, including a naval blockade by the Western Big Four in which Germany and Italy guarded parts of Loyalist Spain. Plans for withdrawing the foreign "volunteers" were soberly proposed and as solemnly pursued, even after Anthony Eden resigned from the Cabinet on February 20, 1938, partly because his colleagues would not insist on an actual withdrawal of some Italian troops. In the long three years before the Spanish people were finally conquered, their resistance sorely tried the wise men in London and deeply irked the Caesars in Rome and Berlin. What they had all thought would be quickly over, after the blanket of "Non-Intervention" was drawn over the Spanish tragedy, went on and on. The slowness of Spain's execution was most exasperating. Mussolini complained to Chamberlain at Munich on October 2, 1938, that he was "fed up" with the Spanish business, where he had already lost 50,000 men.[21]

[20] ***Ibid.*, p. 121.**

[21] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 375.**

Popular Front. The resistance of the Spanish people was one of the epics of the whole period of the Second World War. Almost without arms they saved Madrid and Central Spain. Then they created an army, having to find officers where they could, since nearly all of the army officers were disloyal. Scrounging a little here and there, they obtained some arms from a world organized against them and fought fascism so long and so heroically that its revolting essence was stripped bare for all who would see. Herbert L. Matthews, one of the greatest of ***New York Times*** correspondents, went to cover the Loyalist side of the Spanish war in a state of "stark insensibility" about the issues involved, but six years after its grim conclusion, and after many other war experiences, he wrote: "I know, as surely as I know anything in this world, that nothing so wonderful will ever happen to me again as those two and a half years I spent in Spain. And it is not only I who say this, but everyone who lived through that period with the Spanish Republicans. Soldier or journalist, Spaniard or American, British or French, German or Italian, it did not matter. Spain was a melting pot in which the dross came out and pure gold remained. It made men ready to die gladly and proudly. It gave meaning to life; it gave courage and faith in humanity; it taught us what internationalism means, as no League of Nations or Dumbarton Oaks will ever do."[22]

But the 35,000 anti-fascists from all over the world who went to Spain, usually as individuals, could only help a little. Though a majority of them were recruited communists, a huge minority was composed of "volunteers" in the fullest sense of the word, but neither they nor the Spanish people could prevail against Franco's Moors, plus the military might of Germany and Italy.

Russia's Role. Throughout the struggle the fascist forces promoted the Red bogey, claiming that the Spanish Loyalists were all Red, and this charge was easily believed by conservatives everywhere. Yet when the war started there were only 50,000 Communists in all Spain. Militarily they excelled and gained much leadership, but politically the Socialists and Republicans held control until the end.[23]

Was it then Russia's intervention on the side of the Republic which damned it in the democratic world? All accounts agree that Axis intervention was instant and constant, from July 18, 1936 on. But it was not until October that the Soviets began to send limited aid to the Republic, aid which while it may have saved Madrid could never match the flood of arms to the other side. Matthews' comment is that Russia started late, did little and withdrew early.[24]

Diplomatically the Russian record is better. The democratic governments having hastily retired from Geneva, it was left to Litvinov to do what he could there.

Cold Front at Geneva. On five separate occasions, covering a period of two years, the Spanish Government appealed to the League of Nations for help against the organized aggression of the Axis, but always in vain. The real show was in London. In Geneva the same governments mumbled feebly some

[22] **Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 67.** [23] ***Ibid.*, p. 80.** [24] ***Ibid.*, p. 86.**

weak suggestions for relief or stonily ignored Spain's cry for aid. Only Soviet Russia spoke out plainly and strongly in Spain's behalf.[25]

The Spanish Government first called the League's attention to the international war which was raging in Spain on September 25, 1936. The warning was carefully ignored. Another appeal, when full documentary proof of Axis intervention was available, led only to a resolution hoping that "Non-Intervention" would be made stronger.

In May 1937 Spain appealed again to the League of Nations, whose Covenant was stern about intervention in any state's domestic affairs, as well as definite on what to do about international aggression. On May 28 Litvinov spoke, citing the indisputable evidence presented of armed intervention, reminding the Council that the Spanish Government would have coped with the rebellion long ago, if left alone, and warning that the safety of every European state was at stake. The League would be doomed if it was completely ignored and would stand aside in such cases. He added, also, that when the revolt broke out, his government had no diplomatic relations with Spain and not a single Soviet citizen in Spain.

French Independence at Stake. Earlier, on November 28, 1936, Litvinov had pointed out that it was "self-evident that Germany and Italy by no means need fascism in Spain for the sake of fascism as such or for the declarations of any ideological doctrine. Fascism is in this case a means of achieving entirely different and by no means ideological aims."[26] He thus referred to the obvious interest of Russia in preventing the power of the Axis from expanding at the expense of her ally France. It took no prophet to foresee that France could be so enervated and enfeebled morally by the events in Spain that her value as an ally would be destroyed.

Actually, that was precisely what happened. Feiling admits it in his statement that "the rivals were contesting for the soul of France." The moderate liberals who controlled the French Popular Front Government could never summon the courage to defy their embattled Rightists and save Spain. If they had, there might well have been civil conflict in France. They lacked the courage to risk that, so they assisted in the long strangulation of Spain and in the process killed the spirit and faith of their own people. As Feiling truly says: "Both in Britain and France the Left Wing found a Franco victory almost unendurable."[27] After living through the long agony of it the Left in France could not believe in anything. The whole nation was open to the Fascist cry that nothing mattered except to stay behind the Maginot Line.

Tory Victory. For the Right, too, their victory in Spain was as satisfying as the defeat of the Left was stupefying. Conservative opinion in Britain was united on the proposition that the war in Spain had been a civil war, that "non-intervention" had kept it limited, that recognition was a question of fact and that Franco was well disposed.[28]

Here in a sentence was the whole conservative case. It did not matter that

[25] **See Haines and Hoffman, *op. cit.*, pp. 430–1, for the dates of the Spanish appeals to the League.**

[26] **Litvinov, *op. cit.*, p. 65 .** [27] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 393 .** [28] ***Ibid.*, p. 393.**

a democracy had been killed and a nation restored to its ancient chains. In all the world no nation had been as privilege-ridden. Since the Napoleonic wars the Spanish Army had remained ludicrously bloated with generals who played politics and repressed liberal growth. Franco was only the latest of a long line of military politicos, who supported the feudal privileges of a host of great landlords. These magnates lived in luxury in Madrid and San Sebastian while hard-fisted foremen mercilessly drove the peasants on the land. Hunger was always rife in Spain and education always repressed by the Church, whose prelates presided over vast wealth, in mines, factories and land. Six times after 1767 the Jesuits had been driven out by the Spanish people, mainly for their "unshakeable habit of seeking and accumulating wealth. ... As late as 1931 the Jesuits controlled about one third of the national wealth."[29]

It was this long history of exploitation which had made church burning endemic in Spain since 1834. At Barcelona alone in 1909 some seventy churches and religious buildings had been burned. Widespread church burning during the civil war was only an extension of past resentments, but it had a mighty impact on Catholic opinion elsewhere.

American Complicity. In the United States it was the power of the Catholic hierarchy, coupled with isolationist zeal, which kept the United States firmly anchored to "Non-Intervention" until the end of the Spanish war. The authors of the neutrality laws, designed to keep us out of war, had not thought about civil wars until an enterprising American got together a few second-hand aircraft and some munitions to sell to the Spanish Republic. His temerity caused a convulsion on Capitol Hill in Washington. Frantic efforts were made to pass another law and get it signed before the tramp ship ***Mar Cantigo*** could put to sea. The law was just too late, though Franco's navy accounted for the ship on the other side.

Thereafter, the United States firmly adhered to Non-Intervention, in defiance of all past law, of our tradition of standing for human liberty and of our interest in turning back the fascist flood. Toward the close of the conquest of Spain, American opinion revolted and a Gallup poll showed 76 per cent in favor of lifting the arms embargo against the Spanish Republic, but it was not raised.[30]

This, too, was to be the outstanding blot on the diplomatic record of the Roosevelt Administrations. Former Under Secretary of State Welles wrote in his ***Time for Decision*** that it was "the cardinal error" of the long Roosevelt-Hull conduct of our foreign affairs—"of all our blind isolationist policies, the most disastrous."[31] Certainly it was a blunder which tied the United States in deeply with the policy of steady surrender to fascist conquests. With our aid the sacrifice of the Spanish people was nullified and they were restored to the ruthless rule of the old regime.

[29] Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

[30] American Institute of Public Opinion Surveys, 1938–9, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, October 1939, p. 600. The percentage of people in favor of the Republic increased from 65 per cent in February 1937 to 76 per cent in December 1938.

[31] Sumner Welles, *Time for Decision*, New York, Harpers, 1944, pp. 57, 61; London, H. Hamilton, 1944.

In the process a million Spaniards died, yet not in vain, for Spain had saved her soul. At a later time she would regain her liberty—unless the democratic governments kept Franco in power until communism came with the final cataclysm.

"Civil War." In the meantime, Conservative opinion in Britain was firmly united on the principle "that this had been a civil war." It had been, but not in the sense that the Conservatives meant. It had been a stage in a world civil war in which the victory of the Extreme Right in Spain had made the estates and rule of British Conservatism seem more secure—until the bombs rained on England, first the little ones, then the block busters, then the V-l's, then the V-2's, against which there was no defense—until the bid of the Fascists to rule the earth largely destroyed the economic base of the British Conservatives and deprived them of political power for many a day.

For the Soviet Union the new lessons in intervention administered in London were profoundly disturbing. She herself had suffered the long agony and turmoil of the Allied interventions from 1918 to 1920, sparked and led from London and Paris. Now she was forbidden to go to the aid of a member of the League of Nations fighting for its very life. The determination of the British leaders was absolute. As Feiling says: "With exemplary patience the British leaders in the non-intervention committee drove the rivals, Germany, Italy and Portugal on one side, and on the other Russia, through one deadlock to the next."[32] It was a set-up in which the Russians were caught in a vise. They could not win, when all the law was on their side and when their ally France was being reduced to a state of helplessness.[33]

AUSTRIA SACRIFICED

For Hitler intervention was altogether advantageous. While he was winning with force of arms, in defiance of the League Covenant and all other international law, flort-intervention firmly held the ring for him for as long as it might take to complete his conquest of Spain. This, however, was onerous and dangerous labor for the British rulers, since the outraged feelings of their people flamed dangerously high. So non-intervention was transformed into active intervention—to force Hitler's eastern neighbors to yield to him without a fight, lest the fight explode public opinion in Britain and France, or compel the formation of a common front with the U.S.S.R.

With Italy allied to Germany and deeply embroiled in Spain, the "solution" of the Austrian question was obviously indicated. Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Germany whose mission was appeasement, was told twice during September and October 1937 that Austria was the "first and last" German objective, and the usual offer was made not to interfere with Britain's power overseas if she would give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe. This offer was conveyed to London and an opportunity was made for Lord

[32] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 331.**

[33] **A monograph on *Communism and the Spanish Civil War*, by David T. Cattell, Berkeley, 1955, found that the Communists in Spain were "an insignificant revolutionary group of about a thousand in 1931." Russia was not trying to create a satellite in Spain, but "to stop the aggression of the Fascist states against herself" (pp. 211–12).**

Halifax to go over to Germany, ostensibly as a fox-hunter, and see the German leaders. With them he left the impression that London and Paris would not resist Hitler with force in Central Europe.

Hitler therefore moved in for the kill. In January, 1938 so many Nazi spies were in evidence in Austria that a raid was made and a plot for revolution and occupation by Germany discovered. On February 13, Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austria was hailed to Berchtesgaden, mercilessly browbeaten by Hitler and forced to give in to demands which enabled new hordes of German "tourists" and "commercial travellers" to invade Austria. Schuschnigg was trapped. None of the Western powers would lift a finger for him. His Clerical-Rightist backing was a minority in the country, the labor forces having been smashed with artillery in February 1934.[34]

Litvinov's Plea. In Geneva, Litvinov was still a voice crying in the wilderness. On February 1, 1938 he told a committee which was considering the "reform" of the Covenant that the League was strong enough to deal with the aggressor if it would. He warned that "rampant aggression spreading over all continents" was confronting all States, large and small, with danger. "Political and military autarchy, with all its burdensome increase in home armaments" was not enough. "The collective character of the committed aggression must inevitably impel the States toward collective security. Collective security is Article 16, and we must preserve it, and, when it is possible, make it stronger."[35]

Collective Security Denounced by Britain. No other way of escaping another conflagration was visible, but collective security was anathema to Britain. In the House of Commons, on February 22, 1938, Chamberlain repudiated the whole idea. He called upon the League to "throw off the shams and pretences" of sanctions and reduce itself simply to "a moral force to focus public opinion throughout the world." How much effect this would have on Hitler and Mussolini he did not promise, but on March 7 he made it totally clear to Austria that she must not look to the League for salvation, saying: "We must not try to delude small and weak nations into thinking that they will be protected by the League against aggression."[36]

Schuscfinigg's Defiance. This was as clear a repudiation of the central principle upon which the League was founded as could be invented. In desperation Chancellor Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite in Austria to determine whether Austria should be incorporated into Germany or remain independent. The vote was to be held in four days and it spoiled all plans for a peaceable Austrian demise. "It was the throw of a desperate gambler,"

[34] **Haines and Hoffman, *op. cit.*, pp. 424–6.**

[35] **Litvinov, *op. cit.*, p. 113.**

[36] **The *New York Times*, February 23, 1938; Haines and Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 427. On this occasion he spoke in "cold and almost brutal tones." When the House of Commons debated the rape of Austria, on March 14, Chamberlain's voice flamed with wrath. It was the cool insolence of the Germans "rather than the depravity of the crime itself" which enraged him.—John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich, Prologue to Tragedy*, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948, p. 35; London, Macmillan, 1948. This is the fullest and most revealing account of the Munich period yet published.**

complained Sir Nevile Henderson, adding: "I still do not believe, any more than I did at the time, that the rape of Austria in the form which it finally took, or at that date was definitely premeditated."[37]

Schuschnigg's pathetic last effort was definitely inconsiderate, since Hitler could not permit a democratic decision of Austria's future, especially one that might go against him. He had hastily and brutally to march into Austria and take the country with naked force.

Litvinov Warns Again. Very soon after he had done so Litvinov gave an interview to the press, on March 17, 1938, in which he said that after joining the League "for the purpose of organized collaboration with other peaceful states, the Soviet Government had not neglected a single opportunity to show its "readiness to take an active part in all measures designed to organize collective rebuffs to the aggressors. At the same time the Soviet Government gave warning that international passivity and the impunity of aggression in one case would fatally lead to the repetition and multiplication of such cases." Now not only the eleven countries "bordering on the aggressor" were in danger but all others, and not only in Europe. The "inevitable enslavement" of the small states would create the "prerequisites for pressure and even attack on big States."

Czechoslovakia, he noted, was obviously the next victim. The fate of the world now rested with the peaceful states, especially the large states. Then he concluded:

". . . The Soviet Government is aware of its share in this responsibility; it is aware of the obligations incumbent upon it under the League Covenant, the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the treaties of mutual assistance it has concluded with France and Czechoslovakia, and I can say on behalf of the Government that, on its part, it is ready as before to join in collective action which, decided jointly with it, would have the purpose of arresting the further development of aggression and removing the accentuated danger of a new world shambles. It agrees to proceed immediately to discuss practical measures, dictated by the circumstances, with other Powers in the League of Nations or outside of it. To-morrow might be too late, but to-day there is time yet, if all States, particularly great States, take up a firm unambiguous standpoint on the problem of the collective salvation of peace."[38]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA DISMEMBERED

As Litvinov warned, the hour was very late. Only the firmest stand by Britain, France and Russia could stop the accelerating collapse of the peace, ând in London there was not the faintest intention of taking this course.

Purges in Russia. To all the deep fears and dislikes of Soviet Russia in the minds of the British leaders there was now added the revulsion and perplexity aroused by the great purges which swept through the Soviet Union during

[37] **Sir Nevile Henderson, *The Failure of a Mission*, New York, Putnams, 1940, pp. 121–2; London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1940.**

[38] **Litvinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–17.**

1937 and 1938. Seven generals and many other high personages were shot, along with many thousands of lesser ones. Was such an ally worth anything? Hadn't she weakened herself fatally by the purges?

British Purpose Firm. In London there was not the slightest prospect that Litvinov's urgent call for a solid front against Hitler, on March 17, would be heeded. On November 26, 1937, after the visit of Halifax to Germany, Chamberlain had written about the Germans that "of course they want to dominate Eastern Europe," and he concluded that Britain should say to Germany: "give us satisfactory assurances that you won't use force to deal with the Austrians and Czechoslovaks, and we will give you similar assurances that we won't use force to prevent the changes you want, if you can get them by peaceful means."[39]

In other words, Hitler might absorb Austria and Czechoslovakia if only he would do it by the threat of force and by the wholesale use of fifth columns, a phrase already immortalized by the Spanish war. But, like the Austrians, the Czechs did not want to die and they were a much more formidable people.

Russian Overtures Rejected. On March 24, Chamberlain replied in a public speech to Russia's request on March 17 for a conference between Britain, Russia, France and the United States to discuss means of checking future aggression. His Majesty's Government felt "themselves unable to give the prior guarantee suggested" in Czechoslovakia's behalf. As for the proposed four-power conferences he commented that

> "The proposal appeared to involve less consultation with a view to settlement than concerting of action against an eventuality that has not yet risen___(Such a conference) would aggravate a tendency toward establishment of exclusive groups of nations which must be inimical to the prospects of European peace. The British Government believes differences between nations should be resolved by peaceful settlement, not by methods of force."[40]

Chamberlain was striving incessantly to establish a Four Power group which would exclude Russia from European decisions. It was already a year and a half since Japan had joined the Axis by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact, November 25, 1936. But when a grouping including the Soviet Union was proposed Chamberlain loftily rejected it as aggravating "a tendency toward establishment of exclusive groups of nations."

The Break-up of Czechoslovakia Planned. Aside from its rejection of the Russian bid to a conference, Chamberlain's speech of March 24 was "a masterpiece of obfuscation," but "his evasiveness regarding Britain's contingent support of France was disastrous." It allowed George Bonnet and other French appeasers to conduct a corroding whispering campaign in France. Yet the speech had really revealed Chamberlain's plan—to bring such pressure to

[39] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 333.**
[40] **The *New York Times*, March 25, 1938.**

bear upon Czechoslovakia that the French alliance with Prague would never become operative.[41] As yet no one knew what German demands on Prague might be, but whatever they were they must be granted. Sensing this from Chamberlain's equivocations, Hitler summoned Konrad Henlein, the head of the German Nazis in Czechoslovakia, to Berlin on March 28 and told him to make his demands very strong.

The result was the eight Karlsbad demands of April 24 which called for the abandonment of the idea that there was a Czechoslovak state with a German minority; for the demarcation of the German area, in which there should be only German officials, with full autonomy in every department of public life; and for complete liberty to proclaim their Germanism and their adhesion to "the ideology of Germans." That, said Henlein, meant National Socialism and he capped his requirements with a demand for "a complete revision of the Czech foreign policy which up to today had led the State into the ranks of the enemies of the German people." This meant the annulment of all Czechoslovakian alliances.

Since it was obvious that no government could accept such demands and live, Premier Daladier and Foreign Minister Bonnet of France hurried to London on April 28, and Daladier urged strong joint and parallel action in Prague and in Berlin. Chamberlain demurred. British equivocation again weakened the confidence of those who would have resisted Germany and strengthened the hands of the French appeasers. It was made clear to the French Ministers that "in no circumstances would Britain give immediate support to either France or Czechoslovakia," and "from that moment the French, consciously or subconsciously, wrote off their own obligations" to Czechoslovakia. From this moment also the sovereignty and independence of Czechoslovakia became an obstacle in Chamberlain's mind to his appeasement plan.[42]

On May 10, Chamberlain revealed his plans for the break-up of Czechoslovakia in Germany's behalf to a group of American and Canadian newspaper men at Lady Astor's. Neither France, Russia nor Britain would fight for Czechoslovakia, said the Prime Minister, who also advocated his plan for a Four Power Pact, including Britain, France, Germany and Italy, from which Russia would be excluded. When this news appeared in the ***New York Times*** and ***New York Herald Tribune*** on March 14 the effect in all of the European capitals was profound, especially when acrid criticism in the House of Commons on June 20, 21 and 27 failed to wring any denial from Chamberlain.[43]

Crisis in May. On May 19 extensive German troop concentrations on the Czech frontier precipitated an intense crisis. The next day the Czech Government ordered a partial mobilization, which was quickly and smoothly carried out, while the alarmed governments in London, Paris and Moscow all gave Germany firm and repeated warnings, both in Berlin and in their respective

[41] **Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–42.**

[42] ***Ibid.*, pp. 50–1.**

[43] **G. E. R. Gedye, *Betrayal in Central Europe*, New York, Harper, 1939, pp. 390–1 ; Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–3.**

capitals. This unexpected solid front deeply alarmed the German General Staff and Hitler's political advisers. They all urged a retreat and on May 22 Hitler bitterly agreed.

The Appeasers Aroused. The governments which had everything to fear from Nazi aggrandizement had given, spontaneously and under the whip of fear, a perfect illustration of the right way to deal with Hitler. One would have thought that they would now consolidate their solid front and enforce the peace. But, on the contrary, in Berlin, London and Paris the Czechs were now guilty of a deep indiscretion. Their resolute action had called Hitler's hand for the first time. Since in Russia and everywhere else people had rejoiced, the fat was now in the fire. His Volcanic Majesty in Berlin had been humiliated, so of course the Czechs would have to pay for such stupidity.

Far from taking up the long-standing invitation of the Soviet Union to military staff conferences the British and French appeasers were terrified at their own success. They denounced Benes almost as violently as Hitler himself. Chamberlain practically apologized to Germany, and on June 3 ***The Times*** urged Prague to let the Sudeten Germans go. In France, Bonnet blamed the Czechs, and carried on a constant campaign of hints to the Cabinet that Britain would not support France and of tips to Britain that France could not fight. In public he stood for the alliance with Prague. In private he undermined it incessantly.

Runciman Forced on Prague. These processes went on until July 18 when an emissary from the Fuehrer to London warned that the murder of one Sudetendeutsch would lead Hitler to march. Captain Wiedemann also dangled the prospect of a Four Power Pact. Without a day's delay London proposed to Benes that Lord Runciman be appointed an independent "arbitrator." Halifax took the proposal to Paris. There it met strong opposition in the Cabinet and was toned down. Runciman would be a "mediator and advisor." This general idea was reluctantly accepted by the French and Runciman was forced upon Prague. On July 26 Chamberlain gave the news to the House of Commons in a speech which, says Wheeler-Bennett, was "as remarkable an example of prevarication as that Chamber can ever have heard." Throughout the speech Chamberlain lied brazenly and deliberately. He declared that Prague had requested that a mediator be sent, that Britain was not hustling the Czechs and that there was a ***détente***, a lessening of tension in the European situation. This mission was purely informal and the Government had no responsibility for it.[44]

Actually Chamberlain knew that the German campaign for the destruction of Czechoslovakia was in full swing and that the Czechs were not intimidated by Germany. Apart from the large Czech estate owners, the Agrarians who helped to paralyze the Government at the end, the Czechs were united in a grim determination to fight to the last man. They were confident, too, that the military factors were on their side, given the assistance of their allies France and Russia. It would take extreme measures to prevent

[44] **Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–7.**

them from defending themselves and compelling France to honor her alliance.

Runciman acted accordingly. His first day in Prague, August 4, 1938, consisted of three brief courtesy calls on the Government and two very long conferences with the Sudeten leaders. His days were spent mainly in the castles of Nazi aristocrats, guarded by Henleinist storm troopers, whom he addressed on one occasion.[45] Long memoranda from German democrats were received, but never mentioned in his report. Before he arrived the Czech Government had published its plans for far-reaching concessions to the Sudeten Germans. These were further extended four times under pressure from Runciman until "national self government" was promised to the Germans on September 4. On this last occasion President Benes asked Henlein's deputies to write down on a sheet of blank paper their "party's full demands for the German minority," promising in advance to grant them immediately. When the thunderstruck delegates were unable to write, Benes did it for them. They haltingly dictated their original Carlsbad demands and Benes accepted them. Consternation was complete in both the Henlein camp and in Berlin as well as in London and Paris.[46]

Surrender Advised. The Nazis could think of nothing more to say, so the appeasers said it for them. On September 6 an article in ***La Republique***, the known mouthpiece of Bonnet, said that the Sudeten Germans and Czechs "must be separated" and the next day the London ***Times***, edited by Chamberlain's friend Geoffrey Dawson, advised Prague to cede the Sudetens to Germany. What the Germans had not dared to propose, the outright breakup of Czechoslovakia, was now offered them by Czechoslovakia's fellow democracies.[47] At the same time Bonnet in Geneva rejected, on September 11, an urgent request by Litvinov for a joint ***démarche.*** Litvinov in the presence of the Rumanian Foreign Minister assured Bonnet that Rumania would give Russian troops passage through Rumania.[48]

Inspired Revolt. The next day, on September 12, came Hitler's tirade to the annual Nazi Party Congress, toward which Nazi propaganda had been building for weeks. The speech revealed Hitler's venom at being blocked in May, and was filled with the grossest insults to Benes and the Czechs. It was one long invitation to the Henleinists to revolt. Hitler told how the Czech State "beat up bodily three and a half million members of a race of eighty million people" and when he had finished, in hundreds of Bohemian towns the Henleinists poured into the streets by prearrangement and wrecked the shops of all Czechs and Jews.

Travelling through the area, Gedye saw how easily the Czechs restored order, and he recorded the flood of messages of loyalty from democratic Sudeten Germans which poured into Prague when the Henleinists fled over the border. Gedye wrote that "no one living through this summer in Prague could fail to be conscious of something almost sublime in the attitude of the

[45] **Wheeler-Bennett gives the names of five of the German nobles with whom Runciman lived, pp. 82, 87, 93.**

[46] ***Ibid.*****, pp. 88–93 .** [47] ***Ibid.*****, pp. 95–8.** [48] ***Ibid.*****, p.100.**

humblest person one met every day; a consciousness of high destiny was on everyone, a realization that this country was singled out for martyrdom; a fine pride in the fact that it was Czechoslovakia which, perhaps by its own death, was going to redeem liberty in Europe."[49]

Runciman's Report. Matters had reached a point where Runciman could do no more in Czechoslovakia.[50] He returned to London on September 16 and wrote a report which consisted of two parts. In the first part he set forth the inescapable facts of constantly stepped-up Henleinist demands and of easy mastery of the rebellion by the Czech authorities. Then in the body of the report he expressed "much sympathy" for the Sudeten case, condemned Czech immigrants to the Sudeten areas as "these Czech invaders," and censured them for building Czech schools in the area. In contradiction of all the evidence to the contrary he concluded that "a very large majority of the inhabitants" desired union with Germany and that this should be brought about forthwith. He believed cession to be inevitable, thought a plebiscite would be "sheer formality" and urged the cession at once.

To complete the conquest of the Czechs, Runciman recommended that all of them who had been pursuing a policy hostile to Germany's interests "should be forbidden to continue their agitations, if necessary by legal means." Ignoring completely the thunderous agitations, propagandas and provocations of the Nazis, on both sides of the border, he actually proposed the silencing of all protest by the Czechs and their complete submission to German will. To make crystal clear his intention to make the rump of Czechoslovakia into a German puppet state he urged the compulsory destruction of Czechoslovakia's defensive alliances, accepting the Goebbels line that these alliances might make Czechoslovakia guilty of an "attack" against Germany, or guilty of "aggressive action arising from obligations to other states."[51]

A Powerful Bastion. Runciman had done what he was sent to do. He had carried out his mission as faithfully as Chamberlain could have desired. Yet the Czech bastion still stood. The impression has been propagated by the defenders of British policy that Czechoslovakia's position was hopeless after the German conquest of Austria, that the Germans could quickly have cut the country in two with a pincers attack. Feiling says that German armies could have severed "the narrow ill-protected throat of Czechoslovakia in an

[49] G. E. R. Gedye, *op. cit.*, pp. 424–40. Gedye is one of the best British newspaper men of the period.

[50] The Young Henleinists followed him about with the chant:

"Was brauchen wir'nen Weihnachtsmann
Wir haben unser'n Runciman."
("Now Santa Claus is an 'also ran'
His job is done by our Runciman.")
—*Ibid*., p. 447.

[51] *Ibid*., pp. 445–6. Lord Runciman reported to the Cabinet on September 16. His report was made public on September 28. It was dated September 21, but the second part gives the impression of being written after that date, to conform to what Chamberlain had learned and done at Berchtesgaden and Godesburg.—Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. Ill-13.

afternoon."[52] The Czechs disbelieved that, because they had been fortifying the two danger spots vigorously, whereas the Germans lacked both fortifications and roads in Austria. Later, when the German Army occupied Czechoslovakia their generals found that the Czech defenses were much stronger than they had suspected. Even the weakest sector, the old Austrian border, amazed the Germans and their astonishment deepened when they examined the Czech Maginot Line. Hitler later confessed that "we had run a serious danger" and Keitel testified that the High Command did not believe that they could break through the Czech fortifications.[53]

The Germans could not count on Poland to join in war against Czechoslovakia, either, while Russia's alliance with Czechoslovakia stood. Poland was too vulnerable in the East and the great Polish landlords in the White Russian and Ukrainian half of Poland could not risk a Russian invasion. Similar considerations would make it extremely unlikely that Hungary, militarily weak as she was, would move against the Czechs. The Russian air force was only 150 kilometers away and the Red Army, given a little time, could send aid across Rumania.

These considerations appeared to necessitate huge concentrations of German troops near the two pincer points of attack, mobilizations which could not be concealed and which would have been extremely vulnerable to bombing. If Czechoslovakia's allies stood by her, large German forces in the East would have had to face Russia and the French had an excellent chance to take over the Rhineland by bombing the Rhine bridges. Not more than thirty to forty German divisions would remain to throw against Czechoslovakia, the Czechs thought, and within three weeks they expected to have that many divisions in the field. It would require sixty divisions, they believed, to crush them, and they felt that they could hold out from three to six months alone.

With France also a good plan of campaign had been perfected. The distance across southern Germany, from Alsace to Czechoslovakia, was not great. It was an excellent set-up for shuttle bombing. The plans were ready and the airfields supplied with many thousands of tons of bombs. Intensive bombing of a strip across southern Germany gave good promise of cutting off the Munich area and Austria from the main part of Germany and of opening up a path of invasion down which the two allies could advance from each end. Meanwhile, Russian air strength could be pouring into Czechoslovakia, even if ground forces were slower in arriving.

For such campaigns the military resources of the Czechs were impressive. They had 1,500,000 trained men splendidly equipped and supplied by one of the largest and best munitions industries in the world. They had an air force of 1500 planes and they were standing on the great Bohemian plateau, surrounded by a ring of high mountains which had been fortified, after Germany left the League of Nations in 1933, at an expense of $400,000,000. The Czechs had reason to believe that their Little Maginot Line was better than

[52] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 346.**

[53] ***Nuremberg Documents*, C 136 and 388 PS, item 47, cited in Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 333.**

its French counterpart. This formidable strength was backed, too, by a calm, unshakeable determination to fight to the last man in defense of the democratic liberties which the Czechs had enjoyed for only a brief twenty years and which they had shared with the Sudeten Germans to a remarkable degree.

The power of the nations threatened by German aggression was in fact so great that a German attack on Czechoslovakia could have been prevented by a common front. It is quite true that Hitler was aching for war in 1938 and determined to crush Czechoslovakia by military force, but he was rampant because he knew well that his allies in Britain and France would not combine with Russia to defend Czechoslovakia. A firm front against him would have put an entirely different face on matters. At Nuremberg, General Keitel frankly admitted that "had there been, in place of the Munich Conference, a collaboration between Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R., it would have been impossible for us to strike."[54] Hitler could plunge ahead because there was no one to stop him. Far from opposing him his logical opponents in the West were anxious to help him.

A Working Democracy. In April 1938 the British Royal Institute of International Affairs published a thorough study of the ***Czechs and Germans*** by Elizabeth Wiskemann. In her final chapter the author states that "a German citizen of Czechoslovakia who accepts the political principles of the State is no more aware of the police or the censorship than a Czech; in any court of law he will be just as well looked after." It is really remarkable, she continues, "to find that Sudeten Germans, who have consistently preached treason against the Republic in many cases, live free and unmolested in its midst; no dictatorship would allow such a thing." The Sudetens enjoyed a degree of personal freedom which would have been unthinkable in Nazi Germany. They were "able to criticize, to combine, to complain and to disagree, in the press, in parliament and abroad."

After her exhaustive investigations on the spot, Miss Wiskemann concluded that federalization of Czechoslovakia was impossible because no one could draw language frontiers between the Czechs and Germans. The same difficulty would frustrate any fair attempt to cede the German-speaking districts to Germany. Evidently believing strongly in the viability of Czechoslovakia, she concluded that there was "an efficiency, a determination, and a vitality about the Czechs which promised well for the future, if external violence should not distort normal expectations." On the other hand, the Sudeten and Czech territories were so economically knit together that "if Germany possessed the former she would inevitably covet and absorb or frankly seize the latter." The Czechs had explained this to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and it was still true. The cession of the Sudeten Districts to Germany meant the complete domination of Central Europe by Germany.[55]

The Appeasers Adamant. Knowledge of Czechoslovakia's strong position and formidable fighting power did not give any pause to the British and French conservatives. Nor did the fact that the fall of the Czech bastion would

[54] **Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 398.**

[55] **Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, Oxford University Press, 1938, pp. 272–9.**

make Hitler master of all Central Europe and the Balkans make any difference. In France, Foreign Minister George Bonnet was working frantically to prevent the invocation of France's alliance with Czechoslovakia. Led by its press, the entire Right, with the exception of Henri de Kerillis, was pointing out the foolishness of dying for Czechoslovakia. This was the last moment when a firm stand by France and Britain could have stopped Hitler's career of aggression without war. Or, failing that, it was the last opportunity to mobilize a great coalition against him, before he had seized the great war-making resources of Czechoslovakia and the Balkans. Yet in London the Chamberlain Cabinet was as determined as ever that Hitler must be given what he wanted in Czechoslovakia without a fight.

The failure of Lord Runciman to bring about this result compelled sterner measures, and Chamberlain was ready with a plan. Prior to September 3, Chamberlain had decided that if Runciman could not accomplish the break-up of Czechoslovakia from Prague he himself would go to Germany and arrange it directly with Hitler.[56]

On September 13, the day after Hitler's Nuremberg tirade, Chamberlain telegraphed to Hitler that he was coming over as soon as the latter would see him, and he was received the next day. Returning on the 16th, he convoked the Cabinet at once to hear Runciman's recommendations for Czechoslovakia's dissolution. On the 18th the French leaders came over and it was decided to urge Czechoslovakia to cede at once territories in which Germans were a majority. Afterward Britain would join in a guarantee of the new boundaries, provided that Czechoslovakia should give up her existing military alliances, that is, her alliance with the Soviet Union. "Britain, in other words, stood ready to guarantee truncated Czechoslovakia, if the guarantee would not offend Hitler, who had long campaigned against the Soviet-Czechoslovak Mutual Assistance Pact, and provided the guarantee would not involve the risk of war!"[57]

Czech Surrender Forced. In Paris, Bonnet promised the resistance group in the Cabinet—Reynaud, Mandel and Champetier de Ribes—that he would not exert pressure on the Czechs, which he immediately did. In Prague the British-French note of September 19 presented President Benes with an appalling choice. He sat with his Cabinet and military advisers continuously for a day and a half, before it was decided to propose the settlement of the whole dispute by reference to arbitration under the German-Czech Treaty of 1925.

To this proposal the British and French Ambassadors at once replied that if it were persisted in Britain and France would certainly declare themselves uninterested in the fate of the Czechs. In London and Paris it was greeted with "an outburst of petulance and anger." In Paris, Bonnet and Daladier did not dare to let the Cabinet see the Czech note with its supreme appeal. In London the Inner Cabinet—composed of the appeasers, Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir John Simon—met until 10:30 p.m.

[56] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 357.**
[57] **Haines and Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 511.**

on September 20. Then President Lebrun of France was mobilized to sanction the utmost pressure on the Czech Government.

After midnight President Benes went to bed for the first time in three days, only to be awakened an hour later by the British and French Ambassadors who presented him with an ultimatum which brutally demanded the acceptance of the Anglo-French plan immediately and unconditionally. Otherwise, they would wash their hands of Czechoslovakia, because of her culpable obstinacy, and she would stand before the world solely responsible for the war which would ensue. Then as the Czech ministers debated through the night, insolent, insistent inquiries came over the telephone from London: "What is the meaning of this delay? Has not Benes yielded yet?"[58]

Eventually the two Ambassadors threatened that Hungary and Poland would also attack Czechoslovakia, overwhelming it from all sides, and the Czech Government finally surrendered, at 5:00 p.m. in the afternoon.

When the news became known in Czechoslovakia, "a nation broke into tears." An immense demonstration in Prague forced the resignation of the Hodza Government, and the calling of General Syrovy, the man who had led the Czech legions across Siberia in 1918–20. On the 22nd the whole nation rose to its own defense, while Chamberlain flew to Godesberg to report results. There he found, as usual, that Hitler had raised his terms. He would occupy the conceded districts, specified on his own maps, not later than October 1. In other areas a plebiscite should be conducted, with everybody disfranchised who did not live there in October 1918.

When Chamberlain brought this ultimatum back to London it produced a wave of resistance in Britain and throughout the Empire. Even the French Cabinet stiffened. The two governments advised Czechoslovakia to decree mobilization. All the world thought that at the last moment Czechoslovakia was to be saved. But on the 26th, Chamberlain appealed to Hitler for an international conference, to give him what he wanted without war. Hitler replied the same night with a speech which was "a slanderous and nauseating attack upon the Czechs in general and President Benes in particular."[59] On the same day a British communique, issued without consultation with Russia, stated that Britain and Russia would stand by France if Czechoslovakia were attacked. In Paris the press organs of the French Foreign Office implied that this statement was a forgery and bitterly attacked all of the Ministers who wished to honor France's treaty with Czechoslovakia.[60]

On the evening of the 27th, Chamberlain made his famous radio broadcast in which he revealed his deep revulsion at the turn events had taken, saying: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible, it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing." Later in the evening he received a message from Hitler to which he immediately replied: "After reading your letter I feel certain that you can get all essentials without war and without delay. . . . However much you distrust the Prague government's intentions,

[58] **Gedye, *op. cit.*, pp. 455–61; Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–28.**
[59] **Gedye, *op. cit.*, p. 514.**
[60] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, pp. 371, 373.**

you cannot doubt the power of the British and French governments to see that the promises are carried out fairly and fully and forthwith."[61] The next day, while he was addressing Parliament, the invitation to Munich was dramatically presented to him and read to the relieved House and nation.

Munich. At Munich the representatives of Czechoslovakia were not admitted to the conference. When its decisions were ready they were curtly handed to the Czech Minister, M. Mastny, by the British and French delegations, who summoned him for the purpose. When he tried to ask a few questions he was cut short. The hour was late and Mr. Chamberlain was tired. He yawned continually until the Czechs were dismissed.

At once in Czechoslovakia, as the Czech troops withdrew, all the sadistic horrors of the Nazi occupation of Austria were repeated. Brown-shirted brutality was given full rein. The plundering, the beating, the destruction of property, the deadly insults to other races—for now the Czech minority had to join the Jews under the label of "sub-humans"—set in throughout the Sudeten territory. A few months later the same terror was to engulf all of Czechoslovakia. Czech university students were to be herded wholesale to the public squares of Prague, the young men to be beaten to death while the girls were publicly raped.

The British Government had at last achieved its long pursued dream of achieving a four-power union with the fascist dictatorships.

Munich's Consequences

The Munich Conference of 1938 was one of the most decisive events of the past hundred years. It was so decisive for Czechoslovakia that the Czech people will never forget it in a millenium. Longer even than the Hussite tradition, the humiliation and deep sense of outrage left by Munich will remain. Nations had often been conquered by their enemies, but never before had a proud and worthy people been bludgeoned into submission by its sworn allies and alleged democratic friends. The welshing of the French and the iron determination of the British to accomplish their downfall were betrayals too deep to be forgotten.

It never occurred to Chamberlain and Daladier that after it was all over the Czechs would be virtually unanimous in looking to Moscow for their security and in agreement that there was nothing in the West which could be trusted.

For the Sudeten Germans Munich was also decisive. It meant that for a few years the Nazi element among them could lord it over the Czechs,

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 372. **During the Munich crisis I had the agonizing experience of watching from London the death of the Czech democracy at the hands of its friends.**

Hearing that a demonstration air raid trench was being dug in Green Park, I went to see this phenomenon and observed from a bus a hand shovel slowly appear above the top of a short trench. The next day there were two shovels operating. A day or so later, at the height of the crisis, the dirt really flew, bringing home to the people that there would be no escape from the bombs for London's millions.

Yet throughout the crisis one felt a much greater willingness of the people to stand up to Hitler than the Government evinced.

haughtily and with every refinement of cruelty. Then these Germans would really have to go "home to the Reich," shattered and ruined by Hitler's mad ***Götterdämmerung.*** By then even the democratic Sudetens would choose to go with them. Thereafter no claim of "self determination" for Germans would hang over the future of the Czechs.

For France, Munich was decisive, for two reasons. First, her last chance of fighting Germany with an effective ally in the East was gone. At the climax of the Munich crisis the French Army was keyed up to advance and face the inevitable with courage. On the day of the surrender a French officer in tears told an American military observer in Alsace: "This means that we have lost the war before it ever begins." He and most of his colleagues knew that an unimpeded German onslaught could not be defeated.

Munich doomed France also because the moral rot which was so evident while Spain was being crucified had now spread too deeply to be stopped by anything less than the torture of German occupation. The delirious welcome to Daladier as he came home from Munich and the feasting and dancing which followed could not be atoned for by any future "phony war."

For world politics, above all, the Munich Conference was decisive for a long period. In this global sphere the exclusion of Russia from Munich was the fact of towering importance. For five years the Soviet Government had tried to work with the Western democracies through the League of Nations to stop the fascist aggressors. At every stage their cooperation had been rejected in favor of appeasing the aggressors.

Litvinov's Valedictory. While the death of the Czech Republic was being arranged elsewhere, Litvinov was left to plead alone in Geneva.

On September 21, the day British and French were dragooning Benes in Prague, Litvinov spoke to the League Assembly in Geneva, reminding it that "the League was created as a reaction to the world war and its countless horrors; that its object was to make that the last war, to safeguard all the nations against aggression, and to replace the system of military alliances by the „collective organization of assistance to the victim of aggression." In this all-important sphere the League had failed. To Ethiopia, Austria, China and Spain, Czechoslovakia was now added and on the Assembly's agenda Czechoslovakia was not even mentioned.

Instead the Assembly was debating proposals to water down the Covenant, taking all force out of Articles 10 and 16. It was argued, said Litvinov, that the League could not function because it was not universal, yet it had always had enough members to deal with the aggressors, and still had. It was contended that aggression had now raised its head too high to be controlled and it was true that the aggressor States had "formed a bloc in order to defend the principle of aggression," but, he said, the responsibility for this regrettable fact lies with "those States which restrained the League from resistance to the aggressors when they were still weak and divided, and were still making only their first timid attempts to break the peace. They have grown stronger, thanks to the fact that these attempts were allowed to reach a successful conclusion; thanks to the tolerance, and indeed immunity, of one

breach of international treaty after another, and of the propaganda of aggression; thanks to the policy of concessions, fruitless negotiations and backstairs intrigues with them. They are still weaker, even yet, than the possible bloc of peaceable States."

Litvinov condemned the conception that the aggressor be treated with consideration and his vanity not wounded, "that conversations and negotiations be carried on with him, that he be assured that no collective action will be undertaken against him, and no groups or blocs formed against him—even though he himself enters into aggressive blocs with other aggressors—that compromise agreements be concluded with him, and breaches of those very agreements overlooked; that his demands, even the most illegal, be fulfilled; that journeys be undertaken, if necessary, to receive his dictates and ultimatums; that the vital interests of one state or another be sacrificed to him; and that, if possible, no question of his activity be raised at the League of Nations—because the aggressor does not like that, takes offense, sulks."

It remained only for Litvinov to state his own position and the position of his government.

> "At a moment when the mines are being laid to blow up at the organization on which were fixed the great hopes of our generation, and which stamped a definite character on the international relations of our epoch; at a moment when, by no accidental coincidence, decisions are being taken outside the League which recall to us the international transactions of pre-war days, and which are bound to overturn all present conceptions of international morality and treaty obligations; at a moment when there is being drawn up a further list of sacrifices to the god of aggression, and a line is being drawn under the annals of all post-war international history, with the sole conclusion that nothing succeeds like aggression—at such a moment, every State must define its role and its responsibility before its contemporaries and before history. That is why I must plainly declare here that the Soviet Government bears no responsibility whatsoever for the events now taking place, and for the fatal consequences which may inexorably ensue."

In the current crisis the Soviet Government had abstained from all advice to the Czechoslovak Government, "considering quite inadmissible that it should be asked to make concessions to the Germans, to the detriment of its interests as a State in order that we should be set free from the necessity of fulfilling our obligations under the treaty bearing our signature. Neither did we offer any advice in the contrary direction." A few days before he left for Geneva the French Government had for the first time asked what the attitude of the Soviet Government would be in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia and had received the following perfectly clear and unambiguous reply:

> "We intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact and, together with France to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by the ways open to us. Our War Department is ready immediately to participate in a conference with

representatives of the French and Czechoslovak War Departments, in order to discuss the measures appropriate to the moment. Independently of this, we should consider desirable that the question be raised at the League of Nations if only as yet under Article XI, with the object, first, of mobilizing public opinion and, secondly, of ascertaining the position of certain other States, whose passive aid might be extremely valuable. It was necessary, however, to exhaust all means of averting an armed conflict, and we considered one such method to be an immediate consultation between the Great Powers of Europe and other interested States, in order if possible to decide on the terms of a collective ***démarche.***"

Only two days before he spoke, the Czechoslovak Government had addressed a formal inquiry of the same character and had received "a clear answer in the affirmative." He believed it would be admitted that both were the replies of "a loyal signatory of an international agreement and of a faithful servant of the League." Unfortunately, other steps were taken "which could not but lead to such a capitulation as is bound sooner or later to have quite incalculable and disastrous consequences. The Covenant could be nullified by "the destruction or mutilation of Sovereign States" in an effort to assuage "the appetites of insatiable aggressors"; the Briand-Kellogg Pact could be vitiated by granting "bonuses for saber-rattling and recourse to arms," by rewarding and encouraging "aggressive super-imperialism," but the end of this process was clear in Litvinov's mind. Its practitioners would "avoid a problematic war today and receive in return a certain and large scale war tomorrow."

No truer prediction of the results of British-French appeasement was ever uttered, even by Winston Churchill, who was doing his best to arouse Britain to the folly of appeasing the unappeasable. Ending his last speech in Geneva Litvinov took somber pride in the fact that his government had "no part in such policy" and no intention of abandoning the principles of the Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact. He called "upon other governments likewise to return to this path."[62]

But Litvinov knew that his own role was finished, that his great speech had been his valedictory. His address had moved the newspaper men deeply and when he left Geneva, five days later, only they went to see him off. Back in Moscow nothing that he tried succeeded and on May 3, 1939, he resigned, advising Stalin to appoint Molotov as his successor. "The last great friend of collective security is gone," said Edouard Herriot.[63]

Russia Ejected from Europe's Politics. Unquestionably, Litvinov's policy had failed. For at least five years he had toiled to breathe life and vitality into the collective security system, only to be defeated at every turn. In each crisis —Ethiopia, Spain, the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia—the collaboration of the Soviet Union had been spumed. Either she had been ignored, left on one side, or her efforts positively rejected. Compelled by the British

[62] **Litvinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–31.**
[63] **Pope, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 30, 442, 489.**

National Declaration to make a show of saving the League in the case of Ethiopia, the appeasement governments had thereafter avoided Geneva as the plague, leaving the U.S.S.R. to operate in a vacuum. Almost as soon as Moscow came to Geneva, London and Paris left. London resolutely went back to power politics, operated always at Russia's expense.

Finally, at Munich, Russia was thrown out bodily from any voice in European affairs. She was consigned to Asia, to survive as best she could. This was the deepest meaning of Munich.

Munich was also the culmination of much resolute planning in London and Paris toward that end. In his thorough analysis, ***Prelude to World War II***, the great Italian historian Gaetano Salvemini concludes that "the leaders of the Conservative Party and of the British Foreign Office deceived the English people throughout 1935," by making them believe that they wished to resist Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia. He adds that by 1936 the British leaders "had reached an understanding with Hitler which allowed him a free hand toward Russia," thus "making World War II inevitable."[64]

[64] Salvemini, *Prelude to World War II*, New York, Doubleday, 1954, pp. 10–11 ; London, Gollancz, 1953.

CHAPTER V

THE "PHONY" WAR[1]

In justification of the crucifixion of Czechoslovakia at Munich it was said that Russia could not be trusted and that her assistance would not be worth much in any case. On these points there could be honest difference of opinion, but not about the diplomatic record. Certainly the Czech Government did not doubt Russia's sincerity. At a session of the Harris Institute at the University of Chicago in August 1939 I asked President Benes whether Russia would have supported him had he decided to fight in September 1938. He replied, without an instant's hesitation: "There was never any doubt in my mind that Russia would aid us by all the ways open to her, but I did not dare to fight with Russian aid alone, because I knew that the British and French Governments would make out of my country another Spain."

Benes had had every reason for that judgment. The extreme pressure put upon him had left no doubt that if he still fought for his liberty the British and French Governments would make every effort within their power to draw another blanket of Non-Intervention over the tragedy and hold the ring while Hitler worked his will on the offending Czechs. A deep revulsion in their own peoples might have ousted Chamberlain and Bonnet, insisting that their policy be reversed, but Benes could not depend on that. The forces in France and Britain which were determined to work with the fascist powers were too strong to be easily unhorsed. It later required sledge-hammer blows from Hitler's armies to unseat them.

Did the Munichards Plan a Nazi-Soviet Wart There remains the question whether the appeasement governments deliberately planned to turn Hitler toward the East and into a war with Russia.

There was no question that the Nazis had done their best to convince the world that they were out to smash Bolshevism and conquer the Soviet Union. Hitler's speech saying that if he had the Urals all Germans would be swimming in plenty was only an outstanding example of this propaganda. Nor was there any reluctance among the elites in the Western world to believe him. The great landowners, aristocrats, industrialists, bankers, high churchmen, army leaders—magnates of every kind in Western Europe, together with many middle-class elements—had never lost their fear that their own workers and peasants might demand a social revolution, perhaps one spearheaded and organized by communists. Their support of fascism as a force, albeit a gangster one, which would defeat communism and at the same time leave the vested

[1] A term used by Senator William E. Borah to describe the lack of fighting in the West during the winter of 1939–40.

interests largely in control had been instinctive and sincere. There can be little doubt that many powerful people in Britain and France worked to strengthen and build up the Axis powers with a view to an attack by them upon the Soviet Union. But if this motive was not decisive the inability of the ruling elements to envisage an alliance with Red Russia in a war against the fascist states was. Especially in France that would mean a Popular Front war which would menace the power and privileges of the great interests which controlled the nation's life.

If London and Paris had not consciously sought to speed Hitler's march to the Urals, they had exerted themselves mightily to place within his grasp the necessary power for an attack upon the Soviet Union. Until the Czech bastion was swept away he could not effectively take over the Balkans, which he required to give him the necessary food and raw materials for a really great war machine, in addition to putting him on the borders of the Soviet Union. After Munich the British and French had lost all power to prevent Nazi Germany from becoming a colossus capable of attacking the Soviet Union or of turning upon them. To say that this certain and inevitable result of the long and persistent appeasement of Nazi Germany never occurred to the British and French Governments is to vastly underrate their astuteness and perspicacity. It is hardly possible that they were so imbued with the rightness of Wilsonian principles that they naively and innocently sought, solely and singleheartedly, to secure "self-determination" for abused Germans in Czechoslovakia. However blind and stupid the men of Munich may have been, they were not that simple.

In France conservatism began early to "waver between class interest and national security." Daladier was afraid that a successful war would give power to the Left and he feared communism more than Hitler's embrace. After Munich the Clericals and Rightists in France changed their cry to "Rather Hitler than Stalin" and proclaimed that the German rampart against communism must not be battered down. In London the feverish desire to deflect Hitler was apparent and there was only one direction in which he could be turned. Chamberlain's advisers hoped that Hitler could be deflected into collision with Russia. They thought Germany would be weakened in the process of defeating Russia. When the German Minister of Economics toured the Balkans soon after Munich, and announced plans for their economic conquest, Chamberlain assured the Commons that Germany must have "a dominating position" in that region. And when Hitler torpedoed his Munich vows and invaded the rump of Czechoslovakia in March 1938, "every newspaper correspondent, every business house, every embassy and legation in Europe" knew that he was going East.[2]

From the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1935 on, Russia had had ample evidence that London and Paris meant to turn Hitler in their direction. Whatever doubts about this intention may have existed or may still exist in Western minds, the Russians could not fail to read the evidence. That they persevered in attempted collaboration with the democracies can only be ascribed to their realization of the unbridgeable antithesis between fascism

[2] **Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich, Prologue to Tragedy*, pp. 94, 235, 279, 295–6, 301, 326, 328.**

and communism and to their knowledge that the lust of the Nazis for empire could not really be satisfied without the Ukraine and the Caucasus.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ALLIANCE WITH RUSSIA

During the same period that Litvinov had been striving for collective security Hitler had been plunging ahead, achieving at least one great objective each year, nearly always in March. First it was conscription and the recovery of the Saar, then the remilitarization of the Rhineland, followed by the seizure of Austria and the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Puffed up with the wine of easy conquests, it was not to be expected that he would be idle in 1939. On March 15 German troops rolled into Prague, annexing the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Bonnet denied that the Anglo-French guarantee of Czechoslovakia had ever been put into effect and the London ***Times*** agreed. Chamberlain said: do not let us "be deflected from our course."

Carpathian Alarm Bell. The next day German consent to the Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine was announced. This decision put an entirely different face on matters for the Munich men. Carpatho-Ukraine was the extreme tip of Czechoslovakia, which in Hitler's hands was a pistol pointed straight at the Ukraine. Even the inhabitants of the province were Ukrainian, making a jumping-off point ideal from the ideological standpoint. Yet Hitler now gave it to Hungary. He was not going on to tangle with Russia. At last an alarm bell rang in London and Paris. Maybe Hitler was going to clean up the West first! As Schuman observes, anyone who had read ***Mein Kampf*** would have known that France was marked for annihilation before and not after the conquest of Russia,[3] but Chamberlain only now began to look into ***Mein Kampf***

Pact with Russia? The next day, March 17, under strong pressure from Lord Halifax, Chamberlain responded in his Birmingham speech to the new light on Nazi strategy which had suddenly been revealed to him by announcing a change of attitude toward Nazi aggrandizement. He did it peevishly and under the lash of deep public indignation. He made it clear that he still thought Hitler had been right before Munich and was surprised and irked because the Führer had let him down.[4] Nevertheless he changed the line and, with many pauses and hesitations, fits and starts and backslidings, he maintained thereafter an attitude of further resistance to Nazi aggression, especially resistance by other powers.

On March 17 the British Government suddenly remembered the existence

[3] F. L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad*, p. 363.

[4] Hitler had also not been considerate about the details. He had called President Hâcha of Czechoslovakia to Berlin—an old man in bad health, with no particular courage. Hâcha's ordeal began at 1:00 a.m. on March 15. A treaty to make the death of Czechoslovakia "legal" was placed before him by Hitler, who harangued him first and then left him to the mercies of Goering and Rjbbentrop, who chased him around the table with pens in their hands yelling that half of Prague would be destroyed that night if he did not sign. He fainted twice but doctors were ready to revive him and keep him alive by injections, until at 4:30 a.m. he signed the death warrant of his country.—Ambassador Coulondre to the French Foreign Office, *French Yellow Book*, p. 97.

of the Soviet Union and inquired what its attitude would be toward the Hitler threat in Eastern Europe. Moscow replied promptly and proposed an immediate conference between Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania and Turkey to consider how to resist German aggression. This was exactly and obviously what was urgently needed. Nothing less than a drawing together of all the threatened states could be of any avail. Rumania was under intense pressure to turn over her economy to Germany and the quickest action was needed.

However, the Chamberlain clique could not make the shift. Knowing that they wanted to solve the Nazi menace on the plains of Russia, they ascribed to Russia the very same design of which they were guilty, as devious men so often do. They had a "deep seated conviction," shared also by the French Rightists, that Russia wished to destroy the capitalist system in Europe by provoking a war from which she would remain aloof.[5] The entire diplomatic record of the past five years belied this self-justifying suspicion. It showed that Russia was desperately anxious to avoid war, but also that on every occasion, without exception, she had sought to avoid war for herself by combining with others to prevent aggression or nip it in the bud. It was Russia which had incessantly pleaded that "peace is indivisible," warning that if war came all would be engulfed in it.

All this had meant nothing to conservative men bent on making terms with fascism and preserving it. Now, therefore, Chamberlain hesitated a week until Rumania capitulated and on March 18 notified Russia that her conference proposal was "premature." This was the same rebuff given to Russia when she had proposed a conference a year earlier, at the time of Hitler's conquest of Austria. Again there was no hurry, but this time Chamberlain did propose a substitute plan whereby Britain, France, Russia and Poland would consult if any further acts of aggression were believed to be imminent, but even this proposal was abortive, since it was at once learned, says Chamberlain's biographer, that "Poland would refuse contact with the Soviet, which alone was enough to prevent us from taking up the Russian proposal for a six-power conference." Chamberlain did not blame the Polish Government. He confided to his diary, on March 26: "I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia,"[6]

Polish Impasse. Poland's comfortable blocking of any liaison with Russia revealed the impossibility of stopping Hitler, at this late date, without a gigantic world war. Poland was now the prisoner of her conquests. Obsessed by delusions of grandeur, she had conquered from Russia some ten millions of White Russians and Ukrainians whom her great landlords did not dare to trust in contact with Russian troops, even if they were fighting for Poland's very life. Poland had also aggrandized herself at the expense of Germany, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia, acting like an eager and vindictive vulture when Czechoslovakia was being dismembered. The cause and result of this attitude toward her neighbors was that the splendid Polish people were "ruled

[5] **Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 389–90.**
[6] **Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*, p. 403.**

by an incompetent and purblind oligarchy who preferred government by junta rather than by parliament."[7] This oligarchy of landlords and colonels also believed itself to be a Great Power. Impressed by its conquests, it adopted the impossible policy of balancing both of its huge neighbors against each other. Colonel Beck's slogan, "Not a millimeter nearer to Berlin than to Moscow," would have been valid under a strong League of Nations, but it meant certain destruction in the midst of an anarchy of aggression on the loose. In this situation Poland might survive by close alliance with one of her great neighbors. Being unable to choose between her hatreds doomed her to sure destruction and in all probability to another partition.

It was the defense of this illiberal, vainglorious and impotent regime which Chamberlain chose as the ***casus foederis*** of World War II. His heart had been of flint when the virile democratic and military strength of Czechoslovakia was at stake. The hearts of the appeasers bled for the German minority in Czechoslovakia, the freest minority in Europe, but they were oblivious to the much larger and much worse ruled minorities in Poland.

Guarantees to Poland and Rumania. Poland had been on the hot spot since January 5,1939, when Hitler had summoned Colonel Beck to Berlin to discuss an alliance against Soviet Russia. Beck temporized and incurred Hitler's wrath. On March 21 Hitler's demands on the Corridor and Danzig were presented. The next day Memel was seized from Lithuania. Poland mobilized and London heard from many sources that an immediate German attack might at any moment overwhelm Poland. As usual Hitler was in a hurry, and this time another Munich could not be arranged. Every basis upon which public opinion had been sold on the Munich illusion was swept away.[8] At the same time it suddenly became apparent to the Munich men that the pursuit of their policy would enable Hitler to absorb the resources of all Central and Eastern Europe, not for use against Russia but against themselves, and without a fight. On March 31, accordingly, Chamberlain threw out a British guarantee of Polish independence. "His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power." Here were no weasel words such as had always vitiated his mild threats to do something possibly about Czech independence. For twenty years, from Lloyd George on, Britain had been cool toward Poland. Poland was farther away than Czechoslovakia, and presumably good Englishmen knew less about her quarrels, but this did not deter Chamberlain from giving a firm commitment to go to war if Germany attacked her.

This lightning change of front was not, of course, motivated by any sudden love for Polish liberty. It was born of an abruptly acquired desire to have somebody absorb some of Hitler's lethal fury. Poland was a pale substitute in fighting power for the powerful Czechoslovak fortress which had been so resolutely and callously thrown away, but any sort of ally was now better than none. Mussolini replied by seizing Albania on April 8, and on the 13th Chamberlain announced a guarantee of the independence of Greece and

[7] **Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 375.**

[8] ***The Polish White Book*, London, Hutchinson, 1939, p. 53; Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 403.**

Rumania. Rumania was included only because of the strong insistence of France.[9]

These death-bed guarantees were of course utterly worthless. Britain had no power whatever to save Rumania or Poland from German assault. Only the Soviet Union could do that, and serious consideration of an alliance with the much feared Soviets was not begun until April 15, after the Rumanian and Polish guarantees had been tossed out.

Alliance Rejected. On that date the British Government asked Russia to give a unilateral guarantee to Poland and Rumania. What good this would do, since Poland would not accept Russian assistance, was a mystery, but if that obstacle could be overcome London was willing for Russia to do the fighting. In reply to this transparent maneuver, Russia promptly proposed, on April 17, a binding pact of mutual assistance between Britain, France and Russia, to be implemented by a military agreement, which would guarantee all of the border states from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

This was a starkly realistic proposal. Nothing less offered any hope of stopping Germany without war, or of winning it if Hitler persisted. To offer anything less was to confirm Russia's well-founded suspicions that the West would be glad to hold the ring, as in the destruction of the Spanish Republic, while Hitler worked his will on Russia. Since this was what the British and French regimes really wanted they recoiled in consternation, especially the British, when the Russian proposal arrived. It was quickly learned that none of the threatened border states in East Europe wanted to be guaranteed by Russia. With relief, London replied to Russia on May 9, 1939, repeating its proposal that Russia give a unilateral guarantee to Poland and Rumania and adding the astounding proviso that the guarantee should go into effect only on the decision of the British Government.[10]

It is difficult to imagine how effrontery could go further. Russia was invited to receive the full impact of Hitler's giant war machine without the slightest suggestion of any willingness to aid in her defense and she was invited to move against Hitler on orders from London. This solution of the Nazi menace was proposed, also, after Hitler had made a speech on April 28 in which he tore up both the Anglo-German Naval Treaty and his Non-Aggression Pact with Poland, thus giving plain notice that Poland was next on his list. He also made no attack on either Russia or communism, an omission which might have rung an alarm bell in London. Gone were his scorching diatribes against Bolshevism. There was not a single insult to Moscow in Hitler's long harangue.

Hitler's speech might have sent Chamberlain or Lord Halifax flying to Moscow, especially when Litvinov, long time advocate of support for collective security and cooperation with the West was retired as Soviet Foreign Minister five days later, May 3. On May 7, also, French Foreign Minister Bonnet received a report from his Ambassador Coulondre in Berlin saying

[9]Grigore Gafencu, *Last Days of Europe*, New Haven, 1948, p. 138; London, Muller, 1948. This book is an account of a tour of the capitals of Europe by the Rumanian Foreign Minister in April-May 1939.

[10] Wheeler-Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 397.

that Hitler would come to an understanding with Russia.[11] But none of these startling events produced action in London.

No Entanglement with Russia. By comparison with his past record Chamberlain was becoming magnanimous. In issuing the guarantee to Poland he said he would seek the maximum amount of cooperation with other states, "undeterred by any prejudice." And in an April debate he avowed that "when I say 'our independence' I do not mean only this country's." However, his new-found concern for the independence of small states took an abortive turn. When Colonel Beck came to London to discuss the alliance in April Chamberlain reported comfortably that Beck was "very anxious not to be tied up with Russia." Chamberlain agreed with him, writing: "I confess I very much agree with him, for I regard Russia as a very unreliable friend ... with an enormous irritative power on others." Thus Poland was to be defended against Germany by the ego of the Polish colonels and by the British Navy in the Atlantic, not by the powerful Red Army fighting with the Polish forces.

Chamberlain's eye ranged over the globe to find reasons for avoiding an alliance with Russia. Catholic French Canada might not like it. It might cause division in the Balkans, and what if a Russian alliance drove Spain "over" to the Axis? Yet the absurdity of a guarantee to Poland and Rumania without an alliance with Russia compelled a negotiation. Deeply alarmed cries came from both sides of the House of Commons and from all quarters of the country. A Gallup poll showed that 92 per cent of the British people favored an alliance with Russia. Everybody could see that a tight alliance with Russia was imperatively demanded, except the group of men who were determined not to see. After he had been bombarded in the House of Commons on May 19 about a Russian alliance Chamberlain said wearily: "I cannot help feeling that there is a sort of veil, a sort of wall, between the two Governments, which it is extremely difficult to penetrate."[12]

There was a veil, one held firmly in place in London. Gafencu, who visited Halifax and Bonnet in late April 1939, says that Bonnet was now strongly of the opinion that only a firm alliance with Russia could save the peace. "He wanted it at all costs." Gafencu was "struck by the clearness of his decision," and sure that it had the full approval of the other French leaders. The Soviet proposals were also clear and to the point, but London advanced "a wealth of reservations," proceeding "one step forward, three steps backward." When France brought forward a plain proposal for a new triple alliance, on April 29, Halifax found it much too clear and was disposed "to leave little initiative to the French Government." The conservatives in the British Cabinet wanted to believe with Colonel Beck that an Anglo-French-Polish alliance would be sufficient. They feared that agreement with Russia would mean territorial acquisition by her in East Europe.[13]

On May 19 Lloyd George, Eden and Churchill again pressed upon the Government the life-and-death nature of the need for an immediate arrangement with Russia of the most far-reaching terms. Churchill begged the

[11] **Gafencu, *op. cit.*, pp. 145–6.**
[12] ***Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, Vol. 347, 1939, pp. 1849–50.**
[13] **Gafencu, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–52.**

Government "to get some of these brutal truths into their heads. Without an effective Eastern Front, there can be no satisfactory defence of our interests in the West, and without Russia there can be no effective Eastern Front!"[14] Yet it was not until May 27 that London consented to discuss Russia's proposals, and then London sought to bar the Baltic States from the discussions lest Russia have territorial ambitions there. Chamberlain also had no enthusiasm for a flight to Moscow to arrange the terms. He firmly resisted all suggestions that he go. He had flown eagerly to Germany to wrestle with what he himself called the "wild beast" of Berchtesgaden. Then he had said he was saving the peace, but now he had no stomach for a similar heroic effort in Moscow to save the peace. Things were not so urgent now. Eden offered to go, but "he would not consider letting him go."[15] Lord Halifax refused an invitation to go to Moscow and instead they sent William Strang, a lesser official, from the Foreign Office. This was a triple insult to the Soviet Union because Strang was of low diplomatic rank, he had defended a group of British engineers in an espionage case in Soviet Russia, and he had been a member of Chamberlain's entourage at Munich.

Baltic States Sovereignty Sacred. Strang arrived in mid-June, but with no power to settle the deadlock over what to do about the Baltic States. These three little countries, Russian until 1920, were an open invasion highway from Germany to Petrograd. They were ruled by semi-fascist dictatorships which were much more afraid of Soviet Russia than of Fascist Germany. This was signalized by their signature of non-aggression pacts with Germany, on March 22 and June 7, 1939, whereby all three—Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—pledged themselves to neutrality in any conflict between the Reich and third powers.[16]

In any military showdown these militarily helpless Lilliputians would be sure to side with Germany, but this was not the half of it, from the Soviet standpoint. Axis fifth columns had undermined Spain, flooded Austria with armies of enemies before the open kill and supplied all the sound and fury and excuse for the destruction of Czechoslovakia. All during 1939 this process was being repeated at Poland's expense. Danzig and the Corridor were being taken over by heavy booted "tourists." All of these incontrovertible facts were as well known in London and Paris as in Moscow. The German effort to undermine the Ukraine in the same way was notorious. The Baltic States were, moreover, still largely dominated by German ruling classes. Nothing could be more certain than the Nazi conquest of these strategic lands by the surreptitious methods used so triumphantly to date.

Nevertheless, the British Government found great difficulty in making with Russia a joint guarantee of the Baltic States. These governments did not want it and the men of Munich were most reluctant to guarantee their neutrality against their wishes. The sovereignty of the Baltic dictators now became a precious thing to them. Were they not independent states, small and helpless? How could the democracies coerce them by imposing guarantees which they

[14] **Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, Boston, 1948, p. 374; London, Cassell, 1948.**

[15] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 409.**

[16] **Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 367.**

feared? When the Spanish Republic was being done to death no sign of sympathy for the liberty of the Spanish people had come from Downing Street. On the contrary, London had been wholly tenacious in helping the Italo-German conquest of Spain, while denying Spain the right to get arms for its defense. No finger had been lifted to save Austria and the Munichmen had resorted to extreme coercion to batter down the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, breaking up the finest democracy produced by the First World War and leaving it utterly helpless in Hitler's hands. No soft thoughts about the rights of small nations had deterred them through this long and dismal period, but now they suddenly found themselves apprehensive about the fate of the fascist oligarchies in the Baltic States and Poland.

In his book, ***Last Days of Europe***, Grigore Gafencu, former Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Russia, has an account of the Franco-British-Russian negotiations which quotes official documents directly, though they are not identified. As Foreign Minister, Gafencu toured all of the chief European chancelleries, beginning in the last half of April 1939.

According to his account, when the Soviet note of June 2 raised the Baltic States question both London and Paris drew back, but on July 6 they gave way fully, agreeing that these states should be guaranteed, though they had all objected. Simultaneously, however, Molotov had proposed a new formula which would enable Russia to take action against ***indirect*** aggression in the Baltic States, bringing the alliance into operation if war with Germany resulted.

In the same note Molotov also said that a military convention should be signed before the political alliance. Both of these points caused deep irritation in London, where patience was "almost exhausted." Bonnet insisted that the negotiations must not fail, since public opinion in all countries now attached the greatest importance to them, and on July 24 the British gave way.[17]

Continued Offers to Berlin. While compelled by the urgency of agonized public opinion to go through the motions of negotiating an alliance with Russia, they could not bring themselves to cease making offers to Berlin. On March 16, the day after the fall of Prague, the British Federation of Industries concluded with its Nazi counterpart a series of cartel agreements. In May the British permitted the Bank for International Settlements to send $25,000,000 of Czech gold from London to Berlin. While they haggled with Poland over the terms of a small $40,000,000 armament loan, Chamberlain's economic advisers, Robert Hudson and Sir Horace Wilson, conferred in London with Dr. Helmuth Wohlthat, Hitler's economic adviser, concerning a possible British loan of $5,000,000,000 to the Reich. In Berlin Sir Nevile Henderson was still offering British friendship.[18]

In these circumstances it was as inevitable as anything could be that Hitler should plunge ahead toward the mutilation and conquest of Poland. He had no convincing evidence that the Munich men had really changed their minds, especially when their newspapers continually urged more appeasements.

[17] Gafencu, *op. cit.*, pp. 202–12.

[18] Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 369; Wallace Carroll, *We're in This With Russia*, Boston, 1942, p. 39.

The cumulative effects of years of propitiatory surrender to his rages could not be overcome by anything except the most resolute measures. His entire life experience since January 1933 taught him that his powerful friends in Britain and France would not permit armed opposition to him, and that another Munich at Poland's expense would be the result. Chamberlain told his friend Mussolini "plainly" that if Hitler tried to get Danzig "by force" it would mean starting the European war. To which Mussolini naturally replied, "Let the Poles agree that Danzig goes to the Reich, and I will do my best to get a peaceful, agreed solution."[19]

Chamberlain Complacent. All during the Munich crisis, Chamberlain gave the impression of a man fully convinced that Hitler would blow up the world if he did not get what he wanted in Czechoslovakia. Now that the invaluable Czech bastion was gone, and the West wall guarded Germany's western frontiers, Chamberlain thought that Hitler could be talked out of his next triumph and that his generals would not let him take "the fatal plunge."[20]

There was one way, and only one, by which Germany could be deterred from taking the fatal plunge. That was the signature of an air-tight alliance between the Western Powers and Russia, with no loopholes in it, but on July 30 his biographer records that Chamberlain regarded a breakdown of the Anglo-Russian negotiations "with equanimity, as highly probable."[21]

The appalling prospect that the Anglo-French guarantee of Poland would quickly become a pitiful scrap of paper, in the absence of a firm Anglo-Russian alliance, did not disturb Chamberlain. He was not alarmed when Zhdanov wrote an editorial in ***Pravda***, on June 29, pointing out that the Anglo-Soviet negotiations had been going on for 75 days, during which the Soviet Government took 11 days to return its answers while the British took 59. Zhdanov concluded that "the British and French Governments are not out for a real agreement acceptable to the U.S.S.R., but only for talks about an agreement."[22]

Final Procrastination. This explicit warning did not increase the tempo in London. It was not until July 31 that Chamberlain finally announced the naming of a military mission to Moscow, to arrange the concrete terms of the proposed alliance. Molotov had named his top military men to negotiate, but instead of Lord Gort and General Gamelin the British-French delegation was headed by an obscure British Admiral, Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, and by a French General of comparable obscurity. Nor did this mission fly to Moscow as fast as planes could take it, to concert measures with desperate speed against the pitiable crucifixion of Poland which was boiling up on the horizon. While the sands were running out for Poland by the minute, the Allied mission took a slow Baltic boat, on August 5, and did not reach Moscow until August 11. Then it transpired, once again, that these men had no power to conclude an agreement.

The Soviet Chief-of-Staff, Marshal Voroshilov, outlined a plan to block

[19] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 407.** [20] ***Ibid.*, p. 409.** [21] ***Ibid.*, p.410.**
[22] **W. P. & Z. Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1953, p. 612.**

German pincer movements through Northern Poland and Lemburg in the South. The Allies conferred with Poland and, after four months of negotiations, with German troops piling up on her borders, Poland replied that she did not need Soviet aid.

According to Gafencu, Paris put the strongest pressure on Colonel Beck, but he returned a firm "No." He believed the U.S.S.R. to be too weak militarily to be of much help, but if she were strong she would never evacuate the region occupied. He would not "admit that, in any form whatever, the use of our territory by foreign troops should be discussed."

On August 21 Premier Daladier ordered General Doumenc in Moscow to disregard Beck and sign the military convention, but it was too late. On August 24, speaking to the military delegations, Voroshilov placed the full blame on Poland, but Beck was not worried. He asserted that "materially speaking, nothing much would be changed" by the Nazi-Soviet treaty signed the day before.[23]

In these days, also, with the entire Nazi machine going into high gear for the Polish kill—screaming propaganda, all the old business of atrocities by the Poles, Danzig filled with German troopers, mobilization gaining momentum—Chamberlain went off, on August 16, for "a holiday to the Far Highlands."[24]

German-Soviet Pact. Three days later a far reaching German-Soviet trade agreement was signed in Berlin. On August 23, a non-aggression pact between the same powers was signed in Moscow.

When the German-Soviet Pacts were announced the Western leaders feigned shock and surprise. Actually the French Ambassador to Germany, M. Coulondre, had reported from Berlin as early as May 7 that Germany was planning a deal with Moscow for the partition of Poland. He repeated this warning in the clearest form on May 22, and all during the summer.[25] The Allied chiefs knew well that their failure to make an alliance with Russia would mean the destruction of Poland. There was no other conceivable hope of preventing Poland's liquidation, but London did not choose to bring pressure to bear on Poland or the Baltic states to prevent their own destruction. The great dread of war which had driven Chamberlain to Munich no longer scourged him.

Polish Doom Sealed in London. After August 23, there was but one hope of preventing the smashing of Poland. That was to fly to Warsaw and bring the extremest pressure to bear upon the Polish Colonels to grant "self-determination" to Hitler in Danzig and the Corridor, accept the partition of their country and save it from the terrible rain of death and devastation which could not otherwise be prevented. All the arguments that had been used upon the Czechs now applied triple-strength to the Poles.

Instead, British promises to Poland, never put into binding form, were hastily written into a formal Treaty of Mutual Assistance between Britain

[23] **Gafencu, *op. cit.*, pp. 212–17.** [24] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 414.**
[25] ***French Yellow Book of 1939*, Nos. 123, 124, 125, 127, 155, 176, 194, 199.**

and Poland and signed in London on August 25. Never were names put to a more hollow instrument. Britain and France had not the slightest power to save the life of a single Pole, or even to fire a shot that would mean anything to Poland. If this treaty had any meaning at all it meant that finally the Allies would enlist the might of the United States to wear down Germany and restore some semblance of a ruined Poland, but at the moment this was a dim prospect.

Why then had the Munich men refused all through the Spring and Summer to accept the only terms for an alliance with Russia which could mean anything to Russia? It was, says Schuman, because "all preferred the destruction of Poland to the Soviet defence of Poland. All hoped that the sequence would be a German-Soviet war over the spoils." Is this a too stern judgment? It fits Ambassador Henderson, who told Hitler, on August 23, that he preferred a German-Soviet agreement to an Anglo-Soviet agreement.[26]

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Poland was sacrificed as deliberately as Czechoslovakia was. Poland meant two things to the Munich men: (1) an occasion for reversing their disastrous policy after its futility was evident to them; (2) another diversion of German conquest-mania toward the East which would gain them a little additional time, if it did not lead to a German-Soviet clash. Chamberlain explained repeatedly that "Poland was the occasion but not the fundamental cause, which was the intolerableness of life under recurrent threats of fire and sword."[27]

Poland Destroyed in a Day. Poland's fate was settled on the first day of the German blitz. East Prussia hung over Warsaw and the heart of Poland like a giant vulture, spitting out planes and mechanized columns in swift profusion while the same thing happened from Germany proper and from Czechoslovakia. A million German troops swept over Poland's borders in a giant semicircle. At 11:00 a.m. 5000 German bombers appeared simultaneously over 400 Polish towns. An hour later every line of communication in Poland was broken, including 1000 bridges, and half the population of Poland was fleeing in all directions on the disrupted roads. The details were macabre in the extreme. Nothing was too small to draw machine-gun fire from the air. A single person working in his field or a domestic animal was sufficient to attract the attentions of the Luftwaffe. On the roads, filled with fleeing humanity, German planes had a field day. In the towns even the boy scouts were collected by scores and machine-gunned on the steps of the churches. By nightfall the government of the fatuous Polish colonels had ceased to exist, as the German columns rolled across Poland, reaching the Curzon Line in fifteen days. There they met Russian troops who reclaimed Eastern Poland as swiftly.

This unfortunate episode over, Chamberlain settled down for a comfortable war. Until December he doubted that Hitler would dare to attack the Maginot Line. He did not believe in an armored blitz through the Low Countries. He thought Hitler would shrink before "a breach of neutrality so flagrant and unscrupulous." He doubted too that Hitler would attempt a

[26] Schuman, ***op. cit.*, pp. 376–9.** [27] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 423.**

great air blitz on Britain. Hitler was stymied. Chamberlain waited calmly for "the collapse of the German home front."[28]

Green Light to Hitler. In the Western world the Nazi-Soviet Pact caused widespread indignation. Englishmen thought it outrageous that it should be concluded while their military mission was still in Moscow. The Soviets were accused of executing the greatest double-cross in history. People everywhere said that this proved how treacherous they were and how wise the Allies had been in being slow to trust them. Anti-Communists all over the world charged that this treaty was the cause of the Second World War. Others, a little more discriminating, said that it had touched off the war, made it certain. The pact, it was said, gave Hitler the green light. In this form the charge was to be repeated perpetually for many years, especially when Soviet-American relations became acute after the Second World War.

Actually, the Nazi determination to settle accounts with Poland had for months been as plain as anything could be. This time, too, only the most heroic measures could prevent them from taking what they wanted in an orgy of violence and blood-letting. They had been frustrated at Munich, prevented from trying out their new war machine. Now they were determined to see for themselves just how much destruction it could cause. When the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, talked with Hitler and Ribbentrop on August 11–13, he wrote in his diary: "The decision to fight is implacable.... I am certain that even were the Germans given much more than they ask, they would attack just the same because they are possessed by the demon of destruction. . . . There is nothing that can be done. Hitler has decided to strike and strike he will." He added that 11 Duce "believes the democracies will still give in."[29] The decision to obliterate Poland was therefore fixed before the pact with Russia was signed. Without it the Nazi Panzer divisions would have rolled up to the borders of the Soviet Union, occupying the White Russian and Ukrainian half of Poland to which the Soviet Union had a far better right.

This fact alone should dispose of the contention that if the Soviet Union could not come to terms with Britain and France it should have at least stood neutral like the American Congress. Moscow, it is said, did not need to make a deal with Hitler and give him the green light, but in reality the Soviet Government did not have this choice. By standing aloof it would have lost not only Eastern Poland but the Baltic states as well. By rejecting Hitler's promises, and the threats that always went with them, the Soviets would have placed themselves in the daily and imminent danger of fighting the German-Russian war which they believed the West had tried to bring about.

By making the truce with Hitler the Soviets gained four things. (1) They got everything in the Baltic states which the Allies had refused them, and more, plus the ability to ship home to Germany 100,000 Baltic Germans, as well as 300,000 other Germans from Poland and other Eastern areas. These huge fifth columns were quickly cleaned out of the Russian sphere, to the deep chagrin of the Nazi supermen. (2) They achieved freedom to correct their

[28] **Feiling, *op. cit.*, pp. 425, 418.**

[29] **Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 376.**

boundary with Finland and reclaim Bessarabia from Rumania. (3) Instead of incurring the full power of the Nazi war machine, while the West viewed their plight with satisfaction, they turned Hitler back upon the West. (4) They also acquired nearly two years of precious time in which to prepare for a German onslaught.

Even then the Soviet Union was almost done to death by Nazi Germany, just as all Western Europe was, except Britain whose escape was narrow enough. Of course, in the end both the Soviets and the West suffered from their inability to unite in curbing Hitler while there was time. At last it took the full power of the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States to master Nazidom.

Many Green Lights. Union to curb the Nazis was always the best policy. It was sound when Germany struck at the foundations of European order, and destroyed three treaties, by militarizing the Rhineland; it was sound policy when she moved into Spain, when she raped Austria, when she plunged for Czechoslovakia, and when she lunged for Poland. At each step union against the aggressor was a crying need, and in each case the Soviet Union gave ample evidence of its willingness to unite, but in every instance its cooperation was rejected.

This is a chapter in the recent history of world politics which is wellnigh forgotten in the West. It is, however, not so easily forgotten in the East. The four years of humiliation at Geneva form a long period in Soviet memory. The League of Nations was the creation of the West. It had all of the sound principles and all of the machinery necessary for restraining the Axis aggressors. The coming of Russia to Geneva also gave the League the necessary power to keep the peace, but the democracies resolutely refused to invoke the power of the League in each crisis. Instead they fled farther and farther from Geneva until at last it was an empty shell, capable only of performing one last rite—the expulsion of the Soviet Union.

THE FIRST RUSSO-FINNISH WAR

During September and October 1939 the Soviet Union concluded mutual assistance pacts with the three Baltic States, gaining air and naval bases and full control of the south side of the Gulf of Finland, which leads up to Leningrad. Then on October 5, Moscow moved to secure from Finland military control of the north shore of the Gulf and of the isthmus of Karelia.

This tongue of land, between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, was the southern frontier between Finland and the Soviet Union. The border was only twenty miles from Leningrad and it was heavily fortified by the famous Mannerheim line, which had been constructed under the guidance of German military men, who also trained the Finnish army. This frontier gravely endangered the defense of Leningrad, in case Germany should take over Finland, or in case the strong anti-Soviet feelings of the Finns should make them voluntary allies of Germany. In our remoteness of time and space

from the scene it is easy to depreciate these fears. At the time it seemed intolerably dangerous to Moscow that Finnish guns should be able to shoot into Russia's second city. The Kremlin was intent on remedying the situation and on securing new military bases, just as the United States was, after the fall of France, and for the same reason—an intense desire to ward off a great military threat.

In Russia's case the peril was much nearer. It was rampant in all Eastern Europe, thanks to the policy of the Western Powers in building up Germany to the point at which she escaped all control and smashed the public order of Europe completely. It was a totally lawless world in which the Soviets lived in 1939, a world made lawless in spite of their own consistent efforts to prevent it. This basic factor is essential background in judging Russia's assault on Finland. Up to the time Europe was chaperoned into chaos by the West the Soviets had never indicated any desire to recover any part of the lands surrendered in 1920 during Russia's weakness, except Bessarabia, and that claim was put away when Russia came to Geneva. While Germany yelped constantly for everybody's lands Moscow raised no claims. A border like the Leningrad frontier was no risk to them during assured peace, but it could be a grave danger in a state of complete European anarchy. In similar circumstances it is difficult to conclude that any great power would have refrained from making the demands on Finland which the Soviets made on October 14, 1939.[y]

Soviet Demands Rejected. They demanded: (1) the lease of a naval base at Hangoe, across the Gulf of Finland from their bases in Estonia; (2) the cession of five islands in the Gulf, which controlled Leningrad strategically by sea; and (3) 2761 square kilometers of land on the Karelian isthmus, the new border to be demilitarized. In return, twice the amount of land farther north was offered. If this was the full extent of Soviet desires the Finns could wisely have accepted the Russian demands. But, warned by what had happened to the Baltic States, the Finns were braced to resist, and they left Moscow on November 13 without yielding. They had not been pressured or browbeaten but felt that they were asked to surrender their strategic security as unjustly as Czechoslovakia had been. Being human, they did not understand that the battering down of Ethiopia's formidable strategic security, then Spain's and Austria's, followed by the demolition of Czechoslovakia's strategic security and Poland's, had made strategic security something which only the very greatest powers could command. They pluckily stood up to the Soviet Government just as if they had been a great power, even when the Soviets unleashed a newspaper campaign of abuse and intimidation against them and manufactured an incident on the Leningrad frontier.

Finland Attacked. Moscow then denounced the Soviet-Finn Non-aggression Treaty and broke diplomatic relations, recognizing as the government of Finland a puppet regime alleged to be on the Finnish border and headed by one Otto Kuusinen, a Finnish Communist who had been in Moscow for twenty years, and still was. This mythical government aroused general laughter in Moscow at the expense of the Soviet Government, for perhaps

the first and last time.[30] It "ceded" the required strategic points to Russia, getting back more East Karelian territory than had been offered the real Government of Finland.

Then the Soviet Government sent its planes and third-rate reserve troops against Finland, in the beginning of winter, and waited for the Helsinki Government to collapse. Moscow had miscalculated all along the line. It had thought that the Finnish Government would not fight, had been woefully misinformed about its strength at home, and had not prepared for war against the most spirited fighting by a doughty little people. In addition, Russia had duplicated Hitler's tactics so closely as to shock the rest of the world psychologically and produce a new wave of anti-Soviet feeling.

The U.S.S.R. Expelled from the League. This was not difficult to accomplish, especially in conservative and Catholic circles. On December 3 Finland appealed to the League of Nations, long ago reduced to a state of coma by the resolute neglect of its controlling members. But now a miracle occurred. The League stirred. Argentina supported by other Latin American states urged the expulsion of the U.S.S.R. from the League, and on December 14 the British-French dominated Council expelled the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, on the recommendation of an equally pliant Assembly.

The entire proceeding was of very questionable legality. The Assembly resolution condemned the U.S.S.R. for breaking the Treaty of Non-aggression with Finland, the Pact of Paris and Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant, stating that "by its act, the U.S.S.R. has placed itself outside of the League of Nations." This was strange doctrine, since there is nothing in the Covenant which permits a member automatically to read itself out of the League by violating the Covenant. On the contrary, it specifically became subject to sanctions as a continuing member of the League. There was nothing in the Covenant, either, which permitted expulsion for the breaking of treaties other than the Covenant, or for refusing to attend League sessions, as the U.S.S.R. had done in this case.

Still more serious was the violation of Paragraph 4 of Article 16, which governed expulsions. This paragraph stated that "any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon."

The terms of this article clearly provided two things: (1) that the offending member could not by his vote prevent his own expulsion; and (2) that the expulsion must be concurred in by all the other members of the Council. How were these conditions fulfilled on December 14, 1939? When the vote was taken, fourteen States were members of the Council. Of these, seven members appear to have assented to the resolution of expulsion; viz. France, Great Britain, Bolivia, Belgium, the Dominican Republic, South Africa and Egypt. Several members abstained from voting, including China, Finland, Greece and Yugoslavia.

[30] **John Scott, *Duel for Europe*, Boston, 1942, p. 101.**

Before the vote was taken the Chairman of the Council read paragraph 4 of Article 16 (quoted above) and stated that it provides for "a vote" by the members of the League represented on the Council. Then when the vote was taken he announced that the resolution had carried "as abstentions do not count in establishing unanimity." It is true that abstentions had generally not prevented action in League procedure, but on the most vital matter of expulsion it is difficult to believe that silence was the affirmative concurrence plainly called for by paragraph 4 of Article 16. But, even if this be denied, the resolution of expulsion was vitiated by the absence of two members of the Council, Iran and Peru, whose representatives were not present at the session. Their absence certainly prevented action by "all the other Members of the League represented thereon."[31]

Revealing Death Rattle. The resolution expelling the U.S.S.R. from the League of Nations was illegal, but this is not the vital aspect of the case. More important was the hypocrisy of Britain and France in presuming to put it through. Japan had been allowed to remain in the League for nearly two years while she conquered Manchuria, not for self-defense but for aggrandizement, and permitted to resign when she saw fit. Italy had been carefully tolerated in the League while she carried out a long and equally brazen conquest, which France and Britain always had the power to stop in the name of the League, and Italy also had remained a member of the League until she had extracted the last possible modicum of advantage from membership. Then she too was permitted to walk out under her own steam. Germany likewise was allowed to resign at will and to break all the laws which governed the peace of Europe by militarizing the Rhineland, while she was still legally a member of the League, but no righteous wrath ever led to any effort to place the brand of Cain on her.

When Spain was assaulted by the pampered aggressors adamant firmness in London prevented throughout a three-year period any breath of condemnation of the conquerors of Spain by the League. Geneva was resolutely held quiet while Spain was conquered and Czechoslovakia destroyed. Small states which had every right to look to the League for protection and salvation were denied the slightest help or even sympathy from Geneva. Away from Geneva was the cry. Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay developed a deep loathing for the very idea of collective security, especially after Russia espoused it. When Poland's hour of doom came the League did not utter even a feeble breath of protest. The Second World War which the League was created to prevent was inaugurated amid utter silence in Geneva.

Then when the U.S.S.R. committed an aggression upon Finland which was plainly due to considerations of defense against Germany, the king of all the aggressors, the League of Nations was hastily revived from its deep coma to morally reprimand the U.S.S.R. After years of steady effort to persuade London and Paris to honor their obligations under the Covenant, Russia now

[31] **For a full analysis of the legality of the action of December 14, see: Leo Gross, "Was the Soviet Union Expelled from the League of Nations?",** ***The American Journal of International Law,*** **January 1945, Vol. 39, No. I, pp. 35–44.**

found herself thrown out bodily and illegally. Then the League of Nations relapsed into its last long sleep.

This final act of the League was symbolic of the League's entire history. Throughout its life it had been used by France and Britain when it suited their purposes and suppressed when it did not. But this last act of puppetry played at Geneva was more short-sighted than its authors could have suspected. When all of the immeasurable slaughter and devastation which directly resulted from the nullification of the League of Nations by the United States, Britain and France was over, it would be necessary to organize a new League, of which the Soviet Union would be a key member, if a still greater demolition of Western civilization was to be prevented. When that time came, too, the last act of the League of Nations would be the first memory of the same men in the Kremlin who had felt its sting.

Plunge Toward War with Russia. Throughout the history of the League of Nations the small states, especially those in Europe, had been the most devoted members, expressing the conscience of mankind far better than the representatives of the Great Powers did. Now that the League was dead they were still to prevent the British and French Governments from committing a crowning and irrevocable act of folly.

When Russia attacked Finland all the reactionaries in the world saw their chance for an outburst of holy fury against Red Russia. As Feiling put it, the Russian attack on Finland "had reawakened the ugliest prejudices of the French Right, many of whom would have preferred a joint front with Germany against Communism."[32] Most of the powerful ones in France and Britain (and many in the U.S.A.) forgot all about the war with Germany, which they had done their obstinate best to avoid. Here in the Russo-Finnish War was a war they could really put their hearts into. The same hearts which had been filled with stony flint about dying for Czechoslovakia now palpitated with hot eagerness to help the noble little Finns. They were such good democrats, and in the United States they were the only ones who had paid their war debts.

The American Congress was so deeply moved by the Finnish tragedy that it ventured ever so cautiously out of its paper citadels of neutrality and voted $30,000,000 to Finland, but to be used only for "non-military" supplies, beans instead of bullets, as one Congressman said. On the other side of the Atlantic world no such circumspection governed. London and Paris rushed to Finland the real sinews of war. London sent 114 guns, 185,000 shells, 50,000 grenades, 15,700 aerial bombs, and 100,000 great coats. The French Government from its own meager supplies sent 175 planes, 472 guns, 795,000 shells, 5000 machine-guns, 200,000 grenades and 20,000,000 cartridges, weapons which would have served France well a little later if there had been strong hands to direct their use.[33]

Nothing was too good for the Finns. Although there was supposed to be a war on between Germany and the Allies, Italian, Spanish, French, British

[32] Feiling, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

33 The *New York Times*, March 13, 1940; Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

and German volunteers hurried to Finland to fight shoulder to shoulder against the horrid Red, while "Great Britain, France, the Vatican and the Fascist Powers all united in their denunciation of Russia."[34]

If this aid did not suffice, the French and British Governments were actually prepared to go to war with Russia. On January 19, 1940, Daladier asked his army and navy heads to make plans for attacking Baku and fighting the U.S.S.R. in the Black Sea. On February 5 the Allied Supreme War Council decided to send troops to Finland. Six divisions of troops were made ready for embarkation in Britain and France had 50,000 troops ready to sail. The two governments were saved from plunging into war with Russia only by the refusal of Norway, Sweden and Turkey to grant transit privileges across their territories. Otherwise the Munichards would have been fighting both Germany and Russia.

Were they who had been so careful not to mix in the quarrels of people in far-away Czechoslovakia, "about which we know nothing," now to attack Russia for still more distant Finland's wrongs, without any calculation of the consequences? Did they think they could sit out a war with both of the great land powers of Eurasia? That could hardly have been their calculation for in the middle of April 1940, a full month after the Finnish war had ended, "Gamelin and Weygand were still discussing a possible bombing of Baku, ostensibly to cut off Soviet oil supplies to Germany."[35]

Nazi Blitz in the West. During the winter, while the French and British Tories plunged toward war with Russia, all Germany was a roaring furnace of war activity. On April 9 she unleashed overwhelming attacks on neutral Denmark and Norway, without any presentation of demands which they could weigh for a month and reject at their peril, as in Finland's case. Then on May 10 it was the turn of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. Germany struck her small neighbors without the slightest warning, and after all the preparation which stealth and treachery could devise. These hammer blows at their own existence quickly took the minds of Britain's rulers off the luxury of a war with Russia, but for some days the French Rightists were still capable of dreaming about blows against Russia's far-away oil centers, during their last five minutes of grace. They would have loved a war with Russia. Their choice had been made years ago when they passionately chose "Hitler rather than Blum," the mild and timid socialist reformer Blum. Now they were to have Hitler, and on the whole were to prosper under him, as their counterparts did throughout Europe.

Feeling in the United States. In the United States feeling could hardly have been stronger against the Soviets. The American Institute of Public Opinion reported 88 per cent of Americans for Finland and only 1 per cent for Russia. Labor unions sent money and upper-class society went "all out" for

[34] George W. Keeting and Rudolph Schlesinger, *Russia and Her Western Neighbors*, London, Cape, 1942, p. 37.

[35] Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 389. This hankering after the oil pots of the Caucasus was one reason behind the post-war Soviet demands on Turkey for the return of Kars and Ardahan, provinces which dominate Baku as completely as the Mannerheim line did Leningrad.

Finnish relief. Ex-President Herbert Hoover deserted his non-interventionist position and headed the relief organization which eventually accepted contributions for arms, after another group for that purpose had been formed. Many people exultantly identified the "Communism" of the New Deal with Russia and some Republican leaders charged that if Roosevelt had not recognized Russia she would not have attacked Finland.

The society world found that "after two decades of cumulative bitterness they could hate Russia effectively."[36] Carnegie Hall was filled with people who paid up to $250 for seats, for Finland. Benefits of every kind were held, great balls, bridge and theater parties, concerts and auctions, horse shows, hunt breakfasts were held, in Finland's behalf.

Meanwhile the press proceeded to win the war for tiny Finland and show up with finality the huge colossus with fist of communist clay. The Finnish censorship was to a large degree responsible for this development, to prove that their cause was not hopeless. American newspaper men, who were never permitted to see a Finnish battlefield until the Finnish dead had been removed, and seldom then, contributed their full share of rumored Finnish triumphs, from Helsinki, Copenhagen and Riga. One even wrote a long, graphic account of some 2500 Russians whom he had seen frozen as they were shot—standing, kneeling, in every position they had been in when killed. Most of his readers never learned that this was a medical impossibility. Nor did they notice that Helsinki was not destroyed from the air on Christmas Day, after a powerful three-day build-up for the event. Pictures were faked and many columns filled with tales of revolt and disaster in Russia. Vast plots against Stalin were detailed. Headlines of great atrocities covered articles which said at the end that "there were no deaths." Great slaughter of Finnish civilians from the air finally boiled down to a death list of 234. One correspondent made the headlines with a dispatch telling how 100 Finns held off 300,000 Russians.

Streamers telling of stunning Finnish victories filled the press until they transformed what had seemed a hopeless cause into an irresistible one. It was a rare Finn who had not killed twenty Russians. Circulation managers could not afford to fall behind, or stop to investigate, the thrilling details of the "war which nobody saw," until suddenly Finland was defeated and the war was over.

The Finnish collapse was a great shock to editors across the continent. As the war opened, the Scripps-Howard newspapers wrote, on October 9, 1939, that "Russia now leers through smudgy eyelids on spotless Finland." A little later the same newspaper chain proclaimed that "Hitler now becomes a minor irritant to be eliminated, and that a mass crusade on this savage .. ." would soon develop, with the Prussians in the vanguard beside the British and French. On January 13, 1940, the same newspapers observed that "the greatest Finnish ally is not General Winter but General Dumbness, and the ***San Francisco Chronicle*** spoke for nation-wide comment in acclaiming

[36] This account is taken from *War Propaganda and the United States,* by Harold Levine and James Wechsler, Yale Press, 1940, which was published for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. Chapter 9, pp. 282–324, is an unusually informative and stimulating description of propaganda methods.

Moscow's "great experiment" as a bluff and a fallacy.[37] Then suddenly it appeared that the Red Army was to be reckoned with, a fact, however, which was soon buried under the great mass of emotion generated through the American press during the Russo-Finnish war.

On their side the Russian efforts at propaganda had been few and transparently false. They could not say that they were seizing strategic territory against a war with Hitler. They had to allege that they were fortifying themselves against the imperialistic British and French. Moscow also neglected to warn the New York ***Daily Worker*** that it would suddenly abandon the puppet Kuusinen "government" and the ***Daily Worker*** fell flat on its face, as it did when the Soviet-German truce was made.

Soviet-Finn Balance Sheet. The Russo-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. Seeing the rising danger of a war against the entire West, Stalin sent to the Far East for some crack divisions, hardened in battles with the Japanese, and quickly smashed the Mannerheim line. Then Kuusinen was retired to the wings and peace made with Helsinki, on slightly stiffer terms than those offered in October, but leaving the Finns the two important ports, Viborg, at the base of the Karelian isthmus, and Petsamo, with its nickel mines, as a window on the Arctic Sea.

The Finnish war cost Russia heavily in prestige both abroad and at home. It was never popular with the Soviet peoples. It was expensive in men and supplies lost. It deceived the world and Hitler into thinking that the Red Army was very weak, for the final efficient performance of the Russian regulars received scant notice in the world's press after months of ridicule of Soviet ineffectiveness. On the other hand, the humiliations suffered led to a sweeping reorganization and re-training of the Red armies and the territory gained may have been of decisive importance in saving Leningrad during 1941–4, after one of the longest and most heroic defenses of any epoch. This gain has to be set against the chances that the Finnish armies would not have taken part in the siege of Leningrad, without the provocation of the first JjLusso-Finnish war.

When the second war with Finland was over, in 1945, Moscow took both Viborg and Petsamo, and imposed reparations on Finland, but did not occupy the country, and by all accounts Finland maintains a high degree of ability to govern herself. „

By fighting, Finland lost heavily both times. Yet it may be that without fighting she would have suffered the fate of the Baltic States. This is debatable, since Finland had always enjoyed a more independent status under the Tsars, and since the entire Soviet handling of the first clash with Finland was marked more by miscalculation than by malice. Still the ability of the Finns to fight and to win world sympathy won respect in the Soviet Union and may have saved them from incorporation into the Soviet Union.

Baltic States and Bessarabia Absorbed. During the summer of 1940, while Germany was heavily occupied in the West, the Soviets ousted the Baltic

[37] Levine and Wechsler, *op. cit.*, pp. 285, 290, 321.

Governments and after the customary totalitarian preparations, received in August the usual top-heavy votes for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

Earlier, the Soviets had presented an ultimatum to Rumania, demanding the return of Bessarabia, and the Axis advised submission. Rumania yielded on June 28, 1940.

This cession completed the long chain of buffer lands which the U.S.S.R. recovered during the Hitler-Stalin truce. Whether they were of decisive importance to Russia in stemming the German rush in 1941 may be disputed abroad, but not in Russia. As events developed the German blitz almost engulfed Moscow and Leningrad. It was touch and go when the crisis came, and we may be sure that the Red leaders were glad that the impetus of the first German wave had been absorbed by the buffer belt acquired in 1939 and 1940.

In 1948 an official Russian publication stated that in the absence of this cushion the Germans would have captured Moscow and Leningrad, compelling Russia to go on the defensive for at least two years and releasing fifty German divisions for an assault on Britain and the Middle East, and thirty Japanese divisions for use against China and the Americans in the Far East.[38]

It would be difficult to argue that these results would not have followed, if the two greatest Russian cities and Stalingrad had fallen in the late autumn of 1941. Had the Russian defense not held in early December 1941 the war would have cost the United States infinitely more in money, goods, and especially in blood.

[38] *Falsificators of History,* Soviet Information Bureau, Moscow, February 1948, p. 51.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOVIET-GERMAN TRUCE

1939–1941

In January 1948 the State Department published a book of documents captured in Germany under the title ***Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941.***[1]

This volume was a blow in the Cold War, issued apparently with two purposes: to suggest ***(a)*** that the German-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939, was the cause of the Second World War; and ***(b)*** that the Soviet Union was so avaricious that it over-reached itself with its partner in crime, Hitler, and largely justified the German attack on the Soviet Union. If these were not the purposes the publication was pointless, since no peaceful end could be served by issuing a book of German documents concerning negotiations with one of our greatest allies in the recent war.

That these were the objectives is verified by the reception which the publication had in the press. The ***New York Herald Tribune*** headlined its news story: "U.S. Reveals Documents of a Stalin-Hitler Pact to Divide Up the World." The ***New York Times*** went further, saying: "Seized Nazi Papers Show Soviet Aims in 1939 to Grab Land and Divide Europe. Duplicity Traced. Secret Pact Clauses Set Control Spheres which Soviet Overstepped. Moscow Preferred Berlin to West."

This is the impression which hundreds of newspaper articles and radio speakers gave to many millions of Americans, without ever suggesting that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was the result of the long and dismal appeasement drive on the part of the West. Unfortunately, even the most intelligent of peoples can be conditioned for war by such means, unless time can be gained for a fuller examination of the issues and consequences at stake. In that event the judgment of Walter Lippmann, on February 12, 1948, will be upheld. Said Lippmann:

> "This publication is a classic example of bad propaganda . . . bound to backfire, doing more injury to ourselves and to our friends than to the Russians against whom it was aimed. . . . That the State Department book was the work of propagandists and not of scholars is self-evident on the face of it. It contained only Nazi documents, and no self-respecting historian would dream of basing his judgment on the documents of only one side of a grave historical event. Moreover, only those Nazi documents were selected for publication which bore on Nazi-Soviet relations after

[1] ***Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941.*** **Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. The Superintendent of Documents, Washington, $1.00.**

Throughout this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, the documents used are quoted from this volume.

> April, 1939.... To embarrass our Western allies and ourselves by inviting the publication of documents for the period up to the Munich appeasement is not astute—indeed it is altogether incompetent—propaganda."

As the Nuremberg documents state: "The view that Germany's key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the acquisition of ***Lebensraum*** at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology."[2] Hitler's ***Mein Kampf*** had declared the relation of Germany to Russia to be "the most decisive concern of all German affairs." National Socialism would "stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the East." Instead of "the colonial and commercial policy of the past" there would be "the soil policy of the future" and "If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states."[3] Hitler was as explicit as he could be. He said publicly at Nuremberg on September 12, 1936: "If I had the Ural Mountains with their incalculable store of treasures in raw materials, Siberia, with its vast forests, and the Ukraine with its tremendous wheat fields, Germany and the National Socialist leadership would swim in plenty."[4]

Fron) the beginning the campaign of Nazism against Communism had been one of its chief selling points. Coupled with the often proclaimed Nazi lust for Russian resources it had convinced the controlling elements in the West that German Fascism would really dispose of Russian Communism. What the West had not been able to do in the great Interventions of 1918–20 would finally be achieved by a powerfully resurgent and rearmed Germany. That was one of the leading reasons why German rearmament was not only permitted but assisted by Western capitalists and politicians. At the very least a secure bulwark against communism would be erected. "The sturdy young Nazis of Germany are Europe's guardians against the Communist danger," said Lord Rothermere in the ***Daily Mail*** on November 18, 1933. "Once Germany has acquired the additional territory she needs in Western Russia, her need for expansion would be satisfied."

This was the basic calculation upon which the whole giddy structure of appeasement was reared. Powerful people whose main concern was the preservation of their wealth and social position felt that playing ball with the Nazis was their best bet, especially since they dreaded deeply the social results of any war, even a "victorious" one. If the Nazis would only vent their dynamism in the East all would be well. It was with this hope and expectation that the decisive Bohemian bastion was presented to Hitler.

When this was accomplished at Munich there was for the moment nothing for the U.S.S.R. to do but wait and arm. Russian collaboration with the West had been sincere because based on real fear of Nazi Germany. Gustav Hilger, a high German diplomat who was a Russian specialist, and who spent the period of the Nazi-German truce in Moscow, writes that Moscow recognized

[2] ***Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,* Washington, 1946, Vol. I, p. 795.**

[3] ***Ibid.*, p. 831.**

[4] **Adolf Hitler, *My New Order,* New York, 1941, p. 400. Cited also in Shugg and De Weerd, *World War II,* Washington, Infantry Journal Press, 1946, p. 82.**

the peril of the Nazi regime immediately, that Litvinov tried to be friendly with Hitler's government at first and that he had the full support of the Kremlin in trying to work with the West through the League of Nations from 1934 to 1939. The stronger Hitler grew, the more Moscow labored for collective security, until the Munich conference convinced the Kremlin that the West was not only unwilling to oppose Hitler but not averse to German action against the Soviet Union.[5]

Soviet collaboration had been rejected at every point for five years, and resoundingly at Munich. It was still the best policy, but it was thinkable only if there was a political revulsion in the West which would bring in new governments sincerely desirous of alliance with Russia. A revulsion of sentiment occurred after March 1939, but it could not remove the appeasement governments, who could not and would not make a sincere alliance with Russia. They now feared and deeply distrusted Nazi Germany, after they had stubbornly surrendered their power to control or check her, but less than they feared Red Russia. Driven by public opinion, they had to do something, and the only thing they could think of was to try to intimidate Hitler with a paper guarantee of Poland. If this worked, well and good; if it did not Hitler would still be catapulted toward Russia.

The bluff failed, as it was certain to fail coming from the mouths of the appeasers, but its failure compelled the West to accept a state of war with Germany, which not only offended the explosive lord of Germany but forced him to execute his first rule, to clean up the West before attacking Russia. This maxim had been overlooked by the appeasers, along with an equally vital Nazi principle—never to be involved in a two-front war again. The Nazis accepted Foch's dictum that Germany could never lose a one-front war or win a two-front war, and their military men were still more eager to live by it.

By the Spring of 1939 the stage had been set perfectly for the German-Soviet Pact of August 1939. The Russians needed to buy time, and they would have been superhuman if they had not been willing to get it by turning Hitler back upon the West, which had so steadfastly rejected all cooperation with them. But Germany needed a truce with Russia still more urgently—to avoid another two-front war. In mid-1939 it was as inevitable as anything can ever be in world politics that the two should come together.

The first move had been made in Berlin, on December 22, 1938, when Dr. Karl Schnurre, the German trade negotiator, offered to renew talks with Russia about a loan to be repaid in strategic raw materials. The Soviets reacted favorably on January 11, 1939, and Schnurre was on his way to Moscow when reports of his journey in the British and other newspapers caused Ribbentrop to recall him abruptly, "a slap in the face" which led the Russians to draw back for some six weeks.[6]

Warning From Moscow. Then after the credit negotiations had been resumed Stalin made a remarkable speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the

[5] Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies*, New York, Macmillan, 1953, pp. 305–6.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 285–6.

Soviet Union, on March 10, 1939, saying: "A war against the interests of England, France and the United States?" Nonsense, said Stalin, "the Fascists reply that we are waging war on the Comintern." But, he continued, "war is inexorable, it cannot be hidden under any guise. For no 'Axes,' 'Triangles' or 'Anti-Comintern Pacts' can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain—and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive States. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors."

The aggressors, continued Stalin, "in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors. Incredible, but true." Why was it? The chief reason, he said, was an eagerness not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work "in order that they might become embroiled with others, especially the Soviet Union." He cited "the hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine." The "gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on the Soviet Ukraine" from the Carpathian Ukraine (the tip of Czechoslovakia), "not later than this Spring." Certain European and American pressmen and politicians were losing patience, "putting it down in black and white" that the Germans were talking about colonies, instead of marching to the East.

"Far be it from me to moralize," continued Stalin. "It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality," but, he remarked, "the big and dangerous game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them."

"The foreign policy of the Soviet Union" was "clear and explicit." He summarized it under four heads: (1) peace and business relations with all; (2) "close and friendly relations" with all countries on the borders of the U.S.S.R.; (3) "support of nations which are victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country"; (4) "two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders."

This warning went unheeded in the West. Russia was still rightly counted in the anti-Axis front, though an unwanted partner. When Czechoslovakia was occupied on March 15, both of Litvinov's requests for a conference were rejected by the West, yet he presented a separate protest to Germany on March 19. He refused to recognize either the legality or justice of Germany's latest seizure. He called it "a new blow to the feeling of security of nations."[7]

Thus, on March 19, 1939, Russia was still an opponent of Nazi aggression. Then on April 6 Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons that a pact of mutual assistance was being concluded with Poland, and a week later a similar guarantee was given to Rumania. These paper guarantees, which Britain had no power whatever to carry through, constituted one of the most amazing episodes of the appeasement era. But still more astonishing was the

[7] ***French Yellow Book*, New York, 1940, p. 108; Coates, *A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations*, pp. 603–4.**

British proposal of April 15 that Russia give a unilateral guarantee to Poland and Rumania, accompanied as it was by procrastination on the Soviet counter proposal of a joint military agreement to defend all the border states between Russia and Germany.[8]

Turning-point. It was immediately after this that Merekalov, the Russian Ambassador to Germany, on April 17, paid his first call to the German Foreign Office since he had presented his credentials on June 5, 1938. He came to explore a recent intimation to him that Germany was willing to cultivate and expand her economic relations with Russia. The memorandum of this friendly exchange of views between Merekalov and State Secretary Weizsäcker is the first document in ***Nazi-Soviet Relations.***

Soon after this, on May 3, 1939, Litvinov was abruptly replaced as Russian Foreign Minister by Molotov, a move which so impressed Hitler that he promptly sent to Moscow for Hilger, who displeased the Führer by describing the growing strength of the Soviet regime. Hitler, who was "constantly chewing his finger nails," thought that Hilger might have fallen victim to Soviet propaganda, but if not "then we have no time to lose in taking measures to prevent any further consolidation of Soviet power."[9]

Ten days later the German Embassy in Moscow was ordered to begin discussions about a new trade agreement.[10] On May 20, Molotov suggested to the German Ambassador, Count Friedrich von Schulenburg, that the Soviet Government would be glad to resume commercial negotiations, if the necessary "political bases" for them had been constructed. Schulenburg strove to find out what he meant, but "all of my determined efforts to bring Herr Molotov to make his wishes more definite and more concrete were in vain."

This inclined the Germans to "sit tight" and "to inject ourselves with an impeding and disturbing effect into the English-Russian negotiations," the success of which they thought "certainly will not be easy to prevent." Yet on May 23, Hitler told his assembled chiefs that the Soviet Union must be induced to cooperate in the isolation of Poland or it would not be achieved,[11] and on May 30 Schulenburg was notified that "we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union."

On June 15 the Soviet Chargé in Berlin dropped hints to the Bulgarian Minister to Germany that Russia was undecided, but that if a non-aggression pact were offered her by Germany, with guarantees that Russia would not be invaded by Germany through the Baltic States or Rumania, Russia would probably accept it. This important tip was promptly passed on to the Germans and after July 22 the economic negotiations were resumed.[12]

Moscow Still Undecided? The German economic negotiator, Schnurre, reported on July 27 his impression that "Moscow had not yet decided what

[8] Coates, *op. cit.*, p. 605.
[9] Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 295–7.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 297.
[11] Peter de Mendelssohn, *The Nuremberg Documents*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1946, p. 239.
[12] *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941*, pp. 20–1.

they want to do ... after months of negotiations with England," and that in the economic negotiations "the Russians absolutely reserve the tempo to themselves." He also encountered "excessive distrust," a frequent complaint of the Germans.[13]

On August 4 Schulenburg reported a long conversation with Molotov in which Molotov stated that a peaceful solution of the Polish question "depended first of all upon us," i.e. Germany. The Ambassador concluded his report with the statement: "My over-all impression is that the Soviet Government is at present determined to sign with England and France if they fulfill all Soviet wishes." It would "take considerable effort on our part to cause the Soviet Government to swing about."[14]

This was late in the eleventh hour, when the British and French military missions were leisurely wending their way to Moscow by slow boat through the Baltic, after waiting a week before they started. Schulenburg did not suspect how little the British and French Governments wanted an alliance with Russia, but by August 7 he had discovered that his rival negotiators were having difficulties. He had learned that "throughout Herr Molotov sat like a bump on a log. He hardly opened his mouth, and if he did it was to utter only the brief remark: 'Your statements do not appear to me entirely satisfactory. I shall notify my Government.'" The British and French Ambassadors were "both said to be completely exhausted and glad that they now have a breathing spell ahead of them. The Frenchman said to one of my informants, 'Thank God that that fellow will not participate in the military negotiations!'"[15]

Molotov was evidently a quite uncooperative and suspicious fellow. Schulenburg recorded: "At every word and at every step, one can see the great distrust toward us." Schulenburg could say this without hypocrisy because he was one of the few surviving members of the "Eastern School" in the German diplomatic service. He sincerely believed in permanent cooperation with Russia.

The pain of the Soviet leaders as the moment of decision neared is apparent. They dreaded a pact with Germany, yet the West offered them nothing. With Schulenburg, Molotov was courteous, but on August 14 he still insisted that trouble over Poland could come only from Germany, an indication that his aversion to German aggression had not lessened.

German Pressure. By this time the Germans were getting in a hurry. The Fiihrer's time-table called for war on Poland on September 1. Only two weeks remained. So on August 14 Foreign Secretary Ribbentrop sent a ***Most Urgent*** dispatch to Schulenburg directing him to state to Molotov: (1) that "ideological contradictions" need not prevent the ending of opposition in their foreign policies "once and for all"; (2) no real conflict of interests existed—there was "no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas which could not be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries"; (3) "an historic turning point" had come—now would be decided whether the two peoples would some day again "take up arms against each other" or again

[13] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 32–6.** [14] ***N.SJR.*, pp. 39–41.** [15] ***N.S.R.*, p. 42.**

be friendly; (4) “the natural sympathy of the Germans for the Russians” had never disappeared; (5) the capitalistic Western democracies were the enemies of both; and (6) speedy clarification of relations was desirable. “Otherwise these matters, without any German initiative, might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German-Soviet friendship and possibly of clearing up jointly the territorial question of Eastern Europe.”

Schulenburg was instructed to read this message to both Molotov and Stalin, but to leave no copy, and to add that Ribbentrop would be ready to come to Moscow for a short visit to conclude matters.

Here was an offer which compelled decision, in sharp contrast to the anemic negotiations with the Allies. It was clear that Germany urgently desired the pact and was willing to pay well to get it. It was just as clear, too, that the alternative was likely to be an early war with Germany. The German note plainly put the issue of peace or war in points 3 and 6. Aside from any immediate intent by Hitler to attack Russia if she did not come to terms now, a clash would be almost “inevitable,” not at some unspecified future time, but during the next few weeks. In the absence of a deal, German armies would roll through the White Russian and Ukraine districts of Poland up to Russia’s borders, and perhaps over into Rumania—Bessarabia. But still more explosive was the Baltic States question. If Russia allowed them to be occupied by Germany the defense of Leningrad was almost hopeless. So a Russian rush into these areas, colliding with a German drive to occupy them first was the probable outcome; either that or the seizure of these vital areas by German fifth columns.[16]

Final Negotiations. The hour of decision had come. Molotov met it by stressing to Schulenburg the importance of a non-aggression pact and agreement about the Baltic states. Ribbentrop agreed and urged haste. On the 18th, Molotov replied with a formal note which he both read and gave to Schulenburg.

The Russian note first put the past record straight, as follows:

> “The Soviet Government has taken cognizance of the statement of the German Government transmitted by Count Schulenburg on August 15 concerning its desire for a real improvement in the political relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R.
>
> “In view of the official statements of individual representatives of the German Government which have not infrequently had an unfriendly and even hostile character with reference to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government up till very recently has had the impression that the German Government was working for an excuse for a clash with the U.S.S.R., was preparing itself for such a clash, and was basing the necessity of its constantly increasing armament on the inevitability of such a clash. Not to mention the fact that the German Government by means of the so-called ‘Anti-Comintern Pact’ was attempting to build up a unified front

[16] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 50–2.**

of a group of states against the U.S.S.R., and was attempting with especial persistence to draw Japan in.

"It is understandable that such a policy on the part of the German Government compelled the U.S.S.R. to take serious steps in the preparation of a defense against possible aggression on the part of Germany against the U.S.S.R. and also to participate in the organization of a defensive front of a group of states against such an aggression.

"If, however, the German Government now undertakes a change from the old policy in the direction of a sincere improvement in political relations with the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government can look upon such a change only with pleasure and is on its own part prepared to alter its policy in the direction of an appreciable [ernsthaften] improvement in relations with Germany."

The note specified that economic agreements be concluded first, to be followed after a short interval by the non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government was gratified by the willingness of the German Foreign Minister to come to Moscow. "This stood in noteworthy contrast to England, who, in the person of Strang, had sent only an official of the second class to Moscow." However, Molotov would rather conclude the agreements through diplomatic channels.[17]

Ribbentrop replied instantly that he must come. On the 19th, Moscow submitted its draft of the non-aggression pact, which Hitler promptly approved in a message to Stalin, urging August 23 as the latest date for Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow. This was accepted and Ribbentrop came by air, armed with authority from Hitler giving him "full power to negotiate" the treaty "as well as all related questions" and "other agreements resulting." All agreements would go into force the moment Ribbentrop signed them. In other words, he was empowered to sign anything. The Führer was now really in a hurry.[18]

This readiness to deal offered a sharp contrast to the conduct of the British and French, who had used the past six months in finding reasons why they could not come to an agreement with Russia.

In Moscow, Ribbentrop "indulged in overwhelming declarations of friendship," which Stalin received dryly. Stalin impressed Hilger with his "simple and unpretentious behavior," with "a certain jovial friendliness," and with his remarkable technical knowledge in various fields. In the negotiations he did not hide his distrust of England, but "spoke with unconcealed respect of the United States and particularly her economic achievements."[19]

Among the Russian people Hilger noted many doubts about the suddenly announced Russo-German friendship, and fears of what Germany would do after she had conquered Poland, but the general reaction was one of relief

[17] *N.S.R.*, pp. 59–61.

[18] *N.S.R.*, p. 69. When Ribbentrop finally received his invitation to Moscow, Hitler drummed with both fists against the wall, exulting, "Now I have the world in my pocket!" —Hilger and Meyer, p. 300.

[19] Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 301–5.

from the "war scare which had weighed on them like a nightmare since 1933."[20]

The Nazi-Soviet Pacts. The Non-Aggression Treaty concluded on August 23 bound the parties: (1) to "desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other either individually or jointly with other powers"; (2) to give no aid to any belligerent enemy of the other; (3) to maintain "continual contact" for consultation about "problems affecting their common interests"; (4) not to take part even indirectly in any grouping hostile to either; and (5) to settle any disputes or conflicts by friendly exchange or through arbitration commissions.

The Secret Protocol named the northern boundary of Lithuania as the line between "the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R." Through Poland the line ran approximately along the rivers Narew, Vistula and San. Finally, "With regard to South-eastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas." The text of this last article is important because of later disagreement between the two parties over South-eastern Europe.[21]

This is the pact which former Secretary of State Byrnes said in 1947 was not worth the paper on which it was written because "the Soviet Government concluded the pact while fully intending to violate it."[22] Is this a fair appraisal of the facts?

That both sides regarded the pact as a purely temporary arrangement is certain, though the German Embassy in Moscow sincerely believed that the pact would lead to a Polish settlement without war and promote peace. It was Russia's problem to keep from being attacked before her time had come on the Nazi time-table, and it was Hitler's aim to seize the proper moment. At first he was delighted with his bargain, believing it would intimidate the West into keeping quiet during his conquest of Poland. On August 23, the day the pact was published, Hitler told his Commanders-in-Chief: "The enemy had another hope—that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not reckon with my great powers of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them at Munich."[23] On the same day his Finance Minister was telling the Italian Foreign Minister in Rome that the Führer "did not believe in a war with England and France." His whole experience with them, culminating in Munich, convinced him that the Nazi-Soviet Pact would keep them quiet.

He was wrong on the Allied reaction, because the British and French leaders had discovered belatedly that in all probability Hitler did not mean to leave them in his rear while he disposed of the Soviets. This deep suspicion was confirmed by his pact with the Soviets, which obliged them to fight. The pact surprised them, since they had hoped to neutralize Russia and deter

[20] **Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 309.**

[21] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 76–8.**

[22] **James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947, p. 286; London, Heinemann, 1947.**

[23] **Mendelssohn, *op. cit.*, p. 240.**

Hitler with the appearance of negotiations in Moscow, but when the treaty was announced they had no choice but to fight. They would fight the only kind of war of which these men were capable, a defensive, sitting-behind-the-Maginot-Line and economic-blockade conflict.

The Munich men were now compelled to declare war on Hitler when he invaded Poland. They did so, on September 3–4, 1939, feeling that their sea blockade would hurt him far more than any economic aid he might get from the Reds, with their very weak economic system.

Hitler, of course, was greatly irked, but he felt he had made a fine bargain. Poland was promptly and easily destroyed, and after it was all over he made another speech to his Commanders-in-Chief, on November 23, 1939, in which he boasted that "what has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front. The other front is at present free. But no one can know how long it will remain so. At present Russia is not dangerous. She is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are kept only as long as they serve their purpose." Then Hitler added three very significant sentences: "We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further, Russia is striving to increase her influence in the Balkans and towards the Persian Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy."[24]

Conflict at the Straits. Here were the two factors which would determine the duration of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The German and Russian paths crossed in the Balkans, as they always had for many decades. It was not likely that either would grant the other a free sweep in this vitally strategic region. As a former Rumanian Foreign Minister and Ambassador to Russia, Grigore Gafencu, remarked: "After the U.S.S.R. had regained the old northern frontiers, it was natural that she should also revive her hopes for the south."[25] The clash would come when Hitler was free enough in the West to take over the Balkans.

In the meantime, the partition of Poland had taken place without any conflict between the Soviets and Germans. The lightning speed of the German conquest led the German Government to telegraph very urgently on September 3, 1939, requesting Russia to occupy her sphere of influence in Poland at once, in order that the Germans be relieved of pursuing retreating Polish troops beyond the agreed line. Molotov at first said, on the 5th, that the time had not yet come, but admitted on the 10th that the German speed had taken the Russians by surprise. Molotov sought to avoid a joint announcement of Russia's entry into the Polish struggle, but agreed when Stalin's draft was accepted.

Molotov had not only world opinion to consider, but his own skeptical people. Schulenburg wired to Berlin on September 6 that "the statements of official agitators that Germany is no longer an aggressor run into considerable doubt." The Russian people feared "that Germany, after she has defeated

[24] ***Ibid*., p. 242.**

[25] **Grigore Gafencu, *Prelude to the Russian Campaign*, London, Muller, 1945, p. 49.**

Poland, may turn against the Soviet Union." In the absence of the pact and the official propaganda, that fear would have been justifiably keen.[26]

Premonitions of a clash in the Balkans arose very early. On October 3, when Schulenburg mentioned rumors that England and France intended to assault Greece and overrun Bulgaria in order to set up a Balkan front, "Molotov asserted spontaneously that the Soviet Government would never tolerate pressure on Bulgaria." On October 12 Berlin reported that Molotov had been thinking of a Russian-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact in the event of an attack by a third power, but "This suggestion was rejected in Sofia."[27]

The Russian winter war on Finland—November 26, 1939, to February 12, 1940—went badly for two months, but the Germans loyally kept hands off. Then the humiliated Soviets pushed military preparations in earnest. Gafencu observed throughout 1940 the strengthening of discipline in the army. Saluting was restored and he observed Russian recruits doing "their best, as though it was a strange joke, to salute." All the old regalia of militarism was restored but "these were only the outward signs of the gigantic effort imposed on all the financial and economic resources, all the forces of labour and production of the vast Empire, in hammering out the most formidable war machine that Russia had ever known."[28]

Trade Agreements Loyally Fulfilled. The trade agreements which accompanied the truce played an important part in the Soviet Union's military preparations. The original trade agreement of August 19, 1939, provided that Russia would send great quantities of raw materials, "lumber, cotton, feed grain, oil cake, phosphate, raw furs and other goods."

In return the Russians were to receive "machinery and industrial installations. Machine tools up to the very largest dimensions" formed "a considerable part of the deliveries," and "armaments in the broader sense (such as optical supplies, armor plate and the like) were supplied in smaller proportion.

For the purchase of these industrial goods Russia received a credit of 200 million Reichsmarks. Apart from this sum, the Germans estimated that the movement of goods envisaged by the agreement might exceed one billion Reichsmarks.

From the first both sides tried to expedite deliveries from the other. In this game deliveries were sometimes delayed to compel performance on the other side. In October, Schnurre, the top economic negotiator of the Germans, noted that the Russian goods could only be sent at the expense of Russian consumption. In December, General Keitel complained that machine tools for the manufacture of munitions simply could not be spared to the Russians.

But on February 11, 1940, a still more comprehensive trade agreement was concluded, after long and difficult negotiations, in spite of "the ever present distrust" of the Russian negotiators. Everything had to be referred to Stalin. Nevertheless, the Germans expected to get 1,000,000 tons of grain, 900,000 tons of oil, 100,000 tons of cotton, 500,000 tons of phosphates and much else. The freight rate on 1,000,000 tons of soya beans from Manchuria was cut in half. Precious war metals were promised, along with purchases for Germany

[26] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 86–9.** [27] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 113, 124.** [28] **Gafencu, *op. cit.*, p. 40.**

in world markets. In sum, "the agreement means a wide open door to the East for us."[29]

Again the Russians were to receive "industrial products, industrial processes and installations as well as war material." There were extensive negotiations about the sending of new warship hulls and other naval arms to Russia. On September 26, 1940, Schnurre wrote that the Führer would have to decide between fulfilment of promises to Russia and the armament demands of the Army. Germany was already heavily in arrears on deliveries and a suspension of Russian deliveries was to be expected. On two other occasions Hitler decided that deliveries to the Russians must be made, though toward the end they were delayed or sent by such circuitous routes that they never arrived.

On the Russian side, General Thomas, Chief of the German War Industry Department, recorded that "the Russians carried out their deliveries as planned, right up to the start of the attack. Even during the last few days, transports of India rubber from the Far East were completed by express transit trains."[30]

This was not because the Russians did not expect to be attacked. As early as September 18, 1940, the Germans learned about anti-German propaganda in the Red Army, and interpreted it as a response to fear of attack by Germany.[31] The Kremlin fulfilled its economic commitments to the end because it was determined to give Hitler no cause to attack. Until late in the day, also, the industrial and war materials received from Germany were a very important supplement to Russia's armament efforts. The raw materials which Germany received were mostly perishable, while the arms and machines received by Russia remained when war came.

Fear in Moscow in the Spring. Russia was protected during 1940 by Hitler's unsettled account with the West, though there was a time of desperate anxiety in Moscow in the Spring. Schulenburg was mystified. He sent a long memorandum on April 11, 1940, detailing the strange conduct of the Russians. For some time everything that they did had been "unfavorable to us. In all fields we suddenly came up against obstacles," which "reached their climax in the suspension of petroleum and grain shipments to us." He tried to find out the reason from trade commissar Mikoyan, but found him only negative. "We asked ourselves in vain" for the reason. "After all nothing had 'happened'!"

Then Schulenburg saw Molotov on April 9, ***ajter*** the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. "Herr Molotov was affability itself, willingly received all our complaints and promised relief." The grain and oil would start moving again at once. It was "a complete about face." It was plain that "our Scandinavian operations must have relieved the Soviet Government enormously—removed a great burden of anxiety." The day's article in ***Izvestia*** about our

[29] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 131–4.**

[30] **Mendelssohn, *op. cit.*, p. 264. Hilger is also emphatic that the Russians fulfilled their deliveries up to the very end, long after they were getting the short end of the exchange.**
—Hilger and Meyer, p. 327.

[31] **Mendelssohn** p. **256.**

Scandinavian campaign sounded "like one big sigh of relief." He could only explain it as fear that the English and French were about to occupy Norway and Sweden, reopening the Finnish question with Russia. The Soviet Government, added Schulenburg, "is always extraordinarily well informed."[32]

It is quite possible that Schulenburg had his tongue in his cheek in explaining the relief in Moscow. It is hardly likely that the Kremlin was terrified by what the distant and quiescent Allies would do. It is much more probable that they were on tenterhooks for fear that Hitler might alter his time-table and turn on them first. When he did go the other way they knew that they were probably safe for the fighting season of 1940 and that the German-Soviet pact was not to be as quickly abortive as the Munich pact.

Russia was safe for the summer, while Hitler's panzer divisions rampaged through Holland, Belgium and France, driving the British into the sea at Dunkirk. Then there was a pause, from June 20, 1940, until the air battle for Britain began on August 8. On August 17 the first German directive for "Operation Sea Lion," the great invasion of Britain, was given, but the Battle of Britain was never won. It was definitely lost on September 15, the day 185 German aircraft were shot down. Without command of the skies "Sea Lion" could not go forward.

The German Attack on Russia Long Planned. By the end of August it was clear that the air battle was being lost, and Hitler's thoughts at once turned toward Russia. General Paulus, of Stalingrad fame, testified that "he first heard of the proposed attack on Russia on September 3, 1940," when the Chief of the General Staff, Holder, "handed over to me the plan for the attack, in so far as it had already been prepared, and told me to examine the possibilities of the attack. The forces required were between 130 and 140 divisions." On September 6, 1940, General Jodi also issued from Hitler's headquarters an order to the Counter Intelligence Service containing elaborate instructions for deceiving the Russians about the military preparations in the East, improvements on railroads, roads, airfields, etc., and the increases in troop concentrations.[33]

During August 1940 Sam E. Woods, our commercial attaché in Berlin, learned that plans for war with Russia were being made at Hitler's headquarters, and from that time on he was able to keep our Government informed of important steps in the preparations.[34]

On October 3, 1941, Hitler himself identified August and September 1940 as the time when he turned on Russia, saying: "In August and September 1940, one thing was becoming clear. A decision in the West with England which would have contained the whole German ***Luftwaffe*** was no longer possible, for in my rear stood a State which was getting ready to proceed against me at such a moment."[35] Hitler could not say, of course, that his

[32] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 138–40.**

[33] **Mendelssohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–5; *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol. I, pp. 796–7.**

[34] ***The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, New York, 1948, Vol. II, pp. 967–8; London, Hodder, 1948.**

[35] **Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 400.**

air force was already contained, that is whipped. He knew well also that there was no danger whatever of an attack by Russia, and had so stated on July 21, 1940.

August 1940 is therefore quite conclusively established as the time when the detailed planning for attack on Russia began. The loss of the air battle for Britain removed any doubt in Hitler's mind about the time of the Russian invasion, though in all probability it had been set for the Spring of 1941 long before. If Britain were conquered in 1940 Russia would obviously be the target in 1941, and if the invasion of Britain failed in 1940 then Russia would be the only great prize available in 1941. On August 14, 1940, General Thomas was informed that the Führer "desired punctual delivery to the Russians only until the Spring of 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands."[36] Since this news, coming through Goering, was probably not instantaneously fresh, and since on August 14 the Battle of Britain was only six days old, it would seem clear that Russia was down on Hitler's time-table for 1941, even before the grab for Britain began.

The decision to conquer Russia had been reached long before. The editors of the Nuremberg documents put it in one sentence: "The view that Germany's key to political and economic dominance lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a political factor, and in the acquisition of ***lebensraum*** at her expense, had long been basic in Nazi ideology."[37] Goering told a Council of Ministers on September 4, 1936, that the German rearmament program started "from the basic thought that the showdown with Russia is inevitable." Admiral Raeder left a memorandum of January 10, 1944, in which he quoted Hitler as planning during 1937–8 to settle accounts with Russia. General Jodi stated in a secret speech at Munich, on November 7, 1943, that "during the Western campaign," that is before the fall of France on June 17, 1940, "Hitler informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps" against the Russian "danger." Soon after, on July 21, 1940, Hitler informed Raeder that "even though Russia views Germany's great successes with tears in her eyes, she herself has no intention of entering the war against Germany." There was also no urgent need to attack her, for Hitler went on to say that "war material is plentiful, and the food supply is secure. The fuel situation is the most difficult part, but as long as Rumania and Russia deliver and the hydro-electric works can be safeguarded against air attacks, it is not critical."[38]

Nevertheless, Russia's time had come. The desire to possess her great natural resources was fixed. Here only could the real ***lebensrawn*** be achieved. To be sure Germany was getting the products of Russia in great quantities, but she was having to pay well for them, and the deliveries could be stopped. It was a central tenet of fascism that it is foolish to pay for anything you can take by force. Besides, Hitler had an enormous army on his hands with nothing to do. It could not end the war with Britain by invading her and there is no more dangerous liability than a huge unemployed army. Current

[36] ***Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, p. 796; Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 320.**
[37] ***Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, p. 795.**
[38] **Mendelssohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 252–4.**

necessity therefore reinforced the permanent lust of the Nazis for the Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Urals.

The documents quoted above show clearly that the decision to begin the detailed planning for an attack on Russia was made in August and September 1940, but we hardly need the Nuremberg documents to establish Hitler's objective. A predatory regime acknowledging no law or principle except force and possessed of tremendous striking power, could be depended on to turn to the nearest great prize when blocked in one direction. We do not require any diplomatic quarrels between Berlin and Moscow to explain the German assault on Russia. It would have happened in the absence of any dispute and substantially at the time it occurred.

The attack on Russia, the swift blow which all the world expected to give Germany great riches in six weeks' time, would also have occurred in the absence of any conflict of interest between Germany and Russia in the Balkans.

Rumania Guaranteed. There was a power conflict between them in the Balkans. The old German ***Drang Nach Osten*** of pre-1914 days was stronger than ever in the Nazis, who had no intention of stopping at the Bosphorus when the regime of William II had penetrated beyond. The Soviets, too, responded to the age-old desire of the Tsars to control the Turkish Straits, their chief commercial outlet, and make the Black Sea a Russian lake. On August 20, 1940, Admiral Raeder's Chief of Staff summarized Russia's long-term aims as an ice-free port on the North Atlantic, an advance to the Persian Gulf and an advance through the Balkans to the Dardanelles. This is an estimate of Russian aims which anyone could make by a brief study of a map of the tremendous land-locked Russian area. The Russian urge to have secure access to the seas is historic and perpetual. It has always centered, and still centers, on the Dardanelles.

Being well aware of this axiom, the Germans hastened to lock the Balkan gate against Russia in the summer of 1940. They did not like the Russian seizure of Bessarabia, at the moment when they were still mopping up France. Though this area had been written off in the pact with Russia, its acquisition by Russia did not help German prestige. The Germans protested also against the Russian occupation of Bukovina, a small Rumanian province which Russia claimed as inhabited by Ukrainians. Since this area was not in the bond the Germans objected and it was agreed that Russia would take only the northern part of the province.

These tensions were the result of Russia's efforts to strengthen her position at a time when Hitler's victories in the West had put him in "a mental state bordering on megalomania." Stalin-had counted on the Maginot Line holding a long time, but it didn't and now Hitler was rapidly talking himself into making "an end of Bolshevism" and seizing the German ***lebensraum***.[39]

Prompt action in the Balkans was indicated to Hitler by the fact that Russia's recovery of Bessarabia brought her down to the lower Danube and its mouths, nearer to control of the Black Sea, and closer to the Turkish

[39] Hilger and Meyer, ***op. cit.,*** pp. 318–20.

Straits. They must make sure, the Nazis decided, that Russia advanced no further. Russia had been stopped here, or on the Dniester, by European coalitions in 1856 and 1878, and the Nazis meant to do no less. They therefore invited the Rumanian Minister, Manoilescu, to Vienna for August 29, and when he arrived compelled him to accept a division of the long disputed Rumanian province of Transylvania with Hungary. This move was explained to the Russians, ***after*** the event, on August 31, 1940, as an urgent "arbitration" which had to be made quickly to prevent serious trouble between Hungary and Rumania. It was "imperative that the last remaining territorial problem should not lead to an armed conflict."[40]

Actually the "Vienna Award" stirred such violent feelings in Rumania that the Nazi overlord was thereafter required to keep the peace, a result which had probably been anticipated in Berlin. The alleged danger of a Russian descent on Rumania proper was the main argument used to dragoon the Rumanians into accepting the award,[41] which guaranteed Rumania's new frontiers. Since this guarantee could only be aimed at Russia, Molotov was "reserved, in contrast to his usual manner," when notified by Schulenburg. "He asked me to call the attention of the German Government to the fact that by its action it had violated article 3 of the Non-Aggression Pact, which provided for consultation. The Soviet Government had been confronted with accomplished facts by the German Government____The present case involved two of the Soviet Union's neighbors, where she naturally had interests."[42]

In reply the German Government maintained that "the existence of mutual interests in the meaning of the Non-Aggression Pact of Moscow is out of the question here." The Soviet Government had given Germany very short notice of its intention to occupy Bessarabia, "which also gave impetus for the launching of revisionist demands on Rumania," and had not always practised consultation in the Baltic region, especially with regard to Lithuania. Molotov persisted in his "view that the conduct of the German Government in Vienna was not entirely in good faith as it could not have been in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania and Hungary." The Soviet Government, however, by no means disputed the "fact that Germany had special interests in Rumania." It would have been glad to assure Germany unequivocally that "it had no aggressive designs on Rumania." A long four-page memorandum of September 21 refuted the German contention at all points and offered to negotiate an amendment or deletion of Article 2 of the Non-Aggression Treaty, if Germany desired.[43]

It is about the disputes of this period that Byrnes comments: "Hitler began to be irritated. Evidently, he felt that Germans were shedding blood for the territory they got, and the Soviet Union was insisting upon taking the spoils without the fighting. . . . Suspicions began to grow on both sides."[44] The Rumanian Minister to Russia estimated the same diplomatic interchanges as follows: "The realism of the leaders in Moscow pushed them to extreme prudence. It was necessary to let the unfaithful partner know that they were neither deceived by his actions nor accepted his discards; but this without

[40] ***N.S.R.*, p. 179.** [41] **Gafencu, *op. cit.*, p. 59.** [42] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 180–1.**
[43] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 181–3, 187, 189–94.** [44] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 287.**

arousing his mistrust or provoking his anger." The Kremlin sought "no more than an expression of reproach, a recall to order, an invitation to new and fruitful dealings." He adds also that in the German Embassy in Moscow "the opinion was that Berlin had acted in too cavalier a manner toward her Soviet partner."[45]

Schulenburg did not know that the Rumanian guarantee against Russia was forced upon Rumania immediately after the detailed planning for war on Russia had begun in Berlin. Hitler was making sure of a source of war supplies and of a springboard for his assault on Russia.

Danubian Deadlock. On their part the Russians were intent on asserting their newly recovered position as a Danubian state. When a Vienna conference was called by Germany to establish a provisional administration on the upper reaches of the Danube, Russia insisted, on September 11,1940, that she should be invited. The Conference of Paris in 1856, after Russia's defeat in the Crimean war had established the European commission of the Danube, a remarkable supra-national body on which most of the European powers were represented. It had broad administrative, judicial and political powers over a comparatively short stretch of the lower Danube, with its own patrol boat and flag. The long reaches of the upper Danube were governed by a later body, the International Commission of the Danube, which had only technical and administrative powers.

Russia made it clear that she especially wanted both to get rid of the European Commission, which held the mouths of the Danube against her, and to share in the control of the Danube throughout its entire length. This was an old Tsarist ambition and one which was completely unacceptable to the Germans, who had staked out exclusive control of the Danubian region for themselves. In early October German troops entered Rumania and were quartered along the Danube, opposite the new Russian province of Bessarabia. Their presence was explained to Russia, afterward, as simply for instructional purposes. A few weeks later Russia-took over several islands on the opposite side of one of the main Danubian channels through the delta, after trying to get Rumania to agree to yield control.

A conference was held at Bucharest from October 28 to December 21,1940, in which Russia's will to control the mouths of the Danube, and the Black Sea, clashed with Germany's determination to exercise the same control and to block Russia's southward advance toward the Straits. The conference could reach no agreement, but it did define the conflicting ambitions of Russia and Germany in the Balkans. "The passage to the Southern Seas by way of the Straits of Constantinople remained the major problem of Russian policy" and the Germans were determined to secure the land bridge through Constantinople to Africa, by way of "Iraq with its petrol and Egypt with its cotton."

The Tripartite Pact. September 1940 also brought another severe jolt to Soviet-German relations. On September 26, Berlin gave Moscow a one-day warning of the signing of the Three Power Pact, whereby Japan became a

[45] Gafencu, *op. cit.*, pp. 60, 64.

member of the Rome-Berlin Axis. This military alliance was explained to Moscow as "directed exclusively against American war mongers." This was stressed three times and it was, indeed, the main purpose of the pact to intimidate the United States, which was moving powerfully to the aid of Great Britain. Yet the new alliance was equally applicable against Russia. The three aggressors could, if permitted to grow stronger effectively encircle the U.S.A., but they could much more easily attack the U.S.S.R. from both sides, and the Russians knew well that they would like to do so.

Molotov listened to the news of the Triplice pact. Then before commenting on it he inquired about the reported military agreement between Germany and Finland, and the landing of German troops at three Finnish ports without Russia having been informed by Germany. The Germans, of course, said that the troops in Finland were merely in transit to Norway. The arrangements were "purely technical." It soon transpired, however, that they included the supply of war material to Finland.[46]

Berlin Conference. In view of these developments and after repeated urgent invitations for Molotov to repay Ribbentrop's two visits to Moscow the German invitation was accepted on October 22, for November 12. On that day a conference was held in Berlin between Molotov and Ribbentrop. The latter reviewed the course of the war. Only bad weather delayed a great attack on England, who could hope for no vital aid from the U.S.A. "Regarding possible military operations by land, the entry of the United States into the war was of no consequence at all for Germany. Germany and Italy would never again allow an Anglo-Saxon to land on the European Continent." The question whether America entered the war or not was "a matter of complete indifference to Germany."

Regarding the Triple Alliance Pact he suggested that all four powers should expand toward the South. Japan was now headed that way. Germany had aspirations in Central Africa and perhaps Russia could get her "natural outlet to the open sea" through Persia, though Germany would be glad to have a new arrangement at the Turkish Straits which would "grant to the warships and merchant fleet of the Soviet Union in principle freer access to the Mediterranean than heretofore."

The Germans proposed a vertical division of the Old World, whereby Africa, and presumably the Near East, would go to Germany and Italy. Japan would get China and South East Asia, and Russia access to the ocean through Persia. This division of the world is definitely proposed in Secret Protocol No. 1 of a proposed four-power draft, tying Russia into the Triple Alliance, which was sent to Schulenburg. No mention of the Near East is made, but the constant effort to turn Russia's attention to Persia and the Indian Ocean is good evidence that she was to have no share of the Levant. On four different occasions during the Berlin talks the Germans pointed toward the Indian Ocean.

The Straits were also discussed repeatedly and the Germans offered a revision of the Montreux Convention which would permit only the warships of

[46] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 195–9.**

Black Sea Powers to use the Straits. Molotov, however, was not impressed by paper assurances. He wanted a military base on the Straits. In his second talk with Hitler, on November 13, he also inquired, according to the German record, "what Germany would say if Russia gave Bulgaria, that is, the independent country located closest to the Straits, a guarantee under exactly the same conditions as Germany and Italy had given one to Rumania." Very shortly thereafter he again brought up the question, giving assurances that Russia had no intention of interfering in Bulgaria's internal affairs. In reply Hitler first defended his own guarantee to Rumania and then said that "the question would first arise whether Bulgaria herself had asked for such a guarantee. He did not know of any request by Bulgaria" and he would also have to consult Italy. (It might be remarked that this was the first time that the Führer's delicate feeling for the sovereignty of a small country had manifested itself.)[47]

This is the point at which Byrnes believes Hitler decided to make war on Russia. He says that "it was here that Molotov made his worst blunder. He insisted on a definite answer. The interpreter's report says that at this point Hitler showed great indignation." Until I see other evidence, Byrnes declared, "I shall believe that this was the decisive moment. Certain it is that from this fateful November 13, Russo-German relations steadily declined." These talks, says Byrnes, "in my opinion, marked the turning point of the war ... a decisive point in history. For Mr. Molotov greatly overplayed his hand. His interview with Hitler on the thirteenth, particularly, stands out as a major diplomatic blunder."[48]

The State Department's volume, ***Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941***, does not contain any "interpreter's report" of the Berlin talks. The official report contains no reference to Hitler's indignation or to any insistence by Molotov on a definite, immediate answer to his Bulgarian proposal. Molotov did press the point, but the final statement in the record of the conversation says: "Molotov stressed that he was not asking the Führer for a final decision, but that he was only asking for a provisional expression of opinion." Hilger, who was present at all of the Berlin talks, does not record any indignation on Hitler's part, but he does say that after Hitler's "grandiose but vague" plans for dividing the world, Molotov's insistence on clearing up the existing frictions made two things clear: "Hitler's intention to push the Soviet Union in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and his unwillingness to acknowledge any Soviet interests in Europe."[49]

The German reports of the Berlin conversations fill 37 pages. They show the Germans endeavoring repeatedly to convince Molotov that the big attack against Britain was still coming off; that Germany had now "acquired such large areas that she would require one hundred years to utilize them fully": that she was still thinking about expanding in Africa; that she had "no territorial interests in the Balkans, (thrice stressed) her interests there being "confined exclusively to the economic field" and motivated exclusively by the

47 ***N.S.R.*****, pp. 217–55.**
48 Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 288–9.
49 Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 323–4.

circumstances of our war against England"; and that Germany "had no political interest of any kind in Finland."

Byrnes' account suggests strongly that Molotov made a mistake in not dividing up the world with the Axis, as Hitler was proposing so expansively, instead of arguing about "what Hitler must have regarded as relatively trivial things—Rumania's boundary, a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria." Remembering his own long and exhausting negotiations with Molotov, Byrnes felt that Molotov's insistence on discussing all the questions of the moment sounded like "an agenda for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers!"

Certain it is that Molotov pressed the Germans strongly on both Finland and the Balkans. The sending of German troops to Finland, especially without prior notice, was an obvious violation of the agreement between Germany and Russia, which put Finland in Russia's sphere of influence. In both Finland and the Balkans Germany was assembling troops on Russia's flanks in areas where the Russians believed Britain was impotent to strike. Beside the immediate threat of these maneuvers the possible acquisition of an outlet to the Persian Gulf did not seem very alluring, especially since Russia would find Britain defending South Persia, as of old. Molotov knew, before Hitler told him, that Germany "had at her disposal an extraordinarily large number of divisions, and her air force was constantly growing stronger." Having read the returns from the Battle of Britain, Molotov was concerned about the employment of these huge German forces. He therefore made Finland and the Balkans the test of future Russo-German relations.

Moscow's Conditions. After his return to Moscow a formal note on November 26 stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept the proposed Four Power Pact, subject to four conditions: (1) "that German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland"; (2) "that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria . . . and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by means of a long term lease"; (3) "that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union"; and (4) that Japan renounce her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin.[50]

These conditions are obviously listed in order of importance. Russia would be glad to expand south from Batum and Baku, especially since protection for her very vulnerable oilfields would be secured, but Finland and the Balkan-Straits questions came first. If German military occupation of these two areas were not halted Russia would soon be completely walled off by the German army from Europe and from the world, except through her icy windows.

No German reply to Moscow's four conditions was ever sent, but the news of the day gave the Russians their reply. King Boris of Bulgaria was in Berlin three days after Molotov left, though he avoided commitment to either side

50 *Ibid*., pp. 258–9.

for some time. Hungary signed the Triple Alliance on November 20, Rumania on November 23 and Slovakia on the 24th. Bulgaria signed on March 1,1941, and was at once occupied by German troops.

German War Plans Pushed. While Hitler was sounding Molotov and holding out entrancing pictures of a world to be divided, including a vast bankrupt British estate, General Jodi and his staff were busy working on the details of the plans for "Barbarossa," the invasion of Russia. On December 5, 1940, General Haider reported to Hitler on the progress of the plans. Hitler approved them, adding that the enemy was to be prevented from withdrawing on a closed front,[51] a direction which his armies were never able to carry out.

Before the Berlin talks the Russian leaders had "turned their full attention to the army. Preparations were speeded up in factories, in military maneuvers and on the frontiers. The morale of the army was jealously guarded and its combatant spirit stimulated. The press, radio and every other means of propaganda stirred patriotism."[52] Hitler was not lulling the Russians as much as he hoped.

On December 18, German Army Directive No. 21 was issued as the basic strategical directive to all the armed forces for Operation Barbarossa. They must be prepared "to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign." Preparations requiring considerable time were to begin soon and be finished by May 15, 1941. Great caution was to be "exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized."[53]

The most elaborate plans were made for deceit, but it was in their plans for the economic looting and management of the conquered areas that the Germans outdid themselves in justifying their reputation for thoroughness.[54]

On January 7, 1941, a circular letter was sent to several German embassies, warning them of troop concentrations in Rumania and suggesting "as a plausible reason" mention of precautionary measures against England. On the 17th the Kremlin made a strongly worded protest against the German inundation of the Balkans, saying that "it will consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the U.S.S.R." On February 22, 1941, Schulenburg was instructed to announce that 680,000 German troops were now in Rumania. This was preparatory to the occupation of Bulgaria on March 1, of which Russia was notified as the operation began.[55]

At this point there occurred the somewhat fantastic interlude of Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka's odyssey to Moscow, Berlin and Rome.

Russo-Japanese Pact. If Hitler was expansive in his talks with Molotov he was doubly so in impressing Matsuoka during two long discussions on March 27. A huge army of 240 combat divisions was at his command. It was practically idle and could be employed at any time and at any place he

[51] ***Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol. I, p. 798.**
[52] **Gafencu, *op. cit.*, p. 104.**
[53] ***Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol. I, p. 799.**
[54] ***Ibid.*, pp. 808–11. For the text of the Directive, see *N.S.R.*, pp. 260–4.**
[55] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 264–5, 271–2, 274–5.**

considered necessary. Relations with Russia were correct, but, confidentially Russia had been making conditions lately. “Should Russia some day take a stand that could be interpreted as a threat to Germany,” he would crush Russia.

From Ribbentrop, Matsuoka received another series of not too thinly veiled hints about action against Russia. Matsuoka therefore minimized the non-aggression pact which he had proposed to Russia while in Moscow and Ribbentrop advised him that when he returned to Moscow “only a purely formal, superficial handling of these points was advisable.” Then Matsuoka returned to Moscow and negotiated desperately for some kind of pact. His position in Japan was shaky and he needed a success. Tokyo was also anxious not to fight Russia while Japan disposed of the United States and Britain in the Pacific. The Soviets would not agree to a non-aggression pact, but they would agree to a neutrality treaty, if it be absolute, without any exceptions. They wished to make sure of Japan’s neutrality in the event of an attack by Germany. The negotiations stalled for days over Stalin’s demand that the Japanese concessions in North Sakhalin be cancelled. When Matsuoka finally received authority to make this agreement the pact was speedily concluded. When Matsuoka’s train left, on April 13, Stalin went down to the station to see him off, to the great surprise of the diplomatic corps which was assembled on the platform. After telling the Japanese goodbye, Schulenburg reported, “then Stalin publicly asked for me, and when he found me he came up to me and threw his arm around my shoulders: ‘We must remain friends and you must now do everything to that end!’”[56]

Stalin had reason for his good humor. He had made a pact which probably would, and in fact did, relieve him from the mortal danger of a war on two fronts, if Germany attacked. The Germans tried to prevent the pact and did everything they could during their Russian blitz to persuade Japan to attack Russia, but to no avail. When the Germans attacked Russia on June 22, 1941, they were still true to their aim of avoiding a two-front war. The British were helpless to invade the continent and could only annoy them from the air. A year later the Germans did find themselves involved in a two-front war which was fatal to them. The same thing happened to the Japanese. The British and the Americans fought victoriously on many fronts. Only the Russians managed to pull through on the basis of one front at a time.

Yugoslavia and Greece Crushed. Russia’s deal with Japan was made none too soon, for on March 21 the conservative regime of Prince Paul in Yugoslavia yielded to a German ultimatum and signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna the next day. Yugoslavia was entirely surrounded by the Axis and it was easy to reason that resistance was hopeless. But now there occurred one of those unexpected risings of the people which occasionally upset all the calculations of appeasers and dictators. The cunning and selfish policy inaugurated by the Yugoslav Minister Stoyadinovitch seemed to have paid off. Fawning on Hitler and refusing all communion with the other Balkan victims of Hitler had seemed to give immunity, and now fervent German

[56] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 280–327.**

promises were made to leave Yugoslavia strictly alone. The people, however, felt differently. Revulsion and rebellion swept the entire country. Plain people of every occupation indignantly revolted, peasants and townspeople alike. The people knew what "adhesion" to the Axis meant and swept the Government out of power overnight on March 27.

A few days later, on April 5, the U.S.S.R. blessed the rebellion with a non-aggression pact signed with Yugoslavia in Moscow, in Stalin's presence. No assistance was promised to Yugoslavia, only respect for her "independence, sovereignty and integrity," but Russian defiance of Berlin was plain. The next day the German armies swept into Yugoslavia, alleging, as usual, English machinations. The Nazis had to act instantly, for two reasons. The heart-warming example of the Yugoslavs was stirring the other Balkan peoples to consider whether they too should throw all discretion to the winds and strike for freedom. But equally vital was the delay in the invasion of Russia which the Yugoslav revolt caused. It was essential to have the Balkans firmly under control, including Greece, before beginning the assault on Russia. So the Germans acted in furious haste and with total brutality. Hungary was forced to join in the attack, dishonoring a recently signed treaty with Yugoslavia, and when her Premier, Paul Teleki, killed himself rather than violate his pledge, a more compliant premier was at once put in office. Belgrade was blitzed from the air in the first day, as Rotterdam had been on the last day of Holland's brief resistance, not because either was a military objective, but vengefully to deprive of their chief possession little peoples who defied the Nazis. Armies poured into Yugoslavia from four of her neighbors and by April 17 organized resistance was ended. Simultaneously, German armed might swept over heroic little Greece, whose peasant troops had defeated the Italians and rendered them helpless. Athens fell on April 27 and Crete was taken from the British by air a few days later. At a cost of only 2500 killed the Germans had taken nearly 600,000 prisoners.

The resistance of the Greeks and Yugoslavs was "hopeless," yet it gave hope to all mankind and very probably prevented the conquest of the old world by the Nazis. Such "futile," immortal resistance had not been expected by Berlin. Hitler had taken over all the other Balkan states one at a time without war. He did not expect the last of his victims to resist. When they did he threw everything at them and annihilated all resistance in one furious lunge. But the lunge set back his Russian time-table from May 15 to June 22.

Hitler's Time-table Upset. Admiral Raeder's diary stated that "the extension of operations into Yugoslavia delayed 'Barbarossa' for about five weeks," and General Paulus later testified at Nuremberg that on April 1 "Barbarossa" was postponed for about five weeks from the middle of May.[57]

In the early winter of 1941 the German flood almost overwhelmed Moscow. It was turned back partly with the aid of the bitter cold which the Germans had not expected to interfere with their six weeks' Russian blitz. If they had been able to start their grand assault on May 15, especially in the south, their chances of overrunning European Russia would have been very sharply

[57] Mendelssohn, ***op. cit.,*** p. 273.

enhanced. There would have been five weeks more time in which to pause for breath and to organize new lunges. We do not know certainly that the five weeks made the difference, but the self-sacrificing heroism of the Yugoslavs and the Greeks may well have prevented all Europe from falling under the regressive rule of the Nazi supermen for a very long period.

Moscow Awaits Attack. Moscow was not heroic after the fall of Yugoslavia. On April 12 a new oil agreement was signed with Germany. After a short interval recognition was withdrawn from the ministers of all the Nazi-conquered Balkan states, including Yugoslavia. Russia was now effectively encircled, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Stalin had miscalculated again in believing that the Serbs would occupy Hitler a long time. Now the Führer was genuinely angry because of Stalin's moral aid to the Yugoslavs and thereafter Stalin "left no stone unturned to appease Germany." But Hitler saw in the "constant efforts" of the Russians to prevent a conflict only proof of their weakness and his golden opportunity to get his ***lebensraum***,[58]

On April 22 the Narkomindal again requested Germany to stop the flights of German planes over Russia's borders, eighty violations being alleged from March 27 to April 18. One German plane made an emergency landing near Rovno on April 15, in which, says Schulenburg, "were found a camera, some rolls of exposed film, and a torn topographical map of the districts of the U.S.S.R., all of which gives evidence of the purpose of the crew of the plane." On May 17 Schulenburg was still trying to obtain the release of its crew.[59]

On April 24 the German Naval Attaché in Moscow reported to Berlin: "Rumors current here of alleged danger of war between Germany and the Soviet Union and are being fed here by travellers passing through Germany. According to the Counsellor of the Italian Embassy, the British Ambassador predicts June 22 as the day of the outbreak of war."[60]

The British secret service had discovered the new invasion date. This information was passed on to the Russians. U.S. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had also given Moscow a similar warning, strongly and emphatically, as early as January.

There was no reply to either communication. The Soviets were determined not to give the Germans any excuse to attack because of traffic with the Anglo-Saxons. Stalin himself continued to doubt that Hitler would strike.[61] Hilger believed that Stalin thought Hitler was getting ready to make extortionate demands which could be handled by negotiation.[62]

On their side the Nazis counted heavily on a great swing of sentiment to their side throughout the West, even in the Anglo-Saxon lands. Their years of bitter fulminations against communism and Russia must have left a deep

[58] Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

[59] *N.S.R.*, pp. 328, 343.

[60] *N.S.R.*, p. 330.

[61] Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, Harper, 1948, p. 335; also published in England under the title *The White House Papers of Harry Hopkins*, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948–9.

[62] Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

residue in the minds of Western conservatives and socialists. Surely when the Nazis actually did attack the hated Reds the world would rally to the German side, or at least abate much of its resistance to the New Order. The Number Two Nazi, Rudolph Hess, flew to Scotland to persuade the British aristocracy to see the light.

Two Ambassadors' Attempts to Avert War. The last weeks before the German invasion of Russia were "a tragic experience" for the German officials in Moscow. In mid-April they resolved upon an effort to make clear to Hitler the dangers of a Russian war. A careful memorandum was prepared on which several of the top Embassy officials collaborated. Schulenburg then took the document to Berlin and, after Hitler had had ample time to digest it, the Ambassador was summoned for a short interview on April 28, 1941. Though the memorandum lay before him Hitler never referred to it, limiting himself to "general and meaningless statements" and to a casual remark at the close that he did "not intend a war against Russia."[63]

During the interview Schulenburg did his best to defend Russia against any aggressive intent in concluding the Friendship Pact with Yugoslavia. About the Russian fear of a German attack, Hitler insisted that the Russians had moved first, concentrating many divisions in the Baltic States. Schulenburg replied that this was due to the "well-known Russian urge for 300 per cent security." He could not believe that Russia would ever attack Germany. Hitler practically agreed. "He did not, it was true, believe that Russia could be brought to attack Germany, but strong instincts of hatred had survived, nevertheless, and, above all, Russia's determination to approach closer to Finland and the Dardanelles was unchanged, as Molotov had allowed clearly to be seen on his visit. When he considered all this he was obliged to be careful."[64]

Schulenburg had long since ceased to close his letters with a "Heil Hitler." In 1944, after the abortive effort to kill Hitler, Schulenburg was executed for complicity in the plot. He may, or may not, have been guilty, but there is no doubt that he believed Hitler to be Germany's destroyer. Returning to Moscow certain that the die had been cast, and knowing that disaster loomed ahead for Germany, Schulenburg agreed with Hilger that they must risk their own heads in an attempt to persuade the Russians to involve Hitler in negotiations so deeply that he would have no excuse to attack, for the time being at least. In their desperation they had a secret meeting with the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin and the Chief of the German Section of the Russian Foreign Office, in which they "talked and talked," but accomplished nothing. The two Russians could not comprehend the Germans risking their lives, or speaking only as individuals, and thought they were playing Hitler's game, trying to soften up the Russians.[65]

Once before an ambassador with a long residence in Moscow had sought to restrain his master from hurling himself into Russia's vast spaces. Before Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 Ambassador Caulaincourt had pleaded

[63] **Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 328.**
[64] ***N.S.R.*, pp. 330–2.**
[65] **Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 331–2.**

with him for five hours not to commit so great a mistake. He pledged his head to Napoleon that Tsar Alexander would "not fire the first shot, nor be the first to cross his frontiers." If attacked the Russians would yield space, let their iron climate fight for them and never make peace. Napoleon listened, displeased. He distrusted Alexander and he insisted that it was necessary to convince England that she would not be able to find any ally on the Continent. Napoleon invaded Russia and met his downfall.[66]

Napoleon disregarded the advice of the Ambassador who sought to save him. So did Hitler. Schulenburg knew that Russia was a world. His specialists had studied it long and thoroughly. They believed that if German armies did destroy the Red regime nothing would remain, and that nothing but "profound and irremediable" anarchy could be substituted for it. The hold of the Red regime on the people was too complete. If it were destroyed the Reich armies "would go forward in darkness, through indescribable confusion," provoking "a new revolution, a revolution of general disintegration," which would strike at both the vanquished and the attackers.[67]

Grave Doubt in Berlin. Though not equipped with Schulenburg's exhaustive knowledge of Russia, Weizsäcker, the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, could see that the assault on Russia would be self-defeating. He wrote, on April 28, 1941: "I can summarize in one sentence my views on a German-Russian conflict. If every Russian city reduced to ashes were as valuable to us as a sunken British warship, I should advocate the German-Russian war for this summer; but I believe we would be the victors over Russia only in a military sense, and would, on the other hand, lose in an economic sense." The sole decisive test was whether this project would hasten the fall of England. If it be assumed that England is close to collapse then there was no need to attack Russia, since "Russia is no potential ally of the English." If England is still strong, then an attempt to feed ourselves by force from Soviet territory would be frustrated by passive resistance. The Stalin system would carry on the war from beyond the Urals and "the window to the Pacific Ocean would remain shut." A German attack on Russia "would only give the British new moral strength."

Nothing was more probable, but the Nazis thought it needless to pay for what they could take by force. Schnurre, their chief economic negotiator, listed on May 15, the very great deliveries being made by the Russians, "a notable performance." Evidently he doubted the wisdom of disrupting this great trade, but Hitler had explained it all to Minister Todt and General Keitel: "What one does not have, but needs, one must conquer."[68]

Schulenburg's Final Protests. On May 2 Schulenburg sent a sharp note to Berlin saying that he and all the higher officials of his Embassy had always

[66] The parallel was so striking that Hilger relieved the tension of their wait for the deluge, in May 1941, by telling Schulenburg that he had obtained a copy of the text of his talk with Hitler, and when he read Caulaincourt's advice to Napoleon, changing the names a little, Schulenburg thought it was actually what he had said to Hitler.—*Ibid.*, p. 333.

[67] Gafencu, *op. cit.*, pp. 178–85.

[68] *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vol. I, p. 833.

combated rumors of a German-Russian war. Now he asked Berlin please to bear in mind, "that attempts to counteract these rumors here in Moscow must necessarily remain ineffectual if such rumors incessantly reach here from Germany, and if every foreigner who comes to Moscow or travels through Moscow not only brings these rumors along, but can even confirm them by citing facts." Berlin replied that the same war rumors were current in Berlin. England was suspected of poisoning the wells, and the unjustified Russian troop concentration across the border added to the rumors. Only such German forces were posted there as were absolutely necessary as rear cover for the Balkan operations. Schulenburg was to keep on denying the rumors.[69]

Schulenburg closed his friendly interpretation of Stalin's assumption of the post of Prime Minister, which took place on May 6, with the statement, "I firmly believe that, in an international situation which he considers serious, Stalin has set himself the goal of preserving the Soviet Union from a conflict with Germany." On May 24, he reported an interview with Molotov, who was "as amiable, self-assured and well-informed as ever." All the evidence in Moscow showed that Russian foreign policy was "directed, above all, at the avoidance of a conflict with Germany."[70]

Moscow's Last Word. This was demonstrated with finality on June 14, 1941, by a remarkable communique issued by the Soviet news agency ***Tass.*** This statement ascribed to the British and denied emphatically the rumors that Germany had presented demands to Russia and that because they had been rejected both sides were concentrating troops for conflict. Germany was respecting the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact. The movement of German troops northward did not concern the relations of the two countries. The Russian troop movements were for training only and the U.S.S.R. "has respected and intends to respect" the Pact with Germany.

This statement can be read as a final appeal of Russia for peace. It must have been intended also to convince the Soviet peoples that nothing had been done to provoke war. Yet it had precisely the opposite effect on many people. Having been assured only a week before that Germany was a loyal ally, they suspected that their own government must have done something to precipitate the attack. The Soviet policy of avoiding anything which Hitler could seize upon as a provocation also left the Soviet peoples without "the slightest psychological preparation" for the German attack. Soviet patriotism had been strengthened on a generalized basis as much as possible, but the German assault caught a large part of the Soviet peoples totally by surprise and was "one of the reasons for the lack of fighting spirit" in the first stage of the war, when many troops surrendered and some sections of the populace welcomed the Germans.[71] Heretofore, this reaction has been ascribed solely to dislike of Soviet rule, which was doubtless the primary motivation. Later, some Russians thought that their government must have been deceived, but no one believed it had incurred the attack.

[69] *N.S.R.*, pp. 334–5.
[70] *N.S.R.*, pp. 335–6, 344.
[71] Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 338.

Hitler Spiritually Free. On June 21, Hitler sent a letter to Mussolini telling him how afraid he had been that the Russians would attack him, or spoil a mighty future air blitz on England. Consequently, there was now about to be "war in the East," about which he did not "entertain a second's doubt as to its great success." If he had "waited until this moment, Duce, to send you this information," it was "because the final decision itself will not be made until 7:00 o'clock tonight." He begged Mussolini not to inform his Ambassador in Moscow. He, too, would "wait until the last moment to have my own Ambassador informed of the decisions reached."

After thus assuring his ally that the mighty decision was still to be made, Hitler concluded by saying that since "I struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free." He undoubtedly hoped that a host of people in the West who greatly feared communism would feel spiritual kinship with him from then on.

Many did, but the verdict of the editors of the Nuremberg documents, assembled for the international court which judged Nazi crimes, was: "it may perhaps not be too much to say that in the history of relations between sovereign nations, a blacker chapter has never been written than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators' unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union."[72]

Was the Nazi-Soviet Truce a Mistake? The ordeal ahead for Russia was a frightful one, but on the fifth anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Pact C. L. Sulzberger of the ***New York Times*** appraised it as a victory for Stalin. He described the Allies' policy of ignoring Russia and later seeking to promote war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany "in a fairly obvious fashion." This policy had been consistently developed during the twenty years between the two World Wars, mostly by London and Paris, "with Washington following in some confusion far behind." This policy had boomeranged for the Allies and when Hitler broke the truce and attacked, his major calculations also proved false.[73]

Russian Expansionist Tendencies. What does the record of the German-Soviet truce period show about Soviet expansionism?

Three aspects of this question require comment.

1. ***Soviet Seizures Agreed Upon in the Pact.*** These include: Latvia, Estonia, half of Poland and Bessarabia. All of these areas were seized as defense buffers against Germany. They are all valuable strategic zones,but the BalticStates region is the most vital.

When someone asked Hindenburg why he insisted on having the Baltic provinces of Russia in the Peace of Brest-Litovsk of 1918, he replied: "To give my left wing room to maneuver in the next war"; and at a planning conference on "Barbarossa," on February 3, 1941, Hitler approved the operational plan, but stressed that "the ***main aim*** is to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad."[74]

[72] ***Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,*** **Vol. I, pp. 833–4.**

[73] **C. L. Sulzberger, "The Pact that Shook the World,"** ***The New YorkTimes Magazine,*** **August 27, 1944.**

[74] ***Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression,*** **Vol. I, p. 802.**

2. ***Soviet Acquisitions in Excess of the Pact***. The most substantial of these was Lithuania, which was obtained from Germany in exchange for the Lublin district of Poland on September 27, 1939, during Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow. Soviet troops also occupied a relatively small Lithuanian strip which had not been allotted to them. After extended negotiation Russia offered Germany "half the price of Alaska" for it and later doubled this sum to 7,500,000 gold dollars, which offer was accepted early in January 1941.

The acquisition of North Bukovina has been described above. In this case Russia's original claim was cut in half, but in drawing the line Molotov's red pencil slipped and a small tip of Moldavia was annexed. Though an accident had apparently occurred, Molotov refused to return this area.

These cases show that the Soviets were quite alert to round out their new borders and that once they had occupied an acre they would not give it up.

3. ***Permanent Russian Objectives.*** The German-Russian negotiations of November 1940 disclosed two Russian objectives which are still unrealized, a share in the physical control of the Turkish Straits and expansion to the south of Batum and Baku, toward the Persian Gulf.

Taken together these acquisitions and aspirations indicate that in a time of great flux the Soviets reverted to virtually all of the territorial aims of Imperial Russia. The same factors do not show a Russia seized with a maniacal desire to conquer the world, either in Europe or Asia. This was the role of Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito. As Hilger says, Hitler was so "inebriated" by success, and so "crazed" with the idea that this was the moment to achieve his life's dreams that nothing could change his "resolve to give the Soviet Union the coup de grâce."[75]

Red Russia on the defensive practised a bold, acquisitive defense, though shrewd and prudent, against foes who would hardly have respected a supine or passive defense.

[75] Hilger and Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

CHAPTER VII

ALLIES IN WAR

1941–1945

On June 22, 1941, the German juggernaut rolled over Russia's borders, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Italy joined in the war, for what everyone expected to be a quick kill.

In the United States the isolationists, whose leadership was strongly conservative, were overjoyed. They had been deeply embarrassed by the German cooperation with the Communists. "Now they were free to go berserk with the original Nazi party line that Hitler represented the only bulwark against Bolshevism."[1]

The isolationists wanted to stay out of the war, which would now be won by Germany. Another large segment of American opinion thought that it would be a good thing if the Nazis and Reds killed off each other. After the barbarity and rapacity of the German Fascists had become too obvious to doubt, they were still widely equated with the much feared Reds, especially during the Russo-German truce. Now the evil partners had fallen out. Let them destroy each other!

On the day after the German assault on Russia Senator Harry S. Truman said: "If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible."[2]

As a policy this proposal was, of course, impossible of execution. It is rarely possible to be on both sides of any issue, or to fluctuate from one side to the other. To do so in a war to the death, in which we were already committed to one side by our deepest interests, would indeed require diplomatic and military jugglery of supernatural proportions. It is as a revelation of his thinking that Mr. Truman's statement is important. He made no distinction between ***(a)*** the fervid appeasement of Hitler by the British and French Governments before Munich and the Russian attempt to ward him off and hold him in check afterwards; ***(b)*** between fascism and communism; or (c) between the aggressor and his victim.

A Warm Welcome from Britain. In Britain there was no hesitation about greeting Russia as an ally in a common cause. Britain had survived after Dunkirk, with quick aid from the United States. Then in August 1940 her air force had defeated the German attempt to take control of the skies over Britain and the Channel. Respite had been won from conquest, but not from

[1] **Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 303.**
[2] **The *New York Times*, July 24, 1941.**

terror and extreme peril. Obliged largely to take the cover of darkness, the German bombers still made British nights hideous. Few Britons could sleep in peace or look up at the skies without dread. No man had any idea when or how the ordeal could be ended, and then suddenly it was. Virtually all of the German planes went east and the terrible tension was lifted from British hearts. Even the Englishmen who had sought to push Germany toward war with Russia now welcomed the Soviet Union as an ally with great relief.

All this was human and natural, but there was a deeper reason for the British welcome to Russia. Every British leader knew that Britain could never defeat Germany without tremendous military aid. It might eventually come from the United States, but the Americans were showing no signs of early all-out intervention. In the meantime an American army observer in London reported the state of affairs correctly. The imperial situation as a whole was deteriorating. The power of the Germans, plus immense slave labor and frenzied fanaticism was too great for the dogged British. The old rule of the prize ring still held. "A good big man will beat a good little man every time."[3]

Winston Churchill's record of opposition to Russian Communism was second to none. He had been the power house of Britain's great effort to stamp out Bolshevism in Russia during the wars of intervention from 1918 to 1920. Now he welcomed Russia as an ally warmly and instantly, on the very day of the German attack, in one of his greatest war-time radio speeches. He would unsay no word of his opposition to communism, but all that faded away before the spectacle now unfolding.

"This bloody guttersnipe," said Churchill, "must launch his mechanized armies upon new fields of slaughter, pillage and devastation. Poor as are the Russian peasants, workmen and soldiers, he must steal from them their daily bread; he must devour their harvests; he must rob them of the oil which drives their ploughs; and thus produce a famine without example in human history." If Hitler were successful in Russia he would attempt to plunge the vast peoples of India and China "into that bottomless pit of human degradation over which the diabolic emblem of the Swastika flaunts itself."

The British people had no doubts about welcoming Russia as an ally. After two months of freedom from serious air raids the people in the streets wore "an expression of almost incredulous relief."[4] A large banner appeared in London saying: "Quiet Nights, Thanks to Russia."

The United States Divided. In the United States opinion was greatly divided. As Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to Russia, said at the time: "there are large classes of people who abhor the Soviets to the extent that they hope for a Hitler victory in Russia."[5] Senator Burton K. Wheeler summed up the isolationist argument: "Just let Joe Stalin and the other dictators fight it out." Former President Herbert Hoover asserted that collaboration between Britain and Russia . . . makes the whole argument of joining the war to bring the Four Freedoms a gargantuan jest," and Senator Robert A. Taft declared: "A victory for communism would be far more dangerous to the United States than a victory for fascism."[6]

[3] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 301.** [4] ***Ibid.*, p. 309.** [5] ***Ibid.*, p. 307.**
[6] **Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Road to Teheran*, Princeton, 1944, p. 232.**

The intensity of views such as these led to an initial cutting-both-ways statement by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles twenty-four hours after the invasion, in which Communism was attacked almost as strongly as Nazism, especially for its suppression of freedom of worship. Nevertheless, the statement continued: "The immediate issue that presents itself to the people of the United States is whether the plan for universal conquest, for the cruel and brutal enslavement of all peoples and for the ultimate destruction of the remaining free democracies which Hitler is now desperately trying to carry out, is to be successfully halted and defeated." In the opinion of our Government, "Hitler's armies are today the chief danger to the Americas."

This statement was followed by a presidential announcement, on June 24, that the United States would send all possible material aid to Russia, subject to the prior needs of Britain. Secretary of State Hull issued a statement saying that "there is a world movement of conquest by force, accompanied by methods of governing the conquered peoples that are rooted mainly in savagery and barbarism. The situation calls for... ever increasing production of military supplies for ourselves and for those who are resisting the would-be world conquerors."[7]

In the lend-lease law Roosevelt was equipped with means of aiding Russia which perhaps he would never have achieved had the isolationists ever suspected that it could be used to aid Red Russia when the lend-lease act was passed in March 1941. Since the President had the power to aid Russia, the anti-Russians led in arguing that the Soviets would be smashed quickly before aid could arrive. Columnist George E. Sokolsky wrote: "Soviet Russia has bluffed the world for a quarter of a century, and the bluff has been called.... Russia will soon be eliminated from the war altogether." Martin Dies, first chairman of the anti-Red House Committee on Un-American Activities, expressed the opinion that Hitler "will be in control of Russia within thirty days."[8]

Could Russia Survive? The view that Russia was doomed to quick conquest was almost universally held. Our War Department intelligence officers estimated that the campaign could last only one to three months.[9] This opinion was widespread among military officers in both the United States and Britain. They all agreed that the Germans would slash through Russia like a knife through butter. Most gave the Reds "no more than four to six weeks." Some thought it would be over in three weeks. With strikingly few exceptions it was agreed that the only question was the number of weeks the Reds could last.

This colossal miscalculation was the product of several factors. The treason trials and purges had pointed toward disorganization and impotence. Russia's poor showing in the early stages of the war with Finland had deepened this impression, and the Russian policy of veiling their strength with secrecy was still more important. But, above all, a dislike of communism had led the West to deceive itself. It was a bad system and therefore a weak system. It was

[7] ***The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,*** **Vol. II, pp. 973–4.**

[8] **Schuman,** ***Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad,*** **p. 424.**

[9] **Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy,** ***On Active Service in Peace and War,*** **New York, Harper, 1947, p. 383; London, Hutchinson, 1949.**

fatally inefficient because the government managed the whole economy. This could only mean failure to achieve any important amount of production or national strength. To this conviction was added one hardly less universal, that the oppressed Soviet peoples would never fight for such a tyrannical system against the might of the German Army and Air Force.

Two Americans believed differently. One was former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies; the other was Colonel Philip R. Faymonville, who had served with him in Moscow as military attaché. Both had gained the confidence of the Soviet leaders. They knew where the great industrial establishments in the Urals and beyond were and that Russian resistance would amaze and surprise the world. Fortunately, they were listened to in the White House. Faymonville was drafted to get aid to Russia going and spent another very useful tour of duty in Moscow, where he observed that the representatives of the hate-Russia group in the State, War and Navy Departments came to Moscow openly bragging what they would do to Russia later.[10]

In July 1941, President Roosevelt had to have some confirmation of the optimistic forecast made by Davies and Faymonville before he could venture large-scale aid to the Soviets. He accordingly sent Harry Hopkins to London, where he found the faintest glimmering of hope that the Russians might conceivably hold out until winter. The Russian armies had already held out four weeks, which was longer than the minimum life assigned to them by the British authorities. Strangely enough, too, Stalin had not seemed to be much impressed by British offers of aid. He was more interested in discussing future frontiers and future spheres of influence, from which the British shied away. One wonders what the effect on the future might have been had they cordially conceded to Russia the frontiers which they had refused in 1939 and which she had obtained from Germany. Certainly a great deal of misunderstanding and of bickering with the inevitable would have been avoided in later years. As things developed, our Government set its face strongly against any recognition of Russia's new frontiers and prevented the British from making any concession in this respect during the course of the war, when they were later disposed to do so.

Hopkins' First Mission to Moscow. In London, Hopkins suddenly decided that he should go to Moscow and see for himself what the Russians had. He received quick permission to do so. Having learned of the detailed plans which the British were making to aid Russia, he asked Churchill if he could impart this information to Stalin. "Tell him, tell him," said Churchill. "Tell him that Britain has but one ambition today, but one desire—to crush Hitler. Tell him that he can depend upon us."[11]

[10] Leland Stowe, one of our outstanding war correspondents, described some of the Anglo-American diplomats in Moscow as "smart-alecky and glib." He also criticized the British and American military commands for not selecting every military officer sent to Russia with extreme care, "laying particular stress on intelligence, breadth of views and adaptability." By their personal attitudes and tactlessness many officers had caused much doubt in Russia about the sincerity of the intentions of the Western democracies.—Leland Stowe, *They Shall Not Sleep*, New York, Knopf, 1944, pp. 231–6.

Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–22.

In Moscow, Hopkins found Stalin still smarting under the sting of Germany's violation of the German-Soviet truce. He said that there had to be minimum moral standards among nations and the observance of their treaty obligations or nations could not exist. After listing the supplies which Russia needed most, Stalin said suddenly: "Give us anti-aircraft guns and the aluminum and we can fight for three or four years." Hopkins was surprised to find that the Russians did not expect to need tanks, thousands of which were then being destroyed in tremendous tank battles with the German panzer divisions, but his surprise was no greater than that of American industrialists and Army officers later on when it developed that the Russian tanks were much better than our own. Stalin gave Hopkins a full and detailed account of Russia's military situation. They had entered the war with 24,000 tanks, including 4000 heavies, to 30,000 for Germany. They were producing 1000 tanks a month and 1800 planes. The latter figure would soon be increased to 2500. When the war began each side had about 175 divisions.

Hopkins returned with many pages of the most detailed military information, such as no one else had been able to obtain. He returned also with great respect for Stalin as a leader. "There was no waste of word, gesture, nor mannerism. It was like talking to a perfectly coordinated machine, an intelligent machine." His questions were clear, concise and direct; his answers ready and unequivocal. He never repeated himself. He curried no favor and had no doubts. He was clear about the decisive role of the United States and sure that the military weight of the United States would have to be added to that of Britain and Russia to crush the German military machine. He recognized President Roosevelt's pre-eminent role as the world leader of the anti-fascist forces. "He repeatedly said that the President and the United States had more influence with the common people of the world today than any other force."[12]

Hopkins learned also that there was literally no one else in the whole Soviet Government who was willing to give out important information. He continued to be appalled that such absolute power should be concentrated in one mortal man. He left Moscow on August 1, after one of the most fruitful diplomatic encounters of the entire war period, though the ***Wall Street Journal*** disapproved of the trip, believing that to give aid to Russia was "to fly in the face of morals." American military observers in Moscow also continued to cable pessimistic reports which Hopkins knew from what he had seen as well as heard, "could be based on nothing but mere guess work colored by prejudice."[13]

The President could now proceed strongly to Russia's aid, though always slowed and sometimes blocked by military and civilian bureaucrats who did not want his orders executed. Eventually, on March 7, 1942, he sent letters to all war agencies ordering all material promised to the Soviet Union released and shipped at the earliest possible date, regardless of the effect of these shipments on any other part of the war program.[14] Early in September, Hopkins

[12] ***Ibid.*, p. 343.** [13] ***Ibid.*, p. 344. See also pp. 323–48.**

[14] **John R. Deane, *The Strange Alliance*, New York, Viking, 1947, p. 89; London, Murray, 1947.**

listed, doubtless roughly and inadequately, the elements of the American people which opposed aid to Russia, as: “The whole Catholic population is opposed to it, all the Nazis, all the Italians and a lot of people who sincerely believe that Stalin is a great menace to the world.” The Catholic opposition led the President to send Myron C. Taylor as a personal ambassador to Pope Pius XII in November 1941, a mission which apparently prevented serious opposition from the Catholic hierarchy to lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union.[15]

Lend-Lease Aid to Russia. From Russia Hopkins went directly to the Argentia Conference off Newfoundland, on August 9, 1941, at which the Atlantic Charter was drawn up. At this meeting the British still moved under the assumption of Russian collapse, arguing that stockpiles of American supplies in Britain would do more good than supplies sent to Russia to be captured by the Nazis. The American military chiefs insisted that weapons in the hands of the Russians would diminish Germany’s strength directly and the conference ended with an agreement that a joint mission should go to Moscow to arrange for help to Russia.[16]

Averell Harriman and Lord Beaverbrook, after Churchill the most powerful British advocate of aid to Russia, had three meetings with Stalin beginning on September 28, which resulted in the fixing of the original lists of materials to be sent to the Soviets, the United States being committed to deliver one billion dollars’ worth of supplies from October 1, 1941, to July 1, 1942.

This was the beginning of the military partnership between the Soviet Union and the West which lasted until all of the Axis powers had been conquered. At first the stream of lend-lease supplies was only a trickle. During 1941 its value was mainly moral. During 1942 American war production had not yet reached its stride and there were severe transportation difficulties, so that the aid sent to Russia and Britain could not be tremendous. In 1944 Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., found it difficult to assess the importance of lend-lease supplies to Russia in 1942. He felt sure that in certain critical items, such as trucks and field telephone equipment, our aid had been important. He was sure that American tanks were put to good use in the defense of Stalingrad, but his conclusion was that “in the overall picture, the volume of fighting equipment we sent could not have bulked large.”[17] Mclnnis also estimated that at the time of Stalingrad aid provided by the West was small when compared to Russia’s own production, “and that its quality was often below that of Russian first-line equipment.”[18]

After 1942 lend-lease supplies were of the greatest assistance to the advancing Russians. Up to May 31, 1945, 2660 ships were sent to Russia, of which 52 were diverted to Britain and 77 were sunk by the enemy. A total

[15] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 372, 384, 398.

[16] Elliott Roosevelt . *As He Saw It,* New York, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1946, pp. 30–4

[17] Edward R. Stettiniu, Jr. *Lend Lease, Weapon for Victory,* New York, Macmillan 1944, p. 210.

[18] Edgar Mclnnis, *The fVar, Fourth Year,* Oxford, 1944, p. 90.

of 15,234,791 tons of supplies arrived in Russia. Many convoys went around the terribly dangerous north capes of Norway, from which German submarines, aircraft and surface ships issued forth upon them, crowded down toward shore as they were by icebergs much of the year and exposed to eternal daylight during a large part of it. Here the losses were heavy. Later on a still larger stream of supplies was sent into Russia by the southern route, after great labor had prepared the way, in the terrific heat of Persian ports and along the inadequate railway through the Persian mountains. Yet more than half of our lend-lease aid went into Russia's Pacific ports and was shipped over the Trans-Siberian railway.

To the end of the war the Russians managed to supply the great bulk of the actual fighting tools: 92–5 per cent of the planes used; 91–5 per cent of the tanks; 98–5 per cent of the artillery; 95–5 per cent of the shells; 94–5 per cent of the cartridges and 100 per cent of the rifles.[19]

It was in transportation equipment that our aid was most important. Some 427.000 trucks, 13,000 combat vehicles and 35,000 motorcycles were forwarded. American jeeps were on all Russian fronts. Railroad equipment included nearly 2000 locomotives and 11,000 cars, all manufactured for the Russian wide-gauge roads. A billion dollars worth of machinery went, 2.670.000 tons of petroleum products and 4,478,000 tons of foodstuffs, mostly consumed by the Army. Four million pairs of army boots were supplied, and much else. Tanks and planes were large items in the later period. The total value of the supplies delivered was $11,000,000,000. The total is huge, yet each month of the war cost us $8,000,000,000 during 1944.

Altogether it is clear that our supplies greatly speeded the Russians in driving the Germans out of their country and back to Berlin. Without our transportation equipment the process would have been much slower and the war would have lasted one to three years longer. If it had, additional hundreds of thousands of American men would have been killed or maimed, at the least. Stettinius ended his discussion of aid to Russia with the conclusion that the Russians had "made a return far beyond any measurement in dollars or tons." They had made it in the form of millions of German soldiers dead or in Russian prison camps; in the form of many thousands of German guns, tanks, trucks and planes wrecked on Russian battlefields. Our supplies helped the Russians to do "irreparable damage to the Nazi war machine."[20]

A great many Americans believe that Russia would have been defeated except for our lend-lease aid. This is possible, but not probable. The Russians had turned the tide at Stalingrad before our help arrived in important quantity and throughout the struggle their own factories supplied the basic sinews of war. We speeded their victory, and ours, and never did a people make better use of weapons put into their hands.

More Gratitude Demanded. The smooth working of lend-lease cooperation was marred by a remarkable outburst on the part of U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Admiral William H. Standley. On March 8, 1943, he called in the

[19] **Leslie Roberts, *Home from the Cold Wars*, Boston, 1948, p. 116.**
[20] **Stettinius, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–9.**

American and British correspondents to charge that the Russian people did not know about the lend-lease aid they were receiving.

This was not true, since such items as 2600 planes, 3200 tanks, 72,500 trucks and 3,000,000 pairs of boots were all plainly stamped as made in the U.S.A. The ***New York Times'*** representative, Ralph Parker, found by questioning that everybody recognized American goods, even to sausages, and that millions of copies of photos showing the arrival of American goods had been published in the Russian press. ***Pravda*** had also printed the figures on lend-lease aid.[21]

Admiral Standley was not only wrong on his facts, but on his inferences. He spoke of the American people "giving" aid "out of a friendly feeling" for the Russians. He said the American Congress was "big hearted and generous as long as it feels that it is helping some one."

This was a complete misapprehension of the purpose of lend-lease, one certain to hurt Russian feelings deeply. We were not "giving" the Russians anything. We were sending supplies to enable them to whip the common enemy. There was not an iota of charity or big-hearted ness involved. We were contributing trucks and boots while the Russians paid in blood. They fought snow and mud with our stuff, to fight Germans whom we would otherwise have had to defeat.

Standley's thrust came at a time when fear was growing in this country that the Russians might make a separate peace. Though such a danger really did not exist, Standley invited it by threatening the Russians with a stoppage of lend-lease. With the House of Representatives due to vote the next day on the extension of the lend-lease bill, Standley remarked that "those familiar with legislative procedure know it is a long way from the Foreign Affairs Committee to enactment. The American Congress is rather sensitive."

When the desperately beset Russians received this sudden blow they naturally supposed it came from the American Government. It helped somewhat when the State Department disavowed the testy Admiral, but even then it was difficult to explain why he should speak in such an inexcusable fashion.

In reality Standley was giving vent to frustrations which did not appear in his blast. He was striking partly at Brigadier General Philip R. Faymonville, who had broad power from the White House to administer lend-lease in Russia. His appointment had displeased the State Department. Then in Moscow he administered lend-lease with single-minded devotion to his orders to find out what the Russians needed and get it to them. His zeal and his close, cordial relations with the Russian officials irked the members of the Embassy who disliked the Russians, especially when he refused to use his power to drive bargains with the Russians, or to use it to obtain information the military and naval attachés wanted. Since Admiral Standley, used to ruling his ship completely, could not tell Faymonville what to do, his public explosion of March 8 attempted "to bludgeon Russia into revealing her military secrets in exchange for lend-lease."[22]

[21] **The *New York Times*, March 8, 9, 1943.**

[22] **Waverley Root, *The Secret History of the War*, Vol. Ill, Casablanca to Katyn, p. 349. See also pp. 334–51.**

Faymonville was recalled by the War Department in October 1943, along with the Military Attaché, Michela. A month later Faymonville had been demoted to his former rank as a colonel and stationed in Arkansas. The Army's most valuable man, from the standpoint of working with the Russians, spent the rest of the war in obscurity deep within the U.S.A. General John R. Deane, Faymonville's successor, came home after the war to write ***The Strange Alliance***, a book in which he explained how distrustful and difficult the Russians were to deal with, especially where military information was involved.

That the Russian soldiers and people appreciated the lend-lease supplies we sent to them is not open to question. They were too well marked, too distinctively American and too useful in a time of desperate need to lack appreciation. The Russians, being landlocked and with little experience on the sea, did fail to realize the bitter toil and danger which our men underwent in order to deliver the goods to them through seas infested with every danger of heat and cold, of storm and enemy action. Closely locked, as they were, in endless mortal combat with the Germans on land, and always yearning for the long-postponed second front which would shorten their agony, the Russians did not have much time to spend in thanking us for the material aids we so painfully sent to them. Yet at Teheran, Stalin proposed a toast to American production, "without which this war would have been lost."[23] There could be no doubt of the truth of this statement when the entire global struggle is considered. In this context American machine power was as essential as Russian man power.

An Epic Struggle. It is exceedingly difficult for Americans to comprehend the immensity of the struggle in Russia. Our own war effort was world-wide and it involved bitter experiences in all parts of the globe, yet it was diffused in comparison to the epic conflict in the Soviet Union. In the first days of the onslaught the Germans attempted to do what they had achieved in Poland. Vast areas soon became completely saturated with German troops, containing as many men and vehicles as could be moved or maneuvered. The Russians had 2,500,000 men mobilized and they increased this figure to 10,000,000 as rapidly as possible. Within a few weeks both sides accepted the estimate that 9,000,000 men were engaged in battle.

Overhead, thousands of German bombers rained havoc on Russian cities, on every observable troop concentration, rail or road junction or supply dump, while clouds of fighter planes struck down Russian defense aircraft.

The buffer zone which the Russians had acquired in 1939 was largely seized in the first week. One of the functions of this zone had been to veil from the Germans the construction of a defense-in-depth belt of fortifications further back. These fortifications varied from twenty to one hundred miles in depth. They were designed to absorb the onrushing, infiltrating Germans, to catch them between the cross-fire of many strong points and to prevent any massive break-through. Constructed with furious haste, and with the aid of much

[23] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 474.**

forced labor, they were not entirely completed when the Nazis struck, but performed their essential function. They slowed the German assault until the Russian armies were fully mobilized. Thereafter great retreats ensued, but there was never a disastrous break-through. Many Russian units were encircled, but they did not surrender, as the French invariably had when surrounded in the West. Instead they fought on, seeking to break out, selling their lives as dearly as possible, sapping German strength. From the immense Russian forests guerrillas constantly harassed the enemy, and as retreats occurred, the land was scorched so thoroughly that almost never did the Germans find any aid or comfort in captured towns of villages. Everything was wrecked, including water supplies. In summer the Germans suffered from thirst and from the suffocating, eye-destroying dust created by their own columns. In winter they had to endure cold such.as they had never imagined, and with scant preparation for it. But worst of all was the fierce, implacable hostility of the Soviet peoples.

Nevertheless, they swept up to Leningrad and Moscow. The Russian defense had to be dispersed and it miscalculated in expecting the chief original blow toward the Ukraine. The Russian defenses in the Baltic region held for two months. Then Leningrad was closely invested, but never captured throughout the war. Apart from the military defenses the citizens of the city rose en masse and defended it to the end, man, woman and child. Hundreds of thousands died of cold and hunger, but the remainder never ceased to work and to resist.

The Germans overran half a million square miles of Russian territory, including most of Russia's older and most valuable industrial regions. Much machinery was shipped east by the Russians, but the loss was immense. The drain on man-power was comparable. In early October the Soviets put their losses at 1,128,000 men. On November 6th, Stalin raised the figure by 600,000. The central German armies were bending every effort to encircle Moscow from both sides. By late November they were both north and south of the capital, but fresh, warmly clad, well-equipped Russian armies awaited them in the deep forests on both wings, while the people of Moscow dug an ever-widening belt of defenses in front of the city. Four divisions of hastily mobilized members of the Communist party were almost wiped out in front of the city, while the regulars crushed the German spear-heads on both sides and threw them back. By December 8, Hitler was announcing that he would not press the attack upon Moscow during the winter.[24]

During the fighting season of 1942 the Germans elected to smash through to the Volga south of Moscow and far down into the Caucasus, though short of the great oilfields. This time it was Stalingrad which blocked them. Its garrison and citizens fought for each stone in it until German progress was slowed down to a matter of feet, and finally stalled. The city was totally destroyed, and the Germans held nearly all of it, but they could not drive the Russians out of the river bluff which was honeycombed with deep dugouts.

[24] **Edgar Mclnnis, *The War, Third Year,* pp. 9–30; Henry C. Cassidy, *Moscow Dateline,* Boston, 1943, pp. 161–78.**

The Germans were greatly extended and the Generals wished to draw back, but Hitler's intuition would not let them. Balked at Leningrad and Moscow, he had sworn to take Stalingrad. Counsels of prudence infuriated him. Thus, on November 19, 1942, the Russians repeated their counter-offensive tactics, with the difference that they swept around a huge pocket of Axis troops containing 330,000 men, including several divisions of Rumanians and some Italian troops. More than half of this great host was killed and the remainder captured, with tremendous booty.

After Stalingrad the Russians began the long, gruelling task of driving the Germans out of their enormous conquests. For two and a half years more the Russians relentlessly drove the Germans backward, using every device, modern and primitive, to speed their advance. Sometimes they swam rivers at night, aided by any doors and boards obtainable in a town, to fall upon the enemy who thought they had all the boats. Methodically the Russians employed concentrations of artillery, such as had never been witnessçd before in modern warfare, to smash the German hedgehog defenses. Artillery was their special weapon, an arm in which they needed no help from lend-lease. In the summer of 1943 the Russians used 3000 gun barrels to each mile at Bryansk, a barrage ten times heavier than at Verdun. In the Kursk-Orel battles of the same season, they attained an equal concentration of artillery on a nineteen-mile front.[25]

In the long road back casualties were always heavy and the sufferings of the Russian people endless. The Soviet Government will never know how many of its people the Germans and their allies killed, directly or indirectly. In the city of Odessa, for example, 200,000 bodies were found after the Rumanian occupation, yet out of that city of 600,000 only 100,000 were left. What happened to the other 300,000? How many were taken to Germany as slave laborers? The Soviets estimated their military dead at 7,500,000 and the number of civilians killed at five to six millions. Beyond those slaughtered, the Germans used every known device to degrade some sixty millions of people in the regions they occupied. From the great height of their own racial superiority they looked down upon the Slavs as inferior beings, ***Untermenschen,*** and did everything within their power to destroy any human dignity in them.

Both the immensity of Russia's suffering, and the four-year eternity through which it lasted, have to be remembered before we can understand the depth of her feeling about the long delay of the West in opening a second front and her attitude toward post-war issues. It was especially idle to say what future the Russians had in mind for Germany without remembering what they suffered at her hands.

A Political Agreement with Russia Refused. In the military security of continental United States it was easy for us to regard the political settlements of the future with much more detachment. As soon as the Russians recaptured Rostov on November 22, 1941, the Kremlin renewed its pressure upon

[25] **Albert Parry, *Russian Cavalcade,* New York, 1944, p. 240; London, W. H. Allen, 1947; Shugg and De Weerd, *World War II,* Washington, 1946, p. 203.**

Britain for political agreement about the post-war world. The situation was tense enough that Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was sent to Moscow on December 7. Before he left he received a vitally important cable dated December 5, which was prepared in the State Department and initialed by President Roosevelt. This message stated that it was our considered opinion that the post-war policies of the United States had been laid down in the Atlantic Charter and that it would be unfortunate for any of the three governments to enter into commitments regarding the specific terms of the post-war settlement. "Above all, there must be no secret accords" and "the constitutional limitations to which this Government is bound must be kept in mind."[26]

At the time this policy seemed wise. President Wilson had had unhappy experience with the secret treaties made by the Allies during World War I. The opponents of the Administration in the Senate would also be certain to make great capital out of any treaty arrangements presented to them which appeared to rest upon or to confirm secret agreements made during the war. In the Senate a two-thirds majority is required for the approval of any treaty, a fact which haunted the minds of our leaders incessantly after our catastrophic failure to make peace after World War I. In our unravaged land it seemed wise to wait until the war was over and then settle everything on a basis of high principle. Yet the march of the armies would be sure to determine the main lines of the post-war settlements.

y The question recurs whether an early agreement to recognize Russia's 1940 boundaries would have prevented much later misunderstanding and rivalry. Assurances that they would never again have to suffer from German aggression seemed vital to the Soviet leaders in the midst of their agony. At the end of September 1941, Stalin had suggested to Beaverbrook a post-war alliance between Russia and Britain.[27] He was certainly not thinking then of bitter post-war rivalry with Britain.

Eden's mission to Moscow in December 1941 was largely fruitless, since he was unable to make any agreements about the post-war world. Stalin proposed the recognition of Russia's boundaries as of June 22, 1941; the restoration of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, Austria and Albania; the transfer of East Prussia to Poland, the detachment of the Rhineland and possibly Bavaria from Germany in the West as independent states and reparations in kind, especially in machine tools from Germany. Stalin was willing to support Britain in securing bases in all of the Western European countries opposite her, including France.

With the exception of the last point, this was a realistic program. It was rejected by the State Department in a long memorandum drawn up by the highly conservative Catholic James C. Dunn, and by Ray Atherton. Their memorandum was accepted by Secretary Hull. It took the wholly unrealistic position that the Soviet acquisition of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, etc., could not be accepted and that Stalin was probably leading from weakness, "in case the war should end with a weakened Soviet Union not occupying the

[26] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 401–2.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 390.

territories he was demanding," instead of from strength. Somewhat contradictorily they asserted that there was "no doubt that the Soviet Government has tremendous ambitions with regard to Europe and that at some time or other the United States and Great Britain will be forced to state that they cannot agree, at least in advance, to all of its demands." It was therefore better to take a firm attitude now, rather than later after a diplomatic retreat had weakened the Western position.[28]

Thus the Soviets were forced to fight on without any recognition of even their most elementary political demands (i.e., the 1941 frontiers) by their allies, and without any evidence that the West would really destroy Germany's war-making power. They had to trust to the power of the Red Army to win the guarantees which the West rejected.

The end result of this situation was that the U.S.S.R. secured much wider and deeper guarantees in Eastern Europe than she had proposed in 1941, after it became clear that the Red Army was the most powerful fighting machine on the Eurasian continent. Lacking the restraint of any agreements made freely in advance, before Russia was in the driver's seat, the West could only conduct a progressive retreat before the Russian advance.

Stalin had made it clear to Eden in December 1941 that since Russia had been invaded three times in thirty-five years through Eastern Europe he never intended to let that region fall into hostile hands again.[29] This was, and had to be, the Number One Russian war aim, from which there would be no deviation.

For the time being the non-recognition policy of the State Department triumphed. In April 1942 the British were about to sign an alliance with Russia conceding most of Russia's border demands. They were conscious that their failure in 1939 to give Russia security in the Baltic region had precipitated the Nazi-Soviet truce and did not want another break with Russia over the same point. Roosevelt suggested a compromise permitting the emigration of such of the Baltic peoples as wished to leave. On May 20, Molotov arrived in London and countered the American opposition with the statement that Russian public opinion had also to be taken into account. At this point Hull sent a still stronger memorandum to the President, arguing that any concession on the Baltic question would be "a terrible blow to the whole cause of the United Nations," and threatening to denounce the arrangement if the British made it. Roosevelt approved, the British stiffened and the Russians were driven by degrees to abandon all of their demands for the acceptance of their new frontiers. On May 26 they accepted a treaty of alliance with Britain which contained no territorial provisions. Even the Munich agreement with Hitler whereby Czechoslovakia was dismembered stood unrepudiated and it was August 1942 before Benes was finally able to secure its annulment after the strongest pressure, often repeated, on the British Government. The West would accept Russia as a military ally, but would retreat from no single one of the political positions respecting the

[28] **Hull. *Memoirs*, Vol. II. pp. 1167–70.**

[29] **David Dallin, *Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1939–1942,* Yale University Press and Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 412.**

Soviet Union which they had assumed during the Nazi-Soviet truce. Secretary Hull was "enormously relieved."[30]

It is difficult to imagine a more self-defeating position. Fear of Russia combined with the fearsome shadow which the U.S. Senate of 1918–20 cast down the avenue of history to block the opportunity to accept Russia's 1941 frontiers when this acceptance would have been appreciated. The free and cordial recognition of these frontiers in early 1942 would have been of much more value in setting limits to the expansion of Russian power which the State Department feared than the policy of waiting and conceding as little as possible. Only if Russia, and the West, lost the war could the acceptance of Russia's 1941 boundaries be avoided.

In mid-1942, also, the West was dependent for its survival, in Europe at least, upon the stamina and power of the Red Army and this would continue to be true. The state of affairs has been accurately described in a statement by General Douglas MacArthur on February 23, 1942, which did a great deal to improve feeling in the Soviet Union. From his headquarters in besieged Corregidor, MacArthur said:

> "The world situation at the present time indicates that the hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Russian Army. During my lifetime I have participated in a number of wars and have witnessed others, as well as studying in great detail the campaigns of outstanding leaders of the past. In none have I observed such effective resistance to the heaviest blows of a hitherto undefeated enemy, followed by a smashing counterattack which is driving the enemy back to his own land. The scale and grandeur of this effort marks it as the greatest military achievement in all history."[31]

THE SECOND FRONT

On their side the Russians stood in desperate need of a second front in Europe. They left the recognition of their security needs in Eastern Europe in abeyance in May 1942, because the other need was more urgent. The demand for a second front had been raised first by Litvinov on July 8, 1941. Stalin had repeated it on November 6, and again on February 23, 1942. Three days later Litvinov openly raised the issue in Washington and Maisky made a public plea in London which brought a strongly favorable response from the British press. Everyone knew that the Germans were preparing another tremendous offensive against Russia and that it might succeed. The London ***Daily Mail*** spoke for all sections of the British press when it said: "if Russia falls there will fall with her our hope of victory."

[30] *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,* Vol. II, pp. 1165–74; Edward Taborsky, "Benes and the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1949, Vol. 27, No. 2, p. 205.

Before Hull's near ultimatum arrived Churchill had come to believe that it was imprudent to imperil Britain's cause in behalf of the Baltic States. He reasoned that "In a deadly struggle it is not right to assume more burdens than those who are fighting for a great cause can bear."—Churchill, *The Second World War*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, Vol. IV, *The Hinge of Fate,* 1950, p. 32.

[31] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 497.

Early in January 1942 the American General Staff began to draw up plans for an invasion of northern France. The basic military argument, stated in a letter from General Marshall to the President, reasoned that only in Western Europe could a powerful offensive be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future. In no other place could air superiority be achieved and the bulk of the British ground forces be committed along with our own and in cooperation with those of Russia. The main invasion, originally known as ROUNDUP, and later as OVERLORD, was planned for the spring of 1943, but a more limited operation called SLEDGEHAMMER was to take place about September 15, 1942, in case the situation on the Russian front became desperate. This plan was approved at the White House on April 1, and Marshall and Hopkins were dispatched to London to propose it to the British. There they discovered that the British were not favorable to any such program and that some of their military leaders were not too anxious to get supplies to Russia. British leaders seemed to feel that a great ground attack need never be made.[32] This implied that the West could do its share by sea and air.

Attack in 1943 Agreed. However, the Americans made such a strong argument that on April 14 a meeting of the defense committee of the British War Cabinet approved an invasion of Europe for 1943, and Churchill gave assurance that the British would make their full and unreserved contribution to the great enterprise. Marshall was convinced that the British Government now intended to prepare vigorously for the invasion.[33]

On May 10 Churchill took cognizance of the strong demand in Britain for an offensive in Europe by assuring the public that the Government was no less permeated with the offensive spirit than the people and that it was only awaiting an opportunity to strike.[34]

This was the situation when Molotov came on to Washington from London, May 29,1942. On April 11, Roosevelt had cabled to Stalin a cordial invitation for Molotov to come to Washington. The President had two purposes: to relieve Russian pressure on England with respect to post-war settlements, and to convince the Russian leaders that we really wanted to work with the

The talks with Molotov covered a wide range of subjects. The State Department had provided the President with a list of nine subjects, none of which concerned the war in Europe. Two of them dealt with an offer of good offices to compose certain difficulties between Turkey and Iran and Russia.[35]

Second Front in 1942 Promised. For his part Molotov was interested only in the question of a second front. The German blow could be so crushing as to secure the Caucasus and the Ukraine. On the other hand, if the Allies would engage forty German divisions in the West, Hitler would either be defeated in 1942 or his doom sealed. Molotov was assured that we were preparing for a second front and that we expected to open it in 1942. He was

[32] ***Ibid.*, p. 526.**
[33] ***Ibid.*, pp. 533–8.**
[34] **The *New York Times*, May 11, 1942.**
[35] **Sherwood, *op*. cit., p. 559.**

permitted to write a sentence in the communique issued on June 11, 1942, which said: “In the course of the conversations full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942.”

This announcement was broadcast by the whole apparatus of Soviet public opinion control and it greatly heartened the Russian peoples. It did much to give them faith in ultimate victory, but Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten promptly brought to Washington the disturbing impression that the British Chiefs of Staff did not think a European landing feasible. They thought that it would be impossible to draw off any German troops from the Russian front, since there were already twenty-five German divisions in France and the shortage of landing craft precluded the landing of adequate troops there. Lord Mountbatten arrived in the White House on June 3, 1942, and stayed two weeks, gradually building up arguments against a Second Front in France in 1942. He had one five-hour session with the President, arguing that ***some*** action must occur in 1942 and North Africa was the place. Then the invasion would sweep up through the Balkans past Belgrade to Warsaw.[36]

Churchill Forced Postponement. After Mountbatten had prepared the way, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff arrived in Washington on June 20 to argue for an invasion of North Africa, instead of Europe, knowing well that this project had all along appealed to Roosevelt as a naval minded man. General Marshall was “very much stirred up and emphatic over” this proposed change in strategy. He was tired of decisions which did not stay made.[37] But Churchill many times dramatized the Channel as a “river of blood.”

Churchill was ever mindful, and rightly so, of the terrible and useless carnage of World War I at Passchendaele and the Somme. Fear of a terrific bloodletting such as had weakened France during World War I was one of the British motives in their long and persistent opposition to a landing in France, reinforced no doubt by the fact that they had failed at the Dardanelles in 1915 and had lately been driven out of France at Dunkirk, and out of Greece. In addition Churchill had an incurable attraction to “eccentric operations.” This was traditional in British military history, since the British usually fought more numerous foes. He dreaded frontal operations and always sought to deliver some swift surprise blow somewhere on the perimeter where the enemy was weak. He persisted in believing that Germany could be defeated by superior sea and air power, “plus superior wits,” always insisting that a defeat on the French coast was “the onfy-way in which we could possibly lose this war.”

This minimization of the disaster which could occur on the Russian front was overshadowed by the fall of Tobruk on June 20, opening up the possibility of a German-Japanese junction in the Middle East. Churchill at once “poured forth his matchless prose” in opposition to a Channel crossing and in favor of a landing in North Africa. Marshall, Hopkins and Roosevelt

[36] Martin Sommers, Foreign Editor of the *Saturday Evening Post*, in the Introduction to Edgar Snow, *Stalin Must Have Peace*, New York, 1947, pp. 10–11.

[37] Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

vigorously opposed him. The American military men were deeply concerned, knowing that the proposed diversion of troops and supplies would prevent the invasion of Europe in the Spring of 1943, and in all probability throughout the year.[38]

In one long night session at the White House, Churchill made one of the greatest and most impassioned speeches of his career, painting the virtues of the diversion through Africa and the "soft underbelly attack." Colonel Albert Wedemeyer, speaking for General Marshall, demolished all of Churchill's grandiloquent generalities with factual and statistical evidence that the cross-Channel invasion was the right plan and the other one wrong, but Churchill would not budge.[39]

North Africa Substituted. Since the British categorically refused to take part in anything except the invasion of Africa, Roosevelt decided that it would have to be accepted, since it would be disastrous to morale on our side, mostly in Russia but in America as well, if ***no*** offensive was undertaken in 1942.

Secretary Stimson was strongly opposed to the shift of operations. He "pushed his disagreement with the President to the limits prescribed by loyalty" and his opposition was fully shared by the War Department staff, but without success. North Africa was invaded on November 8, 1942. Russia was left to absorb the full brunt of Germany's fury at Stalingrad. Instead of the Allies taking some of the weight off Russia it was the other way around. The immense German debacle at Stalingrad prevented the Germans from reacting to the African invasion as they would have. Eventually the Allied conquest of Africa benefited Russia moderately by opening up the Mediterranean and speeding the shipment of supplies to her through Persia. There was a great saving of shipping. But during the second great summer crisis of their long battle for survival against the full weight of the German war machine this prospect was cold comfort. Stalin welcomed the move publicly, but all it brought to Russia was a minor distraction of German attention.

To the Germans the decision to attack North Africa was capital good news. They had to expect a great Allied landing somewhere, and the Allies chose to strike far away from Germany. At the moment when the Germans were stretched to the limit, from Berlin to Stalingrad, they would not have to meet a great Allied attack in France, one that would require 50 to 100 divisions to cope with. Instead, they could throw a do2en additional divisions into North Africa and keep the Western Allies occupied for another six months. There would be no Allied invasion in the West in 1942, or in the Spring of 1943. The Germans were to keep the Americans and British busy with small forces all through 1943 and the first half of 1944, as the Allies, slowly and painfully, fought their way up the mountainous Italian peninsula.

The decision to make the North African detour was one of the most fateful made during the entire war. Politically, it involved us in the whole sorry business of preserving the power of French fascism in North Africa, and of

[38] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 588–94.**
[39] **Martin Sommers, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.**

carrying on a long and futile campaign to keep General de Gaulle and the Free French from taking their rightful place in France.

Our preparations in North Africa centered around a close working arrangement between the American Consul General, Robert Murphy, and Lemaigre-Dubreuil, a pre-war fascist who represented powerful Franco-German economic interests. Being open and notorious collaborators and partners with the Germans, Lemaigre's group wished to get on the winning side in North Africa, to which their German confederates permitted them to transfer the huge profits of collaboration—twenty-five billion francs before the invasion in mid-November 1942, including nine billions just prior to it—when they knew the time was short. From this and other sources the Germans were well warned of the coming invasion and ready to act accordingly.[40]

Limited Invasion Rejected. In mid-July 1942, General Marshall, Admiral King and Harry Hopkins went to London for a conference with the British under written orders from the President to press for the execution of SLEDGEHAMMER the limited operation against Western Europe. "Such an operation" the order said, "would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning-point which would save Russia this year, SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that every reason calls for accomplishment of it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event Russian collapse becomes probable SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principal objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front."

In London, on July 20, the Americans agreed to push hard for a limited operation, the seizure of the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy as a permanent bridgehead for ROUNDUP. However, the British opposed this move and the American Naval authorities agreed that the weather hazards were probably serious. Nothing but North Africa was left and the British were inclined to postpone a final decision even on it, until September 15. On July 25, Hopkins cabled Roosevelt urging him to name a definite date for the North African invasion not later than October 30, 1942, since the situation in Russia was so serious that delay was dangerous. Roosevelt so ordered and resisted further efforts to postpone action.

The problem now was how to explain to Stalin that there would be no Second Front in Europe in 1942. Churchill was invited to Moscow on July 31, so the task was left to him. Harriman accompanied Churchill and the two arrived in Moscow on August 12. In their first session in the Kremlin Stalin took issue at every point with the greatest bluntness. He was not impressed by Churchill's diagram of the Nazi monster being punctured by the West in its soft underbelly. Later, he saw several advantages which would result, but the next day presented a memorandum arguing that the German forces left in the West were few in number and inferior in quality. He stressed the blow to

[40] **William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble*, New York, 1947, pp. 171, 321, 351; Waverley Root, *The Secret History of the War*, Vol. II, p. 451.**

Soviet morale if there were no diversion in the West. If the Russians could engage 280 German divisions surely the British and Americans could land six or eight divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsula.

As nearly always happened in conferences with the Russians the final session was friendly and cordial. The Americans supposed that the tough talk in the middle of the conference represented the reaction of the Politburo. At the close of the conference Roosevelt cabled Stalin: "Believe me when I tell you that we are coming as quickly and as powerfully as possibly we can. Americans understand that Russia is bearing the brunt of tke fighting and the casualties this year and we are filled with admiration for the magnificent resistance you are putting up."[41]

On his part Stalin had given Harriman the feeling in the Moscow talks that, though greatly disappointed, he considered that he was dealing with two nations with whom he had binding ties and that with the President and Churchill "he could personally interchange views in the frankest manner without fear of breaking up the relationship. At no time did he show any indication that some action or lack of action on either of our parts might fundamentally affect this understanding."[42]

Soon afterward, on August 19, a Canadian force supplemented by British commandos made a raid on the French port of Dieppe. It was insisted that it was only a reconnaissance in force, but losses were very heavy, confirming the British aversion to storming Hitler's European Fortress. The raid also enabled the Germans to boast about the impregnability of that fortress, and put a heavy damper on the hopes of the Russian people for a Second Front.

In late September another convoy was due to sail by the northern route, after the last one had lost a third of its ships, in spite of seventy-seven escorting warships. In view of this fact and the great need for naval vessels for the African venture, Churchill proposed the abandonment of the convoy. However, our Navy suggested that the ships sail by twos and threes and Roosevelt cabled to Churchill proposing that course, since "our greatest reliance today is the Russian Front." It was better "to run this risk rather than endanger our whole relations with Russia at this time."

Contemporaneously, General James H. Bums submitted a far-sighted statement on our relations with Russia. It was clear to him "that we must be so helpful and friendly to her that she will not only battle through to the defeat of Germany and also give vital assistance in the defeat of Japan, but in addition willingly join with us in establishing a sound peace and mutually beneficial relations in the post-war world." Among many means of implementing this policy Burns suggested that we "treat Russia as one of the three foremost powers in the world" and offer her very substantial credits for rehabilitation and expansion, since her post-war needs would be "simply overwhelming."[43]

Aside from his unwillingness to make political agreements with Russia until

[41] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 616–22; *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, p. 1177.**

[42] **Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, 1957, p. 76; Oxford U.P., 1957.**

[43] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 641–3.**

after the war, this was the policy which President Roosevelt consistently endeavored to follow. He knew something of the long decades of hostility between the West and the Soviets and sought to convince the Red leaders that this epoch was ended. We sincerely wanted to be friends as well as allies. Knowing that it was vital to make contact with Stalin, he made four unsuccessful attempts to do so before he finally accomplished a meeting at Teheran on November 28, 1943. Always Stalin pleaded the primacy of his military duties, and this was difficult to deny.

On November 9, 1942, Churchill had a conference with Ambassador Winant and General "Beedle" Smith, who reported to Marshall that Churchill was reluctantly abandoning the idea of an invasion of Norway but was thinking of getting Turkey into the war for an invasion of the Balkans. He appeared to be cooling on the Second Front. Two weeks later Churchill was expressing great concern to Roosevelt about alleged American abandonment of plans for the Second Front. If it was not possible to invade in 1943 it was "all the more important to make sure we do not miss ***1944***."[44]

The "Soft Underbelly" Attacked. At the Casablanca Conference in North Africa in early 1943 Churchill was arguing that after conquering North Africa the next move should be "to strike at the underbelly of the Axis in effective strength and in the shortest possible time." Events now moved with him, as both sides had foreseen. By January 18 the decision to attack Sicily had been made. This was essential to clearing the Mediterranean. Marshall had still urged the importance of invading France in 1943, but immediate Mediterranean objectives claimed the day. The best he could secure was a statement of objectives which put an attack on the Cotentin Peninsula on August 1, 1943, as fourth in order of priority.[45]

By this time the "soft underbelly" idea had taken strong hold of Churchill. He saw that Russia was holding at Stalingrad and would probably take the long road back. If she did, it would be better for the armies of the West to be in the Balkans before she got there.

At the close of the Casablanca Conference Roosevelt and Churchill sent a long report to Stalin which elicited this response from him early in February 1943:

> "Thank you for the information in your friendly joint message on the decision made at Casablanca in regard to operations to be carried out during the last nine months of 1943 by British and American armed forces. It is my understanding that by the decisions you have taken you have set yourselves the task of crushing Germany by the opening of a Second Front in Europe in 1943 and I should be very obliged for information concerning the actual operations planned for this purpose and on the time scheduled for carrying them out.
>
> "I can give you assurance that the armed forces of the Soviet Union will do everything in their power to carry on offensive operations against

[44] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 657–8. Italics mine.**
[45] ***Ibid.*, p. 690.**

Germany and her allies. But our troops are now tired and in need of rest and will be unable to continue the present offensive beyond the middle of February, and we intend, circumstances permitting, to wind up our winter campaign at that time."[46]

It was not easy to answer this message, and other similar ones. On February 22 Roosevelt told Stalin: "You may be assured that the American war effort will be projected to the European continent, to reduce the Axis forces opposing your heroic army, as soon as possible when transportation facilities can be provided following the successful conclusion of the North African campaign."[47]

This was another fairly strong promise. It was not definite as to time, but it implied that help was coming soon. Yet the mopping up of Tunisia was not completed until late in May and the invasion of Sicily did not begin until July 9. Then it was decided to seize Southern Italy, especially to get the great airfields at Foggia, and to try to put Italy out of the war. It was late September before a firm foothold was achieved on the mainland of Italy.

American Moves Toward a Russian Second Front. Herbert Feis has pointed out that during the whole period in which Stalin was calling for a second front in Europe "he was repelling repeated American requests for cooperation in the war against Japan. Time and again, on the advice of the Joint Chiefs, Roosevelt tried to get him to agree at least to start preliminary talks looking toward combined operations in the Far Eastern theaters of war." While constantly postponing the aid which the Russians so desperately needed, we were inviting them "to take the risk of having to fight on a second front—in the Far East."[48]

Unconditional Surrender. The Casablanca Conference was the scene of a very important statement of Allied policy which is still the subject of strong controversy. In the final press conference, on January 24, 1943, President Roosevelt rather casually called for unconditional surrender from Germany, Italy and Japan, and he later contributed to the idea that it had been an impromptu suggestion.

Actually he had notes in his hand which stated the reasons for enforcing unconditional surrender. Also the formula had been discussed and approved by the American Chiefs of Staff a week before Roosevelt left Washington. At Casablanca, on January 18, Churchill had approved it, and he had telegraphed to the British War Cabinet for its approval, which he obtained.[49]

There were two reasons for making such a statement at the moment. There was strong protest from the liberal forces supporting Roosevelt in the United

[46] ***Ibid.*, p. 701.**
[47] ***Ibid.*, p. 705.**
[48] **Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 117.**
[49] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 693–7.**

Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe*, New York, Harper, 1952, pp. 121–2; London, Collins, 1952. This book by an Australian combat correspondent is the best book on World War II from the British viewpoint. It presents British concepts of strategy convincingly, with fairness to American and Russian ideas.

States against the expediency deals with Darlan and Peyrouton in North Africa, and fear that there would be other deals with such characters as Goering in Germany and Matsuoka in Japan.[50] But more important still was the unallayed longing of the Russians for a second front, and the necessity of permanently setting to rest their fears that we might not see the war through to a finish as loyal allies. Nothing short of a "fight to the finish" statement was likely to give them that conviction.

Beyond these contemporary factors there were solid reasons for insisting that this time the Germans should learn the lessons of defeat, that they be invaded, conquered and prevented from coming up again with a new stab-in-the-back theory, and with allegations that they had been promised better terms than they received. Complete firmness in dealing with the Germans was also dictated by the consideration that, in Churchill's words, "negotiation with Hitler was impossible. He was a maniac with supreme power to play his hand out to the end, which he did."[51]

The reasons for adopting the unconditional surrender policy are difficult to counter, but there has been much criticism of its public announcement. Predictions at the time that the Germans would fight longer and harder were borne out, since the Nazi propaganda could tell the Germans that there was no choice but to stand by the regime. In the last months of the war this plea was all the more effective, since the Germans had several millions of embittered slave laborers in their midst, seized from the various allied countries, and they greatly feared a breakdown of all authority in the final stages.

The Germans did fight longer and harder than they would have if easier terms had been open to them, but it does not necessarily follow that Hitler could have been overthrown, or that it would have been a good thing to be magnanimous to some government headed by German generals who had done Hitler's will while any hope of success remained.

1943 Passed. There was no Second Front in 1943. "It was the Russian situation which continued to dominate the whole strategic picture."[52] Germany had a third chance to make a supreme effort at least to inflict upon Russia "a defeat of such proportions that her offensive power would be broken and Germany would be able to turn the greater part of her forces against the allies in the west."[53] In the latter part of the fighting season of 1943 the Allied operations against Italy tied down some twenty divisions of German troops which might have been sent against Russia, but the Russians tied down at least 200 Axis divisions which could otherwise have been used in the West. It was in the East that the giant forces still wrestled, to and fro. in the summer of 1943, with the Russians again regaining much ground and losing men at the rate of hundreds of thousands a month.

Moscow's bitterness was not concealed, though it did relent occasionally, as when Stalin said about the air war in the West: "from the bottom of my heart I welcome British aviation striking hard against German industrial

[50] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 697.**
[51] ***Ibid* p. 696.**
[52] **Mclnnis, *The War, Fourth Year*, p. 273.**
[53] ***Ibid.*, p. 275.**

centers."[54] In his turn Churchill wrote later: "These three immense battles of Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all within a space of two months, marked the ruin of the German army on the Eastern Front."[55]

Our leaders knew what it would mean should Russia fall. Stimson and Marshall spent "many anxious hours in contemplation of the awful task of beating Nazi Germany if the Russians should go under."[56] They did not go under, but it was inevitable that throughout 1943 they should think bitterly that their allies were going a long way around to come to their relief. It was equally inevitable that many Russian leaders should suspect that the West intended that Russia should be so weakened that she would not be a powerful factor after the war. Perhaps the Munich policy was not dead after all.

After Stand ley's outburst on March 8 about Russia's lack of appreciation of lend-lease, Joseph E. Davies was sent to Moscow in May to try to arrange a meeting between Stalin and Roosevelt. The President felt the ice might be broken better if Churchill were not present. But when Stalin openly charged the Western Allies with bad faith on the Second Front question in a message to Churchill, the latter replied with such a scorcher that Stalin recalled his Ambassadors from both London and Washington in October 1943. The Roosevelt-Stalin meeting was off and there were real fears of another Soviet-Nazi truce.[57]

On May 11, 1943, Churchill led a party of nearly one hundred officials to Washington for the conference known as ***Trident***, at which the date for the Normandy invasion was finally set for May 1, 1944. More important, it was agreed that seven of the divisions in the Mediterranean were to be held after November 1 for transfer to England and training for OVERLORD. "Against this provision Churchill was later to strain in vain; it turned out later to be the crucial deterrent to the extension of Mediterranean operations."[58]

Churchill Unconverted. Later, in May 1943, Churchill visited General Eisenhower's headquarters in North Africa, with General Marshall and General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Churchill insisted that he had no intention of interfering with the preparations for OVERLORD, the cross-Channel attack in 1944, but he wanted the prospective Sicily conquest fully exploited.

Eisenhower was puzzled as to the meaning of this, especially after Brooke told him that he himself would be glad to abandon the Normandy invasion, trusting to naval and air power. "Any suggestion or intimation of abandoning OVERLORD," said Eisenhower, "could always be guaranteed to bring Marshall and me charging into the breach with an uncompromising, emphatic refusal to consider such an idea for an instant." They were therefore on guard against anything more than a limited campaign in Italy.[59]

[54] Sherwood, p. 705.
[55] Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, *Closing the Ring*, Boston, 1951, p. 259; London, Cassell, 1952.
[56] Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 605.
[57] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 734. **[58] Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–9.**
[59] Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, New York, Doubleday, 1948, pp. 166–8; London, Heinemann, 1949.

When Roosevelt, Churchill and their military chiefs met in Quebec, on August 17, 1943, for the conference known as ***Quadrant***, Churchill was still unreconciled to any major operation in Western Europe, though he had agreed to it at Washington in May. He talked at length again about appalling casualties, and failed to credit the Allied air forces with ability to disrupt the enemy communications in France. He wanted further evidence that the strength of the German fighter aircraft force had been reduced and that there would be not more than twelve mobile German divisions in North France.[60]

The American Chiefs of Staff were fearful that, as in 1942, decisions made in the Spring would be reversed in the Fall, but in 1943 Roosevelt was adamant that OVERLORD must take place, and the decision to make it was again reaffirmed. It was at Quebec also that the decision was made to supplement the Normandy invasion with landings in Southern France. From the time of this decision, Churchill fought implacably against it until a few days before it occurred, on August 15, 1944.[61]

As early as August 10, Secretary Stimson wrote to the President contesting the assumption that OVERLORD would be directed by a British commander. Said Stimson: "We cannot now rationally hope to be able to cross the Channel and come to grips with our German enemy under a British Commander." In unguarded sentences the British leaders had revealed to him again and again their idea that Germany could be beaten by a series of attritions in Northern Italy and throughout the Balkans. This attitude was "terribly dangerous." Both Britain and the United States were clearly pledged to the opening of a real Second Front and "none of these methods of pinprick warfare can be counted on by us to fool Stalin into the belief that we have kept that pledge."[62]

The President agreed and Churchill readily accepted General Marshall as the Commander of OVERLORD, but there was so much pressure in Washington for Marshall's retention as Chief of Staff that General Eisenhower was eventually selected.

In the autumn Stimson pressed for Marshall's appointment. He believed that "the fatal delays and diversions which may sabotage OVERLORD will begin in the U.K. this autumn and nothing but his direct presence and influence will save us from them."[63] In September Churchill's Mediterranean complex led him to order the seizure of some of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea, which were promptly recaptured by the Germans, the British losing 5000 first-class troops, four cruisers and seven destroyers sunk or damaged.[64] Churchill then pleaded repeatedly with Roosevelt in long telegrams of October 7 and 8, 1943, for one first-class division and the necessary landing craft to take Rhodes. He had "never wished to send an army into the Balkans," but only agents and supplies. Rhodes was "the key." The chance to take it was "an immense but fleeting opportunity." However, the "negative forces" in Washington did not want any diversions from Eisenhower's strength, in Italy or from OVERLORD. They held that Rhodes would be only

[60] Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
[61] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 746–7.
[62] Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 436–7.
[63] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 762
« *ibid.*, p. 765.

a beginning since it was under the guns of Cos and Crete, both held by the Germans.[65]

How to Counter Russia? On August 31 and September 3, 1943, General Jan Smuts of South Africa, one of the world's leading soldier-statesmen, wrote two remarkable letters to Churchill on the progress of the war in which he said that comparisons with the Russian effort raised uncomfortable questions. "Our comparative performance on land is insignificant and its speed very unsatisfactory." To the ordinary man "it must appear that it is Russia who is winning the war. If this impression continues, what will be our post-war world position compared with that of Russia? A tremendous shift in our world status may follow, and will leave Russia the diplomatic master of the world." This was both unnecessary and undesirable, but "unless we emerge from the war on terms of equality, our position will be both uncomfortable and dangerous."

Then Smuts expressed his dissatisfaction with the Allied war plans for slogging up the Italian peninsula and urged that North Italy be taken at once as a springboard for a big effort in the Balkans, which he thought would bring Turkey into the war, opening the Black Sea for the supply of Russian forces, before she concluded "that her suspicions of us are justified."[66]

The Smuts letters state the almost insoluble problem which the Munich surrender of 1938 bequeathed to the Western statesmen. How could Russia be prevented from dominating the world through the sheer prowess of her arms? How could limits be set to her advance into Europe without imperilling her indispensable contribution to Hitler's defeat?How could the Allies make a military contribution of their own comparable to Russia's, sufficient to establish a good post-war balance, in cooperation with her as comrades in arms?

This was really the problem, for until the very end of the war no one wanted Russia to stop advancing, and no solution that would satisfy everybody was possible. Churchill maintains throughout his memoirs that he never wanted to send armies into the Balkans.[67] This, he says repeatedly, is a "legend." He wanted "only by agents, supplies, and Commandos to stimulate the intense guerrilla activity there." A lot of this was done, also, by sending in officers, money and supplies, but in both Yugoslavia and Greece Churchill found himself cooperating with communist-led partisan movements which dwarfed the small and ineffective rightist guerrillas. So there was not too much hope politically in that direction. In 1944 Churchill crushed the Greek communist-led partisans ruthlessly, but no one was able to suppress Tito's communists in Yugoslavia. Even Moscow failed to manage them for long after the war.

The avalanche of events which Munich turned loose confronted the West with a conundrum which no Western leader was ever able to solve to his satisfaction. It was much easier to turn the giant armies loose than to stop them where it was desired. During 1943, Wilmot says, Churchill became

« Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 208–17.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 126–30.

[67] *Ibid*., pp. 128, 210, 344.

increasingly concerned about fighting the war in a way which would restrain Stalin's ambitions and "ensure that victory did not leave the democratic cause politically weaker in any vital sphere."[68] This was a natural ambition, but one impossible to achieve, since an Allied victory meant a large increase in communist power.

The Moscow Conference, 1943. In August the Russian press had suggested that since the Allied Heads of State could not meet, there might be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. This suggestion was taken up and resulted in the Moscow Conference, which began on October 19. This Conference proved to be an outstanding success for Secretary Hull. Hull had excellent relations with Soviet Ambassador Gromyko, of whose practical judgment and efficiency he had a high opinion. In Moscow he found Molotov increasingly pleasant and communicative. Their conversations became steadily more free and outspoken. Hull was more and more impressed with Molotov's "broad grasp of the questions entering into the discussions." They agreed about the destruction of fascism in Italy and about the post-war treatment of Germany. The draft on this subject by Hull brought Molotov back from Stalin with his face "radiant." It expressed Russia's thoughts exactly. Molotov agreed warmly with Hull's statement that the closest relations and confidence between their two countries were of vast importance. The hairbreadth escape which the world had had from "being conquered and enslaved under the worst methods of savagery" was strongly in Hull's mind and made him feel much as the Russians did. He had no difficulty in agreeing that East Prussia should be separated from Germany.

Molotov assured Hull emphatically that his Government had no disposition to divide Europe into separate zones of influence. The Conference produced a declaration concerning the re-establishment of an independent Austria, a strong seven-point statement regarding the elimination of fascism from Italy and an equally forthright statement regarding the punishment of German war criminals. Most important, however, was the Joint Four-Nation Declaration which pledged the three Great Powers and China to continue united for the organization and maintenance of peace and security. All would act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of the enemy, they would continue to consult and they agreed upon the necessity of establishing "at the earliest practicable date a general international organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States." This was the basic agreement for the establishment of the United Nations.

Hull had convinced the Soviet leaders that he sincerely wished to work with them for the mutual advantage of our two nations in the post-war world. He found Stalin completely sympathetic with this objective. When they parted Stalin told Hull goodbye and then after walking three or four steps away suddenly turned, came back, and "shook hands a second time to a rather protracted extent, but without saying a word." The dictator of all the Russians was not obliged to do that. It might be too much to conclude that Stalin signified thereby a basic desire to cooperate with the West on a long-term

[68] **Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 130.**

basis, though he had just made such an agreement, but he must have felt that Hull was one representative of the West with whom he wanted to be friends.[69]

Churchill Pushed Mediterranean Diversions. On November 13, 1943, the President and his military chiefs sailed for the Cairo Conference. On the way they braced themselves for more British opposition to OVERLORD. They had learned that Churchill always gave it his most eloquent approval in principle, but that "he steadfastly refused to accept it as a scheduled fact." Nor were they mistaken. When they all arrived in Cairo Roosevelt informed his son Elliott that in spite of the agreement at Quebec Winston was still making his doubts clear to everybody. It was still the idea of an attack through the Balkans, dressed up now as "a common front with the Russians." Roosevelt thought that Churchill was beginning to dislike Marshall, since the General was very patient and polite but completely firm. None of Churchill's tactics, whether of wheedling, logic or anger, moved Marshall from his conviction that the Germans must be hit where they were.[70]

In the Cairo sessions Churchill argued for pushing the campaign to capture Rome more vigorously than ever. He strongly emphasized that he was not relaxing his zeal for OVERLORD, but this operation should not be such a "tyrant" as to rule out everything else. There were the Dodecanese Islands, among other objectives. When the Allies reached the Pisa-Rimini line north of Rome they should then decide whether to move to the left or to the right. Since he was known to be opposed to moving left, into Southern France, it was obvious that he had in mind a move to the right into the Balkans.[71]

In a conference with Eisenhower before the Cairo discussions, and during them, Churchill argued for the "soft underbelly" theory, explaining how the Germans could be damaged by pushing the Italian campaign and by invading Yugoslavia, Crete, the Dodecanese Islands and Greece. In estimating Churchill's motives Eisenhower placed some credence in a desire on Churchill's part to prove that his Gallipoli strategy of World War I had been right, but he gave first place to Churchill's "concern as a political leader for the future of the Balkans." This concern, he adds most considerately, "unconsciously" colored the Prime Minister's military strategy.[72]

"***When***?" In Teheran, on November 29, Stalin was shown a copy of the plan for OVERLORD in his first interview with Roosevelt. He looked at it briefly and asked, "When?" Later he inquired "Who will command OVER-LORD?" and when told that this had not been decided he replied that he could not believe in the reality of the operation until a commander had been named. He argued that the commander should have charge of the preparations, as

[69] *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, pp. 1282–1311. Harriman was not sure that anything dependable had been achieved, but he did feel that Hull had made a genuine mark on the minds of the Russian leaders, and that as a result their mistrust was lessened and their inclination to find joint solutions for problems increased.—Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

[70] Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

[71] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 775; Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 334.

[72] Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, pp. 194, 198.

well as the attack itself, otherwise he would not be satisfied to proceed. It was on his way home that Roosevelt finally decided to name Eisenhower.[73]

Churchill warned that there might be delays in launching OVERLORD and explained persistently and monotonously the advantages of getting Turkey into the war. By this time Marshall had reached the point that he simply looked at Churchill when he questioned OVERLORD as if he could not believe his ears. After a final gallant attempt by Churchill to advance the merits of Rhodes and Turkey as strategic points, Stalin asked him if the British really believed in OVERLORD or did they merely approve it to reassure the Russians?[74]

General Deane says that Churchill used "every trick in his oratorical bag," aided by gestures and illustrations. "At times he was smooth and suave, pleasant and humorous, and then he would clamp down on his cigar, growl and complain."[75] If personality could have convinced the Americans and the Russians that the Western Allies ought to attack Germany by the hardest route, Churchill would have done it. Even on the last day of the conference he still talked about the landing craft needed for an assault on Rhodes, and Hopkins did his best to make clear the American belief that none would be available.[76]

An Anglo-American Front Against Russia Avoided. Many subjects were discussed at Teheran, among them the granting of rights to Russia in the Chinese port of Dairen and her possession of the Kurile Islands after the war. Roosevelt presided over the sessions and his views were usually accepted. He also had convinced Stalin that he wanted to cooperate with the Soviets as friends. Roosevelt liked Stalin, found nothing devious in him and admired his directness. In turn Stalin showed marked deference to Roosevelt. The two established a basis of respect and confidence which augured well for the years after the war.

At the close of the conference Roosevelt thought its biggest achievement had been to make clear to Stalin that the United States and Britain were not teamed up against Russia. That would be the one thing which could "upset the apple cart" after the war and he meant resolutely to avoid it by holding the scales even between Britain and Russia. On his last Christmas Day in Hyde Park (1944) Roosevelt talked reflectively of British ability to get other countries to combine in some sort of bloc against the Soviet Union and said soberly, "It's what we've got to expect."[77]

When he left Teheran, Roosevelt sincerely believed in the final words of the Declaration issued: "We came herewith hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose." In his radio broadcast on Christmas Eve, 1943, the President paid tribute to Churchill and said of Stalin: "I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people—very well indeed." The prospects were excellent, for in Russia the whole official machine of opinion control was working full blast

[73] **Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 367.**
[74] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 788; Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 375–86.**
[75] **John R. Deane, *op. cit.*, p. 42.**
[76] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 777–96; Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 176, 183–4.**
[77] **Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–7, 228.**

on the theme of the "Historic Decisions" at Teheran and Allied unity in war and in peace.[78]

A Churchill Charge in Italy. On Christmas Day, 1943, Churchill was meeting with Eisenhower demanding the landing of two divisions at Anzio in Italy, a hundred miles north of the stalled Allied expedition, and getting it against Eisenhower's better judgment. In the end this venture succeeded to the extent that the six divisions thrown in at Anzio led the Germans to send eight divisions to Italy, forces not available in the main theaters in 1944. The Italian business went ahead slowly and painfully during the gloomy winter of 1943—4. For it Churchill had verve and dash, no hesitation or fears, and sorrow but no terror for the heavy casualties which resulted.[79]

Invasion of South France Opposed. On June 6, 1944, OVERLORD at last became a fact. The Americans and the British were finally ashore in France, but on July 19 Churchill was still opposing the landing in Southern France and arguing doggedly for the diversion of forces to the Balkans.[80] Churchill went to France and virtually lived with Eisenhower for the first ten days of August, arguing throughout the whole period against the invasion of Southern France and for the use of this expedition in Italy or the Balkans. He concentrated all the power of his intense personality on Eisenhower, contending that an entry into the Balkans would set the whole region aflame with revolt against Hitler. Though the Intelligence reports showed little effective German strength in South France, Churchill was full of the terrible casualties the Allies would suffer there. He argued that it would be "merely another Anzio," forgetting his responsibility for that move.

Eisenhower more than met Churchill's arguments at every point on military grounds. He "felt that the Prime Minister's real concern was possibly of a political rather than a military nature." He told Churchill that if he was thinking that it would be better for the Western Allies to be posted in great strength in the Balkans, instead of the Russians, he should go instantly to the President. If they decided that for political reasons the war should be prolonged, with further costs in money and men, he would adjust his plans accordingly. In the meantime, he would proceed on military grounds.

Churchill knew, of course, that it would be useless to approach Roosevelt, but "As usual the Prime Minister pursued the argument up to the very moment of execution."[81]

Race for Vienna? In this variant of his Mediterranean strategy there is a considerable probability that Churchill may have been right. What he, supported by Generals Wilson and Alexander and the British Chiefs of Staff, wanted to do was to omit the invasion of South France, leave the seven divisions which were diverted to South France in Italy and press on up through the Po Valley, Istria and the Ljubljana Gap to Vienna, "very possibly

[78] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 798–9.**

[79] **Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, pp. 212–13; Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 478–517; Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, p. 215.**

[80] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 810.**

[81] **Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, pp. 281–4.**

to reach Vienna before the Russians."[82] Churchill maintains, once more, that "no one involved in these discussions" ever thought of diverting forces into the Balkans," though Smuts, who was now in Italy, did suggest on June 23 that after Trieste was captured "the advance will reopen eastward, gathering large Partisan support and perhaps forcing the enemy out of the Balkans."[83]

The invasion through Marseilles did not come off until mid-August, and by then the advantages originally expected of it did not apply. However, Churchill himself admits that another line of communication was opened and that Eisenhower did gain another army on his right flank in France.

There were other reasons, also, for the firm adherence of the Americans to the original plan. They had been burned often on Italian campaigns. These always required many more men and much more time than Churchill hoped they would. The Mediterranean detour had already taken up nearly two years and the proposed rush to Vienna appeared to involve a major effort, which might easily compromise the main drive through France. Moreover, there had been an understanding with Stalin at Teheran that the effort in France would be supported by a two-pronged drive. It had also the advantage of more rapidly clearing South France of the Germans and of permitting the seven Free French divisions, newly trained in North Africa, to take part in the liberation of their country. De Gaulle had not even been informed of the Normandy landing until the day before it occurred, so French participation in the liberation was now vital.

The desire of the British to press up through Italy, at full strength, was natural and it may be that they could have reached Vienna ahead of the Russians. There is, however, no certainty that this would have happened and the reasons behind carrying through the long delayed and long debated invasions of France, as planned, were strong indeed. If there was failure in France then indeed the war would be lost, politically and territorially, to the Russians.

Churchill's Strategy. No one can doubt that Churchill was a great and gallant warrior, and a war leader of the very first rank. As the junior partner of the grand coalition he also had his full share of influence upon strategy. The land fighting of the Western Allies in Europe was confined to the Mediterranean, as he wished, for nearly two years.

On the other hand, the evidence strongly supports the American insistence upon a great cross-Channel attack. There was no "soft underbelly of Europe." In Italy we had to learn all over again what Hannibal had told us many centuries ago from his own bitter experience. In Italy it was an exceedingly porcupiny and costly undertaking all the way. Yugoslavia would have been as bad geographically. There are almost no ports on the Yugoslav side of the Adriatic and high mountains come down to the sea. Greece and Bulgaria would have provided ideal places for a few Germans to kill large numbers of American and British troops trying to force the narrow valleys which lead

[82] Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, *Triumph and Tragedy*, 1953, p. 100; London, Cassell, 1953.

[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 61.65.

northward. The only real hope of getting into the Balkans was through the Turkish Straits, and the Turks were too canny to succumb to Churchill's efforts to bring them into the war until the very end, though they were Britain's allies.

Had Turkey entered the war, the supply of goods to Russia through the Straits would have encountered the great hazards of German air power, based on Greece and her islands, all the way through the Aegean to the Straits, then from nearby German bases in Bulgaria. And if all these regions had been mastered, what would we have done then? Would we have been content to send supplies to the Russians, or would we have sent armies this great distance to take over Rumania, while the Russians continued to fight the main German armies? The political impracticability of such an undertaking should be obvious, even if the Russians did not channel their forces to the North and drive through to the North Sea. Even after an invasion of Germany from the West they almost did that.

By contrast there was every reason for making a smashing cross-Channel attack from Britain. Only here could the Allies expect to gain real mastery of the air. A minimum amount of shipping would be required. Britain was an ideal invasion base. Once a footing was gained American strength could be poured in fast, direct from the United States. From Britain, also, British strength could be used far more efficiently than anywhere else. There would be a great economy of lives and resources and time in a powerful attack which would end the war. From Britain the very vitals of German power could be attacked. Even if footholds could be gained in the Balkans we would still be pecking away at the outskirts of Nazi strength. As Eisenhower has observed, "the full might of Great Britain and the United States could not possibly be concentrated in the Mediterranean." All the laws of logistics were against making the main effort there. The life line to Britain had to be maintained anyway and the U-boat packs in the Atlantic were deadly for a long period. Heavy escorts were necessary to see the ships through. The shortest sea route was to Britain. If the trip had been greatly lengthened, or another route added across the Atlantic, the naval effort required would have been almost prohibitive and the military result at the end of the greatly lengthened line highly questionable, to say the least.[84]

At the very beginning many American military men feared that it might be too costly to storm Hitler's much vaunted Atlantic Wall, but as soon as the War Plans Division of the War Department made a careful analysis, in March 1942, they came to the conclusion that the cross-Channel invasion must be our main war plan against Germany. When General Marshall had heard the whole thing through, he said: "This is it. I approve." Admiral King and General Arnold also approved and the President made it the official American plan of war against Germany on April 1, 1942.[85] From that time on the American leaders resisted the dispersion of our forces around Europe, though unsuccessfully for many months, and they eventually carried through the assault on Normandy on June 6, 1944. But for their everlasting insistence

[84] **Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 45.**

[85] **Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 416; Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 47.**

no invasion of Western Europe would ever have occurred. Churchill would have had us spend further years in Mediterranean adventures.

In the abysmal state of enmity and backbiting between the Soviet Union and the West which existed later many Americans concluded that Churchill had been right. Was his purpose not sound and far-sighted? Would not it have been better to have prolonged the war and by getting into the Balkans to have kept the Russians out of Eastern Europe? Would not the whole later impasse in Europe have been prevented? The prospect is alluring until it is remembered that the Nazis could not have been defeated without the immense power of the Red Army. It was the Russian armies which over a space of three years' time slowly ground to pieces the enormous power of the ***Wehrmacht.***

In November 1943 the Red Army engaged 206 of the 320 German divisions. Of the remainder 50 were in France and the Low Countries, the rest in other parts of West Europe. In June 1944 Hitler still had 157 divisions in the East and in January 1944 there were only 50 divisions opposite Britain, 26 of these absorbed in manning the Atlantic Wall. "Of the rest, a dozen were either newly formed training divisions, or exhausted skeletons from the Russian front, and others were being steadily milked to provide drafts for the East." On April 14, 1944, our Intelligence estimated 199 German divisions on the Eastern Front and 137 elsewhere, including 51 in France and the Low Countries. In September 1944 the Germans were still using 52 divisions in the West, "but many of these were divisions in name only." By January 1945 the Russians were engaging 133 German divisions, half the total German ground forces, and the Allies 100 divisions, 76 in the West and 24 in Italy.[86]

These figures make it clear that the power of the Red Army was the great central military fact of the war in Europe. Most of the myths surrounding World War II begin by ignoring this controlling consideration. Because of it Churchill's yearning to keep the Russians out of the Balkans made no more sense politically than it did militarily. While depending upon the Russians to destroy the German armies we could not push up through the Balkans and meet the Russians in Eastern Europe, thank them for their noble efforts and send them back to Moscow without the accomplishment of their great war objective, the permanent closing of the invasion routes through Eastern Europe into Russia. The Red leaders were not that simple. Besides, the German armies would still have remained in control of most of Europe, powerful and undestroyed. Churchill could not achieve as a political generalissimo what Chamberlain had failed to win as a pacifist appeaser. It was impossible now to bring about a military Munich which would compensate for the failure of the diplomatic Munich. What had been deliberately thrown away in 1938 could not now be recovered by military-political legerdemain.

It does not require deep military knowledge to know that the American plan of concentrating on the main enemy, Germany, first was eternally sound. Otherwise, Hitler might well win the war while we were cleaning up his lesser allies. The same principle applies also to the method of defeating

[86] Chester Wilmot, *op. cit.*, pp. 144, 187, 546, 621; Captain Harry C. Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower,* New York, 1946, p. 520.

him. There was no easy, roundabout way to destroy so great an enemy. Direct assault by the easiest geographic route was required. As Eisenhower observed, "between the coast line of northeast Europe and the border of Germany there was no natural obstacle to compare in importance with the Alps."[87] In other words, why butt our heads against the mountain walls of South Europe?

It is true that the Mediterranean detour gave our troops battle experience. That was an advantage. It also ensured British-American control of the Mediterranean, but that would have come anyway as a by-product of victory over the main enemy. With Germany put out of the war Italy would not have needed to be conquered, foot by foot, and the German troops in Africa, if not already accounted for, would have been little more dangerous than the Japanese armies we by-passed in the South Pacific.

Churchill was the most clever and determined political strategist of the century. It was this characteristic which made his military strategy unreliable and dangerous.

A Thrust to Berlin? The long arguments over strategy between the Americans and the British did not end when France was invaded. On the contrary, they became even more acrimonious, with each side sincerely sure that it was right. There were differences about the best way to take the Ruhr,[88] but the greatest clash centered on the British desire for the Allies to take Berlin. On September 4, 1944, soon after the liberation of Paris on August 25, General Montgomery proposed to Eisenhower that if the Americans would support his Twenty-first Army Group with all available supplies he "could rush right on to Berlin and, he said, end the war."[89]

This was hardly a practical proposition at the time, but as the war neared its end, Churchill had already decided, he says in his Memoirs, "that Russia had become a mortal danger to the free world," and that she must be stopped as far East as possible, especially before she took Berlin.[90] The execution of this policy meant, in effect, that the Western Allies should hurry to take as much territory as possible while the Germans held the Russians as long as they could. Actually, Hitler tried to hold both fronts and he counter-attacked the Americans heavily in the Battle of the Bulge late in December 1944. Then he reinforced the East to hold the Russians as long as possible. For example, during February 1945 he sent 1675 new or repaired tanks and assault guns to the East and only 67 to the West. Thereafter the Germans held a new defense line along the Oder-Niesse rivers and a stable line through Hungary and Austria, while the Russians could not attack until they had restored communications through devastated Poland.[91]

This was the general situation late in March when General Eisenhower decided to make his main thrust from Kassel through central Germany to the Leipzig-Dresden area, with the object of cutting Germany in two and linking up with the Russians on the Elbe. He reasoned that Berlin was still

[87] Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[88] Wilmot, *op. cit.*, pp. 458–68.
[89] Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 305.
[90] Churchill, Vol. VI, pp. 456 ff.
[91] Wilmot, *op. cit.*, pp. 663, 685.

300 miles away, but only 30 miles from the lines of the Russians, where Marshal Zhukov now had a bridgehead across the Oder and a million men under his command.

If he made a dash for Berlin the Russians would in all probability get there first. Even if the Allies crossed the Oder they would still have to cross fifty miles of lowlands filled with lakes, streams and canals. General Omar Bradley estimated that the storming of this region would cost 100,000 casualties and he could see no compensatory "political advantage accruing from the capture of Berlin that would offset the need for quick destruction of the German army on our front."[92] Anyhow, whatever territory Eisenhower occupied beyond the Elbe would have to be returned to Russian occupation according to the zones of occupation agreement drawn up by the European Advisory Commission in London during November 1944 and ratified at Yalta. This agreement on occupation zones was based on a British draft, which the Russians accepted without argument, including the designation of Berlin, deep in their zone, as a separate area of joint Allied occupation.[93]

Eisenhower was not bound in pursuing the Germans by any "stop line." No such line had been agreed upon at Yalta, or even discussed. He decided on strictly military grounds that a thrust for Berlin would leave most of the other units along the remainder of his front practically immobilized and he thought that would be "more than unwise; it was stupid."[94]

On the other hand, a thrust through central Germany would enable both wings to advance and also to cut off the Southern Redoubt territory where it was widely believed, though erroneously, that the Nazis were preparing a huge mountain fortress for final resistance. At the time this was a serious prospect for the Americans, since it might postpone indefinitely the turn about of our forces toward the Japanese war.

For these reasons Eisenhower decided on the central advance and on March 28, 1945, notified London, Washington and Moscow, since he had been authorized to exchange operational plans with the Russians. Churchill at once made a vehement protest by telephone, asserting that Eisenhower did not have authority to notify Stalin, that political considerations should now determine the advance of the armies and that Berlin should be captured as a counterbalance to the forthcoming Russian capture of Vienna. He insisted in cables to Washington that at Malta it had been agreed that Montgomery should advance in the North. This was denied by Eisenhower, who maintained that from D-Day on his plan had not changed. It had been precisely what was now proposed. Eisenhower stood firm, "staunchly supported by

[92] Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, New York, Holt, 1951, pp. 531–7, 544; London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952.

[93] Philip Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1950, pp. 589–91. Dr. Mosely was a Political Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the European Advisory Commission in 1944–5, and intimately connected with the working out of the zones of occupation agreement. He notes that "The Soviet acceptance, without bargaining, of a zone slightly more than one-third of Germany, appeared to be a sign of a moderate and conciliatory approach to the problem of how to deal with post-war Germany."

[94] Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 396; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians*, New York, Doubleday, 1949, pp. 37—8; London, Cape, 1950.

superiors and subordinates alike," and went forward to meet the Russians on the Elbe.[95]

After Roosevelt's death Churchill renewed his plea to President Truman that Eisenhower's armies continue advancing into the Russian zone of occupation, and that they should stay there unless Stalin agreed to a pooling of all German food resources. Truman held that the Allies must fulfill their commitments.[96]

After the Cold War began, the decisions of General Eisenhower concerning Berlin and Prague were much condemned, especially after the Berlin blockade in 1948. Yet he wisely avoided precisely the kind of early clash between the victors which Hitler was striving to bring about. On April 21, when it became apparent that the Russian-American junction was likely to be effected near Dresden, Hitler ordered the German forces on both sides of the Elbe to withdraw toward Berlin "and thus accelerate the expected Soviet-American clash." Three days later Himmler offered to surrender unconditionally in the West while continuing to fight the Russians.[97] But the hopes of the Nazis were not realized. The Russians took Berlin on May 2. There was no Allied clash and Nazi Germany ceased to exist.

Nor is any sober view of the whole story of World War II likely to reach the conclusion that it should have been otherwise. The Allies were wise to fix their occupation zones in advance, and to adhere to them. They could not go charging across Germany, racing for territory, even if trouble over the disposition of Germany might lie in the future. If, also, any one of the Allies had earned the right to take Berlin, it was Russia. She had supplied the vast bulk of the blood required to crush Hitlerism. She could not be denied an occupation zone in Germany on any ground, and if she was to have one in East Germany Berlin would be in it. Churchill could not at the last moment snatch back what Chamberlain had given away at Munich, especially since the British had postponed the invasion of Germany until the last day in the eyening.

There was a way by which the American and British armies could have met the Russian armies in Eastern Europe, honorably and without offense even to the Russians. If the Western Allies had invaded France in 1943, their armies would have had a good chance to sweep through Germany into Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria. The German lines in Russia were stretched very thin and their lines of communication were very long

There was also one American strategist who argued for invading Europe in 1943 to keep the Slavs out. General Albert Wedemeyer contended that the Pacific war should be subordinated in order to "put all our emphasis on getting right at the heartland of Germany so that it would be Anglo-American forces that overran Europe and not Slavic forces." Others argued that we

[95] Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, pp. 396–403; Wilmot, *op. cit.*, pp. 690–4; Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 455–70.

In reality the Eisenhower plan had been adopted at the Malta meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff late in January 1945, after the most violent Anglo-American dispute of the war. It was settled when Marshall said that if the British plan were approved Eisenhower would have no choice but to resign.—Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 848.

[96] Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 696.

[97] *Ibid.*, pp. 700,702.

could not cross the Channel in 1943. He "did not agree with them" and the Slavs did overrun Eastern Europe.[98]

It remains to be proved that there was any other way to prevent the Russians from coming into Central Europe. It is true that the Allies needed another year to wear down the German air strength and to master the deadly submarine campaign, which destroyed 6,000,000 tons of shipping during 1942 and reached another climax in March 1943 with 514,744 tons sunk, of which 400,000 were ***in convoy.*** By mid-1943 the U-boats were under control and four new ships were being completed for each one sunk.[99] Time was needed, also, for the building of the indispensable landing craft, large numbers of which were required in the Pacific.

The long wait for the Normandy invasion can be amply justified on the ground of making it a fairly sure operation. On the other hand, if all the resources used in Africa and the Mediterranean had been thrown into Western Europe in 1943 Churchill might well have been able to meet the Russians in Eastern Europe and been greeted by them warmly and with great relief, but having elected to wait until mid-1944 to invade Germany the Allies could not then claim an extra share of Germany at the last minute. Churchill could not have it both ways. Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe were then in Russian hands, by virtue of hard fighting with no detours.

Churchill's Last Charge. Yet as the fighting ended early in May 1945 Churchill waged another all-out campaign to retain possession of the large sector of Russia's zone of occupation in Germany, which the Western allies had overrun with the aid of the Nazis—together with similar strips of territory in Austria and Czechoslovakia—until a long list of his political aims should have been achieved.

Before our troops pulled back into their own agreed zones he wanted agreements from the Russians to share their anticipated food surplus in East Germany, and about everything else—"the temporary character of the Russian occupation of Germany," the Soviet control of Poland, and "the conditions to be established in the Russianized or Russian-controlled countries of the Danube . . . and the Balkans."[100]

In other words, he still wanted to retrieve the Munich losses by holding the Russians out of the occupation zones assigned to them by agreement, and by military pressure, until they accepted his terms for the future Europe. He wanted to "hold firmly," and on May 11 and 12 he urged upon President Truman a prompt meeting with Stalin, before the American armies receded further.[101]

Fortunately, none of the American leaders was "open to these importunities." The new President and his aides agreed that Churchill's last-ditch proposals would only provoke a harsh dispute with the Soviets, instead of leading to more favorable settlements; that they would be ineffective, because the Russians could retaliate by shutting us out of Berlin and Vienna; and that they were impractical because American opinion would not accept holding

[98] MacArthur, *Hearings*, Part 3, p. 2449. **[99] Wilmot, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–6, 151–2.**
[100] Churchill to Eden, who was in San Francisco, May 4, 1945—Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 501–3. ***Ibid.*, pp. 571^.**

the troops in Europe for such doubtful ends.[102] Besides, our soldiers were already on the move toward Japan and the dangerous course Churchill proposed risked Soviet entry into the war against Japan in time to spare us great loss and suffering. This was now Washington's main political objective, and rightly so, even though it was later discovered that Russia was not needed to defeat Japan.

The role which we wished the Russians to play in the Japanese war was comparable to their long demand that we take a big segment of the German army from their backs. During Churchill's visit to Moscow in October 1944 he had heard General Deane explain to Stalin the five tasks we wanted the Russians to perform, "as soon as possible and in all available strength." They included air attacks on Japan; cutting her off from the continent, by sea and air; and the destruction of the Japanese ground and air forces in Manchuria.[103] The aid we desired from Russia was massive and we continued to want it until the first test A-bomb was exploded, on July 16, 1945, after the Potsdam Conference began.

Military Cooperation with Russia. What is to be said about the military cooperation between the Soviets and the West, apart from the overriding issue of the Second Front? In lesser matters it was seldom smooth and usually vexatious. Major General John R. Deane, head of our military mission to the Soviet Union after Faymonville's recall, has left a full record of his difficulties.[104] Nevertheless, the primary objective of his mission, to obtain Soviet participation in the war against Japan, was attained. This was a matter of the greatest importance to the President and the Chiefs of Staff.

Russia's long delay in fighting Japan was a constant source of controversy in the United States. The isolationist and anti-Russian elements among our people constantly asked why Russia did not fight Japan, especially whenever the Second Front question was mentioned. They argued that Russia was holding out on us. There was just as much reason for her to fight in Asia as for us to fight in Europe. If they wanted a Second Front let them set the example.

The reply to this argünïent was that Russia's margin of superiority over the German Army was not large enough to warrant any diversion in the Far East, especially since the fighting fronts would have been several thousands of miles apart. Nothing could have imperilled the war in Europe more than a full-scale Japanese assault upon Siberia, since that would also have closed the main route for lend-lease supplies to Russia, over which one half of that vital traffic moved. It was to the advantage of all the Allies that the chief enemy be dealt with first. At the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, Stalin voluntarily promised Hull to join in defeating Japan when Germany had been conquered. Thereafter the problem was to prevent a Japanese attack upon Russia until the main operation had been completed.

[102] **Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 636–7.** [103] ***Ibid.*, pp. 460–3.**

[104] **John R. Deane, *op. cit.* See also another book written by a war-time member of the British military mission to Moscow: Edward Crankshaw, *Russia and the Russians,* New York, 1948; London, Macmillan, 1947. Reading the two books together is an extremely interesting and instructive experience.**

This necessity complicated the release of many American airmen who had to land in Soviet territory in connection with their belligerent duties in the Far East. They were allowed to "escape" quietly into Persia in groups.

In general the Russians wanted as few of their Allies in their country as possible. Weather equipment would be accepted but not American personnel to install it. Yet the exchange of weather information was steadily broadened, both in Europe and Asia. The Russians were extremely reluctant to grant visas to British personnel to proceed to Murmansk, alleging that those already there engaged in spying, were troublesome during their long periods of unemployment, and did not treat the Russians as equals.[105] Eden had to iron out these difficulties in Moscow.

Our planes were not permitted to fly into the Soviet Union except to bring very important dignitaries. The Soviets were reluctant to give us bases for shuttle bombing across Germany. When finally they had agreed to do so, centralization of authority, understaffing and pride greatly slowed the process. They were horrified at American insistence upon the control of communications for the project. Still it proceeded. The Russian soldiers went into raptures when the American equipment was finally unloaded at Poltava. Russian women were proud that the great steel mat which they had laid held up under the great American bombers. All of the Russians were deeply mortified when an early German night raid destroyed fifty flying fortresses on the ground. They would not let the Americans go among the hundreds of small contact bombs dropped by the Germans and thirty of their men were killed trying to put out fires. Afterwards "there were no recriminations on either side."[106]

There were difficulties about establishing bomb lines, to separate the Allied and Russian zones of air activity, until an accident occurred and a Russian Lieutenant General was killed. In the Far East the Soviets resisted for a long time the flying of lend-lease planes into Siberia, compelling transfers in Alaska.

It was just as difficult to secure cooperation when the Russians were the sole beneficiaries. When we turned the Norden bomb-sight over to them they were very slow to permit instruction in its use. Always and forever there was the memory of the long decades of hostility between the Soviet Union and the West, and especially of the treachery of German engineers in Russia before 1941. Yet there was much warm cooperation between the members of the two armed forces on a man to man basis. From the airmen particularly, "we encountered nothing but a spirit of friendliness and cooperation," from the top down to the lowliest man.[107]

In the most important matters the Russians cooperated to the full. They kept their word to come into the Japanese war, in full strength, three months after VE-Day. By August 1945 their aid in this theater was not crucial to us, but their final coordination with us in destroying the German armies was. Here also they kept their word to the letter. At Teheran Stalin had promised that the Red Army would undertake great offensives against the Germans at

[105] Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 264, 268, 274. **[106] Deane, *op. cit.*, p. 122.**
[TM7] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

the time of OVERLORD and "demonstrate by its actions" the importance it attached to the operation.

After waiting through so many life-and-death struggles for overlord to come, the Russians did not then ease up and let the Anglo-Americans carry the brunt a while; they attacked with their full strength and kept the bulk of the German armies so busy that they could detach no strength to meet our onslaught in the West. They played their part so stoutly that the Western commanders were not only appreciative but impressed with the reliability of Stalin's word.[108]

ITALY KEPT CONSERVATIVE

In Italy the government of Marshal Badoglio, which was formed after Mussolini's fall, on July 25, 1943, sought to preserve the monarchy and to extricate Italy from the war. It succeeded in getting an armistice with the Allies, on September 3, but lost possession of Mussolini and most of Italy to the Germans within a few days thereafter. The King and the Badoglio government then fled behind the Allied lines and declared war on Germany.

Since most Italian army officers were royalists the Allies hesitated to support the strong popular demand for the King's abdication, even when it was demanded on December 14, 1943, by the Committee of National Liberation, composed of six pre-war political parties. Count Sforza, aged pre-Mussolini liberal exile, returned to Italy from the United States and denounced Victor Emmanuel as "a stupid, vile, abject criminal monarch," but Churchill gave the King his full support in an address on February 22, 1944.

At this point the Soviet Union, which was a party to the Italian armistice, exchanged ambassadors with the Badoglio government on March 13, apparently to better its bargaining position and to prepare the way for the return of Palmino Togliatti, able Italian Communist leader who had been in exile in Moscow during the Fascist era.

On April 12 the King entrusted his powers to Crown Prince Umberto, and Badoglio was able to form a coalition ministry with all of the six CNL parties represented, including the Communists. After the capture of Rome, on June 4, 1944, a new Bonomi cabinet swore allegiance to the country, instead of the King, while many high British and American officials were assured by the wealthy classes and ecclesiastics who entertained them that the abolition of the monarchy would be followed by social revolution. William C. Bullitt spoke for these groups in an article in ***Life***, September 4, 1944, in which he suggested that "Rome" and the "Vatican" hoped for war between the Soviet Union and the West within a few years, though they feared the West might surrender Italy and Europe without a fight.

Responding partly to their own conservative outlook, the Anglo-American officials deferred social and economic reform and instead of welcoming the Italian resistance fighters in the North as brothers who had done splendid service against the enemy, they disarmed them wherever possible as republicans and Reds who might cause trouble.

[108] Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

On November 28, 1944, the British Ambassador precipitated a crisis by attempting to exclude Count Sforza from a new cabinet. On December 5, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., issued a statement in Washington which disavowed any part in the British move, saying that "we have reaffirmed to both the British and Italian Governments that we expect the Italians to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from the outside. This policy would apply to an even more pronounced degree with regard to Governments of the United Nations in their liberated territory."

This statement by the new American Secretary of State stirred Churchill to "furious and vehemently expressed wrath." The last sentence about leaving the liberated United Nations to work out their own problems struck Churchill in several vulnerable spots. It was bad enough to be disavowed in his royalist activity in ex-enemy Italy, but he was also being accused of restoring royalist and conservative control in Belgium and he was most certainly doing it in Greece. The cable he dispatched to Roosevelt was probably "the most violent outburst of rage" in their long correspondence. He went to the House of Commons and demanded a vote of confidence to assuage his wounds, but Ambassador Winant reported that the vote did not reflect the extent of a deeply troubled British public opinion.[109]

Since the Greek and Polish cauldrons were also boiling, Roosevelt sent soothing cables to both Churchill and Stalin. His indispensable and crucial role as a friendly but firm mediator would not be appreciated by his countrymen until after he was gone.

Churchill's determination was so great that he succeeded in excluding Sforza from the new Bonomi cabinet and in breaking the unity of the CNL parties who opposed the monarchy. Nevertheless, public pressure for a republic grew steadily until April 27, 1946, when the Congress of Premier Alcide de Gasperi's Catholic Christian Democratic Party voted three to one in favor of abolishing the throne.

This event led Victor Emmanuel to abdicate formally in favor of Humbert, on May 9, and go to Egypt. On June 2 a national referendum was held and the republic won, 12,719,284 to 10,719,923. Ten days later Humbert sailed for Spain, leaving behind him a ruined and impoverished land in which millions of people still hung on the border line of starvation, in spite of many hundreds of millions in relief supplies from the West.

The monarchy was gone, but the old social structure, with its abysmal extremes of wealth and poverty, had been successfully preserved, along with the suffocating birth-rate which ensured for Italy a future of permanent poverty and perpetual crisis.

GREECE RESTORED TO THE ROYALISTS

On December 3, 1944, Churchill's effort to regain control of Greece came to a head in the outbreak of civil war in Athens. For sixty-three days British armed forces bore the brunt of the fighting until the leftist forces of EAM were finally driven from the capital. Elliott Roosevelt relates that when the

[109] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 837–9.**

news reached Washington he found his father scowling and muttering at the newspapers in anger that British troops should be used to fight the Greek guerrillas, who had fought the Nazis for four years.[110]

This development was the climax of a long struggle for the control of Greece after the war. It has been simply and objectively described by a young American historian who saw the Elas-British war in 1944 and remained in Greece as an Assistant Military Attaché until June 1946. William H. McNeill's book, ***The Greek Dilemma***, is well supported by other accounts.[111]

Aflter the dethronement of King George II in March 1924 Greece was a republic until the royalist Popular Party captured the government and brought the King back in November 1935. Then new elections in June 1936 produced such an equilibrium of royalist and Republican forces that fifteen Communist deputies held the balance of power. This situation, plus rumors of a Communist-led general strike, enabled General John Metaxas, a brilliant military man, to persuade the King to dissolve the Parliament and give him dictatorial powers. His government was vigorous, and successful in building up the army. It was harsh, fascist and unpopular, but it did prepare for the epic resistance which the Greeks made to Italian invasion in 1940. The amazing morale of the Greeks, fighting very individualistically, hurled the Italians back into Albania. In few instances during World War II did men fight more to the limit of endurance than did the Greeks in this war, only to be overwhelmed in April 1941 by the immense weight of the German Army.

Threatened with submergence, Metaxas called on the British to honor Chamberlain's guarantee of Greece, and Churchill quickly responded. In Greece he did not suffer from fears of another Dunkirk and of great carnage. The victorious British Army in Egypt, which had just defeated the Italians, was broken up and 60,000 men sent to Greece, where the vanguard was welcomed wildly in Athens, on March 4, 1941. By late April the British had been defeated in the passes near Mt. Olympus and their evacuation from Greece roughly handled by German aircraft. The Germans swept on into Crete a month later, largely by air. The British suffered 30,000 casualties.

Metaxas had died in January. His successor and the King fled abroad with a few officials and formed the Greek Government in Exile, while a Quisling general headed a puppet government in Athens.

German Rule. In the cities the wealthy and conservative classes generally, though not universally, collaborated with the Germans and Italians, especially in Athens. There some 20,000 people in the Kolonaki district, the most fashionable suburb, lived in luxury all during the Axis occupation, while the nation suffered and starved. The Kolonaki came through it all fat and with well-filled houses and cellars.[112]

The Germans ruled Greece by terror, shooting fifty Greeks for every

[110] **Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, p. 222.**

[111] **Published by Lippincott, Philadelphia and Gollancz, London, 1946.**

[112] **Leland Stowe, *While Time Remains*, New York, Knopf, 1946, p. 243. The same gilded upper crust then collaborated wholeheartedly with the British, their profits and winnings unrestrained by any noticeable taxation or government controls. Since 1946 they have cooperated with the Americans, with almost equally fabulous benefit to themselves.**

German killed, until the collapse of Italy removed a large part of the occupation armies and left the resistance forces in the hills increasing scope. The guerrillas were then combated largely by Security Battalions of conservative Greeks—organized by the Germans. Both sides punished the villages savagely for allegedly helping the other.

Resistance Organized. By the middle of 1942 dozens of guerrilla bands had formed spontaneously in the hills. Two of the original leaders of small bands came eventually to lead large forces. Zervas, a Republican, commanded five thousand men in Western Greece by the end of 1943. His army, called EDES, was backed by a group of politicians and business men in Athens who made little headway in building up a mass following. The guerrilla leader Ares was more fortunate in his backing. The Communist Party, under the able leadership of George Santos, founded a political movement called EAM, which enlisted a great mass following, composed especially of the youth and women. The latter were given equality for the first time and responded enthusiastically. After cells had been formed in the whole of Central Greece a guerrilla force was gradually built up, called ELAS, which numbered twenty thousand by the summer of 1943. Both EDES and ELAS received support from a British military mission of three colonels, which had been dropped into the country in 1942. A royalist guerrilla group under Colonel George Grivas, the "X" band, secured arms from German and Italian sources and conducted street fights with ELAS in Athens. "The energy and enthusiasm mobilized by EAM was tremendous. Most of its members were inspired by honest and lofty motives and profoundly believed in the righteousness of their cause."[113]

EAM's program called for active resistance to the Germans, a resistance government, restoration of all popular liberties and free elections for a constituent assembly. In accord with the dominant mood of the people the movement became anti-royalist. A real state, centering in the Pindus Mountains, was set up which ruled nearly all of Greece, except the Epirus district controlled by EDES, in spite of the enemy. ELAS headquarters cooperated reluctantly in a British-inspired campaign of sabotage late in 1943 which compelled the Germans to send additional divisions to Greece. The numerous British liaison officers by-passed the ELAS command and used their bands directly. When Italy surrendered, ELAS took ten thousand rifles from an Italian division and was thereafter independent of British support. The British then threw all their aid to EDES, but ELAS grew still more rapidly. EDES was attacked and a see-saw war resulted in a delimitation of territories. EDES now changed its political complexion from Republican to Conservative-Nationalist, while ELAS organized reserve forces in the cities. In March 1944 an EAM provisional government was formally set up.

Mutiny in Egypt. After wandering to South Africa, the United States and England, the Greek Government in Exile came back to Cairo in May 1943. For military reasons its communications with Greece were tightly controlled by British censorship. Its army, composed mainly of ***émigré*** officers from

[113] McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

Greece and of urban Greeks conscripted from Egypt, was plagued with idleness and rebellion. In the spring of 1943 a Republican mutiny led to the purge of many Metaxist officers. New recruits from Greece, including some EAM organizers, were nearly all anti-royalist. A rising demand that the King promise not to return until after a plebiscite was rebuffed and, supported by London, the King refused to agree to a regency. At the same time some delegates from EAM appeared in Cairo with a request for representation in their government. Instead of being received as representatives of the only large body of Greeks fighting the enemy, they were greeted with harsh words, locked up and then shipped ignominiously back to Greece.[114] These events led the Republican League to give orders for a mutiny on April 1,1944, which tied up all of the ships in the Greek Navy at Alexandria and spread to all units of the Army except the Royalist Sacred Squadron. The mutineers demanded that the Provisional Government established by EAM in Greece be accepted as the legitimate government. As the British Ambassador in Egypt reported, on April 7, it was "nothing less than a revolution."

Churchill took personal charge of its suppression, sending frequent orders until it was over. The ships were gradually subdued one by one by Greek boarding parties, backed by British warships, and the First Brigade of the Army surrendered after an eighteen-day siege by British troops, ended by smoke screens and some bombardment. Nearly ten thousand mutineers, more than half of the Greek forces in the Middle East, were segregated and imprisoned by the British in desert camps and kept prisoner until after the British occupation of Greece. Late in 1945, 1500 of these Greeks were still in a British prison camp in remote Eritrea.[115] It was these large bodies of Greeks which Churchill spoke of on May 24,1945, as interned "for the time being."[116]

Immediately after the mutiny, General Vendiras, who was bitterly anti-Communist, organized a new Third Brigade, often called the Mountain Brigade, with British backing, on a purely royalist basis.[117] This new Rightist brigade is the force which Churchill persisted in referring to later as "the Greek Brigade which had mutinied earlier in the year, but had now been freed of its mutinous element."[118]

In Greece EAM had swept nearly the whole country. It had a membership of two millions, out of seven millions. "There was a tremendous buoyancy and faith in the EAM movement." Its members meant to make the country over, without benefit of royalty. There was "an element of religious crusade in it." In Athens the alarmed Conservatives began to back the X band and to revive the dream of territorial expansion, "Greater Greece," an effective diversion against the friendship with Greece's northern neighbors advocated by EAM.[119]

[114] Leland Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

[115] Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 54; Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. V., pp. 541–2.

[116] The *New York Times*, May 25, 1945.

[117] McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–30; *Stowe, op. cit.*, p. 247; Clark, *The Nation*, December 23, 1944.

[118] Churchill, *The Dawn of Liberation*, Little, Brown, Boston, 1945, p. 367; London, Cassell, 1945..

[119] McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 132–4.

Lebanon Agreement. By this time there was no middle ground in Greek political life, but George Papandreou convinced the British that he could unite both Right and Left and was made Prime Minister after the mutiny. On May 17, 1944, a conference was held at Beirut in the Lebanon attended by twenty-five delegates who represented nearly all the parties and resistance organizations of Greece. EAM was represented by six men. Only one was a communist. The so-called Lebanon Charter which resulted was a compromise document which could be interpreted both ways. Early in September five EAM ministers entered the Greek Cabinet in Cairo, though they were swamped by fifteen of Papandreou's appointees, none of whom had any constituencies. Simultaneously, the EAM Provisional Government in Greece was formally dissolved. At once Papandreou feigned illness and went secretly to Italy to discuss the liberation of Greece with Churchill. This move led the Liberal ministers to resign from the Cabinet, expecting that the EAM ministers would join forces with them. However, on the advice of the Russian Minister to Egypt they did not do so. McNeill does not believe EAM had any advice or contact with the Soviet Union up to this time, other than the fifty Moscow-trained communists who first went into EAM, but he believes that EAM would have swung Greece into the Russian orbit had it been the post-war government.[120]

Caserta Pact. In September the Greek Government moved to Salerno, Italy, and late in that month a conference was held at Caserta at which the commanders of ELAS and EDES agreed that they would not attempt to seize power at the time of the liberation. They both acknowledged the Papandreou Government, which in turn put all Greek forces under the command of British General Scobie. The collaborationist Security Battalions were out-lawed. However, an operational order by Scobie placed the Athens district under the command of a Conservative Nationalist General.[121]

ELAS Ordered Disarmed. At the end of September British troops landed in Greece and were greeted with wild enthusiasm. The Government reached Athens on October 18 and by the 30th the German evacuation of Greece was complete. Then political tension began to grow. In Athens the Rightists founded newspapers which campaigned in very strong language, and EAM staged large demonstrations. The Rightists quickly demanded that ELAS should be disarmed and disbanded. EAM agreed, but insisted that the Royalist Mountain Brigade, which had now arrived from Italy should also be disbanded. Otherwise, the Government resting on it would be able to recall the King. EAM did not propose to have its years of hard work, suffering and triumphant organization nullified in this manner.

On the other hand, the Right insisted that the Mountain Brigade be retained in service and was backed in this by the British Ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper, on orders from Churchill.[122] General Scobie ordered ELAS to disband by December 10. He certainly exceeded his powers greatly in attempting to abolish the principal force put under his command, but when

[120] **McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 146.** [121] ***Ibid.*, p. 148.** [122] **Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 249.**

the ELAS commander refused Scobie issued a proclamation ordering the rank and file of ELAS to disband. Denying that the Greek Government had ever sanctioned such an order, the EAM ministers resigned from the Government on December 2.

This was the specific issue. Behind it was an accumulation of grievances. On November 22 General Scobie had summoned the EAM ministers of Finance and Agriculture, the latter a communist, and in the presence of Ambassador Leeper had lectured them on two points. First, the proposed wage scale was too high, and second, he demanded within 24 hours a declaration by them that they were opposed to acts of violence.[123] By this time Papandreou's vacillation had become intolerable to most of the cabinet and it was clear that he was a complete puppet to Leeper, consulting him "on every issue."[124]

General Scobie's order to ELAS to disband forced EAM to make decisions. Papandreou's obvious drift, under the firm hand of Leeper, was plainly toward restoring Rightist control in Greece. Eight out of fourteen officers appointed, on November 24, to organize the new National Guard had been former officers of the German-organized Security Battalions. There was no move to punish Quislings and traitors. Thousands of collaborators roamed the streets freely and many others in high office were not disturbed.[125] Now if ELAS gave up its arms, reaction would be intrenched, and without a struggle. EAM therefore called a great demonstration for Sunday morning, December 3, ordered a general strike on December 4, and called up the ELAS reserve in Athens.

Bloody Sunday. Papandreou gave permission for the Sunday demonstration. However, the extensive EAM preparations alarmed the British leaders and at a conference shortly before midnight on Saturday they directed Papandreou to withdraw permission for the demonstration. He attempted to do so, but it was far too late for the EAM leaders to cancel the demonstration, since most of their people, coming from the entire Athens area, did not have radios or telephones and many of them were already on the way. Nor did EAM wish to cancel the meeting.

On Sunday morning scores of thousands of marchers, with many banners and posters, filled all the streets of the city leading toward Constitution Square. They were mostly women and children, since the men were occupied in organizing the general strike and the ELAS reserve. The marchers were completely unarmed and they advanced in a mixed mood of anger and holiday excitement, precipitating great fear in the police, who formed cordons across all of the entries into Constitution Square. About 10:30 **a.m.** the great pressure of the crowds broke one of these police lines and several hundred angry people streamed across the Square toward police headquarters, where a score of policemen took refuge behind a stone wall. While they vacillated, a man in military uniform suddenly ran out of the police building, shouting "Shoot the bastards," and began firing into the crowd. The police then did

123 Poulos, *The Nation*, December 23, 1944.
124 McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 150.
125 poulos, *The Nation*, December 23, 1944.

likewise. They had orders only to use blanks, but one or two guns—perhaps that of the military man—had live ammunition. Seven people were killed and as many wounded. Soon afterward the police lines disintegrated, a few policemen being torn limb from limb, and the Square was filled by the enraged crowds, carrying a few Russian, many Greek, and vast numbers of American flags, shouting "Roosevelt! Roosevelt!" When a company of British paratroopers appeared on the scene, the sixty thousand people jammed into the Square showed no hostility to them, and with remarkable good humor allowed themselves to be herded out.[126]

The shooting into the unarmed crowd precipitated civil war. The ELAS committee ordered all police stations attacked and British troops went to the relief of those which held out. The X band was saved from extermination by British troops. In neither case did ELAS resist the British. There was still time for a political settlement to prevent full-scale war.[127]

Churchill Adamant. On Monday morning, December 4, Papandreou resigned and in the afternoon there was general agreement among the political leaders that the liberal leader, Themistocles Sofoulis, should head the new Government, though the vital question of what share EAM should have was not settled. At this juncture it was constitutionally necessary to secure the assent of King George who was in London. George, however, was not allowed to decide. Churchill did it for him. The British Prime Minister was "adamant against any concession to EAM " He ruled that Papandreou must stay, and the latter agreed quickly enough; Churchill would not permit the Greeks to avoid a bloody civil war, in which British troops would settle the issue. He knew that a Sofoulis Cabinet would make King George's chances of returning to Greece very slim, but above all he was determined to exclude EAM from the Government, fearing that otherwise they would soon take it over.[128] ***1***

Churchill wrote to Eden on November 7: "having paid the price to Russia for freedom of action in Greece, we should not hesitate to use British troops." He hoped also that the Royalist Greek Brigade, which would arrive soon, would "not hesitate to shoot when necessary." Concluding, he said: "I fully

[126] McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 161–72.

[127] This account of the way the Greek war started is verified by an article of William L. Shirer's based on reports "from seasoned and responsible American correspondents who were in Athens at the time and from two U.S. Army officers, one an intelligence officer, Tom Stix, who had served behind the German lines with the guerrillas and who was in Athens later.

Shirer counters Churchill's statement that EAM was bent on a "reign of terror" in Athens by saying that its armed forces were in absolute control of Athens from October 12 to 14, 1944, before a handful of British troops arrived, yet there was no reign of terror, and when the few British arrived the ELAS forces meekly evacuated Athens. Then, though they controlled the rest of Greece for two months, they made no attempt to carry out a *coup d'état.*

He agrees also that Sofoulis could have formed an all-party government which would have prevented civil war, though it would not have permitted the restoration of King George, upon which Churchill was determined.—*New York Herald Tribune,* April 27, 1947.

[128] McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 173–4.

expect a clash with E.A.M. and we must not shrink from it, providing the ground is well chosen."[129]

This was not far from saying that proper ground for a clash should be sought. The clash came when General Scobie banned the demonstration on December 3, after it was too late to stop it. In the early hours of December 5 Churchill sent his famous telegram to Scobie, charging him with responsibility "for neutralizing or destroying all E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. bands approaching the city." He should "not hesitate to act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress." It would be a great thing if he could "hold and dominate Athens" without bloodshed, "but also with bloodshed if necessary."[130]

EAM Conquered. The London ***Times*** made the situation clear on December 7, saying: "although the British Government was perfectly justified in exerting pressure and even using its armed forces to keep in office in Athens a national coalition government representing all parties, once this Greek Government had ceased to be fully representative through the resignation of the E.A.M. ministers, it was a mistake to continue to support Premier Papandreou, because such support inevitably assumed the appearances of supporting conservative elements against Left-Wing groups."

Early on December 6, ELAS reservists tried to capture the Government buildings, but found British sentries posted around them. This nonplussed most of the attackers, but there was some shooting in which the British joined. British airplanes then strafed Ardettos Hill, and by this action consolidated most of the wavering EAM moderates behind communist leadership. There was some negotiation with General Scobie up to December 12, but he offered no terms. The British arrested large numbers of people on suspicion of sniping and transported many of them to North Africa. When it was reported that 14,500 people had been seized for this purpose,[131] ELAS took 15,000 supposed Rightist sympathizers and marched them out of Athens toward the north. The brutality of their guards and the rigors of the march killed about 4000 of these people, an event which did much to cause EAM swiftly to lose its majority support in the nation.

The British successfully defended the districts in which most of the well-to-do Athenians lived and brought in about three divisions of troops, largely by air. Vast districts in which the poor lived were gradually conquered, block by block. Hundreds of buildings were destroyed, usually containing homes of the poorer people of Athens, at least eighty per cent of whom were on the side of EAM. The property damage approached $250,000,000. Casualties ranged between two and five thousand. No damage was done in the Kolonaki district.[132]

The British conquest of Athens produced such a big wave of indignation in Great Britain, the United States and elsewhere that Churchill felt compelled to fly to Athens on Christmas Day 1944 to see if he could compose matters.

[129] **Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 286–7.**
[130] ***Ibid*., p. 289.**
[131] **L. S. Stavrivos, *The Nation*, December 15, 1945.**
[132] **Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 242.**

He now advanced General Nicholas Plastiras in the place of his faithful Papandreou. Plastiras would concede no terms to EAM.

After scolding the Greeks in an ill-tempered fashion, threatening to put them under some sort of international trusteeship if they did not quickly lay "democratic foundations which are satisfactory and inspire confidence," Churchill flew back to London to tell King George that he would have to accept a Regency and to order the British generals in Greece into a full-scale offensive, which began the next day, December 27. By January 11 ELAS was forced to sue for terms and an armistice was concluded, the so-called Varkiza Agreement, on February 12. By its terms ELAS agreed to surrender definite quotas of weapons in all parts of Greece. Actually they exceeded the quotas everywhere, though they secreted many of their best weapons. The other parts of the Varkiza Agreement, which would have prevented a Rightist terror from sweeping Greece, quickly lapsed. Rightist elements filled all the armed forces, Quislings and traitors included; the "X" band was greatly expanded; Zervas, who had been defeated in the civil war, recovered his power. All these forces, plus other Rightist bands, hunted and killed Leftists throughout the British occupation and deep into the American period.[133]

Russia Acquiescent. At this point it is pertinent to inquire what Russia was doing while the communist-led forces of the Left were being crushed in Greece. The answer was given in a letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated March 8, which was quoted by former Secretary of State Byrnes in the ***New York Times*** of October 18, 1947. Said Churchill: "We have been hampered in our protests against elections in Eastern Europe by the fact that in order to have freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at Moscow in October (1944) recognized that Russia should have a largely preponderant voice in Rumania and Bulgaria while we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the thirty days' fighting against the Communists and ELAS in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and those around him."

Churchill also records that though the two leading British newspapers censured his policy in Greece, Stalin "adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens not one word of reproach came from ***Pravda*** or ***Isvestia."*** [134]

The British-Russian agreement that Britain should have a free hand in Greece, and Russia in Bulgaria and Rumania, and the way Stalin lived up to it when it was applied in Greece is pertinent to the later American-British effort to enforce "free and unfettered elections" in Bulgaria and Rumania. It is essential to remember that Greece was the first of the liberated states to be openly and forcibly compelled to accept the political system of the occupying Great Power. It was Churchill who acted first and Stalin who followed his example, in Bulgaria and then in Rumania, though with less bloodshed.

[133] McNeill, *op. cit.*, pp. 195–204.
[134] Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 293.

Issues Involved

Churchill's bloody and wholesale intervention in the political affairs of Greece left many questions to trouble the future.

1. ***Was the Greek Government-in-Exile legitimate?*** It was, in the sense that the King was the titular head of the State at the time of the German invasion. Actually he had lost his right to be a constitutional monarch by creating the Fascist dictatorship of General Metaxas. Because of this he was hated by a large majority of his people.

In Africa, he and his ministers became mere puppets in the hands of Churchill. They were supported by British money and did what they were told. They never did anything else. When they assembled considerable armed forces in Egypt, these mutinied against Royalist-British control and were thoroughly purged by the British of all except the Rightist element. The small forces remaining were rigorously trained to go back to Greece and install the King in power. Except for Churchill's determination that George should be restored to his throne he would have had no chance whatsoever of returning to Greece as King. On April 17, 1945, the special correspondent of the London ***Times*** in Athens wrote that "in October last, when the country was liberated, probably four-fifths of the people were against the king's return." In other words, Churchill's determination to force the King's return was both foolhardy and unjust.

2. ***Was EAM-ELAS a patriotic resistance movement?*** Whatever fighting was done against the Italian and German occupation forces, was done primarily by this group. A leading student of Balkan politics estimates that the Greek resistance movement immobilized between fifteen and twenty enemy divisions.[135] At a press conference in Athens on October 18, 1944, British Brigadier Barker-Benfield, who had personally directed liaison with the Greek guerrillas over a long period, told the assembled reporters: "We should never have been able to set foot on Greece had it not been for the magnificent efforts of the Resistance Movements of EAM and ELAS." Within forty-eight hours he was ordered out of Greece, and other British officers who had served with ELAS followed him.[136] The organization of the Security Battalions by the Germans is further evidence that ELAS caused them great trouble.

3. ***Was EAM-ELAS a valid popular movement? On*** this point the evidence is overwhelming. Organized as a resistance movement, it soon had the allegiance of great numbers of people. Some estimated that it controlled ninety per cent of the resistance forces.[137] Anthony Eden admitted seventy-five per cent in a speech before the House of Commons on April 5, 1944. Since the upper classes generally collaborated, or at least cooperated, with the enemy, it was necessarily mainly a lower-class movement. As such it developed plans for a new Greece in which there would be a better distribution of wealth and

[135] Roucek, *Balkan Politics*, Stanford, 1948, p. 192.
[136] Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 257.
[137] D. Christophorides, the *New York Times*, May 8, 1944,18: 7.

a fairer opportunity for all. The vast amount of poverty in Greece would have made this inevitable, apart from Communist leadership. There was some coercion in building up the movement. There had to be coercion of the enemy and of the collaborators. By its very definition a resistance movement opposes force both to a national enemy and to the domestic allies of the enemy. But there was an enormous amount of enthusiasm and voluntary union. The Greek people were united as never before in their history.

4. ***Would EAM have communized Greece?*** In the light of our later experience in Eastern Europe, it is easy to assume that of course this would have happened. Many of its ablest leaders were Communists, toughened during four years of confinement in Metaxas' jails.

Yet the leadership was by no means solely Communist and the Communists in the rank and file were microscopic in number. The EAM leaders also repeatedly demonstrated their good faith. Prior to the April 1944 mutiny they had sent three missions to Cairo in an effort to achieve unity and gain a part in their own Government. All of these attempts had humiliating results. They joined the Beirut Conference, which Venizelos had been able to call during his fleeting moment as head of the Cairo Government. At Beirut the EAM delegates were moderate. They pressed no extreme demands. On August 31, 1944, six EAM ministers went to Cairo and joined the Papandreou Government, though they knew that it was wholly under British control. At the same time they dissolved the Provisional Government of the Mountains, which they had organized in protest against the King's proposed return. If they had wanted civil war they would hardly have done that, especially since they were in effective control of Greece.

Then late in September 1944, General Sarafis, Commander-in-Chief of ELAS, joined in the Caserta Agreement, promising to make no attempt to seize power at the time of the liberation and putting his forces under General Scobie's command. Before this agreement ELAS had summarily and bloodily purged the alleged collaborationists at Pyrogos, but after Caserta the Quislings were very generally left alone. After midsummer large parts of Greece were wholly in EAM hands and when the British arrived Athens was completely under EAM control, along with the whole country. If war had been wanted by EAM, then was the time, especially when thousands of German-formed Security Battalion members rushed to surrender to the British who received and protected them. EAM agreed that only the leaders of these outlawed battalions should be tried. Nor was there any evidence in this period of the anarchy and terrorism which Churchill so frequently alleged. Frank Gervasi, of ***Colliers***, and M. W. Fodor, of ***The Chicago Sun***, travelled all the way from Athens to Salonika without encountering any hint of ELAS "depredations" or "massacres." There was no more support for such charges than there was for Ambassador Leeper's assertion to Leland Stowe that on December 3: "The police did not shoot first. Grenades were thrown first by ELAS."[138]

Up to December 1 EAM had gone to great lengths to become a part of the

138 *Stowe, op. cit.*, pp. 251–3. During a long interview Leeper scarcely looked Stowe in the eye once.

British-sponsored Government. When on that date they were pushed completely to the wall by the demand for the disarmament of ELAS, they did not revolt, but used the constitutional device of resigning from the Cabinet, hoping thus to change the course of events. The measures they then adopted to back up their resignations were strong, as they had to be if they were to be of any avail, but it was not EAM which committed the overt act which pushed the whole situation over into war. When the war did come foreign observers generally noted that ELAS had no strategic plan for fighting it. ELAS men did much heroic fighting, but in an improvised manner.

The question remains: Did EAM hope to gain control of the Government by democratic processes? Unquestionably they had that hope, but it could not have been an immediate one, with the British Army in Athens to support Churchill's puppets and to back up his well-known determination that King George should return. Later, with the restoration of free elections, about which so much was being said, they could confidently expect to come into control of the Government.

In that event would Greece have been a Communist state? It would unquestionably if Russian armies had occupied Greece in force. Yet even then one wonders. Nobody has ever been able to tame the Greeks and fit them into a mold. The Greek is a "fierce individualist." The great majority of them are small landowners or mountaineers. It would have taken more than a handful of Communist leaders at the top to regiment them all into a Marxist pattern. No people in the world loves freedom more. None has fought more frequently or more heroically for it.

Both the British and the Americans have found it difficult indeed to stamp out the flame of hope for a freer, better life which EAM represented. In September 1945, the month in which far more than one hundred thousand Athenians turned out to celebrate the fourth anniversary of EAM, Edmund Wilson sent this report from Greece to the ***New Yorker***: "It had become very plain to me since I had been in Greece that the movement which the British had disarmed, and which the United States had allowed them to disarm, was neither a chess play directed from Moscow nor a foray of bandits from the hills—but a ***genuine popular movement*** which had recruited almost all that was generous, courageous and enlightened in Greece; the most spirited among the young, the most clear-sighted among the mature."[139]

5. ***Why was Churchill determined to control Greece?*** There is small question that a majority of the British people were not in agreement with Churchill's course in Greece. The majority of the British correspondents in Athens were outraged by the war there. They admitted sadly that it should not have happened.[140] Most of the British officials in Cairo doubted that Churchill could enthrone King George in Athens again.

Even Churchill would not have minded a liberal Greek Government in Athens, if it were firmly tied to Britain. No liberal Government, however, could be "trustworthy," let alone a radical democratic movement based upon

[139] **Leland Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 261.**
[140] **Stowe, *op. cit.*, p. 263.**

the broad masses of the people. Churchill would never have dreamed of entrusting EAM with control of the Greek Government, even if there had been no Communists in it. That it had many Communist leaders of course made it completely anathema to him. Soon after EAM had been crushed by American tanks and planes in British hands, Churchill maintained to the House of Commons on January 18, 1945, that he had but one principle for the liberated countries: "Government of the people, by the people, for the people, set up on a basis of election by free and universal suffrage, with secrecy of the ballot and no intimidation." That was "our only aim, our only interest, and our only care."[141] That was good democratic rhetoric, but the last thing Churchill would have permitted in Greece was a free election, for he knew that EAM would win it. There could therefore be no election in Greece until the Government was securely in Rightist hands, including all the machinery of intimidation.

What Churchill wanted in Greece is, of course, perfectly clear. He wanted to restore the traditional British control of Greece. This was absolutely indispensable to him, since the Russians were pushing down into the Balkans and he had not been able to forestall them. Future military and political strategy therefore made it extremely urgent in his mind that Greece should be regained and firmly held. He would, however, have acted as he did if the Soviet compulsion had been absent. Greece was in effect a British colony. Its public utilities, shipping and insurance were dominated by the British, who held a third of the Greek national debt and controlled one of its main banks. Greece was a part of Britain's imperial heritage, and he would no more have thought of surrendering her than of giving up any acre of ground which was formerly part of His Majesty's empire.

As soon therefore as EAM began to rise in Greece it was automatically Churchill's enemy. He already had his King George, whom he could depend upon to control Greece in British interest. Moreover, Churchill firmly, even passionately, believed in monarchy as an institution. It was wicked of the Greeks not to give allegiance to their rightful sovereign. George was taken firmly in hand, his hot-house government in Egypt was firmly protected by censorship, and from the Greek people, even when a majority of its troops on the spot mutinied. It was protected especially against EAM, whose members became "bandits" to Churchill as soon as it was probable that they had developed political objectives. From that time on, the frustration of EAM merged into the disarmament of ELAS. A bitter war was required to complete the job and thousands of dissenting Greeks were shipped out of Greece to join the other thousands already imprisoned in Africa by Britain, but whatever was necessary to accomplish Churchill's objective was done, even though it meant that the proven Greek patriots must be crushed, along with all that was hopeful, constructive and forward-looking in EAM.

At his Athens press conference on December 6, 1944, Churchill explained everything. Britain did not desire "any material advantages from Greece," of any kind—territorial, commercial or political. Of course, he was in honor bound to "insist on the acceptance and fulfillment of General Scobie's

[141] Churchill, *Victory*, Boston, 1946, p. 6; London, Cassell.

terms." Beyond that "all we want from the Greeks is our ancient friendship."[142]

That was it exactly. Churchill wanted "a friendly government" in Greece, and he could not be sure that it would be friendly unless it were securely in the hands of the Royalists, even if they were largely the people who had collaborated with the Germans. To make certain of his friendly government he rejected the appointment of Sofoulis, which would have nipped the war in the bud, and he vetoed all attempts to find an alternative Greek Government.[143]

[142] Churchill, *The Dawn of Liberation,* Boston, 1945, p. 396; London, Cassell, 1945.

[143] Mallory Browne, the *Christian Science Monitor,* December 8, 1944.

CHAPTER VIII

THE YALTA CONFERENCE PERIOD

OCTOBER 1944–APRIL 1945

Great myths grow up after every world war to explain to the peoples why they were defeated or why their victories were not as fruitful as they had expected. After World War I the Nazi-minded Germans invented the stab-in-the-back theory, to prove that Germany would not have been defeated had it not been for the weakness, amounting to treachery, of the socialists, democrats and Jews in Germany, behind the heroic fighting fronts. This myth was one of the chief vehicles upon which Hitler rode to power, intent upon undoing German defeat altogether and leading Germany to world mastery.

After World War II an American myth grew up around the Yalta Conference of February 1945, to the effect that a dying and deluded Roosevelt gave away Eastern Europe and China to Stalin. Aided by the temptations of partisan politics, this myth grew to such proportions that a large majority of the American people became convinced that this was the first great reason for the contemporary growth of communist power, the second being the weakness and treachery of some Americans in failing to give more aid to Chiang Kai-shek at one time or another.

Any people is loathe to believe that in any decisive moment of history it encountered forces too great for it to manage. This is especially true of the Americans, who up to 1945 had never failed to achieve full success in any undertaking to which they had set their hands. They were therefore wide open to the myths which explained the great post-war expansion of communism as the result of the weakness and treachery of individual Americans. From the acceptance of this principle it was only a short step to the all-devouring witch hunt which sought to track down the purveyors of the false and fatal ideas in our midst, and which horrified all of our democratic allies after the Cold War began to spiral.

In the atmosphere of the Yalta Myth it was difficult to recall the mounting pressure at the time for another meeting of the leaders of the Grand Coalition. The war was then in full cry on both sides of Germany and events were moving fast, especially in the East. Late in August 1944 the Bulgarians sought to surrender to the Allies, but were forestalled by a sudden declaration of war by Russia, on September 5, 1944, and the rapid occupation of Bulgaria, bringing the Red armies to the borders of Greece and Turkey. By October Russian troops were in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and British troops had landed in Greece, where a large majority of the people under communist leadership opposed the return of their king in the baggage of the British Army.

Churchill-Stalin Balkan Bargain

It was at this point that Churchill felt compelled to make a bargain with the Russians which would give him a free hand in Greece, where it would be difficult for him to move against the powerful EAM if Russia supported it. It was then that Churchill went to Moscow and put into force the plan he had been maturing for six months.

Shortly before D-Day the British Government had begun a diplomatic campaign to divide the Balkans into British and Russian spheres of influence. On May 30, 1944, Ambassador Halifax suddenly inquired of Secretary Hull how our Government would feel about an arrangement giving the Russians a controlling influence in Rumania and the British in Greece. Hull opposed this course and the next day Churchill appealed to the President, arguing that the arrangement would only apply to war conditions. He stated that the British Government had suggested the agreement to Russian Ambassador Guosev in London. The Russians had replied on May 18 that they were agreeable, but before concluding the arrangement they would like to know whether the United States had been consulted and was in agreement.

Having been compelled to broach the subject in Washington, Churchill sent another message to Halifax on June 8, arguing that no spheres of influence were involved, but that the Russians should deal with the Rumanians and Bulgarians while Britain dealt with the Greeks and Yugoslavs. The American reply of June 10, 1944, combated the proposal and proposed instead that consultative machinery be set up for the Balkans, in which we would have a part. Churchill replied the next day in “a long, forceful telegram,” arguing that action would be paralyzed by such an arrangement and proposing a three months trial of the plan proposed to Russia. In Hull’s absence Roosevelt agreed. On June 22 he told Churchill that we were disturbed that the British had taken the matter up with us only after the Russians had compelled them to do so.

To make sure that its position with us was correct the Soviet Government then made a direct approach to us. On July 1, 1944, Ambassador Gromyko sent an ***aide-memoire*** to Hull outlining the negotiations to date, from the initial British approach on May 5. Hull’s reply on July 15, approved by F. D.R., stressed that we had accepted the project on a purely temporary basis and made every effort to reserve the future, but without avail. In October 1944, Churchill and Eden went to Moscow and extended the arrangement still further, even reducing to percentages the degree of influence which the two powers would have in the various Balkan countries. The Russians assumed thereafter that they had been granted predominance in most of the Balkans.[1] Our Government protested in numerous diplomatic cables during October 1944 about the extent to which terms of peace were being included by the Russians and British in the armistice conventions for Rumania,

[1] ***The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,*** **Vol. II, pp. 1451–8. Byrnes says that it was understood** that **the Russians would not interfere should Britain take military action in Greece “to quell internal disorders” and the British recognized similar Russian rights in Rumania. —James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly,* p. 53.**

Bulgaria and Hungary, but without much effect. The Russian and British leaders assembled at Moscow proceeded with their spheres of influence agreement.

Churchill's account of the Moscow agreement states that he proposed a "ninety per cent predominance in Rumania" for Russia, the same for Britain in Greece, and fifty-fifty in Yugoslavia. While this was being translated Churchill set down on a half-sheet of paper a proposed split in the five Balkan countries which added Hungary 50–50 and Bulgaria 75 per cent cOntroHo Russia, 25 per cent to others.

Stalin scrutinized the paper, made a large blue tick on it and passed it back. "It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set it down." "After this there was a long silence," the pencilled paper lying in the center of the table. Finally Churchill suggested that since it might seem to some that they had disposed of these great issues, "so fateful to millions of people," in an off-hand manner they should "burn the paper." "No, you keep it," said Stalin.[2]

If there was any one moment when the Balkan countries, except Greece, were "given away," this was it. Nevertheless, Churchill was not giving away anything. He was simply recognizing the current position of the Russian armies. Two days later Churchill wrote a long letter to Stalin about the Balkans in which he reduced their understanding to writing, ruled out fascism, granted that both the Russian system and ours offered securities to the toiling masses, suggested that governments should be established by free elections, and hoped that thereafter neither Great Britain nor Russia would "worry about them or interfere with them." However, after reflection he decided not to give the letter to Stalin and to depend entirely on the meeting of minds represented by Stalin's "tick" upon the sheet of paper bearing the percentages.[3]

This meeting of minds was the prelude to Yalta, and it was not superseded by Yalta. In his undelivered letter to Stalin, Churchill had tried to set down the formulas for keeping the Balkans under what he called "the free enterprise system controlled by universal suffrage," and at Yalta these formulas were spelled out quite clearly, but there is no evidence that either Stalin or Churchill thought that the basic agreement made at Moscow on November 9 was repealed. On the contrary, Churchill had already cashed his side of the bargain, in nearly two months of hard fighting in Athens, when the Yalta conference met, and Stalin was already engaged in executing the conservatives in Bulgaria.

It is true that Washington intended the agreements Churchill made to be provisional, and on October 11 Churchill cabled to Roosevelt from Moscow that "nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and Russia, subject to further discussion and melting down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians."

The full meeting of minds was had, for the reason stated by Churchill in the same cable: "It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war breaking out in

[2] **Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 227–8.**

[3] ***Ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp. 231–3.**

several countries, when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U. J. (Uncle Joe) with the other."[4]

This was the issue—civil war between anti-communists and communists—which on October 11,1944, was just ahead in Greece and would quickly have to be decided in the other Balkan countries conceded to Russia at Moscow.

Bulgarian Rightists Crushed. Alarmed by the swift overthrow of the mighty communist-led EAM-ELAS in Greece, which began on December 3, 1944, the Russians proceeded to make sure that the Bulgarian army officers, who had massacred 12,000 leftist peasants in 1923, were crushed.[5]

For this purpose "Peoples Courts" to try alleged "war crimes" were set up on December 25, which cut down the officer caste "as with a scythe" and condemned scores of high officials in repeated mass trials. A single decree ousted 4000 office holders. This "fast and raw purge" was in full swing when the Yalta conference met and the trials continued until May 14, 1945. At that time the United Press correspondent in Istanbul estimated that 2007 Rightists had been executed and 3064 imprisoned on terms from one year to life.[6]

THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Fourth Inaugural. By Christmas the advancing Russians were not far from Vienna. The need for a Big Three meeting was increasing, but Roosevelt could not go until after his Fourth Inauguration on January 20, 1945.

In his Inaugural address he compressed some of his deepest beliefs into brief compass. We have learned, he said, that "the only way to have a friend is to be one," a principle which was the key to his Russian policy.

The place of the Yalta meeting had also caused controversy and delay. From the first, Hopkins had assured the President that there was not a ghost of a chance of getting Stalin to leave Russia with his armies advancing for the kill in Germany. Roosevelt accepted the Crimea as the meeting-place, but did not feel able to do so officially and publicly until after the election, knowing what an outcry there would be at his going so far to see Stalin again. Then the President's closejidvisers. who in Hopkins' opinion did not like or trust the Russians anyway, descended on him and forced further wavering and delay.[7]

Roosevelt's Competence. On January 23, 1944, the President left Norfolk on the heavy cruiser ***Quincy.*** He had stood for his brief Inaugural address, hatless and coatless. He had a cold and his sinus trouble bothered him severely. Byrnes was worried about him on the way, but found that he had improved greatly by the time they reached Malta. He was a good sailor and sea trips always benefited him. It may well be that the trip to Yalta shortened

[4] *Ibid*., Vol. VI, p. 229.

[5] Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, New York, Knopf, 1949, pp. 356, 289; London, Cresset, 1950.

[6] *Ibid*., pp. 355–8; the *New York Times*, December 25, 1944; February 3, 18, March 6,17, April 6, May 14, 1945. The charges tried in the "Peoples Courts" were so elastic that anyone could be eliminated. Smith adds, however, that between the two world wars "Bulgaria enjoyed the distinction of having the bloodiest and most violent political record in Europe. The normal means of changing governments was by gunfire" (p. 355).

[7] Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 844–5.

Roosevelt's life, but the legend that he was so far gone at Yalta that he hardly knew what he was agreeing to is not borne out by any of the records. Byrnes quotes long excerpts from the discussions at Yalta verbatim. They show the President making his contribution as clearly as anyone else. Sherwood's full account of the conference reveals the President carrying his end throughout. Sherwood relates that at one point Roosevelt made a long speech in which he used his familiar tactics for dodging an issue—extra votes in the UN for Russia.[8]

Sherwood does believe that the President did make the most questionable concession of the Yalta Conference—his agreement in writing that the claims of Russia in Manchuria "shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated"—at the very end of the Conference when he was tired and anxious to avoid further argument.[9] Secretary of State Stettinius says also that toward the end of the Conference "the President naturally showed fatigue. However, he continued to explain the American position skilfully and distinctly, and he also served as a moderating influence when the discussions became heated."[10]

Stettinius says emphatically "that at all times from Malta through the Crimean Conference and the Alexandria meeting I always found him to be mentally alert and fully capable of dealing with each situation as it developed. . . . The President's ability to participate on fully equal terms day after day in the gruelling give-and-take of the conference table with such powerful associates as Churchill and Stalin is the best answer to these stories. ... At Yalta the President was extremely steady and patient. At no time did he flare up. He was kind and sympathetic, but determined."[11]

This is saying a good deal about a man who during the long period of his leadership was unable to stand on his feet without great effort and considerable pain. No other world leader ever carried great responsibilities so successfully, and cheerfully, without being able to walk, or under any comparable physical handicap. The wonder is not that Roosevelt's body gave out when it did, but that it sustained him so long.[12]

THE YALTA AGREEMENTS

The principal subjects dealt with at Yalta were as follows:

1. ***Russian gains in the Far East***

Of all the decisions made at Yalta, this settlement has occasioned the most controversy. How much justice was there in these settlements?

[8] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, 35–41; Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 856.

[9] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 867.

[10] Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference*, New York, 1949, p. 267.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[12] McNeill concludes that it cannot be proved that the President's physical condition had any bearing on the results of the conference. Near its close everyone was "thoroughly tired out" and Roosevelt did hasten its close when Stalin and Churchill felt that there were still other subjects to be discussed.—William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia*$_t$ *1941–46* (Royal Institute of International Affairs Survey of International Affairs, 1939–1946), London, Gollancz, 1953, pp. 532–6.

(a) Recognition of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia, that is of its separation from Chinese sovereignty, could hardly be avoided, since it had been an accomplished fact for twenty years.

(***b***) The return of the southern half of the long island of Sakhalin, lost to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, could not easily be questioned, if Russia was to recover any of her 1905 losses.

(c) The Kurile Islands, stretching from the tip of the great Russian peninsula Kamchatka and down to the northern end of Japan, are of great strategic value to Russia. Like southern Sakhalin they control the northern approaches to Russia's maritime provinces. If Russia was to play the part in the war against Japan which we expected of her, she was entitled to them. No one at Yalta questioned or argued this point. Roosevelt saw "no difficulty whatsoever" about them.[13] This was long before we came to feel that we should control all of the islands on the far side of the Pacific—up into China's harbors. In 1945 no one dreamed of endangering Russia's entry into the Japanese war over these islands.

(***d)*** The recovery of a warm water outlet on the Yellow Sea, through Manchuria, was as strongly indicated. Roosevelt had apparently discussed this question with Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo and he broached it at Teheran. The internationalization of the Port of Dairen, with adequate facilities for Russia there, was a fair arrangement, and one which it was difficult to contest when Russia's landlocked, ice-bound status is remembered.

(***e***) The restoration to Russia of a share in the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railroads, together with the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base, was more questionable, especially since China was not represented at the Conference. This concession could well mean Russian domination of Manchuria. Joint control of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Soviet Russia and China had not meant that during the decade preceding Japan's conquest of Manchuria, but the addition of the South Manchurian could mean Russian control of the entire area, unless China emerged as a strong, unified State. Her sovereignty over Manchuria was formally acknowledged. On the other hand, if some of Russia's losses during the Russo-Japanese war were to be recovered, it was difficult to deny the others, and access to the Yellow Sea might not mean much unless implemented by a share in the control of the railroads leading to it.

When this is said, it is clear that heavy concessions were required of China, which her leaders later accepted in treaty form only because of the great weakness and division which afflicted China. What justification was there for this disposal of Chinese resources?

The overriding consideration was our desire for Russia's aid in the war against Japan. Yalta was first and foremost a military conference. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff were strongly represented there and the thing they wanted above all else was an early and definite pledge of Russian action against Japan. We thought the best part of the Japanese Army was in Manchuria, backed by strong industries on the spot, and we wanted the Red Army to perform for

[13] **The State Department, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta,* Washington, 1955, p. 768. Hereafter called *Yalta Papers.***

us another vast campaign of annihilation, comparable to its operations in East Europe. If it would do so, huge American casualties would be avoided and the war greatly shortened.[14]

If the war against Japan went on to the final mopping-up which everybody supposed would be required, it would be an immense undertaking to land enough forces to clean out Manchuria, in addition to conquering Japan, island by island. Our Chiefs of Staff had told the President that the conquest of Honshu would cost 500,000 American casualties, and it would be of great value to us to have Russia prevent the transfer of crack divisions from Manchuria to Japan. We discovered later that the Japanese did not have as large forces in Manchuria as our intelligence services believed, but at Yalta our leaders had to proceed upon the assumption that the Red Army would be needed to contain and engage the best part of the Japanese forces, as in the case of Germany. The atomic bomb was a strong hope, but there were only verbal assurances of its coming success. None had been exploded and our military chiefs could not depend on it to close the war quickly. The chief reality of the moment was the belief that Russia's army could greatly shorten the war and relieve us of one of the worst military undertakings imaginable. The very entry of Russia into the war against Japan might force Japan to make peace and enable us to avoid invading the Japanese home islands. It must be remembered also that Russia would have the military power to take what she wanted in the Far East. It was of real importance to China that Russia's gains be limited by agreement.

Up to the Yalta Conference, Stalin had not made any demands in the Far East. On October 30, 1943, he had surprised and delighted Hull at the Moscow Conference by voluntarily pledging entry into the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. At Teheran he repeated the same assurance, again without making conditions, though the main rewards for Russia's participation in the war were discussed there. At Yalta he argued that he could not ask the Soviet peoples, after their unprecedented exertions, to undertake a new war unless he could assure them of tangible gains to compensate for further painful efforts. Though we may doubt the need of a dictatorship for such help with public opinion, our own deep reluctance to ask our

[14] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Wilmot, *op. cit.*, p. 640; Stettinius says that he knew at Yalta of the immense pressure put on the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into the Far Eastern War (p. 90). As early as the Quebec Conference in 1943 a U.S. strategic estimate said that "Russia's post-war position will be a dominant one," and "since Russia is the decisive factor in the war she must be given every assistance and every effort made to obtain her friendship." And "*Finally the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.* With Russia as an ally in the war against Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or a negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive."—Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 748–9.

Admiral Wm. D. Leahy, says that at Yalta he "offered no objection" to the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to seek Russian assistance, though he "believed that the United States, single-handed if necessary, could defeat Japan within the time estimated." —William D. Leahy, *I Was There,* New York, 1950, p. 312; London, Gollancz, 1950.

troops for a second great effort on the other side of the world, the projected invasion of Japan, made it difficult to deny Stalin's desire to know what Russia was to get out of it. Up to this point we had successfully rebuffed all of his efforts to validate Russia's 1941 boundaries in Europe. Now we needed his aid in the Far East and it was difficult to refuse his terms, partly at China's expense.

At this point it is necessary to reject the claim of the Chinese Nationalists that their later debacle was due to the Yalta concessions to Russia. The Kuomintang had lost China long before, by its failure to defend North China or even to organize guerrilla warfare there against Japan, by its abysmal corruption and inefficiency, by its stubborn and futile attempt to maintain a feudal agrarian system. The American Army shipped and flew Chiang's troops into Manchuria and North China, after the defeat of Japan. It was the decisive lack of support from the Chinese people which made it impossible to remain there.

The critics of Yalta falsify the picture almost completely by talking from hindsight and failing to record the circumstances under which the military partners at Yalta negotiated. One of these factors was the knowledge that if Russia waited to attack Japan until we had invaded and with painful efforts subdued the Japanese islands, she could come in at the end, get a cheap victory and take whatever she wanted from China.[15] It was to China's interest to have Russia's gains limited and recorded. At Yalta what Russia wanted was distinctly cut down. Stalin desired full control of both Dairen and Port Arthur, but compromised by making Dairen a free port. The Russians asked for ownership of the Manchurian Railways, but accepted joint control with the Chinese. The waning Chinese Government was lucky to have someone to negotiate for it.[16]

It was also very satisfied with the Yalta concessions to Russia. The Sino-Russian treaty of August 1945, embodying the Yalta terms, obligated the Soviets to recognize the authority of the Nationalist Government and to aid its recovery of Manchuria. It was under this treaty that Chiang reoccupied the great centers of North China.[17]

Secretary Acheson testified that "the grave danger was that they (the Russians) would really wait until the war was over . . . and they would come in and do what they wished.''[18] Nor was Russia's entry into the Japanese war merely an official concern. The American people wanted it. On July 25, 1945, long after Yalta, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin made a speech in which he said: "In millions of American homes, mothers, fathers and

[15] Walter Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries,* New York, Viking, 1951, pp. 55, 70; London, Cassell, 1952.

[16] Raymond Swing, "What Really Happened at Yalta," *The New York Times Magazine,* February 20, 1949, p. 53.

[17] Secretary of State Acheson, MacArthur *Hearings,* Part 3, p. 1846. An editorial in *Life* magazine for September 10, 1945, hailed the Soong-Stalin treaty as "containing less ammunition for pessimists than any diplomatic event in the last 20 years. The signatures of two men have done as much to assure peace as all our Flying Fortresses." It was a great victory for common sense (p. 2071).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 1845.

sweethearts are waiting anxiously for news of Russia's intentions. ... They know that if Russia declared war, if her bombing fleets roared out of Vladivostok over to Japan these acts might be the final ones to force a quick surrender of the Japs. Thus countless American lives are at stake in Russia's decision.... Let no one say that we are meddling in Russia's business when we want them to carry their load in the Far East. ... I would be remiss in my obligations as a United States Senator if I did not voice, in all humility but with all the force at my command, the feeling of millions of Americans that Russia do her part in the Pacific."[19]

The fact that the Yalta arrangements affecting China were embodied in a secret protocol, which was only produced from the White House safe after Roosevelt's death, added greatly to the criticism of the Yalta accords, and to the rumors that Yalta had been the source of many secret deals. Secrecy was essential, since Chiang Kai-shek could not be told without revealing the fact of Russia's approaching entry into the war against Japan, and nobody believed that this secret could be kept in Chungking. In February 1945 the invasion of Germany was just beginning, from both sides, and no one wanted Japan to strike first from Manchuria, while Russia was still fully engaged in Germany and very vulnerable in Siberia. That might well make Russia's aid abortive and greatly prolong the war. Roosevelt was keenly aware at Yalta that anything said to the Chinese "was known to the whole world in twenty-four hours." Because of this danger he decided that when the time came to inform Chiang Kai-shek he would send an army officer as a courier through Moscow to Chungking.[20] There was too much at stake to have any slips.

Stalin had first estimated that it would take six months to move some thirty divisions the six thousand miles from Germany to Manchuria, doubling his forces there. At Yalta, after reflection, he shortened that period to three months and made it a pledge. As soon as possible he would begin the movement to the Far East and he asked for the strongest assurances of secrecy. This was the reason for the secret protocol. Apparently Roosevelt expected to iron out the deal with Chiang at the proper time, when Russia was ready to strike. When that time came he was dead.

As events did develop, Russia actually fought against Japan only a few days before the atomic bomb gave Tokyo a perfect excuse for surrendering. Then it appeared to many, especially to Russia's critics, that she had made an excessively good bargain, that she had rushed in at the very end of the war and made great gains, without contributing much effort. When compared with our own years of vast expenditure, hard toil and bitter fighting in the Pacific, Russia's winnings seemed very disproportionate.

Yet this was all hindsight. Russia kept her part of the bargain. She was ready to strike Japan and did so at the time agreed upon and her part in the Japanese war would have been as valuable to us as we had hoped had not the circumstances greatly changed. Then it was easy to say that Russia had won

[19] MacArthur, *Hearings*, part 3, p. 2061. An American sergeant voiced the feelings of millions of American troops when he said: "I've been in the army four and a half years. Maybe those bombs and those Russians will help me get out now."—The *New York Times*, August 10, 1945.

[20] *Yalta Papers*, p. 769.

too much too easily. Those who made this complaint most bitterly overlooked two things: that Russia had contained a large part of Japan's best troops in Manchuria during our entire war with Japan; and that it was a global war which we fought together. In estimating sacrifices Russia's immense contribution in the war against Germany has to be added in. It seemed grasping to many of us that Russia demanded increased geographic security in the Far East and later in Europe, but it did not look that way to the Russians, who had suffered a Japanese occupation of Siberia from 1918 to 1922 and a German occupation of most of European Russia during a similar eternity after 1941.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that in February 1945, our military prospects were still grim in both Europe and Asia. We had hardly recovered from the shock of Hitler's counter-offensive in the Ardennes in Europe and in the Pacific no one could see the end. Much had been accomplished. The Japanese Navy was practically eliminated, but the stubborn island fighting of the Japanese had convinced nearly everyone that they were not subject to rational considerations and would fight to the last man. The bloody battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were still ahead of us and the Japanese cities had not yet been burned.

Time and manpower were becoming crucial factors. We had reached the end of our manpower resources at the time of Yalta, with two wars of incalculable duration still to win. Thirty battle hardened Russian divisions transferred to the Japanese theater therefore looked very good to us. Not only that, the American people were naturally war weary. After the defeat of Hitler it would be asking a great deal of them to ship their sons around the world to fight again. People were already wanting their boys back home.[21] Stettinius says that early in 1945 "there was already a groundswell of public opinion demanding that our forces be returned home as soon as the war was over."[22]

General Douglas MacArthur shared the view of nearly all of his military colleagues in Washington. James T. Forrestal states, after a meeting at Mac Arthur's headquarters, on February 28, 1945—after Yalta—that MacArthur felt

> we should secure the commitment of the Russians to active and vigorous prosecution of a campaign against the Japanese in Manchukuo of such proportions as to pin down a very large part of the Japanese army; that once this campaign was engaged we should then launch an attack on the home islands . . . and that this could not be done without the assurance that the Japanese would be heavily engaged by the Russians in Manchuria.

MacArthur doubted that anything less than sixty Russian divisions would be sufficient. Since the Russians had not asked for material for such a force he feared that they might try to persuade us into a China mainland

[21] Rudolph A. Winnacker, "Yalta: Another Munich?" *Virginia Quarterly Review,* Autumn, 1948, pp. 529–31.

[22] Stettinius, *op. cit.*, p. 127

campaign which would be more costly than an invasion of the Japanese islands.[23]

General Albert Wedemeyer, our Commander in China, and a supporter of MacArthur, also told General Marshall in February 1945, the Yalta month, that Russia should be brought in against Japan in order to prevent her from holing in "in the Shantung industrial crescent and up in Manchuria." He was "afraid the war would go on for a long time, and we would lose a lot of allied lives; whereas if the Soviet would come in it would precipitate our final victory."[24]

Nor did this deep desire for heavy Russian participation in the Japanese war disappear until after the explosion of the test A-bomb on July 16, 1945, had opened up the prospect of ending the war without Russian aid. Secretary of War Stimson recorded that "As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese Government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control." He was informed that it might cost a million American casualties, aside from those of our allies, to crush Japanese resistance.[25]

By any rational standards Japan was defeated in July 1945. By that time her air force was knocked from the skies and she was helpless under our bombers and naval guns. But our belief in the irrationality of Japanese fighting and dying for the Emperor still persisted strongly—to the extent that we let the Japanese keep the Emperor, in order that he might order them to surrender. In February 1945 all this was still in the future. Then the time factor was urgent. It would take the Russians several months to get ready to deal Japan the big blow we desired. It is a huge undertaking to transport thirty divisions 6000 miles overland, with all their weapons and equipment, and we needed firm assurance that the Russians would do so as promptly as possible.

Since our interest in Russian participation against Japan was believed to be great, there is little basis for the charge that Yalta was simply another case of appeasement. There is a superficial resemblance in the fact that at both Munich and Yalta the assets of a friendly power were given away, but there is an enormous difference in the circumstances. At Munich, the Western leaders gave a maniacal adventurer the indispensable ramparts and resources he needed for a drive toward world mastery. At Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill yielded some Japanese and Chinese assets to their mighty ally in the gigantic war which had resulted, in order to be sure of her greatly desired aid in bringing the war to a close. Moreover, China had not controlled these assets for forty years.

Nor was China sacrificed as Czechoslovakia had been. It was Roosevelt who had insisted all through the war that China must be recognized as a great power after the war and made a member of the Big Four. Both Churchill and

[23] Millis, *op. cit.*, p. 31. On July 8, 1952, Joseph and Stewart Alsop stated their belief that pre-Yalta cables established that "General MacArthur's own headquarters were the main source of the view that almost any sacrifice was justified to get the Soviet Union into the Japanese war."—*The Nashville Tennessean*, July 8, 1952.

[24] MacArthur, *Hearings*, part 3, p. 2499. Marshall testified that the Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in desiring Russia's entry into the war (p. 563).

[25] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, pp. 618–19.

Stalin were skeptical that China would really be such a power, but they went along, even to the extent of allotting China a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Meanwhile, Roosevelt was struggling with might and main to keep Chiang Kai-shek's regime in the war, by the Burma campaign, the gruelling airline over the hump of the world and by sending all the military aid he could spare. He also obtained from Stalin a pledge that he would make a treaty of friendship with Chiang, which Stalin did, believing, as wjll be developed in another chapter, that Chiang would be the ruler of China.

Chiang Kai-shek, who was impotent in North China and Manchuria, did not protest the Yalta bargain at China's expense. It was the Chinese Communists, who were strong in this area, who protested. After a visit to Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, following Tito's break with Russia, Joseph Alsop stated that Stalin tried to force Mao Tse-tung into a highly unfavorable coalition with the Chinese Nationalists, on the terms laid down by General Patrick Hurley, but Mao flatly refused. Tito also stated that Stalin had attempted to force him to bring King Peter back to Yugoslavia, and that Stalin tried to carry out the 50–50 division of influence on Yugoslavia which he had arranged with Churchill at Moscow.[27]

Vladimir Dedijer confirmed these statements, adding that in 1948 Stalin tried to persuade the Yugoslavs to stop helping the Greek rebels and that when he came to organize the Cominform in 1947 he carefully left out the Greek Communist party.[28]

2. *Three Votes for Russia in the United Nations*

At Yalta, Stalin asked for separate membership in the UN for the three Soviet states facing Europe: Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, though he soon dropped his claim for Lithuania. The unsurpassed suffering of the other two during the war, still fresh in everyone's mind, made it difficult to deny their claims on grounds of contribution to the creation of the new world of the United Nations.

The Russian claim had two objectives: to secure representation for the U.S.S.R. in the General Assembly a little more in proportion to the huge size and weight of the Soviet Union, and to give it additional voices for debate, not only in the UN but in other post-war conferences. Moscow did not want to find itself isolated and alone in the UN later, with only one spokesman among nearly sixty.

Knowing that the proposal would be strongly attacked in the United States, Roosevelt sought to shelve it, but the British, thinking of India and the British Dominions, supported Russia and the three votes for Russia were approved with the proviso, urged by Byrnes, that the United States should also have three votes. Stalin agreed cordially but the President later dropped this idea.[29]

The announcement of the agreement was botched badly. Roosevelt did not

[26] **Theodore H. White, *Fire in the Ashes,* New York, 1953, p. 343; London, Cassell, 1954.**

[27] **Joseph Alsop, *The Nashville Tennessean,* June 24, 1951; Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *ibid.*, July 23, 1951.**

[28] **Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito,* New York, 1953, pp. 233, 292–3, 321–2.**

[29] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–42; *Yalta Papers*, pp. 714—15.**

like it and he said nothing about it in his Yalta report to Congress. The shadow of Woodrow Wilson was ever with him. He was determined to succeed where Wilson had "failed." Wilson's opponents had raised a violent, sustained and effective clamor about the six votes of the British countries in the League of Nations Assembly. Would not Roosevelt's enemies do the same about three votes for Russia?

Actually the American people had learned enough to avoid being stampeded again by the same specious outcry. It was a mistake not to publish the agreement. When, to buttress himself in the Congress, Roosevelt appointed Representatives Bloom and Eaton, Senators Connally and Vandenberg to the San Francisco Conference delegation he had to tell them about the three votes for Russia, on March 23, 1945. On the 29th the story was "leaked" to the ***New York Herald Tribune***, and the press descended on the White House with the flinty sternness that it did not have to simulate where Russia was concerned. Here was the President making soft and secret deals with the Russians! In Roosevelt's absence Secretary of State Stettinius had to take the rap and the uproar helped greatly to spread the legend of the ailing President's terrible and sinister failures at Yalta.

Unfortunately the small breach made by the concession of three votes to the U.S.S.R. in the principle of one vote to each member of the United Nations has not resulted in a more equitable voting arrangement. The vote of Panama is still equal to that of the United States.

3. *The veto power in the United Nations*

In the opinion of Byrnes, who attended the Yalta Conference, our chief objective there was to secure final agreement for the creation of the United Nations. This was a crucial objective, since the outlook for the world would indeed be grim unless another league of nations, could be created with the Soviet Union a participating member. Otherwise, the world would face the prospect of a rush to fill vacuums and a new arms race between an immensely more powerful Russia and the Wester^ Allies.

Before the United Nations could be created the deadlock over the veto question had to be settled. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference the Soviets had maintained that the veto must be absolute, while we had contended that it must not cover the discussion of charges of aggression. A Great Power holding the right of veto would have the full right to prevent any action against itself, or any vote labelling it as an aggressor but not the right to prevent another State from stating its case when the Great Power was involved in a dispute. At Yalta, Stalin still continued to argue that the stating of a case against a Great Power implied a demand for decision. The matter was "much more serious than merely expressing an opinion." He insisted that all questions are decided by votes and "we are interested in the decisions and not in the discussions." He assured Churchill that if China demanded the return of Hong Kong she would not be alone. Others would vote with her. When Churchill said that Britain could then use her veto Stalin replied that there was another danger. His colleagues in Moscow could not forget the case which occurred in 1939 during the Russian-Finnish War, when at the

instigation of Britain and France the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion" against her.[30]

After further exposition of the American formula for restricting the veto Stalin accepted it, and before Roosevelt had made any concessions on other subjects.[31]

4. *The control of Germany*

In the early part of the Conference there was general agreement that Germany should be dismembered into several states, but later this idea fell into the background. Both the British and the Americans were reluctant to attempt to collect reparations from Germany, remembering their dismal experiences after the First World War and fearing that they might have to support an impoverished Germany. The Russians, fired by the knowledge of their immeasurable losses at Germany's hand, insisted that heavy reparations in kind must be exacted. They felt that eighty per cent of Germany's heavy industry could be removed without impoverishing the Germans and insisted that reparations should total $20,000,000,000 in value, of which half should go to the Soviet Union.

The President agreed that the Reparations Commission "should take, in its initial studies as a basis for discussion, the suggestion of the Soviet Government, tfiat the total sum of reparations should be twenty billions and that fifty per cent of it should go to the Soviet Union." The President meant no more than this statement said, that they would start exploring the reparations question on the basis of the Soviet suggestion, but the Russians ever afterward maintained, with apparent sincerity, that they had been assured of ten billions reparations at Yalta.

The Three agreed heartily and cordially upon a program for the control of Germany. They said:

> "It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces: break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions; remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations."[32]

[30] ***Yalta Papers*, p. 666.** [31] ***Ibid.*, pp. 711–12.**
[32] **The *New York Times*, February 13, 1945.**

Doubtless it was inevitable that differences of opinion should arise about the methods for applying these policies. It was nevertheless almost incredible that four years after Yalta there should be a complete split over Germany, with hot heads on both sides planning to use the Germans against their former allies, and with Nazi-minded Germans expecting to recover their power by fighting on one side or the other.

5. Poland

Frontiers. When the Yalta Conference opened, the American policy of postponing all discussion of Russia's western boundaries until the peace conference had broken down. Starting in great force late in December, from a line stretching from East Prussia to Budapest, the Red armies had swept two hundred miles across Poland to the Oder, thirty miles from Berlin, and the Upper Danube region was being rapidly overrun, while the Western Allies had not yet occupied all of the left bank of the Rhine. The long delay in .opening the Second Front was now working to Russia's advantage.

The West was now glad to propose the 1919 Curzon Line, which was substantially Russia's 1941 border, as the boundary between Russia and Poland. When this proposal was made, Stalin spoke with stronger emotion than at any other time during the Conference. He stood up to emphasize his strong feeling on the subject. The bitter memory of Russia's exclusion from the Paris Peace Conference and of the West's effort to stamp out Bolshevism at its birth boiled up within him. "You would drive us into shame," he declared. The White Russians and the Ukrainians would say that Stalin and Molotov were far less reliable defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau.[33]

Yet after long and earnest discussion Stalin accepted the Curzon Line and even agreed voluntarily that there should be digressions from that line of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland in some regions. He did not mind the Line itself, which Churchill declared in the House of Commons, on February 27, 1945, he had always believed to be "just and right," but he did not want it called by a hated name. The West had long since forgotten the events of 1919, but it was not so easy for the Red leaders, who felt that they had suffered great injustice in that period.

In the Dunn-Atherton memorandum of February 4,1942, the State Department had expected to be able to hold Russia in check by withholding agreement to her 1941 boundaries. Now Stalin made it clear that he meant to move Poland's western borders deep into Germany, back to the western Neisse-Oder River lines, taking not only East Prussia and all of Silesia but Pomerania and the tip of Brandenburg, back to and including Stettin. From six to nine million additional Germans would be evicted, though most would have fled, and Poland would receive far more from Germany than the poor territories, including the great Pripet Marshes, which she lost to Russia. Stalin declared that he preferred to continue the war a little longer, "although it costs us blood," in order to give Poland compensation in the West at the expense of the Germans.[34]

[33] *Yalta Papers*, pp. 679–81; Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 30

[34] *Ibid.*

By this time Churchill was not so cordial toward moving Poland westward as he had been at Teheran, where he and Eden had both heartily approved the idea. After "a prolonged study of the Oder line on a map," at Teheran, Churchill "liked the picture." He would tell the Poles, he said, that they had been "given a fine place to live in, more than three hundred miles each way."[35] At Yalta he thought more about the six million Germans who would have to leave, trying to find work in Germany, and Roosevelt objected to the Western Neisse River being chosen in the south, instead of the Eastern Neisse, both of which flow into the Oder.[36]

The issue was left in abeyance, presumably for the peace conference. However, there was no real question of the justice of creating a strong Poland, both industrially and agriculturally, and one unplagued by large minorities of Germans or Russians. The moving of millions of the German master-race, from the very heart of Junkerdom, to make room for the Polish Slavs whom they had enslaved and openly planned to exterminate was a drastic operation, but there was little doubt that it was historically justified.

Government. Of more importance to the West than Poland's boundaries was, the character of her government. At Yalta the West still believed that Eastern Europe could be kept in its orbit, in spite of the onrushing Soviet armies. Though little democracy had ever been practised in this region, and much of it was still ruled by feudalistic means, it was taken for granted that at least the forms of Western democracy would be established in this area and Western capitalism preserved within it. Believing devoutly as they did in Anglo-Saxon institutions, it was important to both Roosevelt and Churchill that the Poles should have them.

The issue was acute because the exiled Polish Government in London, supported in the main by Britain, was still competing with the new Lublin Government formed behind the Red Army. More time was spent in trying to marry these incompatibles than over any subject discussed at Yalta. The result was an agreement that the Lublin Government should be "reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from the Poles abroad," and pledged to hold "free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." All "democratic and anti-Nazi parties" were to have the right to campaign.

Roosevelt acted as moderator of the long debate on this issue. It was a matter of principle with Churchill, since Britain had declared war in behalf of Poland. To Stalin it was a matter of life and death. He made this completely clear. Speaking with "great earnestness," he said: "For the Russian people, the question of Poland is not only a question of honor but also a question of security. Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia. Twice in the last thirty years our enemies, the Germans, have passed through this corridor. It is in Russia's interest that Poland should be strong and powerful, in a position to shut the door of this

[35] **Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. V, pp. 362, 396.**
[36] **Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, pp. 374, 377.**

corridor by her own force. ... It is necessary that Poland should be free, independent in power. Therefore, it is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet state."[37]

In other words, the Soviet Union was determined to create a Poland so strong as to be a powerful bulwark against Germany and so closely tied to Russia that there would never be any question of her serving as a ***cordon sanitaire*** against the Soviets or posing as an independent, balancing power in between Russia and Germany. Byrnes says that invariably thereafter the Soviets used the same security argument to justify their course in Poland. This reasoning was also as inevitable as anything could be. Any free elections that were to be held in Poland would have to produce a government in which Moscow had complete confidence, and all pressure from the West for free voting by anti-Soviet elements in Poland would be met by restrictions on voting by these elements.

6. *Liberated Europe*

In even greater degree the same rule applied to the remainder of Eastern Europe, where the upper classes had generally collaborated with the Nazis, even to the extent of sending millions of their peasants into Russia as a part of Hitler's armies. But at Yalta the conflicting expectations of East and West were merged into an agreement by the Big Three to assist all liberated countries in Europe "to create democratic institutions of their own choice." In any case ***"where in their judgment conditions require***" [italics added] they would "form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people." Other similar affirmations in the Declaration on Liberated Europe seemed to assure democratic institutions on the Western model. Later it developed that the Soviets had a very different interpretation of democracy, which will be discussed later, and their judgment never told them that the Big Three should unite in establishing democratic conditions, as we understand them, within their zone of influence.

Professor McNeill thinks that at Yalta, Stalin did not fully realize the dilemma which faced him, that he thought the exclusion of the anti-Soviet voters from East European elections would not be greatly resented by his allies, while neither Roosevelt nor Churchill frankly faced "the fact that, in Poland at least, genuinely free democratic elections would return governments unfriendly to Russia," by any definition of international friendliness. Also war-time propaganda and cooperation had "obscured the differences between Russian and Western ideas of democracy," and it seemed better to have them covered by verbal formulae than to imperil the military victories over Germany and Japan.[38]

The application of these formulae could not please both sides, for they really attempted to marry the impossible to the inevitable. While obliged to concede governments in East Europe allied with the Soviet Union instead

[37] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–2; Churchill, *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, p. 369.**
[38] **William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia, 1941–1946,* pp. 532–6.**

of opposed to it, we thought we had preserved our social and economic system in East Europe.

This illusion was described in a far-sighted editorial in the ***New York Herald Tribune***, on March 5, 1947, in connection with the submission of the satellite peace treaties to the Senate. In doing so Marshall and Byrnes were "asking for the ratification of a grim lesson in the facts of international life." We had entertained exaggerated ideas about our victory automatically establishing our system throughout the world. " ***We were troubled about the fate of the Baltic States. Yalta left us with comforting illusions of a Western capitalist-democratic political economy reigning supreme up to the Curzon line and the borders of Bessarabia***." [Italics added.]

This is a penetrating description of our post-war illusion, which applied to other areas than East Europe. The same editorial continued that "We expected to democratize Japan and Korea and to see à new China pattern itself easily on our institutions. We expected, in short, that most of the world would make itself over in our image and that it would be relatively simple, from such a position, to deal with the localized aberrations of the Soviet Union." Yet actually "the image corresponded in no way to the actualities of the post-war world. Neither our military, our economic nor our ideological power reached far enough" to determine the fate of East Europe. Then the editorial added prophetically: "how far they may reach in Asia is yet undetermined, but they fall far short of our dreams of the war conferences."

Here is the best short explanation of the origins of the Cold War that has been written. Failing to heed the lesson so clearly contained in the satellite treaties, President Truman re-declared the Cold War on March 12, 1947, in the Truman Doctrine, exactly one week after the ***Herald Tribune*** editorial was written, and a year after the Cold War had been announced by Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in Truman's presence. Then China promptly went Communist, and Mr. Truman had to fight the interminable Korean war for the democratization of Korea before we learned how far our writ did "reach in Asia."

Years of war, strain, and hatred; of heavy arms expenditures and constant danger of another world war had to ensue before the United States could bring itself to accept the two chief results of World War II—Communist control of East Europe and China.

A New Balance of Power. While the Cold War raged it was easy to blame it all on Yalta. Yet, in summarizing a series of careful essays on the Yalta Conference, Forrest Pogue could find no basis for Yalta becoming "a symbol for betrayal and a shibboleth for the opponents of Roosevelt and of international cooperation." When the Yalta Papers were finally published with great fanfare they had revealed no betrayal by anyone. The United States could not be made strong "by irrational denunciation of its leaders and cries. of treason which grow out of frustration and fear." The country, said Pogue, which constantly tears at its vitals and heedlessly destroys the reputation of its loyal public servants cannot give the sane and courageous guidance so

desperately needed to calm the fears and solve the problems of a troubled world."[39]

The truth was, Pogue concluded, that the concessions made by the West at Yalta "reflected the powerful position of the Soviet Union in Europe and its potential power in the Far East." This was "the overriding fact about the conference; without its comprehension, the meaning of Yalta is sure to be missed."[40]

Allied Unity. There remains the question: "Was the powerful impression of unity created by the Yalta Conference purely illusory?"

The long official report of the Conference, with its nine different subjects and signed by the three world leaders was perhaps the most impressive document of the war period. It had a splendid reception, except in isolationist circles. Herbert Hoover and Arthur H. Vandenberg praised it.[41] It seemed that the Conference had grappled with all the urgent issues of the time and, better still, had laid down continuing procedure^ for the handling of future problems and controversies, both in Europe and in the world itself. Certainly no more could have been asked of any conference. Were all of these hopeful and forward-looking agreements entered into by the Soviet leaders with the intention of cynically violating them?

It is certain that the leaders of the Conference all felt the weight of the responsibility upon them and that they believed that they had done a good job. The final paragraphs of the report reaffirmed their common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace the unity which had won the war. This was a sacred obligation to their own peoples and to all the peoples. They looked forward to "the greatest opportunity in all history" to create the essential conditions for a secure peace.

The Americans left the Conference with a feeling of exultation that so much had been accomplished. Harry Hopkins said later: "We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great victory of the peace—and, by 'we,' I mean ***all*** of us, the whole civilized human race. The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine."[42] Hopkins added one reservation, that they would not feel so confident if Stalin should die.

After refuting the rumors that he himself had been ill during the Yalta period, Roosevelt told a joint session of Congress, on March 1, 1945: "I come from the Crimean Conference with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace." He had never for an instant wavered in his "belief that an agreement to insure world peace and security can be reached." Commenting on the occasion, Ernest K. Lindley, one of the best Washington correspondents, wrote that the President obviously felt well physically and was confident of the success of his mission.[43]

[39] **John L. Snell, *The Meaning of Yalta,* Baton Rouge, 1956, pp. 195–6, 207.**
[40] ***Ibid*., p. 206.** [41] ***Ibid*., p. 189.** [42] **Sherwood, *op. cit*., p. 870.**
[43] ***The Nashville Tennessean,* March 5, 1945.**

Byrnes' stenographic report of the Conference contains evidence that Stalin felt deeply the necessity for unity among the great allies after the war. Said Stalin: "It is not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there is a joint aim to defeat the common enemy, which is clear to everyone. The difficult task will come after the war when diverse interests tend to divide the Allies. It is our duty to see that our relations in peace-time are as strong as they have been in war." The importance of unity was strongly in Stalin's mind, for on another occasion, in discussing the United Nations, he said: "I think that the task is to secure our unity in the future, and, for this purpose, we must agree upon such a covenant as would best serve that purpose. The danger in the future is the possibility of conflicts among ourselves. If there be unity, then the danger from Germany will not be great. Now we have to think how we can create a situation" favoring such unity, he continued, and added, "We will keep a united front."

They all knew, said Stalin, "that as long as the three of them lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions," but after all ten years later none of them might be present. A new generation not knowing the horrors of war would arise. It was therefore their obligation to create "such an organization as would secure the peace for at least fifty years."[44]

It is difficult to believe that Stalin, who had won the respect and confidence of everyone at the Conference, would have made these statements if he expected to violate all of the agreements made at Yalta and split the world disastrously in two. The statements quoted reflect an awareness that this could occur, but also a desire that it should not happen. Stalin did not conduct himself at Yalta like a man who intended to violate all his commitments. His military position was also so strong, and growing stronger hourly, that he could have avoided making so many agreements looking toward post-war cooperation.

In his report to the House of Commons, on February 27, 1945, Churchill stated clearly his interpretation of the inner meaning of Yalta, saying: "The impression I brought back from the Crimea, and from all my other contacts, is that Marshal Stalin and the Soviet leaders wish to live in honorable friendship and equity with the Western democracies. I feel also that their word is their bond. I know of no government which stands to its obligations, even in its own despite, more solidly than the Russian Soviet Government. I decline absolutely to embark here on a discussion about Russian good faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world. Somber indeed would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian Soviet Union, if all the future world organizations were rent asunder, and if new cataclysms of inconceivable violence destroyed all that is left of the treasures and liberties of mankind."[45]

Here, also, was the keen realization that the world could be disastrously split, with fatal consequences, but there was the most positive affirmation of belief in the desire of the Soviet leaders to live in peace with the West.

[44] ***Yalta Papers*, pp. 665–6; Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–7, 44.**

[45] ***International Conciliation*, April 1945, No. 410, pp. 307–8. The reactions of the British Press to the Yalta Conference were as enthusiastic as the American.—McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 563.**

It can be said that the Soviet leaders were dominated inexorably by some Marxian dialectic and that just as soon as Germany was conquered they would push on toward the conquest of the world for communism. Conceivably, but to explain everything which has happened since Yalta as the inevitable and infallible working of such a categorical imperative stretches credulity. There were too many opportunities for normal human disagreement in the application of the Yalta agreements, too much probability that two very different ways of life could not easily be reconciled in the power vacuum of a ruined and devastated Europe.[46]

At the time the Yalta Conference adjourned there can hardly be any serious doubt that both sides wanted to cooperate, not only to win the two wars which still raged, but to live together in the post-war world. But this did not extinguish the intention of each side to restore or establish in the areas coming under its control its own kind of government. Churchill had already made that wholly clear in Italy and Greece. Stalin had already done the same in Bulgaria and he now moved to coordinate Rumania.

RUMANIA FORCED TO THE LEFT

As soon as the Yalta decisions became known the Leftist forces in Rumania moved to seize control, before the Yalta formulas could be put into effect. A government headed by seventy-year-old General Radescu had taken office on December 5, 1944. His government was Rightist in sympathies. Naturally it did not purge the army of pro-fascist elements or move very fast toward splitting up the landed estates. Marshal Malinovsky also complained that it did not preserve order. He alleged that so-called Maniu gangs attacked people of Hungarian nationality.

On their side the Communists had organized a National Democratic Front in October, composed of the Communists and several small groups brought in for appearances, and obtained forty per cent of the seats in the Cabinet. On February 12 the Front filled a hall and prevented the Prime Minister from making a speech. On February 22 a Tass dispatch from Moscow alleged that the Rumanian army had arrested a local Front council at Craiova after a large Front rally. Demonstrations multiplied and the Moscow radio charged that on February 24 many citizens had been killed and wounded by the Rumanian army at a demonstration in Bucharest. Radescu was accused of provoking the situation to justify him in taking "Greek" measures.[47] The nine Front ministers, headed by Deputy Premier Peter Groza, resigned.

[46] Stettinius thought that some of the post-Yalta difficulties may have been due to disapproval of what Stalin had done at Yalta by the Politburo, which "may well have taken the line that the Soviet Union had been virtually sold out at Yalta." He maintained that when all the agreements at Yalta are analyzed the Soviet Union made more concessions to the West than were made to her. He listed four concessions on the United Nations: the agreement for real coordination of military activities; concessions concerning France and Yugoslavia; the acceptance of the American draft of the "Declaration on Liberated Europe," without two proposed Soviet amendments; and the agreements about Poland, where the Soviet Union was already in control.—Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians,* pp. 295–303, 310.

[47] The *New York Times,* February 13, 22, 27, 28, 1945.

Groza Imposed. On February 24 the American and British members of the Allied Control Council for Rumania were denied a meeting by the Soviet chairman, and on the 27th Andrei Vishinsky went to Bucharest from Moscow and demanded the dismissal of the Radescu Government. The demand was repeated to King Michael the next day. The King was given two hours to comply and, to emphasize the warning, the royal door was slammed with such force that the plaster cracked around it. Michael attempted to appoint Prince Stirby, but was forced to accept Groza, and Groza's Cabinet list, on March 6. Molotov bluntly rejected a request of Roosevelt, through Harriman, that an Allied commission be set up in Bucharest to safeguard the Yalta agreements.[48]

Contemporary newspaper comment did not greatly regret the advent of the Groza Government. Writing from London, John MacCormac thought that thus far Russia had shown forbearance. With the Germans still in force in neighboring Yugoslavia she could not afford to have an unreliable government in Rumania. He thought the solution not a revolutionary one, but it was symptomatic of the social conflicts generated by the war and unresolved by liberation. Pertinax, the noted French correspondent, observed that no one should wonder that Vishinsky had promptly settled Radescu's fate. The leadership of the Rumanian liberals and peasants was hopelessly out of tune with the times. The new Cabinet was servile to the Reds and it was rapidly transforming the social structure of Rumania.[49]

Such a transformation was badly needed. A keen analyst has observed that "the social crime of Rumania's interwar rulers was greater than that of other eastern European governments," because they preserved "inordinate rural squalor" in the midst of great natural wealth. With "the most fertile soil on earth" Rumanian production per hectare, one-third of Denmark's, stood at the bottom in Europe. Her rulers contained "the greatest percentage of plain unreconstructed home-grown Fascists" outside of Germany. They had been "unmitigatedly brutal in stamping out not only Reds but also pinks," Jews and peasants who engaged in politics.[50]

Later it was clear to everyone that Russia had moved swiftly and roughly to establish a communist government in Rumania which would break the economic and social power of the conservatives, take a large share of the business profits in Rumania and bind that country firmly to the Soviet Union as a satellite state. In other words, the Soviets were doing in Rumania what Churchill had already done in Greece, with more justification and with little bloodshed. The old regime in Rumania had fought Russia during the war and had done its best to destroy the Soviet Union, while the Greek people had fought as Britain's allies and expected that liberation would also free them from the dominance of their fascist and royalist rulers. However, Churchill's determination to hold control of the Mediterranean combined with his social conservatism and love of monarchy to frustrate social change in Greece. He maneuvered steadily to prevent the Left from gaining power in Greece and at length prevented it from doing so in a bloody war which lasted two months.

[45] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–2.**

[49] **The *New York Times*, March 4, 16, 1945.**

[50] **Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, pp. 361–2.**

Then Rightist reaction and terror held full sway in Greece for years to come, in the interest of the Right. In Rumania communist terror permanently suppressed the Rightist elements and ruled the country, for the benefit of the Left.

"***Democracy*" *and "Free Elections*."** At Yalta, Roosevelt hoped he had prevented from happening the very thing which did happen swiftly in Rumania. It had been agreed that the liberated peoples should "create democratic institutions of their own choice" by "free and unfettered elections" in which "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties" should have a part. Then it transpired that democracy and free elections meant very different things to the two sides.

The diplomatic correspondent of the London ***Times***, who had recently been in Russia, gave a glimpse of the chasm which these words were expected to cover, as early as April 12, 1945. In answer to the question "What is democratic reconstruction?" he wrote: "Where the Western Governments lay stress on the political liberty for all ranks (except for the proven collaborators) and on the need for orderly or gradual progress by ballot, Soviet writers dwell on economic inequalities, on the war records of some of the propertied classes, and on the urgent programmes of the organized workers' and peasants' parties. Democracy to them is democracy of the Left."

To the question "What is a government friendly to the Soviet Union?" he replied: "In the Soviet view it is a question not simply of policy but of proof, and proof comes only when all parties and economic groups which played a dubious part either before or during the war have been excluded from power, when influential landlords have given place to smaller holders and when the economic and political basis of the country provides the guarantee of stability in policy."

The American view, which was fully expressed through Roosevelt at Yalta, was that after some proven collaborators with the enemy had been punished the three Allies would assure absolutely free elections in Eastern Europe to determine the future of those countries. We sought to preserve the power of the top social strata which had long ruled these countries. To the Soviets this was incomprehensible. They assumed that practically all of the upper classes had been collaborators. To them, all capitalists, all large landowners, all aristocrats and royalists were enemies of the people. They had been crushed and destroyed in Russia and it would be wicked in their sight to leave them in control of the Rumanian or Polish peoples. When all these elements had been swept from power—and the social, economic and political power of the Church broken—then you could have "free elections." That is, the great masses of the people could be allowed to vote for the leaders and programs proposed for their benefit. No other kind of election could be "democratic" in their view because "the enemies of the people" would influence or determine the result.

The Russian conception of democracy, says Crankshaw, "is not, as we think, a humbug. It means government for the people with the consent of the people." He adds that temperamentally "the Russians are indisputably

anticompromisers," from which we get the strange situation that the consent of the people may be largely forced, certainly in the early stages, and that no dissent is tolerated.[51]

This is certainly not democracy as we understand it, or as the Greeks defined it. The Russians should get another word for their conception of government in the interest of the great masses of the people. They have, nevertheless, fastened upon the word and have convinced themselves that their definition of democracy is as valid as ours. It would also be impossible for them to apply our conception of democracy in lands conquered by them. If they did, they would stultify their belief in their own system, which they hold with the passionate fervor of a religion. This was the decisive fact which the West forgot, or perhaps did not understand, in composing the Yalta agreements. Having total confidence in the rightness and righteousness of our way of life, we assumed that the Russians would apply it in Eastern Europe. We took it for granted that they knew that they had a bad, inferior and wicked way of life and that they would confess it by accepting ours in all the liberated territories.

As events speedily proved, we expected the impossible. It was as impossible for the Russians to conduct free elections, Western style, in Rumania, as it was that General MacArthur should go into Japan and conclude that out of deference to our great Russian ally he ought to install communism in some of the Japanese islands, or semi-communism in all of them. The very thought is incredible, inconceivable. We know that communism is wholly wrong and could not think of giving it the slightest aid or recognition. Yet we expected the Russian Communists, who are fanatically convinced that they have the one true and right system of government, to accept our way of life in Poland and the Balkans.

ROOSEVELT'S LAST DAYS

As soon as Rumania had been "coordinated" by the U.S.S.R., disagreement arose over the composition of the new Polish Government which had been agreed upon at Yalta. The Yalta agreement said that the Allied Commission for Poland would consult ***in the first instance*** with members of the existing "Provisional Government and with other Polish Democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad," with a view to the reorganization of the government. The Western leaders thought this should lead to a completely new government in which all of the conflicting Polish groups would be merged, but on March 2 Ambassador Harriman reported that Molotov was insisting that only Poles acceptable to the Lublin Government should be consulted. This was Molotov's interpretation of the phrase "in the first instance," an interpretation against which Roosevelt protested in a message to Stalin on April 1, expressing his concern with the development of events since Yalta. In reply, on April 7, Stalin insisted that only Polish leaders should be invited who would accept the Curzon Line and who were "really striving

[51] **Edward Crankshaw, *Russia and the Russians*, New York, 1948, pp. 120, 125; London, Macmillan, 1947.**

to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union." Stalin also continued his refusal to send Molotov to the San Francisco Conference.[52]

The Berne Incident. Russian suspicion that the Western powers would end the war in Europe to Russia's disadvantage also caused a very disturbing incident. In North Italy one of Himmler's men, General Karl Wolff, told our OSS agents that he wanted to go to Switzerland to discuss the surrender of the German forces in Italy. The British Chiefs of Staff thought the Russians should be notified, and they were, on March 11, 1945, it being made clear that the proposed meeting in Berne was only to arrange a meeting to discuss surrender in the field. Molotov had no objections but wanted to send three Russian officers to take part in the conversations. Major General John R. Deane, chief of our military mission in Moscow, urged that the request be rejected, because its acceptance would be "an act of appeasement" which would "react against us in future negotiations." This was apparently the first invocation of the appeasement analogy in the relations between the war-time allies.

The American reply to Molotov, on March 15, welcomed Soviet representatives at General Alexander's headquarters, but did not suggest that they could go to Berne, saying that since the proposed surrender was on an Anglo-American front Alexander would be responsible for the negotiations. On the 16th, Molotov replied that our refusal to let his men go to Berne was "utterly unexpected and incomprehensible." He insisted that the Berne negotiations be broken off.

To our Ambassador, Averell Harriman, in Moscow, this "arrogant language" brought "out into the open a domineering attitude toward the United States which we have before only suspected." He urged firm but friendly rejection. On the 21st he was authorized to reply to Molotov.that no negotiation with the Germans had taken place.[53] .

In the meantime, General Kesselring had been called from Italy to Germany on March 15, and placed in command of the German armies on the Western front. Thereafter the Germans surrendered to the Americans and British, "army by army wherever they could," but did not surrender to the Russians.[54] This development brought Russian suspicions to the boiling-point. Anyone could have predicted in advance, and the Russians doubtless had, that the Germans would seek to escape capture by the Russians, but Moscow now thought they were doing so in collusion with the Allies. Molotov replied to Harriman, on March 23, that during the past two weeks the Americans and British had been carrying on negotiations with the enemy "behind the backs of the Soviet Union" and that this was "absolutely inadmissible." To Admiral Leahy this note was "insulting."

Roosevelt replied to Stalin, on March 24, saying that he was sure that, through misunderstanding, the facts had not been presented to Stalin. The President insisted that we "must give every assistance to all officers in the field who believe there is "a possibility of forcing the surrender of enemy troops."

[52] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–6.** [53] **Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 330–2.**

[54] **Pertinax, the *New York Times*, October 17, 1945; George Fielding Eliot, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 25, 1945.**

No political implications were involved. Then for the first time Stalin made a sharp answer to the President, asserting that the Nazis had moved some divisions from Italy to the eastern front and that "this circumstance is irritating to the Soviet Command and creates ground for distrust."[55]

This message thoroughly alarmed the Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff, who saw that only an open break between the Allies could prevent the speedy disintegration of the German armies. To prevent such a calamity, Roosevelt asked Leahy and Marshall to prepare a reply to Stalin. It categorically assured Stalin that no negotiations for surrender had taken place and that there was absolutely no question of any which would release German troops for the Russian front.

Stalin brushed this argument aside, saying that his military colleagues did not have any doubts that the negotiations had taken place, that they had ended in agreement, and that Kesselring had agreed to open the front to the Anglo-Americans in return for a promise of easier peace terms. Stalin thought his military men were "close to the truth," since "the Germans on the Western Front in fact have ceased the war against England and the United States," while continuing the war with Russia.[56]

Admiral Leahy felt that this reply also was insulting to us, because it questioned our motives and promises. He and Marshall again collaborated on a reply which "approached as closely to a rebuke as is permitted in diplomatic exchanges between friendly states." In "firm tones" it repeated, on April 4, the previous assurances, expressed astonishment that Stalin could see us in a deal with the Germans, and stated sharply that Eisenhower's rapid advance was due to military victory, not to any secret agreements with Kesselring. Stalin's information must have come from German sources and, said the President's dispatch, "Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted subordinates."

The next day, April 5, the denunciation of Russia's neutrality pact with Japan cleared the atmosphere of Allied relations noticeably, and on April 7 Stalin assured Roosevelt that he never doubted his honesty and dependability. On April 11, Roosevelt thanked the Marshal and said: "There must not, in any event, be mutual mistrust, and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the future."

On April 12, Roosevelt sent two cables. One to Ambassador Harriman stated that "It is my desire to consider the Berne misunderstanding a minor matter." The other message, to Churchill, said: "I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out as in the case of the Berne meeting. We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct."[57]

In his excellent account of this incident Herbert Feis thought it revealed

[55] **Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 333.** [56] ***Ibid.*, p.334.**

[57] ***Ibid.*, p. 336; Bymes, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–9. There was nothing behind the German side of the Berne incident. Wolff was apparently acting on his own and never enlisted anybody else.**

what a ruffian Stalin was at heart. On the other hand, the Russians could have thought that some understanding about the details of surrender might be discussed in Switzerland and there appeared to be some doubt in London about the advisability of excluding them from this early stage of the dealings with Wolff, which never came to anything in the end. Feis recorded "the spectacular progress of various allied forces in the West during these days," and Stalin's insistence that his own intelligence agents had been proved right in their previous reports. He noted that Roosevelt had overruled Harriman in closing the incident as a "minor" one.[58]

This is the incident which is often cited as proof that the Russians are impossible people to deal with and that even Roosevelt himself could not have preserved friendly relations with them much longer. It was a disturbing incident, between Allies who had reached accord on so many questions only a month before at Yalta. The Russians were clearly in the wrong in refusing the offer of representation at Alexander's headquarters. The Italian front was a strictly Anglo-American affair. On the other hand, the Soviets did have a deep interest in the surrender of the German armies. Everyone knew that they were likely to hold against the Russians longer than the Western Allies. Stalin was wrong to doubt our word, even when the circumstances seemed to point toward Allied collusion with the Germans, but it was not unnatural that he should believe his own informants, rather than ours, until compelled to see that his suspicions were unfounded. Yet actually they were not without basis, since Churchill was simultaneously fighting a sustained engagement with Eisenhower and the American Chiefs of Staff, from March 29 to April 7, with the object of throwing General Montgomery forward in a dash to capture Berlin before the nearby Russians could do so. Churchill was in fact trying Jo do essentially what the Russians feared, seize the fruits of victory, against weak German resistance, while the Germans held the Russians.[59]

Could Roosevelt Have Avoided the Cold War? As to whether Berne incident indicated sure trouble ahead with the Russians, even in Roosevelt's mind, the evidence is all the other way. His cables to Harriman and Churchill are his very last legacy to us, and they both reduce the incident to its true proportions, an unpleasant incident arising in the final rush of Germany's conquest.[60]

From this it is clear that Roosevelt died believing that he would be able to build a structure of cooperation with the Soviet Union on the foundations which he had labored so hard to lay. There had been disquieting developments after Yalta, leading to sharp words on both sides, but Roosevelt did not believe that they indicated the opening of any basic rift. Most of the problems straightened out, "and our course thus far is correct."

Cordell Hull has also recorded his conviction that Roosevelt did not believe any rift was imminent when he died, saying: "On the occasions when the President came to see me at the hospital after my resignation, including his last visit only a few days before his death, he said nothing about any fears he

[58] **Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 583–96.**
[59] **Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, pp. 396–403.**
[60] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–9.**

might have that Russia would abandon our cooperative movement for peace or would block or destroy it."[61]

It is frequently said that Roosevelt knew during his last weeks that his strategy had failed. If so, he could fail to mention it to Hull. But he also talked with Edgar Snow about Russia, on March 3, 1945, and said positively that at his last meeting with Stalin they "had got close to speaking the same language." Many points had been disputed between Stalin and Churchill, "but Stalin," said Roosevelt, "agreed to every single suggestion I made." ***"I am convinced that we are going to get along"*** the President said emphatically.

"His optimism was so contagious," Snow wrote, that "it dispelled most of my fears. He spoke with absolute conviction of his ability to get along with the Russians. Some have said his dispute with Stalin over the Polish question disillusioned him, but it is incredible to me that Roosevelt could have permitted one incident to cause him to abandon overnight a purpose for which he had worked so ardently throughout the war."

Snow's judgment is well based. It would indeed have been incredible if Roosevelt had allowed one incident or a series of them in the hectic atmosphere of ending a world war, to deflect him from the urgent necessity of working with Russia in the post-war world. This was a need so desperately evident that any layman could grasp it. To Roosevelt, great world politician that he was, there could be no other rational policy. When Edgar Snow saw him in May 1944, Snow had just read the series of articles in the ***Saturday Evening Post*** by Forrest Davis, "The Great Design," in which Roosevelt's purpose "to remove Russia's historic fear of encirclement and exclusion from Europe" was discussed. Roosevelt agreed that Davis correctly interpreted his views, but demurred at the phrase "The Great Gamble," used to describe our policy of working with Russia. "Gamble" was not the word, the President, said, when there was no real alternative to working with Russia except to begin preparations right then for World War III. "I am all for trying to make a durable peace after this war, a world we can live in together," he added.

It has been said times without number that even Roosevelt could not have worked with the Russians and averted the Cold War. This is an article of faith for cold warriors. "Surely he could not have stood for the way they broke their Yalta promises to him!" Yet it is altogether probable that if Roosevelt had been able to finish his fourth term in the White House there would have been no Cold War.

"But what about Eastern Europe? Wouldn't he have broken with the Russians about that?" Of course this is the key question, but there is no evidence that Roosevelt would have plunged the world into decades of futile and sterile Cold War on this score. In his March 1945 interview with Snow he said: "Obviously the Russians are going to do things their own way in areas they occupy. But they won't set up a separate administration (independent of the Allied Control Commission) to rival any arrangement made for all Germany."[62]

[61] *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, p. 1467.

[62] Edgar Snow, "Stalin Must Have Peace," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 1, 1947, p. 96; *The Monthly Review*, March 19, 1959, pp. 399–403.

Aside from the accuracy of his prediction about Germany, this understanding of what the Russians would, and from their standpoint, must do in the areas they occupied was indispensable to peace in the post-war world, and without that understanding in the White House there could and would be no peace. The fate of nations is always in the hands of a few men at the top, and everything too often depends upon their point of view. Roosevelt was clear about the overriding necessity of making the peace in cooperation with the (Soviets. It was his purpose to be firm with them but to ***minimize*** the inevitable post-war disagreements. As we shall soon see, his successor was quick to ***maximize*** the difficulties and to be tough with the Russians. He was soon engaged in doing what would have been inconceivable to Roosevelt—an attempt to "contain" and encircle the Soviet Union with arms, alliances and bases around her frontiers.

Russian Tributes. When the news of President Roosevelt's death reached Moscow, in the middle of the night of April 12–13, Molotov at once went to the American Embassy to pay his respects. Stalin wrote to Mrs. Roosevelt about her husband "as the leader in the cause of ensuring the security of the whole world." In a separate message to President Truman, Stalin said:

> "The American people and the United Nations have lost in Franklin Roosevelt a great politician of world significance and a pioneer in the organization of the peace and security after the war.
>
> "The Government of the Soviet Union expresses sincere sympathy to the American people in their great loss and their conviction that the policy of friendship between the great powers who are shouldering the main burden of the war against the common enemy will continue in the future."

The Associated Press reported from Moscow also that the Russians were firmly convinced by Mr. Roosevelt's election to a fourth term that the American people desired close relations with Russia in building peace and security after the war. They would look for every sign that his program would be continued without interruption.

The ***New York Times'*** correspondent in Moscow reported that the sorrow for Roosevelt was unprecedented. People felt it both in a political way and in a personal sense, from the highest official to the lowest man in the street. Since early morning the President's death had been the single topic of conversation everywhere. Condolences were delivered to Americans all day as if a close personal relative had been lost. Not even Pearl Harbor or the Second Front had made the first page in the Russian press, and pictures seldom appeared there. On that day all newspapers were late, having been made over to carry black-bordered pictures of Mr. Roosevelt on the front page of every newspaper.

The next day the official, black-fringed red banner of national mourning was raised over Marshal Stalin's residence, the Kremlin, all government and many private buildings. No foreigner had ever received such an honor in the history of the Soviet Union. People in the subway were still talking about what Roosevelt had meant. Many were still weeping. Attendance at the

cinemas and theatres fell off noticeably. Many Russians cancelled private parties. Extra telephone operators had to be put on at the American Embassy and hundreds of Russians begged for the privilege of an invitation to the memorial service in Harriman's residence. The Government was using all possible means to encourage the people to honor the memory of their friend.[63]

On the day of Roosevelt's funeral workmen stood weeping at their benches in all parts of the Soviet Union. Indeed, mourning for him was more universal in the U.S.S.R. than in his own country, where so many influential people hated him.

The London ***Times*** representative in Moscow summarized the newspaper tributes as emphasizing Mr. Roosevelt's preeminent part in establishing good relations between the two nations "and his long and resolute struggle against the forces of reaction, in the domestic and international fields, in his country." But, more than anything else, the President's work for the post-war organization of peace was emphasized, and determination was expressed that the cause to which he gave so much of his strength must prevail. The same note was struck in an unprecedented tribute to Roosevelt by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on April 24. Before the Assembly rose in tribute to him a declaration was read saying that the Soviet people would always honor him. It closed with the sentence "let us insure that in future the friendship between our peoples will stand as a memorial."[64]

Friendship or Enmity? It does not follow that if Roosevelt had lived and retained his vigor during the next three years there would have been no serious problems between the Soviet Union and the West. There were serious problems and at the best they would have caused severe strain. The shock of the President's death caused the Soviet leaders to feel their need of his friendship, and of the United Nations Organization, more keenly. Nevertheless, the presumption must remain that the knowledge of his proved friendship would have been a powerful influence in Moscow during the critical years which immediately followed.

It was Roosevelt who had fused the war-time coalition together. Roosevelt; and Hull had convinced Russia that they meant to give her a square deal. They had prevented the formation of an Anglo-American front against Russia. When they were gone there was no one left to hold the scales even, no one who could mediate between Churchill and Stalin and strive to find common goals for the two worlds.

Of course Roosevelt's effort to make peace in cooperation with his allies, one of which had been at odds with the West and rejected by it for twenty years prior to the Grand Alliance, had all history against it. Victorious coalitions had traditionally fallen apart soon after the victory, rapidly becoming rivals and enemies. That is inherent in the egocentric nature of national governments, all trying to exercise their sovereign wills. Yet in history the business of great power struggles ending in world wars had come to a dead

[63] The *New York Times*, April 13, 14, 15, 1945.
[64] London *Times*, April 16, 1945; the *New York Times*, April 25, 1945.

end. No more could be endured. In 1945 and thereafter no man who did not understand this, in the very marrow of his bones, was qualified to control the destinies of any Great Power.

Roosevelt was everlastingly right in his gallant, sustained effort to break out of the ancient cycle of national rivalries—arms race—and war. He saw that there were no objective reasons for the United States and the Soviet Union to fall out immediately and to fight for world mastery. He gave even his last days and hours to preventing that, and he had succeeded up to the moment of his passing. It was not Roosevelt who failed; it was his successors who were unable to make peace.

CHAPTER IX

THE STRUGGLE FOR POLAND

1939–1949

The development of Russo-Polish relations was bound to be a special test of relations between the Soviet Union and the West. Britain had gone to war, ostensibly at least, on behalf of Poland. In the United States there was a real sympathy for Polish aspirations toward liberty, going back to the time of the eighteenth-century partitions. The new Poland had owed its creation in considerable degree to Woodrow Wilson, and its extinction in 1939 had aroused strong feeling, not only among the 6,000,000 Americans of Polish origin. For their part the Polish people had an ancient distrust of both of their powerful neighbors, who had so often $hown themselves capable of working together to the detriment of Poland.

The Russians and the Poles were both Slavs, yet in vital respects they lived in different worlds. For many centuries the Poles had felt the effects of Roman and Western civilization, especially through the Catholic Church. The Russians had had a very different history. Even their version of Christianity was Eastern in origin and powerful Asiatic influences had not been too greatly modified by contact with Europe.

Poles Deported to Russia. The Russian occupation of Eastern Poland was therefore a great shock to the Poles, not only because they considered it an unjustified stab in the back, but because the Soviets began at once to eliminate thejentire Polish leadership in the occupied area. Between February 10, 1940, and June 1941 about 1,500,000 people were forcibly deported into the interior of the Soviet Union. There were four mass deportations—February, April and June 1940; June 1941.[1]

The deportations swept up everyone who had had any conceivable connection with the political life of the Polish State, members of the learned professions, skilled workers and engineers, trade union leaders, ***émigrés*** from Russia, persons who had travelled abroad, and well-to-do peasants, along with aristocrats, landowners, wealthy merchants, bankers, industrialists and other property owners. The last deportation, just before the German invasion, took away all those in prison, those in the earlier categories who had evaded deportations, and everyone who had had any dealings with the Soviet regime or who had served it in any capacity.

[1] **This account of the Polish deportations is based mainly on *The Dark Side of the Moon*, New York, Scribner, 1947; London, Faber, 1946. This book by an anonymous author was compiled from a mass of letters and other documents in the hands of the London Polish Government, recording the experiences of the deportees. Its authenticity is vouched for by the poet, T. S. Eliot, in the preface, and by a note from the wife of General Sikorski.**

The deportees were herded into long trains of freight cars and locked in, with only a hole high up for the introduction of food and one in the center of the floor for the elimination of excreta. Hand baggage was permitted and, when not lost, often meant survival. The guards were uniformly heartless, even about supplying water or fuel for the tiny stove. Medical attention was practically non-existent. Suffering from the weather was extreme, both in the bitter cold of winter and the boiling temperatures of summer. The journeys occupied several weeks, if not longer, for most of the trains went deep into the far north or into Siberia.

The exiled Poles were consigned to one of three fates: prison, labor camp (lagier), or "free exile." In Poland the Russian prisons were unbelievably crowded, filthy and disease ridden. In Russia they were scientifically constructed to permit all kinds of pressure upon prisoners, in order that all might confess to whatever charges had been brought against them. Usually confession was induced by keeping the victim constantly under brilliant light, forbidding sleep for many days, and by prolonged, often repeated questioning.[2]

Slave Labor. The great numbers of Poles who were sent to lagiers found their position hopeless. The labor camps were nearly all in areas where the winters were long and extremely cold. The prisoners did the roughest kind of work in forests, mines, road or canal building for at least twelve hours a day, and never with sufficient food. Food depended upon the achievement of the norm. A day's work was always set so high that no one could achieve it. Those who came nearest ate from the best kitchen. The weakest ate from the last of three kitchens, getting very little nourishment. They therefore died rapidly and even the strongest could not emerge from a five or eight year sentence. This was the more certain since the immediate administration of the prisoners was in the hands of prisoners, who received enough food for bare subsistence if they brought sufficient pressure to bear upon their fellows to strive for the norm. Since political prisoners could not be elected to these posts they were always held by hardened criminals. A system of graft did enable some few to survive. Good clothing issued to the prisoners seldom reached them. All lived in rags and had to use heavy, frozen mud cakes to protect their feet in winter. Some doctors tried to help, but they could exempt only a certain percentage of the inmates from work, and hospitals were extremely primitive.

The original Bolsheviks, who inaugurated the work camp system, had believed that they were establishing a humanitarian device, whereby erring people would be educated and regenerated by their own labor, instead of being sterilized by confinement in prison.[3] In twenty years the lagier institution had degenerated to the point where it threatened to corrupt and destroy the whole Soviet system, especially since the NKVD, which administered the lagiers, had become one of the greatest vested interests in the world. It

[2] These methods of compelling confession were not new. They were used by the Hapsburg Empire in Central Europe long ago.—*New York Herald Tribune*, February 10, 1949.

[3] *The Dark Side of the Moon*, p. 121.

used the slave laborers for its immense raw material and construction projects.[4]

This picture of lagier life was brought out of Russia by the Poles amnestied in 1941. They reported also that those of their number sent to "free exile," into fatcories or to primitive and remote collective farms, were not much better off.

For these deportations, which were also carried out in the three Baltic States, the Red leaders had two reasons. One was to remove every element in the population which could resist with any effectiveness the introduction of the Soviet system of collective farming and state ownership of all economic properties. The other motive was to deport from the new frontier areas all elements with any appreciable ability to help the Germans, should invasion come. The device of populating the frontier districts with Great Russians had been used often by the Tsars. Its use in 1939 and 1940 must have seemed extremely urgent to Moscow, after German aggression had been turned loose to range over the continent.

It has to be remembered, also, that it was the Germans who first decided, deliberately and maliciously, to destroy the Polish nation, simply because the Poles were, in their eyes, sub-human Slavs and their lands were desired. A Polish communique of April 17,1943, charged the Germans with mass arrests of reserve officers and their incarceration in camps "where they die a slow death," with forcible conscription of 200,000 Poles, the execution of the families of those who escaped and the massacre of 1,500,000 people by executions and in concentration camps.

The latter figure was much more than doubled by the time the war ended. In the murder camp at Majdanek, near Lublin, many hundreds of thousands of people were burned. Most of them were Jews, but a great many were Poles and Russians. Our Ambassador Lane saw 200,000 pairs of shoes, including many tiny ones, which the Germans had not had time to remove. At Danzig he also saw and photographed a German soap factory containing the remains of human bodies lying in vats of alcohol, together with dried human skin ready for the manufacture of lamp shades.[5] The Germans deported hundreds of thousands of Poles to forced labor in Germany, forcibly seized Polish girls for their military brothels and made every effort to exterminate the entire leadership of the Polish nation. Libraries were destroyed and scientific instruments confiscated. It was not intended that the Poles should ever rise again, and if the Germans had won the war the Polish people could have existed only at menial labor until Germans were bred, by any and all means, to fill their land.

The Polish Government-in-Exile. All this, however, did not reconcile the deported Poles to their fate in Russia, nor the Polish Govemment-in-Exile to

[4] Edwin L. James found it unreasonable that all the inmates of the Russian labor camps should be starved to death. "One does not do that with good labor." He noted also that some inmates of these camps have been released and have attained high positions in Moscow. Since Russians privately defended the system, James challenged the Soviet Government to make the facts about it known.—The *New York Times*, February 20, 1949.

[5] Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed,* Indianapolis, Bobbs Merrill, 1948, pp. 158, 214; London, Muller, 1949. Mr. Lane was strongly anti-Russian and anti-communist.

the loss of Eastern Poland. When the Polish Government fled to France, on September 17, 1939, the Pilsudski-Beck elements which had dominated it, largely disappeared for the time being, though some of them reappeared later in London. Two men from the old regime, in voluntary exile in France, headed the Government in Exile. They were received very coolly in France but by June 1940, when France collapsed, they had managed to collect some 90,000 troops, including those in the Near East forces. Though exhorted by Pétain and Weygand to surrender when France did, Premier General Sikorski flew to London and struck hands with Winston Churchill, who sent ships to take off considerable Polish forces from Bordeaux. The Polish Government thereafter resided in London and a year later had accumulated 40,000 troops, including about 10,000 airmen who gave a fine account of themselves against the Germans in the Battle of Britain.

THE ATTEMPT AT RUSSO-POLISH COOPERATION

Russo-Polish Relations Renewed. When Russia entered the war in June 1941, negotiations were begun for a Russo-Polish agreement. The British brought strong pressure upon Sikorski to agree to territorial concessions to Russia, knowing that they were inevitable, but without result. A formula was at length worked out and embodied in a Russo-Polish treaty of July 30, 1941, which stated that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 had "lost their validity." This obvious truth could also be interpreted as restoring the previous boundary, but since it contained no guarantee that the Russians would not insist upon a change, Foreign Minister Zaleski and one other member of the Polish Cabinet resigned. The British Government gave the Poles a note saying that it did not recognize any territorial changes which had become effective in Poland since August 1939, but in Parliament Foreign Minister Eden was compelled to say that this statement did not involve any guarantee of Polish frontiers. Russo-Polish relations were accordingly renewed with an unsolved conflict left in abeyance. This action was taken at a time when the Poles were in a stronger position than they would ever be again, unless the loss of the war by Russia was assumed. Since Russia was then heavily on the defensive militarily she was likely to grant better terms at this point than later.

On August 14, 1941, a Polish-Soviet military agreement was signed in Moscow which provided for the creation of a Polish Army in Russia, under the sovereignty of Poland but under the operational control of the Soviet High Command. The Russians would be responsible for pay and rations. Equipment would be provided jointly. The Polish forces were to be recruited from the deportees in Russia and from the prisoners of war, said by the Soviet paper ***Red Star***, on September 17,1940, to total 181,000 men and 9369 officers. The agreement was implemented by a Soviet decree, signed by President Kalinin on August 12, 1941, which granted amnesty to "all Polish citizens on Soviet territory."

Then it developed that the orders of even the most powerful dictatorship are not self-executing. Most of the Poles were held in far-away labor camps, where the voice of Moscow was somewhat dimmed. Some camps released the

Poles promptly, others slowly and partially, still others not at all. Many camp commanders could not understand the release of anyone, let alone large numbers. They were, moreover, under heavy compulsion to fulfil their production quotas. How could this be done if they lost part of their labor force? Some provided transportation for the Poles and others did not. Many of those released were soon rearrested and returned to the camps by the NKVD, who also could not comprehend such doings. Those who were set free were generally emaciated, ragged and destitute. Yet large numbers of them did manage to reach Polish concentration points. They were, of course, a great trial to the communities through which they passed, carrying their hunger and disease with them. The situation was greatly complicated also by the fact that many Poles did not wait for their formal release, in their joy to be able to get away. Those who did wait received, "without exception," certificates without which they would later be in trouble.[6]

To facilitate the salvaging of these people the Soviet Government permitted the Poles to set up an elaborate relief system, manned by several thousand Polish officials, which operated through eight hundred relief stations, schools and hospitals, functioning "throughout the Soviet Union" and bringing help to hundreds of thousands of released Poles. Never before had any foreign organization had such an opportunity to see what went on in the Soviet Union, unless possibly during the famine relief after World War I. In the early weeks even the NKVD gave "genuine cooperation." The human problem involved was beyond its resources. Later the cooperation of the various Soviet authorities varied with the rise and fall of political friction between the two governments. Finally in April 1943, after a year and a half, the Soviet Government took complete control of the Polish relief operations.[7]

In the meantime great difficulties arose over the organization of the Polish Army. The Polish troops were very irregularly and poorly supplied with food. They had to live in tents in winter and received very few arms. It is difficult to say how much of this trouble was due to the dire preoccupation and distress of the Russians in their desperate efforts to stem the German inundation. It is equally hard to know how much of it sprang from the reluctance of the Russians to build up on their own soil the army of a Government with which they had deep sources of friction. Most probably the two things combined, at least in the minds of lower officials.

On December 3, 1941, General Sikorski and General Anders had a long interview with Stalin. When the Poles presented their complaint about the sufferings of the Polish recruits, Stalin asked General Panfilov severely: "Who is to blame for this?" Panfilov, alternately pale and red, said that instructions had been issued. Stalin demanded: "When did I give the order to increase the quantity of food rations for the Poles?" Panfilov replied: "Two and a half weeks ago." Then Stalin asked fiercely: "Why was my order not carried out? Do you expect them to eat your instructions?" Afterwards, Stalin kept General Anders to ask if Panfilov was cooperating about the supplies. Anders replied that he was but appeared unable to do much. Stalin replied that he

[6] ***The Dark Side of the Moon*, p. 213.**
[7] ***Ibid.*, pp. 212–14.**

very much regretted that he had not seen Anders earlier and twice asked him to come again.[8]

At the same meeting Stalin thought all the Poles had been liberated from the labor camps. Molotov agreed that camp commanders had a strong motive for holding them, but Stalin commented grimly that such commanders should be punished.

Up to this time it seems clear that, within the limits of their totalitarian system, the Russians were doing their best to undo the great wrong done to the Polish prisoners, and to establish a new basis for friendship.

Another problem, the whereabouts of the nine thousand officers known to have been captured by the Russians, seriously complicated Russo-Polish relations—fatally in the end. General Anders had been released from prison in Moscow, after a bad time. Then the officers whom he had expected to train his prospective army did not report. Only about four hundred turned up. Earlier inquiries brought no information, and on November 14, 1941, Polish Ambassador Kot took up the mystery with Stalin. Stalin was surprised that any Poles had not been liberated, insisting that: "Our amnesty knows no exceptions." After pacing the room Stalin used the telephone, listened to a long explanation and changed the subject.[9]

No Agreement on Frontiers. The Kremlin talks of early December 1941, were also featured by another very important discussion. On December 1, the day of Sikorski's arrival, a Soviet note stated that all Ukrainian and White Russian residents of the disputed Polish territory had acquired citizenship of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government's readiness to recognize as Polish citizens persons of Polish origin was affirmed, but the same recognition could not be granted to persons of other origin, "since the question of the frontiers between the U.S.S.R. and Poland has not been settled and is subject to settlement in the future."

After the banquet which closed the negotiations Stalin suddenly turned to Sikorski with a smile and asked: "should we not now talk about the frontier between Poland and Russia?" Sikorski saw no reason to discuss a matter finally settled since 1921. Nevertheless, Stalin would like to see some alterations in the frontiers, to which Sikorski replied that he had no right to discuss the matter without a definite mandate from the Polish Parliament, and that it was not a matter for discussion during a war. However, Stalin continued to insist that "it would be useful if we discussed it" and added: "After all, the alterations I want to suggest are very slight. You seem to think, General, that I really want you to agree to some great territorial sacrifices. What I want is only a very slight alteration of your pre-war frontier—one which would hardly change your territorial status and would in no way seriously affect it. In fact, a ***chut chut***, which in Russian means a hardly perceptible alteration." Sikorski replied that even a ***chut chut*** alteration was more than he had a right to discuss. The territory of his country was inviolable and he could not compromise with

[8] Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory*, New York, Doubleday, 1947, pp. 73–5; London, Gollancz. The author was the Polish Ambassador to the United States for the Government in Exile.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 57–8.

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the principle,[10] in spite of the fact that the disputed territory contained between five and eight million Ukrainians who had been "an unhappy and rebellious minority before the war,"[11] plus a couple of million equally dissatisfied White Russians. Though there had not been more than 2,500,000 Poles in the area in 1931, out of 11,000,000 people, Sikorski could not discuss an adjustment.[12]

This was a crucial moment in the attempt to establish Russian-Polish cooperation. The position assumed by Sikorski was lofty and he doubtless thought strategically sound. It was backed absolutely in Washington, though not in London. As Sikorski spoke, the Russians had been retreating steadily since the first German onslaught in June. They were now back to Moscow itself. The Germans were hammering away only a few miles from the Kremlin. Their advance was to be stopped and hurled back during the next two days, but surely this was a favorable moment for the Polish leader to discuss the disputed boundary. Indeed it was probably his first and last opportunity to secure acceptable terms.

It can be reasoned, of course, that if Sikorski had once begun to bargain Stalin would have pushed him from one point to another until he had attained the boundary seized in 1939. However, the whole tenor of the conversations, and the military situation, suggested a different result, a compromise which would have been better than anything obtainable thereafter. It can be said, also, that regardless of where the boundary was put Russia would have gone ahead to dominate the whole of Poland, as she later did. This too might have happened. Considering what the Poles had suffered, it was perhaps impossible for even the most enlightened leader of the Poles, which Sikorski was, to make a fundamental, across the board agreement with Russia. Yet if it could have been done then, the future course of events might have been quite different. At least it would have been more difficult for the Russians to invalidate such an agreement. A few days earlier there had been a meeting of Polish Communists at Saratov, the origin of the Soviet-sponsored movement which later became the Government of Poland, but this movement would easily have been squelched had the Russians wished to do so. At this time it was merely an alternative in which the Russians had not yet invested anything.

Military Pact Dissolved. Both the mystery of the missing officers and the failure of Stalin's attempt to settle the frontier question combined with other factors to cause the breakdown of the Polish-Soviet military agreements. There is strong reason for believing that at this point the Russians were open to a real agreement with the Poles. The most damning of all Polish books on this period, from the standpoint of condemning Soviet acts, states that when Sikorski "arrived within Soviet territory he was received by the Soviet authorities everywhere, and by Marshal Stalin in person, with the highest honours; much more important, he was received with, it seemed, a spontaneous cordiality and in a truly constructive spirit."[13]

M *Ibid*., pp. 78–80.

[11] Anne O'Hare McCormick, the *New York Times*, January 12, 1944.

[12] The *New York Times*, January 11, 1944.

[13] *The Dark Side of the Moon*, p. 228.

On every question discussed, also, Stalin seemed anxious to do his best to reach agreement and promote cooperation. Yet in every case a cloud arose. In the case of military cooperation it was the desire of the Poles to remove their troops from Russia. As early as November 5, 1941, President Roosevelt had suggested that if the Russians found it difficult to feed and equip the Polish Army, they might help to transfer them to a place where we could. This idea had likewise been approved by Churchill. But when Sikorski proposed to Stalin that the Polish recruits be transferred to Iran for training, Stalin was not unnaturally irritated and displeased. Sikorski promised that they would be returned to the Russian front, reinforced by several divisions. Stalin replied: "I know that once your men leave for Iran they will never return here." Then he added, with a grin, "that evidently England needed more Polish soldiers badly." When the two men first met, Sikorski had dispelled Stalin's suspicion that he was an agent of Churchill. Now that suspicion returned. Both Sikorski and Anders insisted that they wanted to fight the Germans "right here," but Stalin had his doubts. Eventually he agreed that two or three divisions might leave, but added that he would give the Poles the place and the means to organize "an additional seven divisions here." It was at this point in the discussion that Stalin learned about the poor care being given to the Polish troops. He then confessed that there were other reasons for the transfer idea besides British insistence.[14]

Thereafter, the military cooperation swiftly disintegrated. A general mobilization of the Poles in Russia was not permitted until February 24, and on March 18 General Anders was ordered to evacuate 44,000 Polish soldiers and civilians to Iran at once. Transport on the Caspian Sea was provided with dispatch and the 44,000 were transferred to Iran in four days' time. Only three divisions of Poles remained, and these, together with civilians swelling the total to 71,000 persons, were transferred to Iran during the summer. During April the Poles in Russia were mobilized, but into Soviet labor battalions and factories.

Deadlock. By this time the rift between Russia and the Polish Government was probably irreparable. The Russians felt, whether justly or not, that the Poles had deserted them when they badly needed help, and the Poles who departed were glad to leave the land in which they had suffered so unjustly. On its part the Polish Government was advocating, in a letter from Sikorski to Welles in Washington, on March 25, 1942, a system of federations in Eastern Central Europe between the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Adriatic.[15] The Poles could say that such a Polish-dominated federation would protect Russia from future German onslaughts, but it was certain that Russia would regard this scheme as another ***cordon sanitaire***, as ineffective as the last one and to be rejected at any cost. Here were Polish aspirations which could not conceivably be implemented, unless Western armies could occupy

[14] Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–4. Stalin also accepted a joint declaration proposed by Sikorski calling for full military cooperation and peace based upon a new international organization.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

Eastern Europe before the Russians did. Ciechanowski says that it was the expectation of this Balkan front which finally decided the Poles to try to transfer their army from Russia to the Middle East.[16]

Sikorski represented the mild wing of the Poles living abroad. The bulk of the American Poles were already organized on ultra nationalistic, anti-Russian lines. When Sikorski visited the United States in March 1942 he implored them to abstain from raising any territorial issues, but in vain. At that time he had the full support of the American Government. It was in mid-April 1942 that President Roosevelt practically compelled Britain to refrain from conceding Soviet territorial demands in the British-Soviet treaty of alliance. Ambassador Winant told Churchill that the President would make a public statement disassociating the United States from such an agreement.[17] During Sikorski's second trip to the United States in December, 1942, the Right Wing in his London Government took advantage of his absence to propose publicly a federation with the three Baltic States. They thus took the diplomatic offensive against Russia and compelled Sikorski publicly to reaffirm Poland's pre-war boundaries, on February 25, 1943.[18]

By this time the Russians had taken the worst that the Germans could deliver, throughout another fighting season, and at Stalingrad had turned them back for good. If in December 1941, when the Germans thundered at the gates of Moscow, there was some faint justification for the idea that Poland did not need to compromise there was no conceivable basis for this idea after Stalingrad, or for the phantasy that Poland could somehow extract the Baltic States from Russia and really play the Great Power role again after the war. After Russia had failed to disintegrate under the first German assault it should have been evident that, as between Russia and Poland, Russia did not need to compromise. She could dictate. Poland had no chance whatever to dictate—unless she could perchance rely on the idea firmly held in Washington that everything done in Eastern Europe in 1939 might be undone in a grand and solemn peace conference after the war, which would make all things right according to the highest moral principles, as conceived in Washington.

On January 16, 1943, the Soviet Government announced that ***all*** Polish deportees in Russia were now Russian citizens, racial Poles included, because they came from a part of the U.S.S.R. A Polish note of January 26 insistently demanded a reversal of this decree, but lacked all means to enforce observance. This was becoming apparent to American officials. On January 30, Under Secretary of State Welles asked Polish Ambassador Ciechanowski: [44]Am I to understand that the Polish Government is determined not to sacrifice even an inch of its eastern territory?" On February 16 the President was compelled to stress that the moment was unfavorable for any effective diplomatic

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 113.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp.104–5.

[18] Waverley Root, *The Secret History of the War,* Vol. Ill (Casablanca to Katyn), pp. 423–5. In a letter to the editors of *Life,* Ambassador Ciechanowski took the position that the repudiation of the partition of Poland by Russia entitled Poland to demand more territory than she had received in the 1921 Treaty of Riga (p. 426).

intervention in Moscow. The Soviets were forging ahead militarily, while the Americans were held up in Africa. The Poles were advised to restrain themselves and urged to keep quiet about their difficulties with the U.S.S.R.[19] On February 4 the Russians urged the Poles in Russia to enlist in the Soviet-sponsored Polish army, and the British Government was even more intent than Washington in urging the Poles to restrain themselves.

THE FALL OF THE LONDON GOVERNMENT

The Katyn Crisis

The ground was obviously slipping out from under the London Poles. This was evident also in Berlin, where the most successful divisive movement of the entire war was executed on April 13,1943, when the Nazi radio announced that the graves of the missing Polish officers had been discovered in the Katyn Forest, ten miles east of Smolensk.

The German press and radio made a field day out of the alleged discovery, charging that the Poles had been murdered by the "Jewish executioners of the GPU" in April 1940. Goebbels promptly announced that German Red Cross organizations had appealed to the International Red Cross in Geneva to aid in the investigation of the crime, and the next day the Polish Minister of War announced that his Government had also asked the International Red Cross to investigate. This announcement indicated belief by the London Polish Government that the German claim was true, a belief which is still held by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the most redoubtable fighter for a democratic Poland in the years which followed.

Mikolajczyk says that the Polish underground had reported that mail from the Polish officers in Russia to their families in Poland had ceased abruptly in March 1940. He states that on April 5, 1940, the Russians began to break up three camps containing Polish prisoners of war and to send out groups of sixty to three hundred men, presumably for repatriation; that about 8500 officers disappeared, of whom only four hundred sent to a different destination were afterwards released. Diaries, newspapers and other documents fixed the time of the murders. At Katyn only men from one of the three Russian prison camps were found. The others are still undiscovered. He learned from a Soviet officer in London that the crime was probably a mistake, due to Stalin's refusal to delegate authority and to the literal mindedness of the Russian secret police. A Red army officer inquiring what was to be done with the camps received from Stalin a notation containing the single word "Liquidate." The NKVD took no chances about the meaning of the order. A year later when inquiries began to be made, Stalin did not know how it was carried out.[20]

On April 16 the Polish Minister of National Defense issued a long statement summarizing the history of the case and pointing strongly to Russian guilt. On April 25 the Soviets broke relations with the Polish Government,

[19] Waverley Root, *op. cit.*, Vol. Ill, p. 139.

[20] Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland,* New York, Whittlesey House, 1948, pp. 21, 28–38; London, McGraw, 1948.

citing the simultaneous hostile campaign in the German and Polish press as evidence of "contact and accord."[21]

Opinion in the Allied world generally agreed that the Poles had fallen into a Nazi trap. They had certainly associated themselves with the Nazi charges and given the Russians the perfect opportunity for breaking relations, for which they had rather obviously been waiting. In their defense the Polish officials maintained that Polish opinion all over the world was in such a high state of indignation that they simply had to take some action. Undoubtedly they felt that way, but the action taken could have no good result for the Polish cause.

Who Was Guilty? Who did kill the Polish officers depends upon the time that the crime was committed. If before July 1941, when the Germans overran the Smolensk region, it would be the Russians; if later the Germans were guilty. The Germans appointed a commission of doctors from the territories under their control which rendered a fifteen point report accusing the Russians. The Russians appointed a commission of their own citizens which exhumed several hundreds of the bodies in January 1944. They invited the foreign correspondents to visit the scene, and Miss Kathleen Harriman, daughter of U.S. Ambassador Harriman, accompanied the party. They observed that the bodies were partly mummified and that they wore Polish uniforms and black boots. The Russian Commission contended that the gond condition of the bpdies, uniforms, belts and buttons made it scientifically impossible for them to have been there since March 1940.[22]

Waverley Root made a long and very careful analysis of the reports of both commissions and the witnesses and documents produced by each. His conclusion was that neither is more credible than the other. He examined exhaustively the clues pointing toward the Russians and found them all answerable. Some of the factors indicating German guilt he thought less accountable. The Germans would also have a more powerful motive for the crime. Root's examination of ***Death at Katyn*** and other literature published by the Poles also elicited no direct or credible evidence of Russian guilt.

On the other hand, one witness had given close to first hand testimony against the Germans. On August 25, 1943, a Hungarian, Ludwig Victor von Tohathy, then a prisoner of war in the Marine Hospital on Ellis Island, New York, made a long affidavit relating his experiences in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. One part of his story related that in early December 1941 about five thousand Russian war prisoners, all captured near Smolensk, were brought into camp. Being abj[e to speak Russian, he learned from them that they had heen forced to-bury 10,000 Polish officers who had been machine-gunned by the Germans. (The method of killing was an error, since they had all been killed by pistol shots through the base of the brain.) The Germans then called the Russian prisoners up for "medical examination" and injected them with typhus bacilli. Those who did not soon die were shot in a sound-proof chamber. Tohathy gave the names of several other people who had

[21] **For texts see Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–30; Root, *op. cit.*, pp. 436–7.**

[22] **London *Times*, and the *New York Times*, January 27, 1944.**

helped carry the corpses to the crematorium. He supplied details of the death of Kurt Schuschnigg, Jr.[23]

The whole question was the subject of a Congressional inquiry in 1951, the evidence adduced pointing to Russian guilt. The chief witness was Lieutenant Colonel John H. Van Vliet, Jr., who as a prisoner of the Germans was forced to go to Katyn to see the bodies. Though he had no positive evidence, he concluded that the uniforms and boots were too new to have been worn two years in a prison camp.[24]

The evidence in the case is conflicting. On balance it indicates that the Russians killed the officers, but of one thing we may be certain; neither the Russians nor the Germans would have been interested in the survival of this key group of nationalistic Poles. The Russians undoubtedly had the first opportunity to eliminate them. On the other hand, the mania of the Germans for exterminating Polish leaders was amply demonstrated throughout the German occupation.

Poland's Position Weakens. After the Russo-Polish break, on April 25, events moved rapidly. On May 9 the creation of a Polish division to serve with the Red Army was announced. On June 12 the Union of Polish Patriots was publicly approved in Moscow, the London Government replying with an announcement that it would continue its efforts to establish a Central European federation. In mid-June Premier Sikorski was compelled to go to the Near East by a serious disciplinary situation among the Polish troops there. He remonstrated with many officers in General Anders' command who were incensed at the idea that he might make concessions to Russia.[25]

On July 4 Sikorski was killed in a plane crash near Gibraltar, on the return journey, an event which made the situation of the London Government hopeless. The Russians were well aware of Sikorski's consistent opposition to the

[23] The *New York Times*, September 9, 1943.

On January 28, 1944, Warrant Officer Ian Sabey, a member of the editorial staff of the *Adelaide Advertiser*, told of his experience in a German prison camp in Austria when the first consignment of Russian prisoners came in, in October 1941, as follows: "At their first sight of the Russians a long, low cry of rage swept up from the French prisoners' quarters, and next came angry shouts from the British as they viewed the tragic spectacle."

"The Russians were so emaciated that they seemed more like animals than humans, and many who were unable to walk were supported by their strongest comrades. At frequent intervals exhausted men dropped out of the ranks. The British prisoners were so sickened by the scene that their attitude became ominous, and guards chased them into the huts. When the Russians were stripped for a shower bath their bones were almost sticking through their infested skins. The guards used whips and kicked and manhandled them. Scores died in the delousing sheds which by night were blocked with dead."—*The Times*, London, January 28, 1944.

In his diary for February 22,1945, written in the Sachsenhausen death camp, Odd Nansen records that a group of Jews was taken to the crematory because they had been employed in "wiping out the traces of the murder of 12,000 Russians in 1941; that is, they dug up the bones, which had been buried somewhere after defective burning, and crushed them" for removal or scattering.—Odd Nansen, *From Day to Day*, p. 450.

[24] *Time*, November 26,1951, p. 25. No judgment was made on the question at Nuremberg. The Russians accused the Germans and then dropped the subject.—*U.S. News and World Report*, December 5, 1952, p. 20.

[25] *The New York Times*, July 9, 1943.

Pilsudski-Beck policies. He was succeeded as Premier by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, leader of the Peasant Party, who was balanced by General Sosnkowski and Vice-Premier Kwapinski, both strongly anti-Russian. On November 19, 1943, Secretary Hull was obliged to tell Ciechanowski that since the Allies had no armed forces in Central Europe to support their arguments it was unlikely that the Soviets would change their position without some compromise on the territorial issue.[26]

The Poles could not contemplate this. During his visit to Washington in March 1943, Foreign Minister Eden said that Sikorski seemed to be conspiring with the small states of the Balkans to gain support for aims that were "very large" and unreal, influenced by expectation that both the Soviets and the Germans would be greatly weakened by the war, enabling the Polish forces and people to play a greater part.[27]

Nearly a year later, on January 5, 1944, as the Red armies were surging across Poland's old boundary in the East, the Polish Government made a broadcast from London about establishing the sovereignty of Poland over the liberated territory as soon as possible. On January 20 Churchill put the need for concession to Premier Mikolajczyk in curt and ominous fashion. The British Government was for a strong, free Poland "from the Curzon line to the Oder." Britain and the United States "would not go to war to defend the earlier frontiers of Poland."[28]

However, the underground leaders in Poland and the armed forces in Italy, for whom General Anders spoke, opposed any cession to Russia, They were willing to accept the territory offered in the West, but not to concede anything in the East. In London some of the inner group were saying that the only real hope for Poland lay in a war between the West and the Soviet Union.[29]

In Washington, Ciechanowski anxiously visited Hull on January 4, 1944, only to learn that the Soviet military position was so much better than that of the Western Allies that it was impossible for the President to coerce or threaten Stalin.[30]

The Russians insisted that they could not have any dealings with the Polish Government in its existing form and the Poles resisted any pressure for the expulsion of their anti-Soviet elements as an infringement upon their fast disappearing sovereignty. Churchill brought open pressure on the Polish Government in a speech to the House of Commons, on February 22, 1944, insisting that compromise was necessary. Mikolajczyk desired to come to Washington, but his visit was postponed, since D-Day was imminent, and it was to be coordinated with Russian military movements in the East to hold the Germans there. As Hull recorded: "We could not afford to become partisan in the Polish question to the extent of alienating Russia at that crucial moment."[31] In lieu of a visit Mikolajczyk wrote the President a long

[26] **Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 237, 240.**
[27] **Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, p. 192.**
[28] **Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 51.**
[29] **Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 296–7.**
[30] **Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, p. 260.**
[31] ***The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, p. 1442.**

letter recalling how he had been restrained from appeals to public opinion. This lack was remedied considerably by 147 speeches delivered in our Congress on May 3, Poland's independence day, praising Poland, stressing the necessity of justice to her and criticizing Soviet expansion.[32]HThere was also a natural intensification of the anti-Soviet campaign among Poles everywhere. The underground newspaper ***Penstwo Polski***, supported by the Govemment-in-Exile, declared: "An essential condition both for our victory and our very existence is at least the weakening, if not the defeat, of Russia."[33] *y*

Mikolajczyk visited Washington June 5 to 14 and was given a cordial reception. Before his departure from London, President Benes of Czechoslovakia had been asked by Moscow to tell him that the Soviets would open informal discussions on two conditions, the acceptance of the Curzon Line and the reconstitution of the Government.[34] On June 20 the London Government was moderately reorganized. General Kukiel was dropped as Minister of National Defense and General Sosnkowski was replaced by Tomasz Arciszewski as presidential-successor, though he kept his post as Commander-in-Chief. The new President designate, an old Pilsudski Socialist, was also anti-Soviet.[35]

On June 22 all members of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. were given the option of regaining their Polish citizenship. The Union of Polish Patriots formally repudiated the Govemment-in-Exile, denouncing it as illegal. On July 1 a decree of the Supreme Soviet granted the right to resume Polish citizenship to all persons formerly residing in the disputed territory in Eastern Poland, including White Russians and Ukrainians. Members of families were included.[36]

The members of the Home Army in Poland now found themselves in a most painful predicament. As the Soviet forces advanced, the Home Army rose against the Germans, just before the Red forces got there, and helped to deliver the towns to the Russians. They were cordially thanked and promised equipment for further operations by the Red Army officers. Then a few days later their leaders were arrested, some shot, others deported, and the troops given the choice of joining the Soviet Army or being disbanded. On July 25 the Supreme Soviet recognized the Polish National Council, organized by the Union of Patriots, as a provisional administrative authority for Polish territories recovered from the Germans. On August 2 the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Committee of National Liberation exchanged envoys. The London Government was now opposed by a complete replica of itself in the rear of the Red armies advancing through Poland. If anything could be done to save the situation, speed was essential. Roosevelt asked Stalin to receive Mikolajczyk in Moscow and he arrived there on July 30.

[32] ***Congressional Record,* Vol. 90, Part 3, pp. 3923–68.**

[33] **Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy, The Secret War Against Soviet Russia.* Boston. Little Brown. 1948. o. 383.**

Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, 295.

Schuman. *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad.* D. 510: the *New*

1944

The *New York Times.* Julv 1. 21. 1944

The Warsaw Uprising

He was received without ceremony, Molotov asking him why he had come, and his progress with Stalin was no better. He was obliged to see the Lublin Poles, whom he found insisting that there was no fighting going on in Warsaw. Actually the commander of the Polish Home Army in Warsaw, General Tadeuz Bor Komorowski, had on August 1, 1944, launched a long-planned effort to seize the city from the Germans. The Russian armies were only some twenty miles away. Their guns could be heard. For days the Warsaw Poles had watched great streams of defeated and dishevelled Germans, both military and civilian, going through the city westward, carrying great amounts of equipment with them. Even the tanks had geese and other loot on top.

The Poles therefore rose, immediately after some fifteen strong radio appeals from Moscow for a rising, expecting the Russians to be in the city within a few days, and quickly seized control of a large part of the city. The Reds, however, stopped their drive and permitted the heroic Home Army of some 30,000 men to fight a steadily losing battle with the Germans for sixty-three days, during which 250,000 Poles were killed and the remainder of the city's population, some 350,000 people, was herded out while the Germans methodically destroyed most of the city. The Russians failed to send aid by air, except on one occasion when they dropped guns and ammunition which did not fit together, and they frustrated British and American aid by air, except on one or two occasions. The Russian purpose was to secure the destruction of the Warsaw Home Army by the Germans.

This is the version of one of the greatest tragedies of the war which appears in Mikolajczyk's ***Rape of Poland*** and in Lane's ***I Saw Poland Betrayed.*** It is undoubtedly believed by those on the losing side of the Polish struggle and by their sympathizers. Lane calls the tragedy a "cold-blooded, premeditated crime against Poland ... an incredible betrayal."

Did Russia Plan It? To what extent is this condemnation justified? When the Warsaw uprising was called, the Red Army was at the height of an astonishingly successful offensive. Beginning on June 23, it had moved nearly four hundred miles in the direction of Warsaw by August 1. The Germans were literally running away from the Russians. The current war maps of the time show that the Russians were making a direct assault on Warsaw with tremendous force. The tip of their great spearhead, coming from a southeasterly direction was inside Praga, the eastern suburb of Warsaw, on August 1. The Russians were apparently making a grand bid for the capture of Warsaw. If they could do so they would have control of the most important communications center in Poland, the best bridges over the Vistula and be able to push on toward Germany rapidly.

Mikolajczyk supplies evidence that the Russians expected to sweep into Warsaw. When he saw Molotov on July 30,1944, the latter said almost airily: "We'll take Warsaw soon; we are already about six miles from Warsaw." When he saw Stalin on the night of August 3 Stalin said: "We hoped to take Warsaw on August 5 or 6, but the Germans were defending it more savagely

than we had expected. There would be a small delay in capturing the city." He insisted that he was "eager to help your Home Army there," but did not know how to communicate with its commanders.[37]

This was true, since the uprising had been called without establishing contact with the Red Army. This important fact is not disputed by either side. General Bor states it in his book, ***The Unconquerables***, saying: "We had not been able to establish coordination with the Red Army Command."[38]

There is some dispute as to whether the Warsaw Poles knew that a huge column of fresh German tank divisions was moving over the Modlin Bridge, north of Warsaw, at the time the uprising was called. It appears that neither they nor the Russians appreciated properly the great preparations made by the Germans to hold the line of the Vistula, the last great natural obstacle between the Red Army and Berlin. This is the real answer to the question: "Who was responsible for the Warsaw tragedy?"

The Germans had also fortified the Warsaw bridgehead with several rings of fortifications around Praga, including powerful steel and concrete fortresses, broad mine fields and all the other defensive devices. This fortified semicircle extended as far out as sixty miles and when the Russians began to penetrate it they were soon slowed down. On August 2, 1944, artillery attacks on Praga were reported. The next day there was a tremendous battle for possession of a narrow strip of territory along twenty miles of the east bank of the river. On August 8 the "stiffest German resistance in forty-six days" was reported on all parts of the line. Regrouping of the Red Army was reported on the 11th. The north flank of the Red Army was exposed and on the 12th a Russian column moved in that direction toward East Prussia. The opening of a one hundred mile front northeast of Warsaw was reported on the 14th. These moves pointed toward encirclement operations, rather than frontal attack.[39]

On August 18 the Russians were thrown back northeast of Warsaw by a fierce German attack. By the 25th the Russians had been forced back thirty-five miles from the Vistula near Krakow in the south. Setbacks were also suffered in the north. By August 10 the Red Army had driven a corridor to the Baltic Sea, east of Riga. It was cut on the 12th and again on the 23rd. On September 8, some thirty-eight days after the Warsaw uprising began, the communiques reported that "Russians in the Warsaw region are making encouraging progress in what is described as the bitterest and costliest battle since Stalingrad."

These dispatches make clear what had happened. At the end of a drive of almost unparalleled length, when their offensive force was spent, the Russians Iran into the extremely formidable belt of defenses before Warsaw. They were driven back, had to stop to rest, regroup, build railways, bring up supplies and begin again. It was six weeks after the rising began before they fought their way into Praga again.

[37] **Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 74.**

[38] ***The Reader's Digest,* February, 1946, p. 148.**

[39] **See the reports from the Warsaw front for the dates mentioned in the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor.***

That the Red Army did not deliberately wait outside of Warsaw for the Home Army to be destroyed in the city is fully established by the military history of the time. The Russians suffered very great losses which would have been avoided had they been able to march into the city at the top of their long drive. They had every reason to do so, since it would have been a great triumph and shortened the war notably. When they were stopped cold and had to retreat, they then began to say that they had always intended to take Warsaw by encirclement, to save the city from destruction and also to greatly reduce their own losses. This was the method which they used later, early in January 1945, to capture Warsaw and all of the other remaining strong points in Poland. Great, wide sweeps by their columns, knifing back and forth unexpectedly, confused the Germans and almost eliminated the losses from attacking fixed positions.

Was Air Aid Denied? There remains the controversy over whether the Russians deliberately denied air aid. General Bor says that both Russian and German planes disappeared during the first few days of the uprising. The weather was bad. Some help arrived from the British on the 11th, 12th and 13th of August 1944, supplies being dropped at night. Churchill began early to ask the Russians for air aid, but on August 5 Stalin told him that it was unimaginable that a few Polish detachments could have captured Warsaw when the Nazis were defending the capital with four fresh tank divisions. On August 14, when our Government intervened, the same reply was returned. The Soviet note added that the Warsaw uprising was a "purely adventurist affair," and the Soviet Government would not support it. On the 17th, Molotov told Harriman that it had become evident by August 12 that the movement in Warsaw was inspired by men antagonistic to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt and Churchill then made a joint appeal direct to Stalin on the 20th, and he finally gave permission for one shuttle flight on September 18. About one hundred American bombers flew over the city at night, dropping supplies and going on to Russian-held territory. A second flight was cancelled for operational reasons.[40]

An account more favorable to the Soviets was written by Anna Louise Strong, who was behind the Russian front during the uprising, and who interviewed a number of men and women who had taken part in the struggle. She states that the underground forces in Warsaw had divided into two groups, about twenty-five thousand belonging to the Home Army and 7500 to the People's Army. The latter group regarded the Russians as liberators. This division among the Poles is also substantiated elsewhere.[41] At the close of the struggle, according to this account, the Home Army made terms for surrender to the Germans, leaving the People's Army as outlaws. Some of these people crossed the river, with Russian aid, and gave Miss Strong their stories.

Earlier the Home Army had resisted establishing contact with the Red Army, but two girls crossed the river on September 10 and gave locations of

[40] ***The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,*** **Vol. II, pp. 1445–7.**

[41] **James T. Shotwell, Max M. Laserson,** ***Poland and Russia, 1919–1945,*** **New York, 1945, p. 60.**

the resistance fighters to the Red Army. On September 12 a Russian plane dropped letters giving instructions for signals on Lelevela Square. That night and for ten succeeding nights small Soviet planes came in low and dropped supplies into the Square without parachutes, both food and munitions. Two Russian radio men were also dropped for liaison. Artillery support was then given, but a battalion of the First Polish Army which managed to cross from Praga was soon destroyed by the Germans.[42]

Last Chance. General Bor states that orders by him to Home Army units thWighotirPoland to march to his relief met with obstructions by the Russians in the part of Poland controlled by them. Those who tried to come were disarmed.[43] There is no reason to doubt this, since the rounding up of the Home Army units by the Red Army began on July 25, in accordance with the military decree of the 21st—the date on which the Polish National Liberation Committee had been recognized as the administrative authority for the liberated Polish territory.

These events can hardly have been unrelated to the decision made on July 29 to begin the Warsaw uprising. The outlook of the London Poles and their Home Army in Warsaw was desperate. It was perfectly plain that all vestiges of their authority in Poland would be eliminated with the advance of the Red armies. There was one chance, and only one, of retaining a foothold in Poland, political, military or diplomatic. That was to be in effective control of the national capital when the Red Army and its Polish allies arrived. This might not save the situation for the anti-Soviet Poles, but it was the one thing they could try of their own volition. It was already clear, too, that the diplomatic help of their Western allies was steadily weakening and not likely to be of much avail.

When, therefore, the Red Army seemed about to march into Warsaw the Home Army struck. By the testimony of its opponents, the City Hall, police stations and other buildings of political importance were taken, and military positions, such as the bridges and the citadel, neglected.[44] The move was a desperate gamble. Yet if the Russians had soon marched in, finding the Home Army in effective control of the city, as it was for some time, the London regime would have had a pawn which would greatly have embarrassed its opponents.

This was, of course, clearly recognized by the Russians, as soon as they understood what had happened, and they refused to exert themselves thereafter in behalf of a group which was hostile to them. In the early weeks there was little, if anything, which they could do. They were too busy meeting the

[42] Anna Louise Strong, *I Saw the New Poland'*, Boston, 1946, pp. 150–78. Miss Strong, who had married a Russian and for several years edited an English newspaper in Moscow, was arrested and expelled from the U.S.S.R. on February 15, 1949, as a "well known intelligence operator," illustrating again the fact that even the most sympathetic reporter of the Russian scene could not please the regime. One unfavorable remark was sufficient to bring condemnation—a state of mind very similar to that of the most fervid spy hunters in the United States.

[43] *The Reader's Digest*, February, 1946, p. 148.

[44] Strong, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

German counter-offensive. Later they were not disposed to make a costly frontal assault to save the Home Army.

Moscow Conference Stalemate. The heart-rending tragedy of Warsaw ended on October 1, 1944, when the Home Army surrendered. This disaster was immediately followed by a diplomatic crisis of the first magnitude. Churchill and Eden, who had gone to Moscow to salvage what they could in the Balkans, urged Premier Mikolajczyk to come to Moscow at once for the "last chance for the Polish Government to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union." Mikolajczyk and three associates arrived in Moscow on October 12. He told the assembled conference, in which Harriman sat, that there was "no possibility for the merger of the legal Polish Government with the Lublin Committee." He also staunchly refused, against Churchill's advocacy, to accept the Curzon Line, even after he learned that that had been substantially settled at Teheran.

After this first session, Churchill reproached Mikolajczyk for not accepting the Curzon Line early in 1944, when he had been urged to do so. Then there would have been no Lublin Committee of Liberation, Churchill declared. If the Poles were still obdurate Churchill threatened to tell the House of Commons that he entirely agreed with Stalin. He added that "I talked to your General Anders the other day, and he seems to entertain the hope that after the defeat of the Germans the Allies will then beat Russia." Unable to move Mikolajczyk, Churchill told him in his most impassioned manner that he was "absolutely crazy." If he missed this chance he would lose everything. Unless he accepted the Curzon Line he was "out of business forever." The Russians would "sweep through your country and your people will be liquidated. You are on the verge of annihilation."

At last Mikolajczyk agreed to recommend the acceptance of the Curzon Line to his Government, on condition that Lwow and the oil deposits near it be left to Poland. Roosevelt had urged this solution earlier, but Stalin would not agree to it.[45] He was determined, as later events demonstrated, to absorb the Ruthenians in the tip of Czechoslovakia, behind Lwow, and to establish a firm territorial connection with Czechoslovakia and with Hungary, across the Carpathians. He was keenly aware that he had not been able to intervene in Czechoslovakia at the time of the Munich crisis, for lack of land connection.

The London Government Moribund. It was as well for Mikolajczyk that his territorial offer was rejected, for he told Harriman on November 23 that his Cabinet would not have accepted even that solution. Since only his own Peasant Party supported him in trying for a territorial settlement, Mikolajczyk resigned as Premier the next day. Churchill lamented the intransigence of the Polish Government before the Commons on December 15, reiterating his belief that its attitude about the frontier question was self-destructive. Late in December the Lublin Committee declared itself a provisional government

[45] **Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–99; Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 328, 333–7.**

and sought recognition as such. The Soviet Government gave it on January 5, 1945. The London Polish Government protested violently, but was obliged to dissolve the Home Army on January 19.

The Government-in-Exile had played its last card. Some of its leaders had shared the expectation of General Anders that the Russians and Germans would wear each other out, permitting the Anders Army to return and dominate Central Europe. When events moved otherwise there was no real hope for the exiled Poles, unless Anglo-American armies could carry them back into Poland. This was the expectation which had buoyed up General Sikorski. On January 10, 1943, he told Ciechanowski, with passionate intensity: "I shall live, because I have still one thing to do. I shall lead our troops in a victorious offensive into Germany and through Germany back into Poland."[46] When this hope disappeared all was lost, unless the Western Powers could retrieve the situation at Yalta.

Yalta Hopes Illusory. They believed they had done so. Roosevelt was relaxed and relieved, especially about Poland.

The Yalta Agreement appeared to have performed a miracle. At the last moment it seemed to have snatched Poland from the Soviet grip and restored her to the West. "Free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot" would surely give Poland a Western orientation. The Government was to be reorganized, moreover, to give this result. The word "reorganized" was used and the Allied Commission was to consult "in the first instance in Moscow" with the members of the existing Provisional Government and others. This enabled Molotov to insist that only men acceptable to the Lublin Government could be included in the "new" government which the Yalta Agreement mentioned twice and which the West apparently expected to be a really new creation.[47]

Actually, the Yalta Agreement on Poland was "a compromise between the inevitable and the impossible."[48] It was impossible at that late date to create a Poland oriented diplomatically to the East, but politically and ideologically to the West. The Lublin Government had served the Soviets well. It was certainly a puppet, but it was dependable from the Soviet standpoint. It doubtless had the willing support of only a minority of the Poles, yet the minority was sizeable and it contained many sincere patriots. It was not possible for Moscow to see this regime liquidated and lost in a new one in which the utterly embittered London Poles and Home Army people might predominate. The most that Moscow could permit, given its military position and authoritarian habits, was that a few relatively harmless representatives of the other Poland should be admitted into the already functioning Polish Government.

Hopkins' Last Mission. On the other hand, Russian intransigence deeply alarmed the West. The Russians were not going to permit the Poles to freely choose our kind of government, our way of life. When the deadlock was

[46] **Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, p. 135.**
[47] **Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 53–4; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, pp. 365–87.**
[48] **Samuel L. Sharp, the *Nation*, February 12, 1949.**

complete Harry Hopkins was sent to Moscow by President Truman, arriving on May 26,1945. Hopkins assured Stalin, in all earnestness, that "two months ago there had been overwhelming sympathy among the American people for the Soviet Union." Now that same body of opinion, especially the supporters of Roosevelt's policies, was gravely disturbed. Everything was endangered. Stalin replied that Soviet governmental circles were alarmed about a number of recent American moves. He cited the admission of Argentina to the UN, our insistence that France must be a member of the Reparations Commission —an insult to the Soviet Union because she had opened her frontier to the Germans; the "brutal" stoppage of lend-lease, even though that order had been reversed; the failure to turn over to Russia her share of the German Navy and merchant fleet; and the attitude of the United States Government toward the Polish question.

Stalin said that "at Yalta it had been agreed that the existing government was to be reconstructed and anyone with common sense could see that this meant that the present government was to form the basis of the new. He said no other understanding of the Yalta Agreement was possible." He insisted that the British Conservatives were trying to revive the ***cordon sanitaire*** system on the Soviet borders. He "did not intend to have the BritisITmanage the affairs of Poland and that is exactly what they want to do." Russian opinion had also to be considered, since Poland had been liberated at a great cost of Russian life.[49]

In between the six Hopkins' meetings with Stalin there was an animated discussion with Washington by cable of various names for the "new" Polish Government. On June 17, 1945, the Polish leaders who had finally been agreed upon met in Moscow to form a new government. Cardinal Sapieha and Wincenty Witos, two great leaders from Poland, were unable to go. On June 21 the composition of a new government of National Unity was announced.

The Sixteen Polish Leaders. Both the negotiations and Allied relations were embittered during the spring and summer of 1945 by the case of the sixteen Warsaw leaders of the London Government who had been imprisoned by the Soviets. Polish sources agree that at the end of February the sixteen had been invited to a conference with Soviet General Ivanov, and after negotiations and assurances that their safety would be "completely assured" the meeting took place near Warsaw on March 28. The Polish leaders, including Vice Premier Jankowski and General Okulicki, late commandant of the Polish Home Army which had been disbanded on January 19, did not return. On April 6 the London Government announced their disappearance and presumable arrest. This was confirmed by Molotov at the San Francisco Conference in the middle of May. The men were taken to Moscow and tried for "diversionary activities" behind the Red Army. They were tried at the same time the Unity Government was being formed. All except one confessed their guilt, as prisoners prepared by the NKVD almost invariably did. Three were acquitted and the rest received prison terms varying from one year up to

[49] Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 888–912.

sixteen years for General Okulicki. Six of the convicted were amnestied in August.[50]

An account of the case which questioned the treachery of the Russians was given later by Dr. Irving Langmuir, Associate Director of the General Electric Research Laboratory, who visited Russia in June 1945 as a delegate to a scientific Congress. He stated that Ambassador Harriman told him that the sixteen Poles had been arrested in Poland for distributing arms for use against the Russians. They had not been invited to Russia for a conference. Langmuir attended some of the sessions of their trial. He noted that the defendants were proud of their actions against Russia, one stating that he was willing to fight Russia for a Polish exit to the Black Sea. Langmuir believed the Poles had a fair trial and he had never heard of any retraction of the charge widely published in our press that the sixteen had been invited to Russia for a conference.[51]

A "Unity" Government in Poland. The new Cabinet of National Unity was formed on June 28, 1945. The Communist Party, called the Worker's Party, and its satellite parties controlled a majority of the ministries directly and others through vice ministers. Mikolajczyk and one or two other London Poles returned and joined the Cabinet. His Polish Peasant Party was allotted six Cabinet posts, though not the controlling ones.

Mikolajczyk was received everywhere with acclaim and he soon believed, with much reason, that at least sixty per cent of the people favored his Peasant Party. In addition to his own Peasant following, about half of the small business men and intelligentsia in the towns joined the Peasant Party, together with nearly all of the conservatives and reactionaries whose old political parties had been outlawed. He frequently repudiated the support of some of these groups, but they had nowhere else to go.[52] As in other East European countries, they became peasants. In Hungary the feudal elements crowded into the Small Landholders Party, though they had for generations frustrated small land-holding.

On July 5 Secretary of State Byrnes recognized the Provisional Government of National Unity and withdrew recognition from the London Polish Government. For some weeks Ambassador Ciechanowski had found that even his best friends in the State Department gradually became too busy to receive him.

Potsdam. At the Potsdam Conference, late in July 1945, Western resistance to the new Poland took the form of opposition to the western boundaries established by the Soviet Union for the new state. Many months before, Moscow had decided that Poland should be compensated for her losses to Russia at the expense of Germany. The Poles should receive three-fourths of East Prussia, the remainder of Silesia, Pomerania and a tip of Brandenburg —that is, everything over to the Niesse and Oder rivers, including the city of

[50] The *New York Times*, October 1, 1945; *The Dark Side of the Moon*, pp. 292–9; Lane, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–9, 104–5; Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–12.

[51] *One World Or None*, New York, 1946, p. 51.

[52] S. Harrison Thomson, "The New Poland," *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 1, 1947, p. 228. This report gives a good account of the struggle in Poland during this period.

Stettin on the other side of the Oder. The administration of all of this German territory was turned over to Poland just before the Potsdam Conference. This unilateral action was protested strongly by Truman and Churchill, but they had no way of reversing the Russian decision, which was agreed to in the Potsdam communique. President Truman did insist, time after time, that there could be no transfer of territory until there was a peace conference and the Yalta formula was reaffirmed, saying that the "final delimitation" of the Western frontier should await the peace settlement. The Yalta provisions about free and unfettered elections were also restated in full, with freedom of reporting for the press added.[53]

A New Poland. Poland thus remained in effective possession of rich German territories, but without legal title to them. Two of the nine million Germans who had lived in these areas still remained, but these were speedily deported into the rump of Germany. The Poles, who had been crowded by the Germans into Central Poland, could now spread out and a vast repatriation of the deported Poles from the U.S.S.R., and from the eastern half of Poland transferred to Russia, supplied four million citizens for the territory taken from Germany.[54] A large part of the original deportees to Russia were finally repatriated, and the Ukrainians remaining in Poland were transferred to the Ukraine.

The new Poland thus created is much stronger than the one destroyed in 1939, except for the loss in the war of one-fifth of the Polish people, including much of Poland's leadership. The new state has great resources of coal, is far stronger industrially, has a broad seacoast with adequate ports, and richer agricultural lands. It has almost entirely lost the great racial minorities which resented their inferior status in pre-war Poland and is now racially homogeneous.

As between Germany and Poland the settlement is just enough. The Germans were responsible for the death of some eight million Polish citizens. They killed 700,000 in Warsaw alone. Poland had a higher percentage of human losses than any other participant in World War II. The Germans did their best to murder the Polish nation and to enslave the remnant permanently. They used every device of sadistic cruelty to torture and degrade the Polish people. ***The Dark Side of the Moon***, the Polish book of horrors in Russia, is a record of much heartlessness and inhumanity, of callousness to suffering and ruthless exaction of labor, but it contains little of deliberate, sadistic cruelty. Odd Nansen, the son of Fridtjof Nansen, has left a full record of his eternity spent in German prisons, including Sachsenhausen, in his diary ***From Day to Day.***[55] It contains many instances of "the purest sadism, of a craving for the sight of pain, the display of power, the exercise of hate."[56] I do not find in ***The Dark Side of the Moon*** any such record of calculated bestiality and deliberate depravity. It was left to the Germans to exterminate

[53] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–81 ; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, New York, Doubleday, 1955, pp. 366–70, 372–3, 387–8, 405–6; London, Hodder, 1955.

[54] Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 136, 241.

[55] New York, 1949.

[56] Nansen, *From Day to Day*, p. 386; London, Putnam, 1949.

races in wholesale fashion, including multitudes of little children, by starvation, cremation and other methods, after suffering every kind of indignity.[57]

Polish industry was wrecked, her soils, forests and livestock gravely depleted, her transportation system ruined "beyond belief"; her schools, public buildings of every kind, private dwellings and business houses were damaged beyond use in huge numbers. If ever a people deserved restitution at the hands of their destroyers, it was the Poles.

American Policy Ineffective. From the standpoint of the West the manner of Poland's restoration was unpalatable. The State Department's policy of refusing to agree to any territorial settlements until the peace conference broke down completely. The Dunn-Atherton memorandum, which was the basis of this policy, assumed that in 1939 Russia was an equal partner in crime with Germany and that her motives in taking territory were no more justifiable than Germany's. When this thesis was enforced upon the British in May 1942, and they were compelled to refuse acceptance of Russia's 1941 frontiers, the Russians were put upon notice that the West would not willingly grant what they conceived to be their minimum geographic security. They were obliged to leave their boundaries to the arbitrament of war and as military success developed they were free to establish their security step by step, a little at a time, until they had achieved far more than they could have hoped for in 1942. Our policy of refusing recognition of Russia's 1941 boundaries until the peace conference met was completely abortive. By leaving the Russians unbound we lost the opportunity of setting any legal limits to their gains by a cordial acceptance of what they had done for themselves after the West scuttled the League of Nations and turned Germany toward Russia. There was only one chance in a hundred that Russia could ever be talked out of the territories acquired in 1939, unless she lost the war, yet she was put upon notice that any gains from the war, including the 1941 frontiers, would have to be won militarily.

The result was that Poland was liberated directly by Soviet arms. The indirect contribution of the Anglo-American war effort was immense, but not visible to the Polish people. Soviet armies were on the spot and they determined the character and extent of the new state. Stalin's often repeated promise of a strong Poland was amply fulfilled, at Germany's expense. The new Poland was thereby bound firmly to Russia, for without unqualified Russian support Germany would certainly insist upon recovering much of the land she had lost to Poland.

Political War. The political struggle in Poland after Mikolajczyk's return was bitter and bloody. At first his presence lessened the political tension. Then as immense crowds paid him tribute he was impelled to fight for the rule of the majority while the dominant minority was correspondingly steeled to defeat him. He knew that he had the strong backing of the American and British Governments. It was his only real reliance, but it was diplomatic and far away. Everyone knew that the West would not go to war over Poland at

[57] **For an account of German rule in Poland in the early part of the war, see Simon Segal, *The New Order in Poland*, New York, 1942.**

that time. Every conceivable handicap was imposed on the Polish Peasant Party. Its newspaper was heavily censored and starved for newsprint, control of the election machinery was seized, very onerous electoral requirements invented. Peasant Party meetings were systematically attacked, thousands of Party workers were arrested, large numbers of them were beaten and tortured and many killed. The opposition naturally fought back against these repressive measures, aided by large numbers of underground fighters.

Homer Bigart, one of the best American reporters, suggested that it was unfair to judge the Polish Government by Western standards. Since Poland lived under a continued threat of underground terror of the Right, it was inevitable that the government should impose a legalized terror from the Left.[58] The whole country was devastated and brutalized by years of German rule. Scores of thousands of desperate men belonging to various underground organizations lived in the woods, had arms and used them freely against their hated opponents, including Russian troops. Many of the latter deserted and added to the anarchy of violence. Simple brigandage was prevalent and the Russo-Polish flying squads often behaved as badly as the marauders.[59]

Losses were heavy on both sides. On November 24, 1946, the Government announced that 2483 security police agents had been killed.[60]

Uncertain of success, the Government first tried a referendum on June 30, 1946, to test its ability to "win" an election. Three questions were proposed to the voters. The opposition did not contest the approval of land reform and nationalization of industries or approval of the new western frontiers, but it did oppose the abolition of the Senate, and apparently won a very large majority where the vote could be honestly counted. The count was falsified in most places and the official result gave the Government a victory of 68 per cent to 32.

The same story was repeated in the national elections finally permitted on January 5, 1947, over protests by the American and British Governments that promises of Yalta and Potsdam were being violated. This time the Peasant Party candidates' names were stricken from the ballot in ten of the fifty-two voting districts and a stupendous Government victory was announced. The Government bloc was said to have won 327 seats in the Sejm to 24 for the Polish Peasant Party. After a few rearguard actions in the new parliament Mikolajczyk escaped from Poland to save his life, late in October 1947, feeling that he had aided in bringing more than two hundred and fifty thousand underground fighters out of hiding and back to citizenship.[61] An amnesty proclaimed after the election, on February 21, 1947, had brought about twenty thousand out of the woods. This ended the worst of the fighting which in the early stages had almost approached civil war proportions.

Mikolajczyk had made a valiant fight, one foredoomed to failure. The Leftist government which he entered could not have permitted his victory, even if it had wished, without bringing outright Soviet intervention. Two

[58] *New York Herald Tribune*, May 13, 1946.
[59] *Newsweek*, October 29, 1945, p. 46.
[00] The *New York Times*, November 25, 1946.
[61] For his account of these events, see *The Rape of Poland*.

obvious courses had been open to him. He could go back to Poland, join the Government bloc in a minority status and work loyally from the inside to try to ameliorate Communist domination. At one time he was offered twenty per cent of the seats in the Constitutional Diet. He asked for seventy-five per cent. Feeling that he represented the nation he was unable to do otherwise than to fight a losing battle for control.[62]

SOME UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

This brief review of the Polish drama raises several questions.

1. ***Was Stalin Insincere at Yalta?***

It is easy to conclude, as the great majority of Americans have, that Stalin was wholly insincere in the agreements he made at Yalta. He had not the slightest intention of permitting the Poles to determine their own way of life. He knew that he was going to impose communism upon Poland and incorporate her eventually into the Soviet Union. So at Yalta he merely made promises to please the Western leaders, who sincerely thought they had secured a free and democratic Poland.

This judgment satisfied all of our combative instincts. To what extent does the available evidence verify it?

In mid-October 1944, Mikolajczyk asked Stalin directly if he intended to make Poland a Communist state after the war. “No,” Stalin said, “absolutely not. Communism does not fit the Poles. They are too individualistic, too nationalistic. Poland’s future economy should be based on private enterprise. Poland will be a capitalistic state.” He added that there was no middle system. Capitalism could assume many forms, but what is not communism is capitalism.

In August 1944, Mikolajczyk had sounded Stalin out on the idea, voiced by a captured German officer, that Germany would embrace communism so devoutly as to rule the world, Russia included. Stalin “scoffed impatiently” and replied, “Communism on a German is like a saddle on a cow.” Then he said that the four great Allies must remain close friends for many years after the war because Germany could be expected to start a new war after about twenty-five years.[63]

It may be that Stalin was concealing his intentions about Poland, but it would hardly seem that he was at that time planning to communize Germany. He hated the Germans too much for their barbarities in Russia to wish to share his communist religion with them. He preferred alliance with the West to any such dubious experiment.

When Harry Hopkins was sent to Moscow, in late May 1945, to try to break the deadlock which prevented the implementing of the Yalta accord on Poland, Stalin explained his attitude toward Poland, as follows: The Germans had twice invaded Russia through Poland in the course of twenty-five years. Nobody who had not lived through such invasions could imagine what they were like. It was not warfare. It was a new incursion of the Huns, made

[62] **S. Harrison Thomson, “The New Poland,” *supra*, p. 229.**
[63] **Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, pp. 100, 79.**

possible by Poland's weakness and hostility. Her weakness also enabled the Germans to do what they wished in the West, as well as the East, "since the two were mixed together." It was therefore a vital interest to Russia to have Poland both strong and friendly.

Stalin continued that the Polish people did not want the Soviet system and that "it must develop from within on the basis" of conditions which were not present in Poland, which would live under the parliamentary system. The Soviet system was "not exportable." All that the Soviet Union wanted was "that Poland should not be in a position to open the gates to Germany."[64]

Was Stalin merely pulling the wool over Hopkins' eyes?

He spoke these words to his friend Harry Hopkins, the man who had come to Moscow soon after the German attack and convinced him that the West really wanted to help Russia in her worst hour. The close relationship thus established had been maintained throughout the war, especially in the inter-Allied conferences. After Roosevelt's death, Hopkins was the man in all the West whom Stalin had most reason to trust, and least reason to hoodwink. Stalin was not speaking for publication. He was talking intimately with Hopkins, yet everything he said would be reported to Washington and London, and stand against him in history.

It is possible that he was concealing a deep laid plan, but more probable that he was describing the situation as he then saw it. What he said could as easily mean that he was willing for Poland to remain capitalistic and parliamentary, democratic in our sense of the word, if only she were a firm Soviet ally. He was willing to concede everything else if he could only be sure of that. Yet when he came to examine the names of men for the new Polish Government he rejected almost every one mentioned from among the London Poles and nearly all of their associates in Poland. He was sure he could not trust them to be friendly. When it came to the scratch he found himself able to trust only the Lublin Poles who had voluntarily aligned themselves with Russia.

On his side, Mikolajczyk was equally unable to trust the Lublin Poles. He rejected them as renegades and sought to take the power from their hands through free and unfettered elections. It must be assumed that Stalin's thinking would change during the year and a half of deadly political warfare which ensued in Poland, just as the thinking and attitudes of the Western leaders changed during this period, a time during which the cold war between the Soviet Union and the West became frigid indeed. Two years after Yalta the situation was certainly very different from what Roosevelt had expected, and there is no reason to believe that Stalin could have foreseen everything which occurred during that interval. To make this assumption would be to credit him with supernatural powers.

_ The whole story of Yalta indicates that Stalin wanted to continue his wartime association with the West, on his terms as much as possible, but on a basis of compromise and accommodation. In his talk with Hopkins quoted above he still had that idea, for he went on to say that Germany could not have been defeated in either of the two world wars without the intervention of the United States. Indeed, the United States had more reason to be a world

64 Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 899–900.

power than any other state. “For this reason he fully recognized the right of the United States as a world power to participate in the Polish question and that the Soviet interest m Poland does not in any way exclude those of England and the United States.”[65]

Late in June 1945, at the close of the Moscow discussions which set up the Polish Government of National Unity, Stalin arose to speak and to propose a toast, saying: “Poland is a big country now, backed by Soviet Russia and the Allies. But no country, even the biggest country in the world, can today feel secure with but a single alliance. The Germans can arise again, as they did after World War I, and assume great strength and military power. If this is the case, the Soviet-Polish alliance will not be sufficient. Thus, both nations must have alliances with the West . . . with Great Britain, France, and the United States. I drink a toast to those Allies!”[66]

There was no reason why Stalin should have said this unless he believed it. He uttered a profound political truth, one which did not point toward an imperialistic Russia trying to conquer the world. Nor, did he anticipate that Poland would be one of the principal means of dividing Russia and the West. In the same short speech he said he knew there were people who doubted the real intentions of Russia toward the Poles. These people should observe current events, they would find that their suspicions had no basis.

It can hardly be questioned that Russia’s primary, overmastering purpose in Poland was security, to get a strong Poland loyally allied to Russia, possessing herself real strength for dealing with any future German onslaught and ready to call in the full power of the Red Army instantly if one should occur.

This controlling Russian objective did not arise out of any dogma. It did not originate in any man’s mind. It was burned into the minds of scores of millions of Soviet citizens by what the Germans did in Russia.

The Soviet Union would have a friendly Poland, but Stalin did not foresee that the political struggle about to take place in Poland would go far toward alienating Russia from her Western allies. In late June 1945 he regarded that as a calamity, insisting that both Russia and Poland “must have alliances with the West.”

2. *How could Poland have been saved for the West?*

The West deliberately gave Poland away at Munich. It is conceivable that the self-centered and ill-informed Chamberlain was not aware of this, but the craven French leaders were. They knew that, after Czechoslovakia, Poland would be next on Hitler’s list and that they would be absolutely powerless to save her. They also knew enough about Nazi plans and manias to know that more was intended for Poland than a slight rectification of the Corridor. If any doubt about this existed, it was dissipated by the raging Nazi campaign against Poland in the summer of 1939.

After Germany struck, there was but one hope of making amends to Poland and reclaiming her for the Western system. That was to defeat Germany. This the Allies were totally unable to do until Russia entered the war. Thereafter

[65] **Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 900**

[66] **Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 128.**

Poland could be kept out of the Russian orbit only if Western armies marched across Germany into Poland. Yet even after the entry of the United States into the war the British opposed this kind of campaign. Churchill fought to the bitter end to prevent a direct, massive assault upon Germany. He not only prevented a landing in France in 1942 but by securing the North African detour he also prevented it in 1943.

If in 1943 the great military strength and the immense logistical effort used up in Africa and Italy had been hurled across the Channel instead, when Germany's armies were still deep in Russia and her strength in France much weaker than in 1944, the Western armies might have met the Russian armies on the plains of Poland.

Such a meeting was deeply and intensely desired by the Russians. Far from objecting to our presence in Poland they would have been delighted by it. It would have meant the saving of millions of Russian lives, a shortening of the war and the spending of at least several hundred thousand additional American and British lives. In such circumstances the Russians would have been pleased to strike hands with us in Poland. The Polish problem would have looked very different to them and we would have had the power to help police Polish elections on the spot.

It may well be that this situation would have led to graver trouble with Russia over Poland than has occurred, but only in such a military development was there any chance of our being able to exclude a Russian solution of the Polish problem. At the last minute we could not reclaim by diplomacy alone what both diplomacy and military policy had surrendered, especially since American diplomacy refused to make any settlement about Poland until compelled to do so, step by step, by military events.

3. *What Future for Poland?*

There was general agreement that a most remarkable national revival began in Poland during the first three years after Germany's defeat. In the summer of 1948 John Gunther visited Warsaw and was astonished at what he saw. He reported the "massive energy and zip" the Poles had put into the rebuilding of Warsaw. He spoke of "electric animation and effervescence." Warsaw was the liveliest capital in Europe. Food was cheap, good and plentiful. The people were rebuilding the city almost entirely with hand tools, with very few of the great machines we use so plentifully, but every Pole he met was "almost bursting with hope."

This was by no means due solely to the character of the Government. Indeed, most Poles hated Russia. He did not see in Warsaw a single Red flag, a photograph of Stalin or a Russian soldier. There were few signs of overt pressure on the people. An American who bitterly hated the regime told him that there was no arbitrary use of the police power, no concentration camps or terrorism. The Poles were building for the future. They did not expect another war to tear down their city again.[67]

On January 2 and 3, 1949, the ***New York Times'*** correspondent, Sydney Gruson, reported that to return to Warsaw after three months' absence was

[67] John Gunther, "Inside Europe Today," *New York Herald Tribune,* February 8,1949.

to have one's breath taken away. The change he saw justified President Bierut's description of Poland as a country "pulsating with work." Much had been accomplished under the impetus of an intensive one-month production drive and labor competition to celebrate the final merger of the communist and socialist parties. The results had astounded both the people and the Government. Many new ways of saving time and work had been discovered. Two new bridges across the Vistula had been completed. Blocks of new flats "providing better housing than Polish workers had ever enjoyed before" had been completed and new ones started. Rationing had been abolished entirely, wages raised and prices lowered. Shops had been well stocked during the holidays, with plenty of customers from all levels of the population.

The Government was buoyant with confidence that it was steadily winning honest support. Its detractors acknowledged that it had gradually won the grudging acceptance of a majority, mainly because they were no longer able to envisage an alternative. A year earlier a majority had unquestionably been positively opposed to the Government.

In February 1949 the ***Atlantic Monthly*** had a report on Poland which told of deep resentment among the Poles because of Russia's interference in their affairs, along with the admission that the new administration had brought them stability, prosperity and a will to work. There was plenty of money in circulation, particularly among the poorer and peasant classes. Women had attained a position of strength and power in the nation. They got equal pay for equal work and had important positions in the Government. The people looked well and reasonably happy.

However, merciless propaganda against the richer peasants had begun. This was likely to fail, but the rapid industrialization of the country would promote collectivization of the land by supplying the necessary machines and draining away peasant workers. Some pressure upon Catholic schools and religious orders had begun, and education promised in time to indoctrinate the young people in the theories of Marx and Lenin. Government control of all phases of Polish life had tightened after the defection of Yugoslavia from communist orthodoxy in 1948.

Then the cold war turned hot in Korea in 1950 and the great rearmament of the West which accompanied and followed it led Stalin into the nearly fatal error of arming Poland and the other East European states heavily—on top of the back-breaking burdens of reconstruction and heavy industrialization—leading to privations and resentments which could only be controlled by police state methods.

CHAPTER X

SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN EAST EUROPE

1945

The advance of Russian influence and control to the Stettin-Prague-Trieste line was the greatest result of the Second World War. It was Russian control of Eastern Europe which alarmed the West and precipitated the Cold War. If the Russians had been willing to fight the war without any permanent power gains in this region there would have been no plunge toward a third world war after 1945.

Russian-Communist control of East Europe was the basis of the belief in the West that Russia was out to conquer the world. Vice versa it was the Western opposition to the Soviet organization of Eastern Europe which convinced the Red leaders that the West was as fundamentally hostile as ever. Then the prolonged talk in the West of freeing East Europe from Soviet domination led the Russians to arm and to conduct a world-wide ideological struggle against the West, quite apart from any previous desire they may have had to do so.

This factor was not the only one in Russian thinking, but it is not possible to begin to understand Russian motives and feelings without knowing what they think about Eastern Europe.

No Planned Aggression. What is the first point to note? Surely it is that Russia did not set out cold bloodedly to conquer this region, as the Nazis did. From the national standpoint Russia lost grievously as the result of World War I. All of the gains of Peter the Great were swept away, save only the narrowest and most precariously held window to the West at Leningrad. The port of Riga and others which had helped the old Russia to breathe a little in the Baltic were in hostile hands, serving as rumor factories for an unending stream of Russian atrocity stories. When the notorious ***Chicago Tribune*** representative, Donald Day, was expelled from Moscow he stopped in Riga and spent years composing the most fantastic horror stories—published and widely believed in the United States. [1]

Yet there was no raging campaign in Russia to recover the lost territories. The German example was not copied. No claim to recovery was raised in any case, except that of Bessarabia, and this claim was tacitly dropped as long as there was hope of stopping Hitler by diplomacy. In Poland the Reds had a perfect basis for setting up an outcry to recover the 8,000,000 Ukrainians and White Russians in East Poland, but they never did so. For this reason they were embarrassed for reasons when it came time to partition Poland with

[1] **Marquis W. Childs, *New York Post*, June 4, 1945**

Hitler, since they could not say that the main reason was defense against him.

The Attacks of the Nazi Satellites upon Russia. The Russian occupation of East Europe was due simply and solely to the outcome of a giant war of aggression against the Soviet Union. We know about the huge German onslaught on Russia, but we are not so aware that Finland, Rumania, Hungary and Austria were active and importanfhelligerents against Russia. Some 700,000 Austrians fought in Hitler's armies, many of them perhaps unwillingly, but the amount of human and material damage they did in Russia was very large. There is no record either that they behaved more humanely in Russia than the other Germans, or that they deserted to the Russians in scores of thousands, as the Czechs did in World War I. If we had remembered the Austrian contribution to Russia's agony, the Russian economic seizures in Austria would not have seemed so hard hearted, especially since they were firmly based legally on the armistice terms.

The Finns, of course, had their grievance of Russia's attack on them in 1939, but that did not make their part in the siege of Leningrad any more welcome to the Russians. The Finns also fought on several fronts other than their own and the Russians were very bitter toward them.[2] Yet when they were finally forced to sue for peace a second time, after years of admonition to do so by Secretary Hull, Russia stiffened the peace terms against them very little. She took Petsamo in the North, as any power in her place would have, but Finland was not occupied. A control commission of 300 Russians went to Helsinki to supervise the execution of the armistice terms. That was all. On December 1, 1945, C. L. Sulzberger could not find the slightest evidence of incorrect behavior by the Russians, or of interference in Finland's internal affairs.[3] David Lawrence wrote that Russia had shown herself "magnanimous and broadgauged in victory." Those of us who had been portraying Stalin and Russia as "greedy for territory and as eager to trample on the rights and aspirations of small nations" would now have to revise their judgment[4]

Russian leniency toward Finland was due to several factors. There was the strong sentimental affection of the Americans for Finland. We never declared war on her. But, more important, the Reds respected a people who fought hard for what they believed to be their rights, and then paid their reparations punctually and in full when defeated. If in the end Finland is taken over by Russia it will be due to developments in the Cold War, not to any desire for vengeance.

In the cases of Rumania and Hungary the Russians had little reason to be soft. The Rumanians had their Bessarabian grievance, but that hardly justified their conduct in Russia. They carried the brunt of the war in the southwestern Ukraine. They massacred 200,000 Soviet citizens in Odessa alone and their troops were captured all the way to Stalingrad.[5] That the Rumanians suffered great losses of men hardly endeared them to Russia. Yet the Russian troops

[2] The *New York Times*, February 10, 1944. **[3] *Ibid*., December 2, 1945.**

[4] Washington *Star*, September 5, 1944.

[5] *Ten Eventful Years, 1936–1946*, The Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago, 1946, p. 830; Edgar Snow, *Why Stalin Must Have Peace*, New York, 1947, p. 88.

behaved with disciplined restraint when they invaded Rumania. In pursuing the Rumanians from the Volga to Rumania the Russian soldiers had found that the Rumanians carried off everything that could be moved, including the seats of the Odessa State Theater. Frequently the victors passed through their own home towns and learned that the Rumanians had destroyed their homes and murdered their families. Still they obeyed orders and let the Rumanians alone. All during 1944 there was no interference in Rumania's internal affairs.[6]

The Hungarian invasion of Russia in Hitler's wake was entirely wanton—one more jackal joining the pack. The Hungarian peasants had no wish to fight the Russians, but they were forcibly conscripted by their native masters and sent off to Russia, where on January 25, 1943, almost the whole of the Second Hungarian Army was annihilated at Voronezh. Ten divisions were lost in the winter slaughter before Stalingrad, but not before the Hungarian rulers had boasted that they had killed a million Russians. At the Potsdam Conference Stalin said that the Hungarians had sent 26 divisions against Russia, the Rumanians 22 divisions and the Finns 24—the latter being essential to the blockade of Leningrad.[7]

If Russia was not overwhelmed, it was not because the lesser fascist states did not do their best to help Hitler do it. Even Italy sent several divisions to Russia, and Franco Spain contributed the large "Blue Division." Altogether, the scores of divisions supplied by Hitler's satellites added a grievous weight to his onslaught, even if they were not usually such ferocious fighters as the Germans. They contributed their full share to the immeasurable devastation in Russia.

Russian Conquest Applauded. Eastern Europe was occupied by the Red Army because all of these efforts to destroy Red Russia failed. There is no other reason. When the Russian armies swept into the Balkans, also, we were glad to have it done. Many fears had arisen in the West that the Russians might stop at their own frontiers and leave to the Allies the appalling job of destroying the German armies, and those of their satellites. We were not then gripping our chairs and hoping that the Red armies would not invade the sacred precincts of East Europe. We were cheering them on to do what would be immensely difficult if not impossible for us to do should the Russians stop at their borders and say they had done enough. On March 29, 1944, the leading editorial in the ***New York Times*** celebrated Russia's entry into the Balkans, saying that this event disposed of "the last unjustified suspicions" that the Russians might stop at their own frontiers, or at most conduct a ***Sitzkrieg*** there, while the Western Allies finished the war. The ***Times*** commented further that it was generally understood in London that at Teheran Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed to drop any plans for a Balkan invasion. Conceding a sphere of influence to Russia in Eastern Europe, the Allies would invade Western Europe.

It was still to be three months before they did so.

[6] The *New York Times*, October 22, 1944.

[7] *Ten Eventful Years, 1936–1946*, The Encyclopedia Britannica, pp. 355, 604; Snow, *Why Stalin Must Have Peace*, p. 88; Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 364.

RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES

What motives, aims and purposes actuated the Russians after they had occupied Eastern Europe? What did they seek to accomplish?

1. *Security*

Their first driving and continuing motive was, and is, security. This is the cardinal, outstanding fact which explains the Cold War more than everything else put together. Unless this dominating consideration is not only understood but ***felt*** there can be no understanding of the Cold War.

How can anyone be so certain that security is the ruling Russian aim in East Europe? The real answer to this question is another: "How could anyone who lived through the war doubt it?"

Consider some of the statistics collected by a Russian Extraordinary State Committee. The Nazis and their allies occupied Soviet territory in which 88,000,000 people had lived. They destroyed, completely or partially, 15 large cities, 1710 towns and 70,000 villages. They burned or demolished 6,000,000– buildings and deprived 25,000,000 people of shelter.

They demolished 31,850 industrial enterprises, 65,000 kilometers of railway track and 4100 railway stations; 36,000 postal, telegraph and telephone offices; 56,000 miles of main highway, 90,000 bridges and 10,000 power stations. The Germans ruined 1135 coal mines and 3000 oil wells, carrying off to Germany 14,000 steam boilers, 1400 turbines and 11,300 electric generators.

Any reflection on these figures by American city dwellers will undermine the idea that Russia can have no motive in the world except aggression. Farm people, too, will not be so sure of that when they think of the meaning of 98.000 collective farms and 2890 machine and tractor stations sacked and the following numbers of livestock slaughtered by the Germans or carried away by them; 7,000,000 horses, 17,000,000 cattle, 20,000,000 hogs, 27,000,000 sheep and goats, 110,000,000 poultry. What would the American countryside be like if this kind of scourge had passed over it? And what feelings would be left behind it?

The Germans and their satellites were not any more tender either with Soviet cultural institutions. They looted and destroyed 40,000 hospitals and medical centers, 84,000 schools and colleges, and 43,000 public libraries, with 110.000.000 volumes. Some 44,000 theaters were destroyed, and 427 museums. Even the churches did not escape, more than 2800 being wrecked.[8]

Are these only Soviet statistics, and of course false? The reply is that anyone who followed the newspapers closely during the four interminable years after June 1941, and who has read the books of a few war correspondents, knows that these figures cannot be far wrong. Of course they are in sum total beyond comprehension. No human mind can take them in. Moreover, it is not enough to understand them intellectually. What this limitless damage means to the Russians must be felt.

Naturally this can never be done adequately by the well-fed American sitting in his undamaged home. He could understand fully only if the United

[8] Statement of the Extraordinary State Committee, *Information Bulletin*, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Vol. V, No. 106, October 11, 1945, pp. 1–12.

States had been ravaged in the same way, from the Atlantic to the Mississippi with some 15,000,000 people killed, twice as many made homeless and 60.000.000 treated to every degrading and brutalizing experience that the fascist mind could invent. Only then could we really know how the Russian: feel about their security from future attack through East Europe.

Several months after the end of the war the correspondent of the ***New York Times*** visited the totally destroyed city of Minsk and talked with an old brick mason who was doing a little to rebuild his home town. At length he laid down his trowel, looked up and said simply: "You know, when our new five-year plan is completed this kind of thing will ***never*** happen again!" Yet at the same time some highly educated Americans were greeting with profound alarm the item in this same plan which called for 60,000,000 tons of steel for Russia in 1960. Of course the Russians meant to conquer the world! Here was the plain evidence, though at that moment the United States was producing 100,000,000 tons of steel annually and could greatly expand that figure if it desired. At that time, too, and for many succeeding years, the Russians could have used twice 60.000.000 tons of steel in their vast domain without putting a pound of it into armaments.

It was this kind of incomprehension which almost led the American people into a limitless disaster. One actually read frequent statements that of course the Russians know that Germany can never harm them again. Surely the Reds must know also that frontiers do not mean anything any more, that we have big airplanes which can fly over any boundary and over any buffer zone. So it does the Russians no good to hold Eastern Europe. Why don't they come up to date?

If the Russians were only thinking machines they might conceivably accept this reasoning—if they did not observe the Americans acquiring or clinging to military bases many thousands of miles from home, in Japan and the Philippines, in Greece and Turkey, in the Mediterranean and Western Europe, all around the Soviet Union.

Going deeper still, no people can forget the kind of experience the Russians have lived through, not only after 1940, but after 1914. Terrible memories of this kind, twice burned in, cannot die. They are bound to dominate all thinking, mounting even to a security neurosis and giving rise to a fierce, permanent resolve that this kind of thing shall ***never*** happen again. There are many people in our own South who still feel strongly about what General Sherman and others did there nearly a hundred years ago. How then can the Russians forget what they have suffered at Germany's hands through Eastern Europe, during the next century?

A determined if not sympathetic comprehension of Russia's security complex is the beginning of all wisdom in the period after World War II. Without a keen understanding of the deepest and strongest psychological urge left by that war all else is vain. Otherwise we can never understand how the Russians feel about Germany, about reparations, and about Eastern Europe, i.e. about the main element in the Cold War.

No people in the world who had first suffered as the Soviet peoples have and then won a tremendous military victory would go into Eastern Europe

merely for the ride. They would be bound to make sure that the invasion gate was closed, and by the methods which seemed sound to them, not those recommended by others living at a great distance.

This key fact was well understood in the West before the Cold War gripped us. When Russia issued her declaration on the Polish boundary, on January 12, 1944, the ***New York Times*** assessed it as "one of self-protection, not one of senseless aggression." Three days later Anne O'Hare McCormick, the noted foreign expert of the same newspaper, greeted the abolition of the American Communist Party as "pretty convincing proof that Stalin believes this Government is a friendly Government and seeks to do away with every obstacle to good relations with Washington." A little later, on April 3, 1944, she noted that Russia was changing ideologically. The star she followed was not the Red Star, but that of a Great Power.

On February 3, 1944, James B. Reston reported from London a general tendency among diplomats "to believe that Premier Stalin's sphere of influence policy is intended as defensive and not offensive." On July 14, Eric Johnston, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce, returned from a six weeks' visit to Russia with the impression "that it is Marshal Stalin's complete desire to rebuild Russia and not to engage further in world conflict if he can avoid it." Johnston found every evidence of Russian desire to cooperate with us and could see no reason for conflict. It was only later that the idea developed among us that the terribly wounded Soviet peoples, with upwards of twenty million fresh graves among their continent-wide ruins, had suddenly decided to conquer the world.

On September 29, 1944, Reston reported to the ***New York Times*** from Washington that "the Soviet Union is not harboring any great expansionist dreams and is not plotting to communize Europe." This belief was buttressed by a remarkable speech which Stalin made on November 6, 1944, one which can well be studied with care.

In it he reviewed the whole course of the war, analyzing the failure of German and Japanese aggression, with every indication that he thought all such aggressions must fail. He was certain that Germany would try again, and he urged that means to avert any new aggression be worked out now. What means? After the complete disarmament of the enemy there is only one means, "namely, to create a special organization to defend peace and insure security, composed of representatives of the freedom-loving nations, to put at the disposal of the leading organ of such an organization the essential amount of armed force required to avert aggression, and to make it the duty of this organization, in case of necessity, to apply without delay these armed forces to avert or liquidate aggression, and to punish those guilty of aggression."

Here was a call for a powerful United Nations organization, one with teeth in it, one which could move against any aggressor. It should have "everything at its disposal to defend peace and avert a new war." There is no hint here of a U.S.S.R. vetoing and laying about her in the UN. Stalin voiced the inveterate insistence of the U.S.S.R. that the peace must be founded on the cooperation of the three great powers. Of course there had been difficulties, including the question of the second front, but all "were solved in the long

run in a spirit of complete agreement." He paid tribute to the unity shown a the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Stalin could have had no anticipation that Russia would soon feel herself beset in the UN and fearful of it.[9]

His whole address of November 6, 1944, was that of a statesman. He made it clear that aggression could not succeed, because it aroused all the world against an aggressor. It is not credible that an astute statesman who under stood this basic principle should at once turn around and start on the same disastrous road himself—before the almost fatal wounds suffered by his nation had begun to heal. Nor is it reasonable that he should stand staunchly for a strong UN, with power to curb aggression, if he thought there was any possibility of Russia turning aggressor and bringing the UN down upon herself.

It must be remembered, too, that this was a Party speech, for home consumption. It was given on the greatest of all Soviet anniversaries, that of the October Revolution. It was printed and heard throughout the Soviet Union and would do great harm to Soviet public opinion if Stalin was planning aggression.

As late as October 16, 1945, a group of American Congressmen returned from Russia reporting that they found the Russian people friendly to America opposed to any more war and eager to raise their standard of living. Even a the end of 1945, on December 21, Walter Lippmann interpreted Russia's decisive vote for placing UN headquarters in the United States as clear evidence that Russia believed that our fundamental policy would be "not to lead the Western World against Russia" but to mediate the issues which existed between Russia, Western Europe and China.

Anne O'Hare McCormick summed up all the evidence as to Russia's main goal for the future, including East Europe, when she said in a carefully reasoned article in the ***New York Times Magazine***, on October 28, 1945: "The only fact which overrides all other facts is that the aim of Russia is security Her motive in setting up an outer fortress and insisting that the great power shall be supreme arbiters in making and maintaining peace is to insure security by force." Since none of the great powers could permit any one of them to become strong enough to dominate the others, the only alternative was partnership and "only a will to war or a philosophy of despair would abandon at the first or the hundredth setback the endeavor to achieve that partnership."

This is a strikingly statesmanlike utterance. The towering fact of the whole post-war period is recognized. "***The only fact which overrides all others is that the aim of Russia is security***." Her policy of peace through a partnership of the great powers was also sound and nothing should deflect us from achieving it. Unfortunately this realistic, life-giving policy, already seriously endangered was soon to be almost fatally undermined by Winston Churchill in his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, which substituted the policy of alliance against Russia, with strong hints of liberating East Europe.

[9] He also hailed the vital part of the seventy-five Allied divisions in the West in speeding Russia's advance and shortening the war. He greeted our landing in France as "unprecedented in history as regards organization and scale."

When Mrs. McCormick spoke, our relations with Russia were already gravely damaged, without basic reason, as other clear heads saw plainly. On November 15, 1944, Red-baiting Representative J. Parnell Thomas (Rep., N.J.) sought to draw out General Dwight D. Eisenhower about our future enemies. Eisenhower replied promptly, while a packed committee room applauded: "Russia has not the slightest thing to gain by a war with the United States. I believe Russia's policy is friendship with the United States. There is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common man and they want to be friends with the United States."[10]

Here again is a powerful breath of common sense. The American leader who had kept his eyes on the Russians as perhaps no one other than Franklin D. Roosevelt had, knew that they had no reason or desire to be anything but friends with us. Eisenhower knew also that there is in Russia a desperate and continuing concern for the lot of the common man.

This is an epic fact which has been buried under mountains of assertion and invective by our passionate cold warriors. Indeed scarcely anyone besides Eisenhower could have made that statement later without imminent risk to his future career.

2. *Land Reform*

The second Soviet objective in East Europe was land reform. The first thing which an invaded, despoiled Russia would do in East Europe, to convert it from an invasion route into a security zone, would be to break the power of the fascist elements which had teamed up with Hitler for the assault on Russia. This would be true even if Russia were not communist. If we had suffered from fascism as Russia has, our blood would boil at the mention of the word.

Breaking the power of the fascist elements in East Europe meant first of all the dispossession of the great landlords. Feudalism had long survived in this region. The German Junkers are the best known example. It was these landed aristocrats who were the very source and center of Prussian militarism for two centuries. They officered the army and the state and kept all lesser Germans goose-stepping in their proper places. They survived even during the German Republic, which was too anemic to break up their estates. Far from that the Junkers lived constantly on the bounty of the state, the famous ***Osthilfe***, squandering their receipts in all the pleasure capitals of Europe until they were bankrupt, then going back to the national treasury to be bailed out again. Hindenburg was one of them originally, and they bound him to themselves in the years of his senility by collecting money and presenting his son with an estate in their midst. A group of these barons actually took Over the German Government at the end, turning the country over to Hitler when Premier Schleicher threatened to do something about the ***Osthilfe*** scandals.

The great bulk of the Prussian Junkers lived east of the Oder. Their estates were promptly broken up by the Russians in 1945.

In Poland the feudal magnates who ruled the Slavs east of the Curzon line had been the driving force behind the Polish attack on Russia in 1920, which

[10] ***The Nashville Banner*, November 15, 1944.**

resulted in the incorporation of their estates into Poland. Thereafter it was their power and fear, in large degree, which prevented any settlement of the Polish question until the Red Army provided the settlement. Then county committees of Poles, mainly farmers, divided the estates, trying to give each family twelve acres. In Radzyn County, for example, twenty-eight estates, including two of 4000 acres, were divided. Some 30,000 acres were allotted to the peasants and 10,000 acres of forest land went to the state. Distribution was unimpeded since most of the landlords had either been disposed of by the Germans, or had fled with them when the Red armies came.[11]

Elsewhere throughout East Europe the process was similar. In Czechoslovakia the estates of the German aristocrats, in whose castles Lord Runciman spent his time while Czechoslovakia was being betrayed, were quickly disposed of by the Czech Government, along with those of the large Czech landlords who had opposed fighting with Russian aid in 1938.

Though the Prussian Junkers were more dangerous in bulk, it was in Hungary that the post-war land reform was most drastic in its national effects. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy had rested one of its main pillars on the feudal magnates. In Hungary forty per cent of the land was held in huge estates, one of 570,000 acres, or 890 square miles. Three hundred and twenty-four others averaged 41,000 acres, or 64 square miles each. Vast acreages were held by the Church. One bishop controlled 266,000 acres.

The degradation and misery of the peasants who existed as semi-serfs on these estates has been pictured unforgettably by G. Poloczy-Horvath in the small book ***Darkest Hungary***, the accuracy of which is attested by one of the ex-magnates, the liberal exile Count Michael Karolyi.[12]

Reform was defeated in Hungary after World War I by the triumph of the reaction to Bela Kun's abortive communist regime. Thereafter the Hungarian magnates quickly organized under Admiral Horthy the first fascist regime, antedating even Mussolini's brand. Praetorian guards were gathered from among the impoverished gentry, army officers and chauvinistic middle-class elements which protected the magnates and kept the peasants in their thousand-year-old state of subjection. To the Hungarian landlords, as to the Vich French, Hitler was the defender of order and property, their savior. In alliance with him they could continue forbidding the peasantry (90 per cent of the people) to form labor unions. It was illegal for the Social Democratic Party to work among them. But the peasants were forced to fight Russia under the Nazi banner.[13]

As soon as the Red armies had conquered half of Hungary the division of the estates began and, as elsewhere, it was rapidly carried through. The distinguished writer Emil Lengyel made a survey of the Hungarian land reform

[11] **Strong, *I Saw the New Poland*, p. 220.**

[12] **London, 1945. During his brief government of Hungary in 1919 Count Karolyi decreed the break up of the great estates above 500 acres, and personally set the example by dividing his own huge estate among his peasants, in lots of 5 to 20 acres.—*The Memoin of Michael Karolyi*$_y$ New York, 1957, pp. 149–51; London, Cape, 1956.**

[13] ***Ten Eventful Years*, *1936–1946*, TTie Encyclopedia Britannica, pp. 599–604. Georg« Mikes has a striking picture of the abject serfdom of the Hungarian peasants.—*Thi Hungarian Revolution*, London, Wingate, 1957, pp. 17–18.**

on the spot in September 1946. He found that 3200 land claims committees, consisting of 30,000 peasants, had distributed more than 6,000,000 acres, or a third of the total arable land. About 800,000 families had received land, up to six acres each. Lengyel characterized the dispossessed land barons as the "class which lined up Hungary on the side of the war makers—Hapsburg and Hitler."[14]

Throughout Eastern Europe the estates were broken up, usually without compensation, as a preliminary to the collectivization of the land on the Soviet pattern, a later campaign which very largely failed except in Bulgaria.

3. ***The Nationalization of Large Industry and Banking***

This was the second means used by the new Communist governments to reduce the power of the groups which had attacked the Soviet Union.

Of course they would not have needed this powerful motive, since nationalization is a cardinal communist doctrine. It must be remembered, also, that the war itself made a great deal of nationalization inescapable. Everywhere the Germans went they seized the great properties—steel, coal, manufacturing, banking, any industrial property which had value—either directly or in collusion with native collaborators. Many of the native owners were killed, imprisoned, scattered abroad or otherwise disposed of. Often a perfect maze of new property relationships was created. The tangle was so great everywhere that the pre-war ***status quo*** could not be restored in countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, even if the people had wished to do so. The governments were compelled to take over the Germanized properties and the people approved their remaining in government hands. Small industry was generally left in private hands. In Czechoslovakia factories employing more than 400 men were nationalized. After the Communists seized control in 1948 the figure was reduced to 40.

> The Second World War gave an immense impetus to the nationalization of industry and banking all over Europe, including Britain. It is true also that Europe had been increasingly Socialist politically for fifty years, but this was not the main reason for the sweep of nationalization after the war. The real reasons were to be found in the war's immense destruction of three things: property owners, capital goods and belief in things as they were.

4. ***Economic Orientation Toward Russia***

Since the Industrial Revolution began in England nearly two centuries ago, Eastern Europe had been an economic colony of the West, in the same way that the South and West in the United States used to be dominated by the industrial East. Yugoslavia's rich copper and other mineral deposits were mainly foreign owned. In one case a French company held its concession but did not develop it for fear of competition with North Africa. In Rumania half of the metallurgical industry and 85 per cent of the oil industry were in foreign hands, chiefly British and American until the Germans took over the properties. After the war these properties were in Russo-Rumanian hands, convincing some American oil men that, as one expressed it, we should make war on Russia to liberate these people.

[14] **The *New York Times*, September 22, 1946.**

Traditionally the West not only owned the industrial properties in East Europe, but left the area largely undeveloped, preferring to import great quantities of food and raw materials from East Europe, process them and send a large proportion back at a good profit. Thus the East stayed agricultural and poor, just as for a long time the Southern United States did.

After 1945 East Europe was closed to this particular brand of exploitation. Every state in the region had its program of industrialization, but there was no field for foreign private investment. Trade with the West could still continue on a state-controlled basis, but only to benefit state industries.

This, too, was not the worst of it. The old assumption of East-West trade in Europe was broken. The assumption became East Europe-Soviet Union trade, with the West getting only what it could bargain for. This left Western Europe, which traditionally depended on the East for much of its food, with serious economic problems. All of the basic European Recovery Plan documents insisted that West Europe could recover durably only if a large measure of East-West trade were restored.

It was this dilemma, added to resentment over land reform and nationalization, which convinced many a Western conservative that war was the only solution.

This conclusion came naturally to many highly placed Americans who learned or observed what went on in East Europe after the war. Sympathy with people of their own rank or occupation who were being liquidated economically was bound to be quick and profound, without inquiring into the historical causation of the measures carried out. American and British diplomats were especially open to the appeals of the expropriated groups. They could not believe that the polished, cultivated gentlemen who owned the great houses and entertained so beautifully should lose their status and fortunes to a lot of crude Communists and unwashed peasants. Left to themselves the diplomats of the West were certain to do what they could to save the doomed classes, even if their superiors in the Foreign Offices had not felt the same way. Accordingly, they tried everywhere to put the brakes on the revolution, with the result that the old ruling elements suffered more severely than they would have. This was especially true of the leaders of the old political parties. Western support both encouraged them to resist and doomed their efforts to do so.

5. *To Reduce the Power of the Catholic Church*

Added to our strong feeling for the ruined conservatives was a still more powerful emotion, stirred by the acts of the new communist states against the power of the Roman Catholic Church. For the Catholic hierarchy this struggle was mortal. It could accommodate itself to fascism successfully since fascism allied itself—for its own purposes—with conservative interests and since the fascist regimes were destroyed in the war, but it was unable to come to terms with communism. There was not only the atheistic basis of Marxism, which labels religion “the opiate of the people” to deal with, but the still more formidable determination of the communist hierarchy not to tolerate any rival. During the war and since, the Soviet Government has shown itself

willing to tolerate religious worship, purely as such, and to use the Russian Church as a political instrument, but its opposition to a rival wielding great economic, social and political power was implacable and was fully reciprocated by the Catholic Church.

The Mindszenty Crisis. The struggle between them did not come to a head in Hungary until the winter of 1949. The Government had moved in 1945 to divide all estates above 150 acres in extent, which meant the confiscation of the huge estates of the Church, striking at its great economic power. Then on June 19, 1948, a law was passed ending compulsory religious education and taking from the hands of the Church all schools, except those which taught religion exclusively, and theological seminaries.

The opposition to these measures had been led by Cardinal Archbishop Mindszenty, Prince Primate of Hungary. The spirit in which he fought is indicated by the pastoral letter which he issued four days before the first post-war election, on November 5,1945. In it he opposed both the land reform and the new marriage law facilitating divorce. He predicted that first the marriage ties would be loosened, then youth would become depraved; next moral libertinism would become the rule and finally, "men forgetting decency and chivalry will break with wild passion upon defenceless women to satisfy their passion."[15]

When the law nationalizing the schools was up for passage Mindszenty threatened the Catholic members of Parliament who voted for it and his opposition to that law led to his trial and conviction, though on other charges, in February 1949. His opposition to the land and school laws had been adamant and he had consistently refused to recognize the existence of the Hungarian Republic.[16]

When he was sentenced to life imprisonment there was a natural explosion of wrath from the American Catholic hierarchy, one which many millions of non-Catholics shared, and which advanced American public opinion notably toward the view that the conflict with communism was irreconcilable and could be settled only on the battlefield.

Spellman's Call to Action. On February 6, 1949, Francis Cardinal Spellman, of New York, demanded the suppression and extermination of communism. Preaching in St. Patrick's Cathedral, he avowed "that unless the whole American people without further ostrich-like actions and pretenses, unite to stop the Communist floodings of our own land, our sons, for the third and last time, shall be summoned from . . . their own homes and families to bear arms against those who would desecrate and destroy them."

The general content of this sentence would suggest civil war ahead, yet the phrase "for the third and last time," indicated clearly a third world war. This result of military action against communism would also be in the nature of things, since a war due to an inundation of our own land by Communist floodings could hardly be ended, with the finality suggested, without sending our atomic bombs and our armies to the source of the "floodings."

[15] The *New York Times*, November 6, 1945.
[16] *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, February 18, 1949.

Urging in an impassioned sentence that prudence be put aside, along with "silence, procrastination and compromise," and assailing "the world's most fiendish, ghoulish men of slaughter," Cardinal Spellman asked if we were "always to endure the insults and wounds they inflict upon our American honor and decency as they enslave countries and persecute peoples."

Calling upon "the American Government, the American public, the leaders in all phases of American life, religious, educational, political, labor, industrial, communications, yes, and entertainment," to "raise their voices as one and cry out against and work against Satan-inspired Communist crimes," he cried: "How long—Oh my God—shall we stand by and see Thy peoples who love Thee reviled, persecuted and murdered by atheistic Communists?"

6. *Unification of the Slavs*

The Second World War was primarily a war for fascist world conquest, but it also became a mighty German-Slav struggle.

From the time of the Teutonic Knights the Germans had been pushing out into Slav lands to the East. They mastered the Baltic states and became a power even in St. Petersburg. They flung out great colonies into Hungary, Rumania and Russia. The map was splotched with them, ending in the biggest enclave of all, the Volga Germans.

World War I was, first and foremost, an effort of the German and Hungarian magnates of the Hapsburg Empire to crush the rising nationalism of the Slav majorities in that Empire. They decided that these Slav nationalistic aspirations must be crushed by force, and Berlin gave them a blank check to do it. Attempting to survive by the sword the Hapsburg Empire perished by it, but Hitler felt himself able really to settle the German-Slav struggle for all time.

He did his best, but failed. After the Germans had killed some 8,000,000 Polish and nearly 20,000,000 Soviet citizens, carrying fire and rapine to the Volga—from which the Volga Germans had been moved far away—the Slavs won the struggle. The Nazis bankrupted and ruined Germany in the effort to exterminate the ***Untermenschen*** Slavs and seize their lands, at least as far as the Urals.

Such a gigantic, ferocious and bloody failure must have results. Pan Slavism had been a considerable force in the Tsarist Empire. Russia had fought in 1914 to save a small South Slav state from extinction, though Russia turned out to be the chief loser in World War I. In the late war the tables were completely turned. The Germans gambled everything and lost.

In the long sweep of history the German failure during 1940–5 to conquer the Slavs permanently is a decisive event of enormous proportions. As far as anyone can see, the German-Slav struggle is finished, with the Germans defeated by their own insensate greed. Instead of the Germans inundating all of Europe from the Stettin-Trieste line to the Urals, that vast area is now swept clean of them. They are nearly all back in a smaller Germany, to stay, There can be no real hope of a future German triumph over the Slavs, unless the Germans can serve as the spearhead of an American attack upon Soviel Europe—an event which would consolidate the entire Slav world as nothing

else could. The Yugoslavs may insist on their own tempo in moving toward the communist millennium. The democratic Czech Republic may live long in the hearts of the Czech people. The Poles may chafe under tutelage by a power from which it has never been welcome. But let there come another real threat from Germany and all of Slavic East Europe would merge into a desperate wall of opposition, backed by the constantly growing industrial and military supremacy of the Soviet Union in Europe.[17]

Can East Europe be Recovered for the West? There was never any real probability that it could be, without a war which would finally finish Western civilization in West Europe, including Britain, whatever the military outcome.

Western Europe had had its day as the ruler of the world, a brilliant day which it frittered away in fratricidal balance of power wars. Its world sway was finally finished by Germany's lusts for a "place in the sun," before 1914, and for revenge, "living space" and loot after 1918.

Correspondingly, Eastern Europe had fallen into the Russian orbit for a long period. For better or worse the Soviets had turned the ***cordon sanitaire*** back upon the West and it could not be reversed. Nor could the West ever recover the ground lost as a result of its failure to establish and defend world law when it could have been done after 1918 with cheapness and efficiency.

[17] **This paragraph was originally written in 1947. By 1959 the American rearmament of Germany, with nuclear arms planned, had gone far toward creating the Slav unity predicted.**

PART II

THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE

1945–1950

CHAPTER XI

AFTER ROOSEVELT

APRIL–AUGUST 1945

Just before Roosevelt died on April 12,1945, he had prepared a radio address to be given the next day to celebrate Jefferson's birthday. In it he had written that "the mere conquest of our enemies is not enough. We must go on to do all in our power to conquer the doubts and the fears, the ignorance and the greed, which made this horror possible."

Urging that an end be put "forever, to this impractical, unrealistic settlement of the difference between peoples by the mass killing of peoples," he asked the American people to "keep up your faith. I measure the sound, solid achievement that can be made at this time by the straight-edge of your own confidence and your resolve."

Then in his last words to us Roosevelt said: "The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith."

This was the spirit in which Roosevelt faced the making of peace, on the last day of his life. There was no hint of a long, bitter "cold war" over who should control Eastern Europe, a conflict extending to Asia and becoming the loudest and most expensive "peace time" power fight in all human history. Both Roosevelt and Hull had been filled with a mighty resolve that this time the peace should not be frittered away and lost, that there should be no resurgence of self-defeating isolationism, no reentry into the old, old treadmill of rival alliances, armaments race, mounting tension and war. This time it should be different. They both willed it and had faith that the fatal cycle could be avoided. They both knew that preserving good relations with Russia was the factor upon which all their hopes depended and they meant to achieve a solid working agreement with the U.S.S.R. in a new league of nations.

SUDDEN REVERSAL

When the strong hands of both Roosevelt and Hull were removed from the helm of the ship of state within a short space of time it was almost certain to move less surely into the future. Some of their successors meant to carry on their international policies, but others wanted to reverse them, especially the key policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

After he returned from Yalta, Roosevelt had little time or energy to counsel with the new Vice President, Harry S. Truman, about post-war foreign policy, and as his strength waned the risk of a reversal of his world policy constantly increased. It began to materialize two days after his death, when on the way

home from Roosevelt's funeral the new President began to learn of "the status of many serious problems in our foreign and domestic relations" from James F. Byrnes.[1]

The next morning at 9:45, and every morning thereafter, the new President, overwhelmed by the tremendous responsibilities suddenly placed upon him, had a conference with one of the strongest and most impressive personalities in Washington, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Staff to the President and top-ranking man in the entire hierarchy of army, navy and air officials.

Each morning at this hour Admiral Leahy told the President about the state of the world. He summarized intelligence reports received during the night, military, political, social and economic, almost anything that had a "bearing on American security and the shaping of policy."

The man who was in this unique position to influence the new President had a long-time aversion to the Russians. "Only once did Leahy swerve from his adamant attitude toward the Soviets and then only momentarily" at Teheran when he thought the Russians were very friendly, until Charles Bohlen reminded him that they had also been friendly to Ribbentrop when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed.[2]

It was Leahy, said Frank Gervasi in a significant article "Watchdog in the White House," who "tutored Truman on what happened at all of the Big Four conferences and a lot of others he had attended." He "coached Roosevelt's inexperienced successor on the significance of Russia's emergence as a major power at the end of World War II" and these tutoring sessions enabled Leahy to be "one of the principal architects of the 'tough-policy' toward Russia." He "did not singlehandedly bring the United States about in a full 180 degree turn on the course toward Russia. Other helmsmen had a hand on the wheel from time to time. But only Leahy was always near enough to the wheel to make his influence felt constantly."[3]

Leahy worked so rapidly that a week after his first conference the new President was ready to reprimand the Russians strongly. The occasion came on the afternoon of April 23, 1945, when Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov came to see the President on his way to the San Francisco Conference. Stalin had refused to send Molotov to the conference until after Roosevelt's death, when he acceded to Truman's request as a gesture of good will toward him.

The Truman-Molotov meeting was preceded by a conference in the White House attended by Secretary of State Stettinius, Secretary of War Stimson, Navy Secretary Forrestal, Admiral King, General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, Charles Bohlen, Ambassador to Russia Harriman, and Major General Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow.

The majority of this group was quite ready to take a tough attitude toward Russia, some from long predilection, others influenced by the series of

[1] James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 49.

[2] Frank Gervasi, "Watchdog in the White House," *Colliers*, October 9, 1955, p. 77.

3 *Ibid.*, pp. 76–7.

dispatches from Ambassador Harriman during the preceding three weeks to the general effect that the Russians were feeling their oats too strongly and that a "tough" policy should be adopted toward them.[4]

Secretary of State Stettinius reported to the gathering that discussions with Molotov about the seating of the Russian-sponsored Polish Lublin Government at San Francisco had taken a most unsatisfactory turn. Stettinius had "completely reliable information" that the Lublin Government ***"did not in any way represent the Polish people***." (ForrestaPs italics.)

When asked for his views Secretary of War Stimson, the most experienced elder statesman in the room, reminded the group that the Russian conception of freedom, democracy and voting was quite different from ours, and he "thought that the Russians perhaps were being more realistic than we were in regard to their own security." In other words, Stimson understood what Poland meant to Russia from the security standpoint. He recalled that "the Russians had carried out their military engagements quite faithfully and he would be sorry to see this one incident project a breach between the two countries."

Stimson almost seemed to say that after all Poland was a matter of desperate concern to Russia and far away from our borders.

Admiral Leahy recalled that "he had left Yalta with the impression that the Soviet government had no intention of permitting a free Poland, and that he would have been surprised had the Soviet government behaved any differently than it had." He hoped "the matter could be put to the Russians in such a way as not to close the door to accommodation."

General Marshall was "even more cautious." He reminded them that we hoped for Russian participation in the war against Japan "at a time when it would still be useful to us," participation which the Soviets could delay "until we had done all the dirty work."

Secretary Forrestal was for "a showdown with them now rather than later" and President Truman came down heavily on that side, saying "that he felt our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one-way street and that he could not continue; it was now or never. He intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco and if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell."[5]

This decision brings out strikingly the great rapidity with which Roosevelt's policy of working with Russia was reversed. It may well be that Roosevelt would have resisted the acceptance of the Lublin Government at San Francisco. The strong probability is that he would have, but without telling the Russians to go to hell.

[4] Harriman cabled that the Russians were making political capital out of the difficult food situation behind the Anglo-American lines as compared to the alleged good situation behind theirs. Where they controlled they were going to establish totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy. The only hope of stopping them was to establish sound economic conditions in the threatened countries. He could not "list the almost daily affronts and total disregard which the Soviets evince in matters of interest to us," but he thought that if they were brought up sharply on one or two of the worst cases they "would ultimately come around."—*The Forrestal Diaries*, Walter Millis, pp. 39–41.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 48–51. Most of the quotations are from Bohlen's notes of the meeting.

The three outstanding men in the conference, from the twin standpoints of experience and personality—Stimson, Marshall and Leahy—all refused to regard the matter of the Lublin Government as a ***casus belli.*** From their statements they did not regard it as of capital importance that Russia be slapped down, then and there, but belligerent minded President Truman was all ready for it, at the very start of his presidential career.

Admiral Leahy and Charles Bohlen stayed for the meeting with Molotov when he was ushered in to pay his respects to the new President, "who lost no time in making very plain to Molotov our displeasure at the Soviet failure to carry through the agreement made at Yalta about the character of a new Polish Government." Truman's "blunt language unadorned by the polite verbiage of diplomacy" was "more than pleasing to me," said Leahy. Then he added: "Personally I did not believe that the dominating Soviet influence could be excluded from Poland, but I did think it was possible to give the reorganized Polish Government an external appearance of independence."[6]

Leahy knew what the realities in Poland were. He had told Roosevelt at Yalta that the agreement concerning Eastern Europe could be "stretched all the way from here to Washington without ever technically breaking it," and he knew that Roosevelt's reply that he could not do better for Poland was true,[7] but Truman would not concede to Molotov that the interests of Russia in Poland were controlling,[8] and the meeting ended abruptly.

Ten years later, when Molotov was reluctant to hear Truman speak at the Anniversary session of the United Nations, Drew Pearson wrote, as he had repeatedly done before, that on the occasion under review Molotov "heard Missouri mule-driver's language." Charles Bohlen, who served as interpreter had told Byrnes later that "he had never heard a top official get such a scolding."[9]

There are some who think the Cold War did not begin until around 1947, but it is clear from this episode that President Truman was ready to begin it before he had been in office two weeks. The years of labor by Roosevelt and Hull to build a basis of understanding with the Soviet leaders which would last through the peace making were cancelled out on April 23, 1945. The Foreign Minister of a victorious ally, one still greatly desired by us for the Japanese war, was given a tongue lashing such as the minister of a Central American republic might bridle under.

From the eminence of eleven days in power Harry Truman made his decision to lay down the law to an ally which had contributed more in blood and agony to the common cause than we had—and about Poland, an area through which the Soviet Union had been invaded three times since 1914.

It was another five months before Truman decided finally to regard the Soviet Union as an unfriendly state, after our post-Hiroshima diplomatic campaign to enforce free elections in the Balkans had led to total deadlock in the very first Conference of Foreign Ministers, and began composing the

[6] William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 351–2.
[7] Gervasi, *supra*, p. 76.
[8] Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 352.
[9] Drew Pearson. *The Nashville Tennessean*, June 29, 1955.

Truman Doctrine for the "containment" of the Soviet Union.[10] However, the basis for the Cold War was laid on April 23 in the scourging which Truman administered to Molotov, giving notice that in areas of the most crucial concern to Russia our wishes must be obeyed. J

By this time the Roosevelt-Hull policies had been thrown into reverse, though the people did not know it, and the signals set for many years of desperate and dangerous power rivalry, beginning in Eastern Europe and involving the expenditure of many hundreds of billions of dollars in an atomic armament race.

Lend-Lease Abruptly Cut Back. The famous incident of the abrupt reduction of lend-lease supplies to our allies, including the U.S.S.R., was due to a willingness of some officials to act quickly in this direction, to the inexperience of President Truman, and to legislative requirement, rigidly interpreted. In his ***Memoirs*** President Truman explained that the order had been approved by President Roosevelt, but not signed, and that when Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley and Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew brought it to him on May 8, 1945, he signed it without reading it.

Then Crowley promptly placed an embargo on all shipments to Russia and other European countries on May 12. Some ships were even turned around and brought back to port for unloading. This abrupt end of the great flow of food, clothing, arms and munitions "naturally stirred up a hornet's nest" in the U.S.S.R. and after other European countries complained President Truman rescinded the order. He adds that if he had read it in the first place the incident would not have occurred.[11]

Secretary of State Stettinius, himself a former lend-lease administrator, was shocked by the occurrence. From San Francisco he promptly indicated his disagreement[12] and he wrote later that the order was "particularly untimely and did not help Soviet-American relations." The fact that the Soviets were pledged to enter the war against Japan made it "even more incredible." It "caught the State Department completely by surprise" and came "without any warning whatsoever to the Soviet Union." Stettinius urged Acting Secretary of State Grew to discuss it with President Truman immediately, and the President 'wisely modified the order. However, psychological damage had been done in our relations with a nation as suspicious as the Soviet Union."[13]

When Truman sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow, on May 27, 1945, to try to settle some of the outstanding questions with Russia, Stalin said that if due warning had been given the cancellation of lend-lease would not have caused hard feelings. Hopkins explained that no pressure upon Russia was intended and Stalin replied that he was fully satisfied with the explanation.[14]

Then after the end of hostilities with Japan, Administrator Crowley did exactly the same thing. Japan surrendered on August 14 and four days later, at 5:00 p.m. on August 18, Crowley suddenly stopped all lend-lease shipments

[10] Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, March 23, 25, 1947.
[11] Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 221–2.
[12] The *New York Times*, May 16, 1945.
[13] Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Roosevelt and the Russians*, pp. 318–19.
[14] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–3.

through Portland, Oregon, the port for shipments to the Soviet Union. Two days later Crowley sent unofficial notice of the ending of lend-lease to all of our allies, and on August 21 President Truman suddenly announced the end of all lend-lease operations. Again the British were hurt, though the axe had fallen on Russia more promptly. Prime Minister Attlee said that "we had hoped that the sudden cessation of this great mutual effort would not have been effected without consultation and prior discussion," and Churchill found it difficult to believe that the Americans "would proceed in such a rough and harsh manner as to hamper a faithful ally—an ally who had held the fort while their own armaments were prepared."[15]

During this period everything which Roosevelt and Hull had hoped to avoid came to pass. With Russia conflict was the order of the day, instead of cooperation, to such an extent that after a year or two diplomacy practically ceased to exist. There were only name calling and propaganda efforts by each side to convict the other of an intention to conquer the world. Even the United Nations, which was created to keep the peace after it was made, was reduced mainly to a forum in which the two giant powers assailed each other.

THE CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Nothing of this was foreseen when the United Nations was being created. Nobody anticipated that Roosevelt would die at the moment of victory and that the next day there would begin the "full 180 degree turn on the course toward Russia" which Gervasi recorded in 1948.

In the early war years all attention was centered on preventing again precisely such a disastrous 180 degree turn in our foreign policy as had happened after World War I. The abrupt reversal of Woodrow Wilson's policy after 1918 had let us in for World War II. This time we would not about face the moment the fighting ended.

When it became apparent that the incredible fact of a Second World War was about to curse mankind, so soon after the Armageddon of 1914, the spirit of Woodrow Wilson was strong in the land. Everywhere people remembered his heroic struggle to prevent just such a pitiful, tragic repetition of world-wide death and desolation. Everywhere people said: "Wilson was right. We must do better this time."

By this they meant that the effort to make peace must not again be smothered under a deluge of partisan and personal hatred, registered in the United States Senate at treaty making time. The Senate must not again bury the peace beneath a shroud of hair-splitting, "preservative" reservations, designed to make the world wholly safe for Uncle Sam forever, and end up by making a separate peace with the enemy.

This feeling was so general that even the Senate could not avoid being aware of its power. Isolationist Senators began to ask their internationalist brethren to tell them about this League of Nations. Group meetings were held at Senators' homes and when the inquiring heard about the League they said: "Why this is the very thing we need."

[15] **The *New York Times*, August 22, 25, 1945.**

It was not enough, however, for the Senate to be willing to let the peace be organized in 1945. Some affirmation was necessary to persuade the world that this was true. The Senate had convinced people everywhere that the United States could not make peace. The other peoples agreed that we could win wars, but added that our requirement of a two-thirds vote in the Senate for the approval of treaties made us unable to make peace.

This conviction was so universal, and so well understood, that on March 14, 1943, four Senators—Ball, Burton, Hatch and Hill—began to agitate in the Senate for a promise of good behavior on its part after this war. Naturally this went hard with Senatorial dignity, but the country insisted, knowing that otherwise there would be no foundation of faith on which a more durable peace could be built. When a Republican Post-War Advisory Council meeting was held at Mackinac Island, Michigan, on September 3, 1943, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, head of the key committee, made it plain that heavy accent would be put on nationalism and the full retention of sovereignty in any pledge to cooperate with other countries.[16] Yet a group of New England Governors was able to secure a resolution which promised "responsible participation by the United States in post-war cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression. ..."

The Fulbright and Connally Resolutions. A few days later, on September 21, the House of Representatives passed the Fulbright Resolution by a vote of 360 to 29. It was "Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring) that the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace among the nations of the world and as favoring participation by the United States therein, through its constitutional processes."

Thus prodded, the Senate at last voted a resolution of its own, on November 5, 1943, in which the Senate recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization "with power to prevent aggression and to preserve the peace of the world." The vote was 85 to 5 and the announced position of absentees made it 90 to 6, every Senator being committed.

Discussions with Senators. This made the planning of peace possible and, with the sensibilities of Henry Cabot Lodge the elder and his associates ever in his mind, Secretary Hull resolved to make a mighty effort to get bi-partisan agreement during the peace making. Accordingly, he cultivated Senators informally and then invited the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to name a sub-committee to meet with him. When this group held its first meeting, on April 25, 1944, Hull stressed the primary necessity of keeping Russia "solidly in the international movement." He pointed out that "malcontents in this country were doing their best to drive Russia out of the international movement by constant attacks and criticisms largely about minor incidents or acts. Unless it was possible to prevail upon newspapers, commentators, and columnists to refrain from this line of activity, which

[16] **Associated Press dispatch in the *New York Times*, September 4, 1943.**

during the past two months had greatly confused the mind of .the public with regard to the more essential phases of the postwar situation, it would be difficult for any international undertaking, such as that offered by us, to succeed."[17]

At the next session, on May 12, 1944, a Senator "inquired pointedly" whether Russia really desired to cooperate and Hull replied that "at all times up to this day, Marshal Stalin and Molotov and their associates had quickly made clear to any inquirer their unqualified desire to become full-fledged associates in the international cooperation movement." Our customs and manners were about as mysterious to the Russians as theirs were to us. Time and patience were absolutely indispensable, Hull added, insisting that "we simply must not quarrel with each other."

When the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on the international organization met, August 21, 1944, the preliminary discussion had been so thorough that the Russian, British and American drafts did not differ greatly. In the debates some difficulties did develop. Gromyko paralyzed the conference on one occasion by observing that the sixteen Soviet republics should be charter members of UN, but he did not press the point. This conference was unable to agree upon the exercise of the veto power, but Hull recorded that the Russians had "shown an admirable cooperation from the first day of the conference."[18]

The Origin of the Veto. The principle of the great-power veto was not under discussion at Dumbarton Oaks, but only the extent to which it should be used when a great power is a party to a dispute. The American delegation had itself split on this issue, and on December 5 the State Department forwarded a compromise proposal to Russia and Britain, providing that the great powers should have the right to veto any sanctions or other action against themselves, but not to prevent the discussion of a dispute with another member of UN, little or big. This was accepted at Yalta and became the permanent provision in the UN Charter.[19]

It is essential to be clear about the origins of the veto, since its frequent use by Russia later on raised great feeling against the veto power itself and the impression grew that it was a Russian invention. Nothing could be further from the truth.

When the framework of UN was being prepared in the State Department it was agreed that the United States must retain a veto over the ultimate use of force; that is, over the use of its armed forces in any and all contingencies. Then the question arose: "If we keep a veto for ourselves to whom else must we concede it?" The answer was, "to the other great powers." This was a real gain, since in the League of Nations every member had had a veto, in both the Assembly and the Council.

It is true that Russia would not have entered UN without a veto right which would prevent any action against her, by a majority dominated by twenty Latin American states or by any majority, but Britain was just as firm

[17] ***The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,*** **Vol. II. p. 1659.**
[18] ***Ibid.,*** **p. 1681.** [19] ***Ibid.,*** **pp.1702–5.**

in retaining the veto for her own usé and there cannot be the slightest doubt that the Senate would have rejected any UN Charter which did not retain a veto for the United States. If, too, the Russians should suddenly come forward and propose the abolition of the veto it is certain that we would rush to its defense.

It may be unfortunate that the great powers were not willing to give the United Nations any real, irrecoverable authority, but this was the fact and all three of them were equally to be blamed, or praised, for this decision. In Hull's words: "we were no less resolute than the Russians in adhering to this principle. . . ."[20]

SENATOR VANDENBERG'S CALL FOR JUSTICE

Shortly after Hull left office Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, rose to a position of strong leadership in the field of foreign affairs, a position which grew rapidly after Roosevelt's death.

Up until Pearl Harbor, Vandenberg was a leading isolationist. His biographers say that for years "he had been carefully creating for America a kind of Portrait of an Isolationist." When the lend-lease bill was passed he felt as if he "was witnessing the suicide of the Republic." If America cracked up, this would be the moment when "the crime was committed."[21]

Soviet Russia was "a matter of no little concern" to him from the start of the war. He repeatedly reminded people that he had been one of two Senators who voted against recognition of the Soviet Union. He had urged the breaking of relations in 1939. Yet on April 21, 1943, he recorded "the gloomiest morning I have had since Pearl Harbor." He had heard that Germany had made "peace proposals to Russia which ***might*** detach her from the war." A week later he faced a dilemma which he found intolerable. Suppose Stalin should ask if we considered his retention of the Baltic States, East Poland and Bessarabia, as "territorial aggrandizement." If we said "Yes," we would infuriate Moscow and if "No," we would infuriate tens of thousands of our own people, referring to his heavy Polish-Ameiican constituency in Michigan. Therefore: " ***We must win the war first.*** Russia's withdrawal would cost a million needless casualties."[22]

In other words, we could not do without Russia's powerful aid. Losing it would cost us a million casualties. So the effort to roll back Russia's 1941 boundaries would have to wait until the war was won.

As it continued, Vandenberg saw that "real international cooperation was the only alternative to future wars too horrible to imagine." He therefore combined this objective with a demand for the revision of Russia's boundaries in his famous speech of January 10, 1945. It was intended, as he wrote later, to be "a challenge to the President on the eve of his departure for Yalta." He was moved by "the deep conviction that it was time to anticipate what

[20] Hull, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 1683.

[21] Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., and Joe Alexis Morris, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, Boston, 1952, pp. 9–10.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 46, 48. "The large number of Michigan residents of Polish descent gave Vandenberg a special interest in Poland at all times" (p. 148).

ultimately became the 'Moscow menace' and to lay down a formula which would make post-war Soviet expansionism as illogical as it would be unnecessary."[23]

Vandenberg's address was made with such "honest candor"—he used the phrase seven times—that the nation was deeply impressed. Speaking in a "spirit of anxious humility" and pleading for "the straightest, the plainest and the most courageous thinking of which we are capable," "devoid of prejudice or ire," Vandenberg proclaimed his disbelief that "any nation hereafter can immunize itself by its own exclusive action." Pearl Harbor had settled that. War had "become an all-consuming juggernaut." He proposed to do everything in his power to keep the laboratories of death closed hereafter and as a concrete step to this end he proposed that "a hard and fast treaty between the major allies" be signed at once, "today," binding us to move automatically against any new German or Japanese aggression in the future, without any "need to refer any such action back to Congress." The "Commander-in-Chief should have instant power to act."

When Vandenberg, a man of impressive voice and personality, closed his address with the statement: "I do not wish to meddle, I wish only to help. I want to do my duty," the effect upon the Senate was profound. From that moment and for years afterwards he was to be the leader of his Party and of the Senate in foreign affairs. The world was now his province.

A New Statesman. The effect upon the American people was almost as far reaching. Vandenberg was hailed as the isolationist who had made a full, frank and sincere confession of his conversion to internationalism. Far from quoting George Washington on entangling alliances he was now willing to make the most sweeping and binding alliances to keep the peace. Since it took a broad gauge man to do that, he at once became a statesman. The present writer wrote him a letter of appreciation, and it was not until long afterwards that he discovered that the famous Vandenberg address was the first basic document in the Cold War.

In the meantime, Vandenberg's prestige rose to record proportions. He was promptly invited by the OWI to speak to the nations overseas. On January 21 the headlines stated that he was boomed for the Presidency in 1948 by his party colleagues in the Senate. On February 4 the ***New York Times*** found that fifty Senators would vote for his proposed treaty and eighteen others were favorable, a two-thirds majority.

Delegate to San Francisco. On February 14, 1945, President Roosevelt named him a delegate to the great United Nations Conference at San Francisco. Four days later the country heard that Vandenberg would not accept the appointment unless he had a free rein. He could not serve in the constitutional position of a representative of the President. He must be in no manner bound. On March 6 it was announced that an exchange of letters with Roosevelt had convinced Vandenberg of his right to free action. He would

[23] **Vandenberg and Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 125, 128, 130. When the Yalta announcement revealed that Poland's Eastern boundary was to be the Curzon line Vandenberg thought it "indefensible" (p. 148).**

exercise it to insure that "justice" should be made the "guiding objective" of the peace.[24]

"***Justice*" *for Poland.*** By this time he had made the word "justice" his motto. His famous address of January 10, 1945, filled nearly five newspaper columns and when analyzed it was, first and foremost, a demand for "justice" for Poland. The startling proposal of a hard and fast treaty with Russia and Britain was aimed squarely at their unilateral actions in Poland and Greece. He included Greece, but Poland was his real concern.

The London Polish Government was being submerged by a Russian sponsored one, and half of Poland's territory was lost to Russia unless something was done. Since Russia gave us her "perfectly understandable reason," her "insistent purpose never again to be at the mercy of another German tyranny," Vandenberg proposed his treaty of guaranty as a substitute for Russia's method of gaining security. "Russia's unilateral plan appears to contemplate the engulfment, directly or indirectly, of a surrounding circle of buffer states, contrary to our conception of what we thought we were fighting for in respect to the rights of small nations and a just peace." This was the core of the immediate problem.

Having by his proposed treaty guaranteed Russia's security against any future German attack on Russia, the way would then be open to revise the Polish settlement according to our own ideas of "a just peace." He made it clear that "we have the duty and the right to demand that whatever immediate unilateral decisions have to be made," military and civil, "they shall all be temporary, and subject to final revision in the objective light of the post-war world and the post-war league." He was "not prepared to permanently guarantee the spoils of an unjust peace."

This was the first public call by a responsible Western leader for a stop-Russia movement. She could not be stopped then. As he spoke, her armies were sweeping into Budapest. But let us tell her, in the most solemn and binding manner, that we will protect her from Germany in the future and then revise these war-made settlements that she is making, "in the objective light of the post-war world and the post-war peace league." What Churchill had failed to accomplish by military action through the Balkans Vandenberg now proposed to achieve by diplomacy.

[24] The *New York Times*, March 6,1945. Vandenberg entered the conference as a delegate sure that there were "Russian clouds in every sky." We were going to have trouble with Moscow "on every point—a sort of 'rule or ruin' attitude." Yet a few days later he noted in his diary about Molotov: "He is an earnest, able man for whom I have come to have a profound respect—despite our disagreements."

Vandenberg soon saw "that there is no longer any strong hand on our foreign policy rudder" and he did much to supply strength, blocking the admission of the Polish Lublin Government to the conference, and urging Stettinius *to be the Secretary of State,* in fact as well as in name. But he thought John Foster Dulles "the most valuable man in our entire American set-up." Though "nominally just an 'advisor' he has been at the core of every crisis."

However, the combined efforts of Vandenberg and Dulles failed to secure a withdrawal clause in the Charter.—*The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg,* pp. 176, 179, 181, 184, 191, 192, 194–5, 215.

His Offer to Russia. Was his proposal not statesmanlike and fair? Would not Russia be safer to entrust her security to the protection of the United States and the new peace league than to rest it on "a circle of buffer states?"

The answer is that Russia would have been wise to accept Vandenberg's apparently generous offer, if the United States had first honored and then kept Wilson's offer of the same guarantee to France in 1919. This treaty of guarantee, signed by Wilson and Lloyd George with Clemenceau, was Vandenberg's model. It had the identical purpose, to ease the French security neurosis growing out of repeated and ever more devastating German invasions of France, and to persuade her to accept a paper guarantee instead of holding the Rhine and the Rhineland.

When this triple alliance to keep Germany from erupting again was signed by the three great Western Allies in 1919 it was one of the most realistic and practical treaties ever framed. All three states, close democratic brothers, had a powerful, common interest in preventing another German eruption. This was the sensible way to do it. But Vandenberg's friends in the Senate scorned this obvious step utterly. They raised a great hue and cry because Wilson chose not to submit the Treaty of Guarantee at the same time that he laid the Treaty of Versailles before the Senate, but once they had gotten the Treaty in their hands they put it into a pigeon-hole and never thought of sending such an absurd, traitorous entangling alliance to the Senate for ratification.

On the contrary, the Senators made a separate treaty of peace with Germany and the United States and Britain rearmed her, leaving France without the security of: ***(a)*** the guarantee treaty; (***b***) the military possession of the Rhineland; or (c) a strong League of Nations. The League was scuttled by France's allies, later with her own help, along with the treaty of guarantee.[25]

This is the background for Vandenberg's magnanimous proposal of January 10, 1945. In 1919 it was the obvious solution and if loyally executed by the United States and Britain it would have prevented the Second World War. In 1945 it was a clever gesture to make the same proposition to the Russians, in lieu of the territorial and political moves in East Europe which they wished to make, but it was only a gesture. It might, and did, seem noble and generous to Vandenberg's countrymen, but there was not a chance of the Russians accepting it. Since this prescription was originally written in 1919 they had seen the Western powers deliberately permit and encourage Germany to go her own vengeful way, with the result that rivers of Russian blood had been shed. There was no chance whatever that in 1945 they would accept the same kind of paper as the sufficient Palladium of their future peace and security.

This certainty, however, did not stop Vandenberg's meteoric rise. On March 9, 1945, he was telling a respectful Senate that the new Polish Provisional Government would be tested by its attitude toward Generals Bor and

25 D. F. Fleming, *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918–1920,* New York, 1932, pp. 232, 293–4; London, Putnam, 1932.

Anders. He warned that expediency and "justice" were often not even on speaking terms. If injustices remained they would "fall squarely within the asserted jurisdiction of the new Peace League."

Revision of Dumbarton Oaks Demanded. When he studied the Dumbarton Oaks draft Vandenberg found that this was not the case, and he learned that there was no reference to "justice" in the Oaks document.

To remedy these omissions he wrote a memorandum to the State Department which was issued to the press, proposing eight amendments. Three of these mentioned "justice," though without defining it or saying how it was to be determined in complex situations. The small states, he insisted, had to be protected. "In a word, our League needs a 'soul'."

To breathe immortality into the soulless UN, his No. 7 amendment provided that "if the Security Council finds that any situation which it shall investigate involves injustice to peoples concerned it shall recommend appropriate measures which may include revision of treaties and of prior international decisions. .. ."

When the new league was established it should hold a majestic review of the fallibilities of Teheran and Yalta, and especially of Russia's unilateral acts in Poland. "For example," Vandenberg explained, "it is one thing to accept a dictated boundary for Country X under pressure of immediate expediency. It is quite a different thing to accept such a boundary as a permanent limitation, underwritten in the basis of world peace, never again to be changed except by international rebellion which we agree to help suppress." (This was the old isolationist argument that the League of Nations Covenant would fasten Britain's chains on Ireland forever.) In an impassioned paragraph he urged, "with every emphasis" at his command, "the indispensability of this amendment."

In case Russia should not heed the behest of the UN to change her boundary with Poland, his No. 8 amendment provided that the Security Council "shall not act, nor shall any member be called upon to act, to perpetuate a status which has been created in disregard of recommendation by the Security Council," or "a status the adjustment of which has been recommended by the General Assembly or by the Security Council," or a new status which comes about "through a permanent member of the Council vetoing measures of restraint against it."[26]

The intent to discipline Russia with all the moral resources at the command of UN, in spite of her veto, was plainly stated, though this intent did not deter general and enthusiastic acceptance of Vandenberg's amendments by the American and British delegations.

When a long list of British and American amendments was presented to Molotov at San Francisco on May 4 he accepted all of them with a "friendly attitude," except the Vandenberg proposal to authorize recommended revision of the peace settlements.[27] He thought that such recommendations would give the Germans a chance to propagandize everlastingly for revision of the settlements in their favor, as they had done after World War I.

[26] **The *New York Times*, April 2, 1945.**

[27] ***Ibid.*, May 4, 1945.**

Nothing, of course, could be more certain. Yet in the end the Russians accepted Article 14 of the Charter, under which "any situation, regardless of origin," may be brought up for debate and recommendation, subject to the provision of Article 12 that no "dispute or situation" before the Security Council could be dealt with. This Article would make it possible, though not as mandatory as Vandenberg would have liked, for Polish affairs to be debated and recommendations made.

Indicating the kind of action he wanted taken, Vandenberg wrote a public letter to the State Department, on July 20, 1945, stating that the settlement of the Polish question thus far made was "inadequate and unconvincing" and demanding supervision of the promised "free elections" in Poland. Citing the Moscow and Yalta declarations, the Atlantic and San Francisco Charters, he urged that the "full weight of our American influence should be exerted in behalf of final determinations which shall clearly serve the ends of justice in behalf of Poland."

The Double Standard. A few days later, on August 6, the ***New York Times*** accurately headlined another Vandenberg letter to Secretary of State Byrnes as follows: "Vandenberg Urges We Do All Policing in This Hemisphere." "We might well enough," said the letter, "accept" in connection with our American allies "exclusive responsibility for any armed forces required to maintain peace and security in the Western Hemisphere. I doubt whether we shall ever want any other armed forces to enter this area."

The same letter proposed that the President receive a free hand to commit a limited quota of our military forces to world action for keeping the peace.

Vandenberg had made a perfect recording of the double standard which was to be increasingly applied to Russia thereafter. From his citadel of justice he yearned to regulate matters in Poland, according to the canons of principle and conduct which he knew to be just. Poland was on the other side of the earth, and what went on there was to the Russians a matter of life and death, but that made no difference. Justice must be done.

In this hemisphere the case was totally different. Nobody from afar should ever take any hand in establishing justice in this vast area, even through UN. We would not "want" them to do so. If some Mexican bandits should kill a few American citizens in Texas and we should send General Pershing deep into Mexico in their pursuit, as happened in 1916, there can be no doubt about our reaction to any Russian efforts to secure justice for Mexico. The Reds would get short shrift. And if perchance Latin America had disastrously invaded the United States twice in thirty years, through Mexico, one needs little imagination to foresee the thunders of righteous wrath which would hurl back any Russian efforts to get justice for Mexico. The most obtuse Russian would be made to understand that American security took precedence over his notions about justice, and that Mexico was not his affair.

Herbert Hoover wrote in the ***New York Times*** on March 27, 1945: "There will be continuing gigantic wrongs in the world. Americans for all time will sorrow for the fate of Finland, of Estonia, of Latvia, of Lithuania, the partition of Poland, and other states that will be partly or wholly submerged by

this war. Arguing for the revision of treaties, he wanted to at least leave "a hope open for their long future."

ARGENTINA SPEEDED INTO UN

Our hearts bled permanently for the fate of Latvia, but we were not willing to consider Russian susceptibilities toward any country in Latin America. There was one government there toward which Russia had strong feelings. Argentina had taken the lead in Russia's expulsion from the League of Nations. She had also gone fascist and had become, in Hull's words, "the refuge and headquarters in this hemisphere of the Fascist movement," a regime obviously aiming at "Argentine hegemony of South America."[28]

Worse still, Argentina had given great aid and comfort to our enemies the Germans and the Italians all through the war. Hull's memoirs contain on many pages ample evidence of her enmity.

For all these reasons Molotov protested the admission of Argentina to the UN at San Francisco, and when the Conference steering committee overrode his protests, Molotov called a press conference and put his case before the world. Quoting castigations of Argentina by both Roosevelt and Hull, he asked only for a few days' delay in voting on Argentina's entry. Then he appealed to the full Conference Assembly and was outvoted, first by a vote of 28 delegations to 7 and then by 31 to 4.

As its last act the League of Nations had expelled the Soviet Union. The first act of the United Nations was a vote isolating and humiliating the Soviet Union. This action was taken, moreover, in behalf of a government which was openly taking fascist action against its internal enemies. On June 1, 1945, Arnold Cortesi, who had long reported the doings of Italian Fascism to the ***New York Times***, cabled from Buenos Aires an article which was accurately headlined: "All Freedom Found Ended in Argentina. New Curbs Imposed. Wholesale Arrests Made and Press Is Silenced Under War 'Security.' Jails of Country Full. Correspondent Says Conditions Are Worse Than Any He Saw in Fascist Italy."

Hull was a member of the American delegation to San Francisco. Too ill to attend, he telephoned to Secretary Stettinius his strong opposition to Argentina's entry. He warned that "if the American delegation were not careful we should get Russia into such a state of mind that she might decide that the United Nations organization was not going to furnish adequate security to her in the future." She might decide to rely on the acquisition of outposts, buffer territory, warm water harbors, and build up "a federation of nations close to her."[29]

This prophetic warning was ignored and Argentina went sailing into the United Nations. On the very first test vote in the UN Russia was isolated with a couple of her satellites (Greece made a gesture of independence), a position from which she has rarely been able to emerge.

Argentina was admitted partly because of commitments made to the Latin Americans at the Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City, February 21, 1945,

[28] ***The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,*** **Vol. II, pp. 1405, 1419.** [29] ***Ibid.,*** **pp. 1722–3.**

a preliminary conference which had been held to consolidate a regional Pan-American security system before the world conference at San Francisco met.

At this gathering two fears of Russia met. Throughout Latin America, with the exception of Mexico and one or two other countries, a thin upper crust rules a vast mass of submerged peons and workers. Communism had grown in this fertile ground during the war, alarming "church and state leaders alike." They were sure that this increase in communist activity was due to Moscow, rather than to the dangerous social conditions beneath them, and so were highly nervous about Russia.

The Latin Americans also feared Argentina, who was not invited to the Chapultepee Conference. It proceeded to agree to apply sanctions to any American aggressor state. Having thus warned Argentina, the Latins wanted her also subject to the vows and sanctions of the UN, and our delegation received orders from Washington to promise implicitly that Argentina would be voted in. Arthur Krock, who is always very close to official sources, said on November 21, 1946, that at San Francisco, "on orders from Washington, redeeming an implicit pledge previously made at Chapultepec by the same orders, the American delegation formed a combination with Latin American and other states in favor of the motion" to admit Argentina.[30] In both cases the "orders from Washington" must have come from President Truman, since Secretary of State Stettinius attended both conferences.

From Truman's point of view he was doubtless consolidating his Latin bloc, in advance of the organization of UN, as a counterbalance to Russia's prospective East European bloc, though this bloc was not yet organized or its permanence conceded. Pedro Leao Velloso, Brazil's Foreign Minister, who had just flown up from Rio with Secretary of State Stettinius, baldly declared to the Chapultepec Conference that one of its prime purposes was to line up "a solid bloc of votes" for the forthcoming world security conference.[31]

This was a natural, normal move in the game of power politics, but it was also a body blow at world cooperation with the U.S.S.R. through the UN, not only because of the initial effects but because it would tend to set a pattern. As Krock observed later, "the bloc idea was permanently founded in UN practice," that is, the anti-Russian bloc idea.

The Latin Americans had reluctantly agreed not to insist on Argentina's admission when the Ukraine and White Russia were admitted, but when Molotov pressed for Poland's admission, about whose government there was so much current conflict, they rebelled and insisted that Argentina must go in at once.

This is, essentially, the explanation which Harriman later gave to Stalin.[32] It was as good an explanation as could be made of an action which was politically unwise and morally wrong. A little later Walter Lippmann observed that "it was not necessary to purchase the solidarity of this hemisphere by riding roughshod through a world conference with a bloc of twenty votes."

[30] The *New York Times*, November 21,1946.

[31] *Time*, March 5, 1945, p. 24. The report added that "alarmed shushes greeted this un-bagging of an unseemly cat."

[32] Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, pp. 897–8.

We were strong enough to have insisted that "our neighbors show a wise moderation in the presence of nations which have suffered so much more in the war and have contributed so much more to winning it."

Our Central Position Lost. Lippmann noted with regret that the United States had already drifted away from and been maneuvered out of "its central position as a mediator." We had suddenly become the champions of a Latin American bloc against the Soviet Union, and in the Polish question the departure from Roosevelt's position as mediator had already "had the most unfortunate consequences." The real issue was between London and Moscow, yet at San Francisco we had allowed ourselves to be drawn into it as partisans.

This was alarming, Lippmann continued, since Anglo-Soviet difficulties extended in "a wide arc through the Balkans to the Middle East and Persia." If ever there was a moment "when a wise reserve is called for on our part, it is now."[33]

"INEVITABLE" WAR ASSUMED

Lippmann had sensed the drift accurately. Only a month after Roosevelt's death we had abandoned the controlling, central position among the Allies and had become a partisan. Soon we would be fighting Russia actively alongside of Britain. Then we would take the leadership in opposing Russia at every point until, less than two years later, we would actually proclaim a policy of mounting watch and guard around every mile of the vast perimeter of the Soviet Union and Russia's sphere in Europe.

This is a profound change. How could it be that at the very moment of a splendid common victory in Europe, and before the agreed common assault on Japan, we should begin a plunge toward conflict with Russia? Before attempting a statement of the reasons for this momentous shift, let us look at some of its details.

On May 22,1945, the able editor of the liberal newspaper PM, Max Lerner, discussed the developing agitation for war with Russia, most of it whispered, but some becoming quite open. Very little of it, "except in the papers which operate on the margin of sanity," had reached "the stage of direct incitement," but some writers were beginning to say gravely that a clash with Russia may be "inevitable." Labelling such a conflict "a day dream war," Lerner declared that it existed "only in the wishes and imaginations of small groups of men," people who shared the basic outlook of the German Nazis. These men had had to practise some restraint throughout the long Roosevelt period. "Now that Roosevelt is gone and our energies slackened their pent up hatred bursts out."

On May 26 Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State, sought in a radio address to quiet the growing talk that Russia and the United States were "headed for inevitable conflict." The basis of the fear, he said, is only fear itself. "The basis of the suspicion is nothing more substantial than suspicion." He termed the talk of inevitable conflict "a curious debate, with

[33] ***New York Herald Tribune*, May 15, 1945.**

our soldiers living side by side in conquered Germany and our common dead but freshly buried."

The two nations had proved that they could cooperate in the trying and difficult prosecution of a total war, as well as in the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences. Their vital interests did not conflict at any point on the globe. Both were rich in their own resources. There was nothing real or logical behind the talk of inevitable conflict.[34]

Columnist Edgar Ansel Mowrer welcomed this broadcast. There was "far too much talk in this country about our having to fight Russia next. Some of this is silly, some of it criminal, all of it is dangerous."[35]

In the same newspaper, Samuel Grafton, one of the keenest and most penetrating writers of the time, analyzed the attacks of a conservative columnist on the British Labor Party as being too friendly to Russia. Moreover, it was complained, a victory for the Labor Party in the coming British election would encourage radicals in America. That, said Grafton, was the way fear spreads. One begins by fearing Russia and ends up by fearing Americans.

On June 3, eleven members of the faculty of Yale University voiced in a letter to the ***New York Times*** their concern about "the deplorable and dangerous state" of oiir relations with Russia. Noting that none of the issues between us touched the security of either country, they warned against the dire effect of "talk in some quarters of the 'inevitable' war with Russia—the fulfilment of Hitler's dream." The fear of such a conflict could become "the premise of future policy on both sides."

Ammunition from the Left. Two days later Lemer noted that representatives of the Left like William Henry Chamberlin and Socialist Norman Thomas were furnishing anti-Russian ammunition to the great mass audiences which Hearst and McCormick, DeWitt Wallace and Clare Luce supplied. The Left opposition to Russia had two themes: (1) that Soviet Russia is both tyrannical and imperialist, bloody and omnivorous in its appetites; and (2) that American policy under both Roosevelt and Truman has been a long course of appeasement toward this monster. Chamberlin had recently told a ***Town Meeting of the Air*** audience that "America has swallowed many insults, many broken promises, in the interest of war-born unity. But American patience is wearing thin."

The "frayed Utopians" and "embittered Galahads" of the Left, said Lemer, "see no distinction between meeting an ally half-way to cement a war coalition and maintain a peace coalition, and appeasing an enemy who is openly bent on destroying you." He challenged these "irresponsibles" of the Left to have the courage to call for a war, as the publishers and publicists of the Right did.

An Isolationist Contribution. On the same day, Senator Burton Ki Wheeler delivered a long anti-Russian speech to a body of American soldiers in Rome which was combated by one of them. The soldier said: "I thought we were all Allies fighting one war. I've never been told there was any possibility of

[34] **The *New York Times*, May 27, 1945.**

[35] ***New York Post*, May 31, 1945.**

a war with Russia over some mystic ground about fundamental difference from the American way of life. I've never heard of such a conflict. Has the United States Government been fooling me? What is this conflict?"[36]

Demands for Drawing a Line. On June 14 Grafton noted a quiet phase in the process of making up our minds about Russia. Three approaches had been tried. (1) The idea of war. It had not sold well. "Mrs. Clare Luce's position of bitter and unredeemed hostility toward the Russian government has not made her a heroine." (2) Bitterness had developed "against Americans who entertained more or less friendly sentiments toward Russia." (3) There was a demand that we draw a line; thus far may Russia go and no farther. For the moment there was a lull.

After the entry of Russia into the war against Japan temperatures rose again. On August 9 the ***New York Post*** recorded new outbursts by the elements who could not accept the idea of a world balanced between Russia- and America. Instead of approaching the emergence of Russia as a peace problem to be solved, they were press agenting the end of the world. They were hysterical because we had bargained with Russia at Potsdam and bewailed that conference as a disaster. They could not be reassured because wherever they looked Russia was still there. Yet we ourselves had grown greatly during the war. We had sprouted a great Pacific fleet, island bases, and a colossal industrial power. If Russia did not like all this she would just have to get used to it.

The People Optimistic. Momentarily it appeared that the American people felt confident about the future. A Gallup poll released on September 10 reported that confidence that Russia could be trusted to cooperate with us was back at high peak. On this question 54 per cent had voted affirmatively, 30 per cent in the negative and 16 per cent were undecided. Confidence in peace with Russia was closely related to education. Of those who had attended college 71 per cent believed that Russia would work with us, while only 58 per cent and 47 per cent of the high school and grammar school groups thought so.

In Washington, too, there was a ***détente.*** James B. Reston, one of the most responsible correspondents in the capital, surveyed official opinion and concluded that officials were beginning to understand that the solution of the "Russian problem" was "not an act but a process." Solution would never come in any one conference. It must be pursued for generations.[37]

SOME REASONS FOR THE QUICK ASSUMPTION OF INEVITABLE WAR

1. ***Accumulated fear, hatred and distrust***

When the war ended the bulk of the American people unquestionably wanted only to live in peace with the Russians, whose valor they had admired so much. This was far from true of some groups, both on the Left wing and on the Right. It was the latter whose influence was of tremendous import,

[36] ***New York Herald Tribune*, June 5 and 7, 1945.**

[37] **The *New York Times*, September 30, 1945.**

because they controlled so much of the machinery of public information. Some conservatives are always afraid of the future, and when it comes with sudden, rushing impact, bringing the development feared most of all, it becomes next to impossible to accept it. French Rightists have never yet accepted the French Revolution of 1789 and their American counterparts had not accepted the Russian Revolution of 1917 when the Second World War catapulted Communist Russia into control of the heart of the world.

A large body of our enlightened conservatives did not find this result intolerable, but the powerful conservative-nationalist-isolationist element did. They had never wanted to fight the fascist powers and only did so with wrathful reluctance when Pearl Harbor compelled them. Then when Germany attacked Russia their spirits soared. The hated Red menace would surely be scotched, after all.

To their amazement it wasn't. The abhorred system generated great power and emerged in control of half of Europe. This meant that the war was more than lost. Much more than they had ever feared had come true. Something must be done about it.

This compulsion became as strong also in powerful religious bodies.

2. *Tribal, balance of power thinking*

The almost insupportable feelings of these groups merged into the age-old tribal thinking of men organized in nations. Every other group which might be a threat is feared, in proportion to its strength. Here suddenly was a strong new group, brash and self-confident, therefore automatically assumed to be aggressive.

I well remember my own feelings on VE-Day, when I realized that all buffers were gone between us and this rising incalculable power, rolling up out of the East. I did not regret that the German buffer was gone, and my study of the Russian Revolution had by no means made me a Russophobe, yet I had a powerful feeling that the going might be rough and uncertain from here on.

Months before the victory over Germany I had been alarmed by the discovery that certain army officers were looking forward to war with Russia. They took it for granted, as a matter of course. Their entire professional training had taught them to prepare to fight the most probable enemies, mentally and materially. Every army must have an enemy, if it is to thrive or even survive. Now there was only one possible enemy left in the world, so duty was perfectly plain. The situation was simple, as it had never been before. Of course the clash would come, especially since the new enemy was an upstart, with false ideas and bad practices.

I do not believe that this line of reasoning was strong among the men who fought the war, but it was bound to spread as friction with the Russians grew. It would spread rapidly also among influential civilian groups which had come out of the war without any pronounced dislike of Russia. They also would soon accept the idea of "inevitable" war, as the press and radio brought news of the refusal of the stubborn Russians to agree with our negotiators.

Once started, a vicious circle of recriminations would feed itself. More and more people would conclude that this Russian outfit had to be dealt with.

3. *Russian Acts*

The Russians came out of the war very self-confident. They had taken the worst that could be hurled at them and had overcome it. They proceeded to take their own security measures with one hand, and they held out a sincere offer of cooperation with the world through UN with the other, but they were through with being treated as pariahs and inferiors. They would sit down at the head of the table, and put their feet upon it if others did.

Each time they engineered "a friendly government" in Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland, they convinced the groups of Americans discussed above, and others, that something should be done about them. Each time, too, that they deadlocked a conference with their demands the result was the same.

THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZED

During the San Francisco Conference there were many headlines indicating deadlocks caused by the Russians, and there were some clashes.

In his opening address, on April 26, Molotov assured the delegates that the Soviet Government was "a sincere and firm champion of the establishment of a strong international organization of security" and that "in our country the whole people are brought up in the spirit of faith in and devotion to" that cause. Then he promptly challenged the traditional right of Secretary Stettinius to serve as President of the Conference, being host, and that office was put in a commission of the Great Powers.

On Argentina Molotov was defeated, after using all the resources at his command. The next day he eased the tension by calling on Stettinius and saying that he was disappointed but wanted the Conference to succeed and would cooperate to that end.[38] On May 10, when Molotov returned to Russia, Arthur Krock, conservative writer for the ***New York Times***, wrote from San Francisco that Molotov could report to Stalin that Russia conducted itself at the Conference "as a great power and a generally cooperative one on the task in hand." If he should add that Russia's individual interests were handled very well, "he would be within the facts." He could report also that, "despite extraordinary efforts" by articulate groups to make the success of the conference turn on a settlement of the issue between Moscow and the London Poles "that would be satisfactory to the Western Allies of Russia," the attempt failed and the conference went on with the quite separate business for which it was summoned.

Allied Victory Celebrated in Moscow. On the same day the Associated Press telegraphed from Moscow that the final surrender of Germany was presented in the Russian newspapers "as a triumph of all the Allies, not just one," and they put the sharp words of Truman and Churchill against Japan on the front page. The press also carried an unprecedented display of photographs—Truman, Stalin and Churchill across the top of the front page. Others included Eisenhower, General Carl A. Spaatz, and the British Marshals. The

[38] **The *New York Times*, May 2, 1945.**

speeches by Truman and Churchill had also been carried throughout the Soviet Union.

On the other side of the coin, the Russians were making difficulties about admitting Allied representatives to Austria or Hungary and they stalled on letting the Allied Control Commission go to Berlin, perhaps regretting the four-power agreement for the administration of the German capital. However, the fighting in Berlin had ceased only a day or two before.

American Communists Reactivated. On May 24, also, a 7600–word article in ***The Daily Worker*** by Jacques Duclos, French Communist leader, indicated that the Kremlin might have concluded that cooperation was likely to break down. The article condemned the policies of Earl Browder as swerving "dangerously from the victorious Marxist-Leninist doctrine." The implication was plain that Moscow was considering the revival of the American Communist Party.[39]

Yet only two months earlier the editors of ***The Foundations of Marxism*** had published a long article which indicated that "a sweeping change is being made in Soviet Russia in Marxist economic dogmas as they have been officially taught in the schools, the press, on the platform and radio. Marx's theory of the exploitation of the proletariat is completely revised and capitalism is declared to be a 'progressive' and not a 'backward' system."[40]

At the end of the Roosevelt period preparations were apparently being made in Russia for a live and let live policy, so far as doctrine was concerned.

Russia Cooperative at San Francisco. The San Francisco Conference does not provide any evidence that the Russians had despaired of cooperating with the West. While asserting themselves at various points, the Russians had played a cooperative role at the Conference. On June 12, James B. Reston summed up the record in a dispatch from San Francisco to the ***New York Times***, saying: "The conference record shows, the delegates note, ten concessions by Russia which have contributed greatly to the liberalizing of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals."

He then described the Russian concessions in more than a column of newspaper print. They had: (1) not been eager to have the conference at that time or to have Molotov attend, but had yielded on both points; (2) insisted on four Presidents, but had conceded to Stettinius all the powers he needed as chairman of the four Presidents; (3) opposed any autonomy for regional security systems, unless directed at a renewal of German aggression, but had yielded twice to the Pan-American group; (4) accepted three important modifications of the veto power; (5) acquiesced in strong outlawry of war proposals after opposing them earlier; (6) compromised with the United States on the trusteeship provisions; (7) made two important concessions to the middle-sized nations in connection with the Security Council; (8) agreed finally to an amendment on peaceful change; (9) accepted reluctantly an American amendment providing for a constitutional convention for revision of the Charter, and agreed to reduce from three-fourths to two-thirds the General Assembly

[39] ***New York Herald Tribune*, May 25, 1945.**

[40] **Will Lissner, the *New York Times*, April 2, 1945.**

vote necessary for convocation; (10) agreed at last that the Security Council should have real power to recommend terms for the settlement of disputes.

This was certainly not the record of an obstinate, domineering government, vetoing everything right and left and refusing to play except on its own terms. On the contrary, that was the record of a government willing to make real and important concessions, which might be used against it later, in order to get agreement for a great undertaking in cooperation. The Reston article continued: "The delegates here are conscious of reports that the Soviet Union has come here and demanded what they wanted and got what they demanded, and there is a general feeling that these reports do not give an accurate impression of what has happened."

This could only mean that the delegates had read the American press and knew that powerful sections of it were giving a false account of Russian conduct in the conference. The process of convincing the American people that the Russians are a contentious, unreasonable lot, who will agree to nothing right, was well under way. The Reston article would do a little to counteract that impression, but it would not be read by most of those who had been subjected to the original articles in other newspapers.

An article in the Moscow newspaper ***Izvestia*** in late June 1945 also gave no hint that Russia expected to be labelled an aggressor for the next ten years. ***Izvestia*** described the new UN as "an organization able to prevent possible aggression or to curb the aggressor by the united forces of the peace loving peoples. . . . One can say with conviction that the final text of the United Nations Charter leaves far behind all previously existing projects for the creation of a stable international organization."[41]

Twenty-five Years Late. When the huge San Francisco Conference ended, on June 26, 1945, most Americans were also confident that a new era in peace making had opened. They believed that the tragic error of 1919 had been repaired or, if not that, its repetition avoided.

Yet actually the shades of Lodge, Borah, Brandegee, Johnson and the other Senators of 1919 had triumphed. What these men did then had struck such fear into the hearts of Roosevelt and Hull that they courted the Senators of 1945 long and ardently. These later Senators were mollified and won to cooperation, but the result was just another league of nations. It was an improvement on the old, rejected League in many details, and in a few important particulars, notably the curtailment of the veto right to the great powers, yet it was still a league of sovereign states, when a real mechanism for world government was required.

Time had moved on relentlessly and decisively, but American official thinking on the crucial problem of world peace had not. It merely caught up with 1919. This time a Republican Senator sat in the conference, and a Democratic one, and they returned from San Francisco all aglow with their achievement. They knew, too, that they could put it into effect. Wilson had not been able to secure ratification; they would.

Hands across the aisle were so firmly clasped that the consideration of the

[41] **McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia, 1941–1946*, p. 604.**

UN Charter in the Senate was one long love-feast. I sat in the Senate galleries for some days, marvelling at the great change which had come over the Senate. Henrik Shipstead, of Minnesota, one of the older irreconcilables, did utter some syllables of objection, but they were spoken in too low a voice to be heard. Hiram Johnson was too ill to come for his always bitter dissent. In all the Senate only two votes against the Charter were cast, when the vote came on July 28, 1945, those of Shipstead and Langer of North Dakota. The poll was 89 to 2 and the Committee on Foreign Relations had not offered a single reservation.

It was high time that the Senate rested from making reservations to peace treaties. "Since a league to enforce peace had first been mentioned to members of this chamber by Woodrow Wilson in 1914, some 40,000,000 human beings, armed and unarmed, had been killed in two great wars."[42]

Yet, sadly enough, the 1945 concord in the Senate was oppressive and ominous, for it really meant that the Senate was doing what it should have done in 1919, not what a later epoch required. Most Senators felt that the damage had now been repaired, after another colossal war which should never have been allowed to happen, but it could not be. In the lightning progress of our scientific age there are no second chances. When the crash and flame of a great human disaster like the First World War lays open to all men the absolute urgency of a new course, they cannot take it a generation later, after a still greater catastrophe has resulted from their blind stubbornness.

It is the fashion to say that no league of sovereign states can ever keep the peace, since the larger states will invariably pursue their short-term, selfish interests of the moment, instead of acting for the common good when aggression occurs. This may well be true, but there was a precious, golden opportunity in 1919 for the United States really to establish the peace through the League of Nations.

Then there were seven great powers left in the world, and no one of the other six was strong enough to defy a league of nations led by the United States. Both Japan and Italy could have been handled with relative ease and Germany could never have gone on a revenge rampage. Russia was down and out in 1919, and counted out too completely, but she was incapable of aggression, even if she had desired it. The League of 1919 might have failed, even under the leadership of the United States, the giant of the nations in that day, but the conditions for success were there. Unquestionably the United States could have organized the world so effectively through the League of Nations that Russia could do little about it.

In 1945 only two great powers remained. The full extent of Britain's weakness was not known, but everyone knew that she would be a poor third in the post-war world. France was far below her, and China only a potential power in the future, after her old order had collapsed. In these vastly changed circumstances no league of nations could hope to enforce peace upon either of the two great powers. This was indeed recognized throughout the controversy over the veto. The overwhelming need was for cooperation between the

[42] **James B. Reston, the *New York Times*, July 29, 1945.**

giant Big Two. Yet we allowed a group of small states with very little power to override Russia on the Argentine case at the very beginning of the UN organization meeting.

This indicated, again, that we believed nothing had changed since 1919. Yet in the interval Russia herself changed decisively. In the years before 1939 she had tried hard to make the League of Nations succeed. Now she was not willing to subject herself to the coercive authority of a new league, and she was wholly unwilling to go on to the establishment of a real world government, unless it should come about through the expansion of the Soviet Union to global proportions.

Russia's View of World Peace Organization. Everlastingly, at every Allied conference, the Russians made known their conception of the UN. It should be a body led by the great powers, preferably by the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. They would include Britain—and, much more grudgingly, France and China—but what they wanted to do was keep the decisions in as few hands as possible. That was the nearest approach to their authoritarian way of doing business at home and it also seemed to them to accord with the realities of power. Since we had great power, and since they respected us, they would go far to meet our wishes if we would deal on that basis. They would also resent, in rapidly rising degrees, being overridden by the votes of many small states.

On our side this way of doing business offended our ideas about the rights of small states and about majority rule. Besides, we knew that the little states were almost certain to vote with us. Since we were sure that the majorities were on our side, whenever needed, majority rule seemed more than ever right to us.

Thus in 1945 neither of the two behemoths was willing to advance beyond a league of nations. Everything would depend on their being able to settle down to cooperation in UN, dividing the world between them on some basis acceptable, or bearable, to both. At the same time, both of the giants were young and immature in world politics, without any slowly acquired skills in world politics to guide them. In these circumstances the ancient tendency of strong national states to fear and distrust each other promised to be irresistible, and fatal.

Would Bi-Partisan Agreement Save Us? Nor was the desire for bi-partisan unity on foreign policy likely to prevent disaster. Such a policy could continue only on the lowest common denominator of national interest. Toward Russia, especially, we could maintain a bi-partisan foreign policy only by accepting the toughest attitude that the leaders of either party favored. Otherwise it would quit the bi-partisan coalition with loud charges that the other party was appeasing the Reds and selling out the national interest. There could be bi-partisan competition in tough attitudes toward Russia, but no rivalry in devising a policy of cooperation with her. Only by agreement on toughness could bi-partisan accord in foreign policy be maintained. Then, as the inevitable tension with Russia mounted, the hue and cry of a national debate over policies toward Russia could not be afforded, it was sure to be argued, because it would destroy national unity in the face of danger.

POTSDAM

In mid-summer 1945 matters had not yet gone so far. There was still the assumption that the world must not split in two again and plunge toward the final war. Another inter-Allied conference met at Potsdam on July 17. The Russians had as usual made the most painstaking preparations to entertain the delegates. President Truman liked Stalin, and Stalin at once suggested that Truman preside.

Deadlock on East Europe. The Conference, according to the account of the new Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, at once approved the creation of a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Great Powers.[43] Then the Americans presented a paper which "stated flatly" that the Yaha agreements concerning East Europe had not been carried out. Joint action by the three powers was proposed to reorganize the governments of Bulgaria and Rumania, in order to permit the participation of "all democratic groups." Such action would precede the establishment of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of peace treaties. The three powers would then help the interim governments to hold "free and unfettered elections."

This program for insuring that Rumania and Bulgaria should be organized on the Western model, and remain in the Western orbit, was met by the presentation the next day of a Soviet paper severely attacking the Western brand of democracy in Greece.-Eden angrily termed the attack "a travesty of fact," pointing out that international observers had been invited to observe the Greek elections. This was not true in Rumania or Bulgaria. The British Government "took the gravest exception" to the charges. Eden did not add that the power of the Left had been effectively smashed in Greece before international observers were invited to come and check the elections.[44]

Molotov replied by quoting British and American newspaper reports on events in Greece to show that there were greater excesses there than in Rumania or Bulgaria. He then complained that the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Council in Italy was not receiving proper attention, a point which had some substance. "The exclusion of the Soviet Union from all voice in Italian matters was ... a bad precedent for common action by the Big Three elsewhere."[45] The truth was that neither side was willing to yield to the other a share of political control in the countries occupied by its armies.

Byrnes sought to convince Molotov, both at Potsdam and on many later occasions, that it would be better for Russia to have friendly ***people*** on her borders. This meant representative government and elections supervised by all three powers, to make sure that all classes voted freely. Byrnes tried hard to persuade Molotov that this would be the best way, for Russia, but he feared that "Mr. Molotov never understood or believed." Instead of admitting that it would be better for Russia to have Balkan landlords, bankers,

[43] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–87.

[44] Some of the observers noted that the people voted under the direction of the village bosses.

[45] John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs. 1945–1947*, New York, 1947, p. 54.

industrialists and other pre-war ruling elements keep their political power, Molotov persisted in reverting to Greece when pressed on free elections for the Balkans. It happened "scores of times during ensuing months."

Another irritant which ran through the Potsdam discussions was the disposition of American and British owned industrial equipment in Rumania which had been seized by the Russians, who maintained that because the Germans had owned these properties last they belonged to Russia.

On the other hand, when Russia asked to be named trustee of one of the Italian colonies in North Africa, "Churchill was reluctant even to discuss it." At length he "delivered an impassioned statement" in which he explained how the war had impoverished Britain, yet she was making not a single territorial claim. She did, however, "have great interests in the Mediterranean" where any marked change in the ***status quo*** would need long and careful consideration. He had not even "considered the possibility of the Soviet Union desiring to acquire a large tract on the African shore."[46]

The shock was equally great when the Russians pressed for the return of two provinces from Turkey and the establishment of a Soviet base in the Turkish Straits. Byrnes was unable to convince the Russians how "unrealistic" they were to want a base in the Straits which, "without complete air superiority would be of little value."

Here was an issue which would have caused little difficulty if the Allies had trusted each other. An Italian colony for Russia, and her entry into the Mediterranean, might have been taken as a matter of course. But, since the Russian occupation of the Balkans had caused great distrust and fear, the Americans were quite certain to support the British in holding on to exclusive control of the Middle Sea. There would be fear that the world strategic balance would be too greatly upset, if Russia came into the Mediterranean.

The Churchill Government Defeated. At this point the Potsdam Conference recessed to permit the British delegates to go home and learn the result of the 1945 election. A report by Herbert Matthews in the ***New York Times*** on July 27 was headlined: "Churchill Defeated in Labor Landslide. British Turn Left." Labor had "the staggering total of 390 seats out of a Parliament of 640." In the last Parliament Labor had only 163 seats. The Conservatives fell from 358 to 195 seats; the Liberals from 18 to 11. The probable Government majority, including the small groups, would be 407. The popular vote gave Labor twelve millions and the Conservatives nine millions. The results, said Matthews, were "a personal, decisive repudiation of Mr. Churchill as a peace-time leader. He himself personalized the election; he had asked that votes be cast for him so that he would be returned to power."

Churchill did not return to Potsdam, but Ernest Bevin, new Foreign Secretary, sat in his place and British policy toward Russia did not change an iota. Bevin was a Labor Churchill, still more volcanic and irascible, without Churchill's aristocratic graces. Bevin had long been an inner member of

[46] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 76. McNeill thinks it was Byrnes' ability as a compromiser which enabled the conference to produce a series of verbal agreements which made the conference appear to succeed.—*Op. cit.*, p. 622.

the Churchill coalition cabinet. His opposition to Russia was even greater than Churchill's, since to Sir Winston's defense of Imperial positions ***vis-a-vis*** Russia he added the hatred of the democratic socialist for the dictatorial brand. Neither tact nor diplomacy would restrain British attitudes toward Russia thereafter, as the Conservative-dominated Foreign and Colonial offices stiffened Bevin for conflict with the Soviets.

World Conquest. At the end of his account of the Potsdam Conference Mr. Truman says that he was not altogether disillusioned "to find now that the Russians were not in earnest about peace." It was clear, he continued, that their policy was based on the expectation of a major American depression, of which they would take advantage. They understood nothing but force and were "planning world conquest."[47]

How he arrived at this startling conclusion is not evident from his account of the conference. He records that Stalin "spoke in a quiet, inoffensive way." Stalin did not make long speeches, as Churchill did, but reduced his arguments quickly to the question of power. His "wry humor" was frequently in evidence. When Molotov talked as if he were the Russian state, Stalin would smile and change his tune with a few words in Russian.[48]

On the other hand, by the end of the second session Truman was beginning to "grow impatient for more action and fewer words." Soon he was telling Churchill and Stalin that he had not come to hold "a police court hearing." He told them that if they did not get to the main issues he was "going to pack up and go home." He "meant just that." Later, his impatience grew and on a number of occasions he "felt like blowing the roof off the palace."[49]

Though undoubtedly a man of action, Truman's narrative makes it clear that he was not a negotiator. His handling of the Potsdam Conference was a far cry from Roosevelt's mediating but firm and conciliatory role in the earlier conferences. Truman was clear about the thing he most wanted to get from Stalin at Potsdam, "a personal reaffirmation of Russia's entry into the war against Japan, a matter which our military chiefs were most anxious to clinch," but he made up his mind that the Russians would get no share in the control of Japan after the victory. General MacArthur would have "complete command and control."[50]

The Potsdam Agreements. The Potsdam communique, recording the Potsdam agreements, is an impressive document. Nearly filling a newspaper page, it laid down procedures for the framing of peace treaties with all the satellite states, beginning with Italy. It contained detailed rules for the de-Nazification and demilitarization of Germany, and for her economic administration, "as a single economic unit." An extensive section on reparations allotted ten per cent of German surplus industrial capital equipment to Russia outright, and an additional fifteen per cent if exchanged for raw materials. Agreements on a dozen other important subjects were recorded, including one that the Franco Government in Spain, "having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins and its close associations with the

[47] Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 411–12. **[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 364, 350, 349, 386.**
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 354, 359, 360, 364. **[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 411–12**

aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify" membership in the United Nations.

Applauding the realism of the decisions Turner Catledge attributed much of the tension which had arisen since Yalta to "the apparent timidity of spokesmen for the United States and Britain to face up" to this question of reparations. "Now, at least they have faced up."[51]

The Issue of Russia's Recovery—Reparations and Loans. This comment recognized the abysmal difference between the economic conditions of the two victorious Allies. The Russians craved reparations for the repair of their devastated land. We had no devastation and too many new factories, if anything. Our chief desire was to avoid paying Germany's reparations again indirectly, as we had after 1920. At the same time, we were reluctant to grant large credits to Russia for her reconstruction.

Reston had reported from Washington, on April 3, that a leading reason for the coolness of the Russians toward the San Francisco Conference was their disappointment at the slowness of the United States to act in the economic field. They were not getting the heavy industrial equipment requested under the fourth lend-lease protocol, due to be signed June 30, 1944, but still under negotiation.

The Russians were disturbed also by the lack of progress on their request for a $6,000,000,000 post-war credit, to aid in their reconstruction. This request had been discussed for months, and always the Administration said it had no power from Congress to grant anything like this sum, but the Russians felt that nothing was being done to get the authority. In other words, Russia wanted her international collaboration based "on what she believes to be more tangible things than international security alone." Another writer observed that the Russians did not mind the roof of collective security being provided, but they wanted the house built first.

In the later days of the Cold War most people applauded our slowness to help bind up Russia's wounds. Why arm "the enemy"? Yet the reflection cannot be excluded that the grant of a large credit to Russia might have changed much of the post-war atmosphere—if it could have been made in good spirit and not largely devoured by American inflation—both apparently impossible conditions.

On July 22, 1945, Russia gave an indication of willingness to carry risks as well as receive benefits from international economic collaboration. In the Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference she had first insisted that her subscription to the Bank for International Reconstruction and Development be held down to §900,000,000, but just before the conference closed she raised it to $1,200,000,000, agreeing with the American argument that each country's risks in the world bank should be as large as its rights in the international monetary fund to stabilize post-war currencies.[52]

No Deep Rift in Sight. The Potsdam Conference certainly did not prove that the East and the West could not agree. They could not agree on all points, but the amount and range of agreement was impressive indeed. The principles

[51] The *New York Times*, August 5, 1945.

[52] *Ibid.*, July 23, 1945.

agreed upon for the control of Germany especially, were sound and promising. As before, not everything agreed upon would be smoothly put into practice, but a good foundation for further Allied collaboration was laid down.

A Program for a Sure Peace. In the summer of 1945 one of America's most beloved elder statesmen, Bernard M. Baruch, was asked to give his views to the Senate Military Affairs Committee on the future of Germany. He responded on June 23 with a plan not for a "hard" or a "soft" peace but a sure one. Plunging to the heart of the problem of making peace, he warned that what was done with Germany "holds the key to whether Russia, Britain and the United States can continue to get along." Unless Germany were firmly dealt with we could be certain that she would make a third try to conquer the world. "By tackling immediately and forthrightly the question uppermost in the Russian mind—security against Germany—" he believed we could arrive at a full understanding with the Soviets. If it was not possible the sooner we knew it the better.

There must be a drastic diminution of Germany's war-potential, by dismantling factories, breaking up the junker estates and other means. To accept the view that the restoration of German industrial dominance in Europe was inevitable was "to resign ourselves to the return to a new cave age."

Unlike so many influential Americans, Baruch had tried to put himself in Russia's place, to ask himself "what would I think if I were a Russian?" Reviewing the history of the preceding thirty years he found much to give him pause. On their side the Russians must make the same effort to understand us; they should permit free access to Eastern Europe; we should treat them strictly on a basis of reciprocity; and we should pursue a program of determined preparedness.

Though Baruch's attitude toward Russia was firm, there was no hint in it of "inevitable" war, or of the hysteria which was to carry so many of his countrymen out of the realm of sober thinking. He had "no fear of the spread of Bolshevism in the United States—jobs and higher living standards were the proven anti-toxins."

Then, leaping years ahead of the most constructive thinking among American political leaders, he urged the lifting of living standards all over the world. He "would insert into all financial and economic arrangements we make a denunciation clause giving us the right to terminate any agreement which results in lowering wages or lengthening hours—an undercutting of human standards," but that was not enough. Living standards must be lifted.

Before the Marshall Plan or President Truman's 1949 proposal to send our "know-how" over the world were thought of, Baruch knew that the condition of the vast masses of depressed people over the world was the key problem of our time. "And as living standards within Russia improve, the atmosphere there should lighten, and some practices which strike us as unfavorable are likely to disappear."[53]

Here was the conflict in which both East and West should have joined hands—a common war to improve living conditions everywhere, to give men life instead of more death.

[53] ***New York Herald Tribune*, June 23, 1945.**

CHAPTER XII

AFTER HIROSHIMA

AUGUST–NOVEMBER 1945

At 8:00 A.M. on August 6, 1945, the “all clear” signal after an air-raid warning was given in the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Nothing had happened, so “nearly all the school children and some industrial employees” went to work in the open, tearing down buildings to provide fire breaks and removing valuables to the country. Delayed factory workers, not the majority, also travelled to work.[1]

At 8:45 a single American plane bearing an atomic bomb came over. Within a few minutes 80,000 people were dead and an equal number badly injured. Exploding high over the city, the bomb itself did terrific damage. Then fire spread over 4·4 square miles of the flimsy city, creating a “fire storm,” with a powerful updraft, which quickly burned out the area. Some 62,000 buildings, or 69 per cent, were destroyed, 6–6 per cent were badly damaged and the remainder slightly so.

A giant step had been taken in the discovery of the weapons of destruction, by which man increasingly destroys his civilization. Quantitatively, the damage done in Hiroshima was not larger than had already been achieved in a single fire raid on Tokyo. Indeed it was less, since on March 9, 1945, 16 square miles of Tokyo were destroyed and as many people burned to death as at Hiroshima.[2] For many weeks our bombers had been burning Japanese cities, with very high casualty rates. In Europe, also, old-fashioned bombs had destroyed some 70 cities.

These achievements, however, had required the use of many thousands of planes and of a few million tons of bombs. Now a city of 300,000 people could be destroyed with one bomb. The qualitative gain was enormous, granted that the cost of production was not too great.

The killing of Hiroshima at a single blow climaxed the greatest single coordinated effort of American scientific, engineering and industrial genius ever made. Since the Germans had first split the atom in 1938 we feared they would perfect atomic bombs during the war. Actually they had given up the effort as unattainable in their time, but we did not know that.[3]

[1] ***The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,* Washington, 1946, p. 3.**

[2] ***Ibid.* Dr. Karl T. Compton says that one of our fire raids on Tokyo killed 125,000 people and another nearly 100,000.—*Atlantic Monthly,* December 1946, p. 54. Stimson says that this raid killed more people and did more damage than the Hiroshima bomb.—Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War,* p. 630.**

[3] **Dr. A. S. Goudsmit, head of the military intelligence mission to Germany to investigate German atomic progress.—The *New York Times,* December 7, 1945.**

By the time Germany was knocked out, success in creating an atomic bomb seemed assured, though the first one was not tested, at Alamagordo, New Mexico, until July 16, when Japan was obviously very groggy. Before that, however, the advisability of using the bomb on Japan had been canvassed and the decision made to do so, if the test succeeded.

Afterwards controversy arose as to the wisdom of this decision. Some suspected that the reasons were political, that the A-bomb was used to knock Japan out of the war before Russia could enter it, if possible, and, in any event, to restrict Russia's gains and voice in the Far East. Is there any foundation for this charge?

WHY WAS THE BOMB USED?

1. *To Save American Lives*

In his report on the Potsdam Conference, on August 9, President Truman said: "The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base. That was because we wished to avoid, in so far as possible, the killing of civilians. But that attack is only a warning of things to come. If Japan does not surrender, bombs will have to be dropped on her war industries, and unfortunately thousands of civilian lives will be lost."

It is true that Hiroshima was the military headquarters for southern Japan, and it contained several thousand troops at the time of the A-bomb attack. Yet it was not at these troops that the bomb was aimed. In order to have any effect in knocking Japan out of the war it had to be aimed at the Japanese people and it had to kill a huge number of them. In the words of the U.S. ***Strategic Bombing Survey***, "Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as targets because of their concentration of activities and population."[4]

We used the bomb, continued President Truman, "to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans."

At the time, and doubtless later, this was a sufficient reason for most Americans, especially in view of the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and of their barbaric treatment of our prisoners of war.

Later Estimates. Opinion remains strong also that a great saving of lives was made. Dr. Karl T. Compton has recorded his "complete conviction that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands—perhaps several millions—of lives, both American and Japanese."[5] Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson believed that 5,000,000 men in the Japanese armies still unbeaten had the strength to cost us a million casualties, though he did not subtract the 2,000,000 Japanese troops on the continent for which the Russians would certainly account.

By April 6, 1949, President Truman had revised the life-saving estimates downward somewhat. In a speech made to deter Russia from making any

[4] ***Op. cit.*, p. 41.**

[5] **Karl T. Compton, "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1946, pp. 54–6.**

drastic reply to the North Atlantic Pact, he said that he had ordered the use of the bomb to save the lives of 200,000 American soldiers as well as from 200,000 to 400,000 of the enemy. The President "bluntly announced" that he would not hesitate to order the bomb dropped again, to preserve the "welfare of the nation" and "democracy."[6]

After Hiroshima our highest military authorities agreed that the use of the A-bomb had not been essential. General Henry H. Arnold, the head of the Army Air Force, wrote that "the fact is that the Japanese could not have held out long, because they had lost control of the air."[7] Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. also stated that "the first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. It was a mistake to ever drop it. Why reveal a weapon like that to the world when it wasn't necessary?" Explaining that the Japanese navy was already finished, Halsey blamed the use of the bomb on the scientists.[8] The U.S. ***Strategic Bombing Survey*** also concluded that "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to December 31, 1945, Japan would have surrendered, even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."[9]

Secretary of State Byrnes has also stated that the bomb did not end the war, that Japan was beaten and suing for peace when it was dropped.[10]

The Contemporary Situation. At the time the bomb was used on Hiroshima the saving of American lives was not an urgent matter, since the Japanese navy had been almost destroyed, their air force nearly driven from the skies and no land invasion of the main Japanese islands was planned until November 1.

During July the daily news releases made it plain that Japan was defeated. On July 2, 4000 tons of incendiary bombs fell on four Japanese cities. The next day four more cities were burned, the total rising to twenty-six. On the 5th our Mustang planes had a field day over six nearly empty airfields in the Tokyo area and a naval convoy was smashed. On the 7th a 600–bomber raid made a 4000–ton attack. Not a plane was lost. So it went: 9 ships sunk in coastal waters; 154 planes smashed in carrier blow, no U.S. warships attacked; huge U.S. battleships rake Hokkaido, our ships enter landlocked bay and shell steel port; 1500–plane attack on heart of Japan;shell Tokyo Bay entrance, record B-29 assault; 1000 planes smash remnantsof enemynavy, 7 large ships in hiding bombed; navy planes hit 60 Honshu airfields.[11]

Forty per cent of the built-up area of 66 Japanese cities was destroyed.[12] No nation which had lost the power to retaliate could stand that kind of

[6] ***New York Herald Tribune,* April 7, 1949.**
[7] **Masters and Way, *One World or None,* New York, 1946, p. 28.**
[8] ***New York Herald Tribune*, September 9, 1946.**
[9] ***U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey 4, The Summary Report on the Pacific War*, p. 26.**
[10] **James B. Reston, the *New York Times,* November 11, 1945.**
[11] **The *New York Times,* July, 1945.**
[12] ***U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report on the Pacific War,* Washington, 1946 p. 17.**

pounding very long. Japan's cities and industries were being destroyed at will. A tight sea blockade had been established, with submarines, surface ships and by our ability to mine Japanese harbors freely from the air. It was apparent even to headline readers that Japanese resistance could not continue much longer.

Nevertheless, there was a powerful belief in the highest military quarters in Washington that invasion of the main islands would be as costly proportionately as Iwo Jima and Okinawa had been. General MacArthur's staff estimated that the initial landings would cost us 50,000 casualties. The Kamikaze air attacks had made a justifiably powerful impression on us, as well as the terrible fighting on Okinawa.

While, therefore, the probability was that Japan would have to surrender soon, it was easy enough to dread a huge mopping-up operation in Japan, should it be necessary. If the A-bomb could compel surrender it was almost certain that it would be used some time in advance of November 1.

2. *To Shorten the War and End a Painful Re-Deployment*

There was also a very strong domestic political reason for its use. The country was determined to settle accounts with Japan, but it had had enough of war and yearned to see the end of it. This desire was especially deep because of the geography involved. Most of the army veterans of the European war were being re-deployed to the Far East, through the United States, on furloughs. This was doubtless necessary, but it was extremely difficult to ask those same men to go half way around the world again to finish another war. They would do it, but the prospect was so infinitely distasteful to them that any Administration would grasp at almost any means which would avoid that painful necessity.[13]

3. *To Announce the Atomic Epic Fittingly*

A further incentive was bound to motivate strongly some of the military men who had been responsible for the administration of the vast atomic project, the desire to show the world and the American taxpayers that the stupendous effort had paid off. The whole undertaking had been sensational, but secret. Now news of it would soon begin to spread, and what more effective announcement of results could there be than the mightiest explosion in history? This was a natural impulse in men who had been closely associated with the saga, one so powerful that it was by no means an inconsequential element in the decision to use the bomb. The urge to demonstrate in the most striking manner, the greatest "invention" ever made, was certain to be compelling. The expenditure had been huge, the anxiety about success had been great, and finally it had come. How else could it be announced so effectively as by using the bomb?

These three factors—to save lives, shorten the war and demonstrate the atomic discovery—made the military use of the A-bomb more than likely.

Were There Countervailing Reasons? Unquestionably, strong psychological forces worked for an early use of the bomb. Yet two considerations remain

[13] **Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, p. 632.**

to be explored: (1) Were there long range reasons for avoiding the military use of the bomb; and (2) if not, when was the best time for its employment?

The Franck Report. One group of Americans had done some deep thinking on problems which would arise. Several memoranda prepared by scientists who had worked on the atomic energy project crystallized in the report of a "Committee on Social and Political Implications" to the Director of the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, which was forwarded to the Secretary of War on June 11, 1945. The committee was headed by Professor James Franck.

The Franck Report is the first important document looking toward international control of atomic energy. Warning that in Russia the basic facts and implications of nuclear power were well understood in 1940 and that the experience of Russian scientists was "entirely sufficient to enable them to retrace our steps in a few years," the report cautioned that a nuclear arms race could not be avoided, either by keeping our advance steps secret or by cornering raw materials. Evaluating our own vulnerability, it held that Russia and China were the only great nations which could survive an atomic attack.

For these reasons the Franck Committee urged that the first use of the bomb should be a test demonstration on the desert or a barren island, at which representatives of all the United Nations would be present. Stressing that new and imaginative methods were required to handle so momentous a development, the committee asked "the highest political leadership of this country to consider what the effects would be if the bomb were first used without warning as a military weapon."

> "Russia, and even allied countries which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries may be deeply shocked by this step. It may be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing a new weapon, as indiscriminate as the rocket bomb and a thousand times more destructive, is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement."

They felt that "it is not at all certain that American public opinion, if it could be enlightened as to the effect of atomic explosives, would approve of our own country being the first to introduce such an indiscriminate method of wholesale destruction of civilian life." The saving of American lives might be outweighed by "a wave of horror and revulsion sweeping over the rest of the world and perhaps even dividing public opinion at home." Altogether, "If the United States were to be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race for armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons."[14]

The Decision to Proceed. Secretary Stimson has made a careful record of the decisive steps which led to the dropping of the bomb.[15] On April 25 Stimson

[14] **See text in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1, 1946.**

[15] **Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harpers Magazine*, February 1947, pp. 97–107. See also Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 259–65.**

had told the new President about the atomic project. Mr. Truman was advised that with the aid of atomic bombs "even a very powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a very few days by a very much smaller one." Small nations could build A-bombs, as could "a larger nation in a much shorter time." The implication was plain that a large nation would soon have the power to destroy the United States without warning.

Toward the end of April an Interim Committee was then appointed to advise the President on the questions raised. Its members were Secretary Stimson, George L. Harrison, James F. Byrnes, Ralph A. Bard, Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. Karl T. Compton and Dr. James B. Conant.

On June 1 this committee unanimously recommended that the bomb should be used without warning against Japan "on a dual target—that is, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage."

A Scientific Panel consisting of Dr. A. H. Compton, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Dr. E. O. Lawrence and Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer had been appointed to advise the Interim Committee and it formally concurred with the Interim Committee on June 16, 1945. It could propose "no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war."[16] The demonstration bomb might be a dud, or it might not explode at the proper height. Besides, there were no bombs to waste. After the New Mexico static test on July 16, only two were available —the ones used on Japan.

In addition to the Franck Committee, which forwarded its report on June 11, two individuals made strong efforts to avert the routine use of the A-bomb on Japan. One member of the Interim Committee, Mr. Ralph A. Bard, Under-secretary of the Navy, at first assented to its report, being entirely new to the subject, but on further consideration he wrote to Stimson urging that two or three days' warning be given Japan. On July 1, to make his dissent as emphatic as possible, he secured an interview with President Truman and, knowing that Japan was already securely bottled up, he urged that an all-out American invasion would not be necessary.[17]

One of the atomic scientists, Dr. Leo Szilard, who had been instrumental in initiating the atomic project, did his utmost to bring to the attention of the President the effect that the atomic bomb would have on our relations with Russia. Some time in March, 1945 he drew up a memorandum which by implication warned against the use of the bomb against Japan. President Roosevelt's death prevented him from presenting it to Roosevelt. Then he tried to reach President Truman and was advised to go down to South Carolina and see the President's personal adviser, James F. Byrnes. He did this on May 28, accompanied by Dr. Walter Bartky, associate dean of the physical sciences at the University of Chicago. This attempt to reach the

[16] This conclusion was arrived at after a long and agonizing week-end spent by the four scientists at Los Alamos on June 9 and 10. See the important article by Alice Kimball Smith, "Behind the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb: Chicago 1944–45," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* October 1958, pp. 288–313. The article attempts to reconstruct the role of the scientists in the months before and after the decision to use the bomb.

[17] Alice Kimball Smith, *supra,* p. 297.

President directly, which greatly disturbed General Leslie Groves, was inproductive.[18]

Then Dr. Szilard drew up a petition to the President urging that the bomb not be used until after a "suitable warning and opportunity to surrender under known conditions."[19] This document, signed by sixty-seven Chicago scientists, evoked some counter petitions and Dr. A. H. Compton, who was "deeply troubled by the extent to which opinion at the Chicago laboratory ran counter to the use of the bomb," secured a poll of these scientists on July 12, 1945.

This poll offered four choices. Of the 150 who replied, 69 chose to "Give military demonstration in Japan to be followed by renewed opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapon." "A military demonstration" could conceivably have been interpreted to mean the destruction of a large Japanese city, but if so what would a later "full use of the weapon" mean?

Some 39 scientists voted to "Give an experimental demonstration in this country, with representatives of Japan present, followed by a new opportunity for surrender before full use of the weapon," and 16 voted for public demonstration of the weapon without any military use. Accordingly, of the 150 scientists 124 voted for a demonstration before any "full use of the weapon."

Dr. A. H. Compton interpreted the result as a vote in support of the official decision to drop the bomb on "a dual target—that is, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage" and "without prior warning," and he so advised Washington on July 23.[20]

Aside from this highly doubtful interpretation, it seems unlikely that any of the efforts of the Chicago scientists to avert the quick use of the bomb on Japanese city had any effect. The decision of the Interim Committee recorded in the preceding paragraph was made on June 1, after which Bard's protest was ineffective. The Franck Committee's report was not completed until June 11 and there is "no evidence to show that Stimson actually saw" it. Dr. Szilard was first shunted to South Carolina and his later petition was forwarded to President Truman at Potsdam on July 17, when the President was fully prepared to drop the bomb after an enigmatic warning to Japan, the successful test of the A-bomb on July 16 liacf already removed any question about it use, before someone in Washington requested, on July 23, the results of the Met Lab poll.[21]

The issue had been decided by Secretary Stimson's memorandum to the President on July 2, in which he listed the evidence that the Japanese were nearly knocked out, along with his conviction that they would fight forever, in very rugged terrain, if we set foot on the larger islands. Surrender, he thought, could be arranged through the Emperor, if a very impressive warning were first given, outlining assurances for Japan's future and warning of "the

[18] ***Ibid.*, pp. 293, 296.**

[19] **A. H. Compton, *Atomic Quest: A Personal Narrative*, New York, 1956, p. 242; Oxford niversity Press, 1956.**

[20] **Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 304–5.**

[21] ***Ibid.*, pp. 302, 306–7.**

inevitability and completeness of the destruction" which "the varied and overwhelming" force at our disposal would bring about.

The Question of Timing. The President promptly accepted this program and discussion at once turned to the timing of the warning to Japan which would precede the use of S-l, the atomic bomb. In the end the decision was made by President Truman, who ruled that the warning should be solemnly issued at the Potsdam Conference, in the name of the United States, Great Britain and China, so that it would be plain, in Stimson's words, "that ***all*** of Japan's principal enemies were in entire unity." [His italics.][22]

In other words, it was decided to try to force Japan's surrender by A-bomb attack before Russia's entry into the war on August 8.

This decision precipitated a period of intense strain at the Los Alamos Laboratory, where the bomb was being fabricated. One of the leading physicists who helped to put it together, Dr. Philip Morrison, has testified "that a date near August tenth was a mysterious final date which we, who had the daily technical job of readying the bomb, had to meet at whatever cost in risk or money or good development policy."[23]

We do not, however, need this evidence to dispose of the suggestion that our policy makers simply forgot about the date of Russia's entry. Everyone in high authority in Washington, and many others, knew that Russia was due to enter the war on that date. It had been known since the Moscow Conference of 1943, when Stalin volunteered the information to Hull, that Russia would enter the war against Japan when Germany was defeated. It had been one of our very first objectives at Yalta to secure the fixing of the date and there was great satisfaction when Stalin advanced it from six months after VE day to three months.[24] Since VE day fell on May 8, August 8 at once became a key date in all the principal allied capitals.

When Russia did declare war on Japan, on August 8, the Moscow correspondent of the ***New York Times*** cabled that he had heard months ago that Russia would enter the war on Japan three months after VE day, and both the military expert of the ***Times*** and the editor stated plainly, on the 9th, that they had known about the Yalta agreement. Churchill also testified in his address of August 16 that he knew Russia's entry was due on August 8.

Nor was it possible for our officials to forget so momentous a date Stimson's memorandum of July 2 on warning Japan raised the question by suggesting that "if then a belligerent, Russia should be included in the warning." At the close of the memo he added: "If Russia is a part of the threat, the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far."

Effective use of the bomb depended either on dropping it before Russia's entry into the war or immediately afterwards.

A dramatic warning was to be issued from Potsdam by ***"all*** of Japan's principal enemies." Actually this term included Russia since she was pledged to war with Japan, but technically and legally she could be ignored and the warning issued without her knowledge.

[22] **Stimson's article, *supra*, p. 104.**

[23] **Philip Morrison, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1949, p. 40.**

[24] **See Chapter VIII above.**

Russia Not Informed. Secretary of State Byrnes has given the details. Secretary Stimson had informed the American leaders that the July 16 test of the A-bomb had met our highest hopes and on the evening of July 26, in the midst of the Potsdam Conference, a telegram arrived from Chiang Kai-shek, approving the text of the ultimatum to Japan, thereafter known as the Potsdam Declaration. The declaration, says Byrnes, "was immediately released for publication and a copy was sent by special messenger to Mr. Molotov." Later in the evening Molotov telephoned, "asking that the declaration be held up two or three days." When he was told it already had been released he "seemed disturbed." The next day Byrnes explained to Molotov that the declaration had not been presented to him because "we did not want to embarrass the Soviet Union" since it was "not yet at war" with Japan. Molotov "said simply" that we should have consulted him.[25]

This impression in Molotov's mind would be doubly strong since Stalin had twice told Truman and Byrnes, earlier in the conference, about successive efforts on Japan's part to enlist Russia as a mediator and his failure to encourage that idea. President Truman had expressed his approval of Stalin's action.[26]

Russian Help Not Desired. One hardly needs to wonder that Molotov "seemed disturbed" when he read the Potsdam Declaration. The long and laborious deployment of Soviet forces from the West to the East was about completed, but his Western allies now apparently hoped to end the Japanese war without Russia by dealing with the Japanese Government. Two days later Molotov came to arrange the immediate occasion of Russia's entry into the war. Wouldn't the Allies invite Russia in! This presented "a problem to us," which it took hours to solve. The President was "disturbed" and, because of Soviet acts in East Europe since Yalta, Byrnes would have been "satisfied" had the Russians decided not to enter the war. He "believed the atomic bomb would be successful," indicating that he expected that the Japanese would reject the Potsdam ultimatum. The military situation had been "entirely different" when the Yalta agreement for Russia's participation in the Japanese war had been made, but "we had to stand by our obligations."[27]

The same idea had been expressed by Churchill to Mikolajczyk on June 15. Relating that Stalin had asked for the Potsdam Conference because he wanted to get into the Japanese war, Churchill said: "We don't care whether he comes into the war against the Japanese or not. We don't need him now."[28]

The Bomb Dropped. The Japanese Government was not impressed by the Potsdam Declaration, which was issued on July 26, 1945. This ultimatum to Japan was "solemn," as Mr. Truman desired. It was signed by himself, Churchill and Chiang and it was strong. It spoke of the forces of all three governments "poised to strike the final blows upon Japan." The might now converging was "immeasurably greater" than that which had crushed the

[25] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–9.**
[27] ***Ibid.*, pp. 207–8.**
***Ibid.*, p. 207.**
[28] **Mikolajczyk, *The Rape of Poland*, p. 118.**

German people. (No mention was made of the immense Russian forces then assembling around Manchuria.)

Terms were then laid down. The "self-willed militaristic advisers," presumably of the Emperor, must be eliminated—but nothing was said about his elimination. "Parts" of Japan's territory would be occupied, and she would be stripped of her empire. Thereafter access to raw materials and trade would be permitted. Subject to these terms, "unconditional surrender" was demanded.

There was not even a hint in this "warning" that a tremendous new destructive force was about to be visited on Japan—a totally new dimension of warfare inaugurated. Everyone would take it for granted that she was to be destroyed by the old "conventional" means, horrible as these were. No time limit was laid down, and though she was nearly helpless it was not likely that the bad advisers of the Emperor would commit hari-kari promptly or surrender before the target for the bomb could be selected and clear weather obtained for its delivery eleven days later.

The warning may be judged to have been "fair" by conventional standards, but it was almost certain to be rejected, as its authors must have expected. Confronted with such a dramatic and public demand, the response was predetermined, especially from a land where "face" was supremely important. On July 28 Premier Suzuki announced that the Potsdam ultimatum was "unworthy of public notice."

The way was now fully prepared for the use of the bomb. As Stimson observed: "In the face of this rejection we could only proceed to demonstrate. . . The bomb had been rushed to the Far East, part of it by ship and part by air, and was ready for use on July 31, but five days of bad weather delayed the destruction of Hiroshima.[29] It was dropped on August 6. the day before the American leaders returning from Potsdam reached Washington.

When the news reached President Truman on shipboard, he said to a group of sailors around him: "This is the greatest thing in history. It's time for us to get home." Later he wrote: "Let there be no mistake about it. I regarded the bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used." He wanted it used "in the manner prescribed by the laws of war," on "a military target," "a war production center of prime importance."[30] Many years later Mr. Truman added that he had "no qualms" about using the A-bomb. It was "a weapon of war, an artillery weapon," and he had "never lost any sleep over it since."[31]

Two days later the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, alleging falsely that "taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of victims and facilitate the speedy restoration of universal peace.

[29] General Groves, the *New York Times,* November 29, 1945.

[30] Truman, *Memoirs,* Vol. I, pp. 419–21.

[31] Cabell Phillips, "Truman at Seventy-Five," *The New York Times Magazine,* May 3, 1959.

Loyal to its Allied duty," the Soviet Government had accepted the proposal of the Allies and had joined the declaration of July 26.[32]

On August 9 Nagasaki was A-bombed. On the 10th the Japanese Government offered to surrender, subject to a reservation about the Emperor's authority. Final terms were agreed upon on the 14th and the formal surrender was signed on September 2.

The bomb had enabled the Japanese leaders to surrender and save face. Or was the Russian declaration of war the decisive factor? Either would have been enough when Japan's position was already hopeless.

Russia's Predicament. For the Russians this cataract of events was extremely embarrassing. The Washington correspondent of the ***New York Times*** reported on August 9 that "It was learned on high authority that, although Russia had been told by President Truman that a new explosive was about to be brought into play in the Pacific war, nothing of its destructive potential was revealed." This is confirmed by Byrnes' statement that after one of the Potsdam sessions, on July 24, President Truman walked around the table and told Stalin that after long experimentation we had developed a bomb far exceeding any known in destructiveness "and that we planned to use it very soon unless Japan surrendered." Stalin merely replied that he was glad to hear about the bomb and that he hoped we would use it.[33]

The whole episode was brief and casual. There is no evidence that the Russians understood that an epochal event was about to occur. They displayed no curiosity whatever after the conversation.

The A-bomb exploded and then a few days after the Russian armed forces had been launched in Manchuria the war was over. Russia's allies were celebrating the end of the war and the news was seeping into Russia, where it had to be denied for many days, until the occupation of Manchuria could be substantially completed. In the world at large Russia was convicted of being a Johnny-come-lately who had jumped into the Japanese war at the very last minute to grab the fruits of a victory she had not earned. To combat this impression at home, the Russians faked the moving pictures of the final surrender to show that Russia alone had won the war.

Nearly a year later, on June 15, 1946, Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter reviewed the decision to use the bomb as it was used in an article in the ***Saturday Review of Literature.*** They agreed that there was not time to arrange a test demonstration "if the purpose was to knock Japan out before

[32] On August 9 the AP White House correspondent who had accompanied President Truman to Potsdam wrote, in the *New York Times*, that "Final agreement on Russia's entrance into the war with Japan, it may now be disclosed, was the primary objective" of the trip. A Soviet declaration of war, the President said, might save hundreds of thousands of Americans from injury or death. Leaning against a rail of the *Augusta*, en route to Europe, he frequenUy remarked on the job ahead. "He wanted more than anything else, he said, the use of Russian air bases with which to step up the assault on Japan and its conquered territories."

The *Augusta* sailed on July 7, and the successful test explosion of the A-bomb did not occur until July 16, 1945, changing our outlook greatly.

[33] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

Russia came in," and that "it may be argued that this decision was justified; that it was a legitimate exercise of power politics in a rough-and-tumble world; that we avoided a struggle for authority in Japan similar to that we have experienced in Germany and Italy; that, unless we came out of the war with a decisive balance of power over Russia, we would be in no position to checkmate Russian expansion." On the other hand, they thought that "there can be little question that the first error may have been the biggest error. The first error was the atomic bombing of Hiroshima."

Certainly the military use of the atomic bomb created a presumption amounting to a certainty that it would be used again in any future world war. If we had refrained from using it, there would have been a presumption against its use. All other peoples, including the Russians, would have been under a moral compulsion not to use it. This presumption would not have made us ijsafe, by any means, but it would have been a first deposit in the bank against the dreaded day, a first payment on a policy to regulate and control the use of atomic energy.

On May 14, 1947, British Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Cunningham declared in an address at Leeds University that he had always regretted the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan. He did not think that Japan could have done anything but surrender unconditionally within a short time, whereas the result of dropping the bombs had been "that the incalculable benefit which atomic energy may confer upon mankind has been obscured by the possibility of the use of atomic energy as a weapon."[34]

Some Results. In midsummer 1945 four powerful urges pushed our leaders toward the swift use of the atomic bomb: (1) to save American lives; (2) to shorten the war; (3) to announce the atomic epic fittingly; and (4) to minimize the expansion of Russian power in the Far East.

In the earlier stages of the decision the first two motives were the strongest, in the final stages the last two appear to have become decisive. At the time the first three purposes seemed to have been brilliantly achieved and the fourth in part. In perspective our success seems more doubtful.

On December 30, 1945, Raymond B. Fosdick, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, wrote that by using the A-bomb to shorten the war we gave our moral sanction to any weapon in the future that would win a war, no matter how destructive it might be.

This is a consideration which those who decided to use the bomb would doubtless rebut by saying that, of course, that is what war is like. Nevertheless, it was a grave thing that the United States, presumably the most humanitarian of nations, should inaugurate a new era of frightfulness, without being under the overwhelming necessity of self-preservation. The effect was to convince everyone that there could be no safety in the world thereafter. If the humane and democratic ***Americans*** would do this, then of course the Bolsheviks would A-bomb anyone they did not like. This was a conclusior, to which Russophobes all over the world were certain to jump, even if the bomb had not been used, but since we had used it, it was easy for larger

[34] **The *New York Times*, May 15, 1947.**

and larger circles of public opinion to accept the idea that of course the Russians would do the same thing to us if they could, and as soon as they could.

A very thoughtful Englishman, Sir Arthur Salter, also expressed his deep disquiet because the bomb was used on Japan without ascertaining whether the alternative really was the loss of additional millions of Allied lives, without waiting to see the impact upon Japan of Russia's entry into the war, and with so short an interval between Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[35]

Using the bomb to save American lives also got us into a kindred dilemma. Professor Albert Einstein defined it. Noting that we had used the bomb when it was not necessary to win the war, "in consideration of possible future loss of American lives," he pointed out that we now had to consider "possible loss" of ***millions*** of lives.[36]

In other words, there is no end to the hypothetical saving of American lives. Working under that principle we can justify a preventive war which would kill many millions of Russians and other Europeans, to forestall the possible killing of millions of Americans.

Our fourth objective, minimizing Russia's gains in the Far East, was achieved only so far as Japan was concerned. Yet it would have been a serious thing for American prestige had Russian armies swept over Manchuria and North China in the summer of 1945, bagging hundreds of thousands of prisoners, while American armies were inactive. The impression that the Red Army always prepared the way for Allied victory, and that it was invincible everywhere, would have spread over the world. Likewise, the prodigious American four-year effort in the Pacific would have been overshadowed. The prevention of these developments goes far to justify the use of the bomb politically.

On the debit side, the decision to deliver a decisive knockout before Russia's entry into the Japanese war also led to the decision to use the Japanese Emperor as a tool. This was a momentous step, since it involved the immense risk that all of the old war-making classes would be able to shelter under the throne until American occupation waned. This probability was so great that the sudden announcement that the Emperor was to be preserved brought intense agony of spirit to all those who had expected that there would be a real effort to end the old order in Japan, and free the world from the threat which was so plainly inherent in it. We also took the very questionable method of blasting a couple of hundred thousand ordinary Japanese, nearly all civilians, in order to help the Emperor make up his mind quickly, before Russia's entry into the war hit him.

The scrapping of the unconditional surrender policy for Japan surprised even the State Department. One of the most reputable political scientists in the United States stated at a conference on international affairs in 1947 that up to the time of the Potsdam decision the State Department was moving

[35] Sir Arthur Salter, "The United Nations and the Atomic Bomb," *International Conciliation*, January 1946, No. 417, p. 42.

[36] Albert Einstein, "The Real Problem is in the Hearts of Men," the *New York Times Magazine*, June 23, 1946.

toward unconditional surrender for Japan. The plans were all ready. Then they were changed at the last minute to provide for the recognition of the Emperor.

The military results of Hiroshima were comparatively minor. The inevitable surrender of Japan was hastened a little. The political fission which flowed from Hiroshima helped powerfully to split the world by inaugurating a ne balance of power conflict and arms race under conditions more dangerous than ever before.

The American decisions concerning the use of the atomic bomb definitely marked the end of the war-time alliance with the Soviet Union and the beginning of the post-war balance of power struggle.

STRONG AMERICAN-BRITISH STAND IN THE BALKANS

The impact of the American decisions which were registered at Hiroshima upon the Russians was strong and lasting. They still got their winnings in the Far East, and they eventually concluded that A-bombs could not conque: them. Nevertheless, all their security calculations were thrown into grave question. They thought they had finally won geographic security, but now space was of less value than before, yet it was the only defense available to them.

Up to this time control of Eastern Europe had seemed vital to them as s. means of preventing a German come-back. Now the same region was even more vital as a buffer against the atomic-armed West.

On its side the West now decided to act strongly to secure “free and unfettered elections” in the Balkans.

To achieve this purpose it was necessary to prevail over two strong forces the fixed Balkan habit of “making” the elections and the dictatorial bent of the Communist regimes which were in power, supported by Russian armies.

The first barrier was of very tough fiber. Rumania had an excellent constitution, on paper, but no government had ever resigned because of a vote or non-confidence. The king simply dismissed the government when he chose and dissolved the Parliament at the same time. Then the party leader whom he selected “made” the election, aided by a law that the party which received forty per cent of the votes should have two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament. Only once in several decades did the government bungle its job of getting the necessary forty per cent.

In 1926 General Averescu received the royal nod, and garnered 280 seats, to 105 for the opposition. The next year Stirbey was the king’s choice and his party received sixty-two per cent of the votes, instead of the seven per cent it received in the 1926 election. In 1928 Maniu, the Peasant Party leader, was allowed to try and in the “first free election” his party got eighty-five per cent of all the votes and 385 seats. In 1931 Maniu was dismissed and Iorga, head of a nominal party, received forty-eight per cent of a very small vote. In 1932 the Peasant Party came back. In 1933 the National Liberals made the election and jumped from 30 seats to 274. This process continued, with one exception

in 1940, down to the coming of the Nazis. The party which controlled the election machinery won the election.[37]

This record does not prove that Communist-dominated governments would be preferable in the Balkans, though they might be more efficient. The possibility of changing the government, even by corrupt methods, means much to us. We would rather live under democratic forms, even though they did not give us honest elections or real democracy. The hope of slow evolution into the real thing would buoy us up. The Balkan record does show, however, that it would be next to impossible suddenly to get free elections and real democracy there. It could only be done by our going in with power to make the elections, in this case to keep anyone else from making them, and then staying to enforce the rules of the democratic game. In other words, we would have to do what the Soviets were in the act of doing for their brand of government.

Balkan Governments Warned. The new American and British leaders nevertheless resolved to try to prevent Russia from consolidating her hold on the Balkans. In his Potsdam report on August 9, President Truman stressed that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were "not to be spheres of influence of any one power." On August 18 an American note told the Provisional Bulgarian Government that it was not adequately representative of "important elements of democratic opinion" and that its arrangements for the forthcoming election were not free from the fear of force and intimidation. The participation of all important democratic elements would be essential for the conclusion of a peace treaty with a recognized democratic government.

Two days later in a public address Foreign Secretary Bevin gave the three Balkan governments the same threat of non-recognition. He had the impression that "one kind of totalitarianism is being replaced by another."

The A-Bomb in Diplomacy. On August 26, 1945, C. L. Sulzberger summarized these developments as the start of an Anglo-American diplomatic offensive in East Europe. It grew out of three developments: (1) the removal from power of Roosevelt and Churchill, who had made or consented to spheres of influence arrangements with the Russians; (2) Russia's current preoccupation in the Far East; and (3) Anglo-American possession of the atomic bomb, "completely shifting the actual balance of military power," had "revised the entire over-all atmosphere."[38]

It would have been strange if the Russian leaders had not ascribed the Western post-Hiroshima, diplomatic offensive in the Balkans to the same reasons. The A-bomb had supplied a counter to the great strength of the Red Army, and, whether mentioned or not, would be a factor in all future balance of power moves.

Winston Churchill was the first to indicate publicly that the A-bomb should be used as an instrument of power politics. In a speech in the House of Commons on August 16, he had both attacked Russian policies in East

[37] **The *New York Times*, May 29, 1926, July 9, 1927, December 14, 1928, June 3, 1931, July 18, 1932, December 21, 22, 1933, November 21, 1946.**

[38] ***Ibid.*, August 26, 1945.**

Europe and pleaded that the atomic bomb be kept an American-British monopoly. The great plants necessary to produce atomic bombs could not be built in less than three or four years. In the meantime, the United States stood at the summit of the world, and he rejoiced that it was so.

He was moved by the tragedy of the 9,000,000 expellees from East Germany. He spoke of the "iron curtain" which divided Europe, behind which millions of people lived in fear of the knock on the door, and declared that "we must know where we stand, and we must make clear where we stand in these affairs of the Balkans and Eastern Europe." In the same address Churchill was emphatic about Fascist Spain. "It would be wrong to intervene in Spain in a forcible manner or to attempt to re-light the civil war in that country."

Describing the feelings of the Anglo-American leaders at Potsdam when the news of the successful test of the bomb arrived, he said: "We were in the presence of a new factor in human affairs. We possessed powers which were irresistible." From that moment "our outlook on the future was transformed."[39]

Balkan Elections. Confronted with the parallel protests of Washington and London, the Bulgarian Government postponed the elections until November 18, and a long series of moves and counter moves ensued, including the dispatch of a special American representative, Mr. Mark Ethridge, to observe developments independently. He found much evidence of strong-arm tactics on the part of the Communist-dominated governments.

Western pressure for a further postponement of the election was rejected and on the appointed day the voting took place, in "complete order and without any disturbance. This was not only officially stated, but was witnessed personally by numerous foreign correspondents of different nationalities who arrived for the purpose and visited the polls in many parts of the country."[40]

The result was that "more than 85 per cent voted for the Fatherland Front." The Bulgarian Government had made the election very successfully. Its chief device had been to organize, or dragoon, the permitted parties into a single voting list, so that all the voters had to do was to vote "yes" or "no." Then after the "election" the seats in Parliament were distributed as follows: 94 Agrarians, 94 Communists, 46 Zveno group, 32 Social Democrats, 11 Radicals and 1 Independent.

In the case of Hungary the Provisional Government was notified by Byrnes and Bevin that the proposed joint list was undemocratic, and on August 29 the projected elections were postponed. On October 23 it was announced that the four principal Hungarian parties would submit separate lists, but would continue their coalition regardless of results. Recognition was extended on November 2, after a preliminary offer to do so on September 29, provided democratic freedoms and elections were assured. The election, on November 4, was hailed as the freest in decades. It gave the Small Landholder's Party 59 per cent of the votes and 191 seats in Parliament; the Communists 17 per cent and 54 seats; the Social Democrats 18 per cent and 52 seats.

[39] **The *New York Times*, August 17, 1945.**

[40] **Dispatch to the *New York Times*, November 21, 1945.**

In Austria a similarly free election in November returned a strongly anti-communist government.

In Yugoslavia Tito's communist regime, popular in its own right, had no difficulty in securing an overwhelming vote on November 11, 1945, and on November 29 a republic was proclaimed. King Peter was disavowed.

Backed by the West, King Michael of Rumania demanded Premier Groza's resignation and refused to validate ministerial decrees. The British and American Ambassadors encouraged resistance and the anti-communists rallied, but the power of the Red Army kept Groza in office[41]

In Rumania, where Russia's defense concerns were vital, it was impossible to have a government friendly to the Soviet Union by free elections in which everybody voted.[42] In attempting to force such elections Byrnes and Bevin did two things. They invalidated the Churchill-Stalin gentleman's agreement's of November 1944, after Churchill had cashed his side of the bargain in Greece, with Stalin's support. They also denied the basic Yalta premise, on which the Yalta formula was built, that the East Europeans must have governments friendly to the Soviet Union. Nor was it "possible to plant democracy in Eastern Europe by diplomatic fiat."[43]

THE SEPTEMBER COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

On September 11, the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, provided for at Yalta, met in London and failed to agree on anything. Molotov argued soberly and long for a foothold in the Mediterranean and was firmly rebuffed. He wanted a larger voice in Japan, though the West at first thought this only a bargaining point. There was disagreement also over Italian.reparations, but the main cause of dissension was East Europe. The Americans introduced treaty drafts for Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania. The last two had notes at the top saying that the drafts were theoretical since peace could not be concluded with the governments in control. All three drafts ended with a stipulation that all foreign troops should be withdrawn as soon as the treaties were signed.[44]

In private conversations Secretary Byrnes did his level best to persuade Molotov that we only wanted governments in East Europe which would be "both friendly to the Soviet Union and representative of all the democratic elements of the country," but Molotov insisted that our refusal to recognize the governments in Bulgaria and Rumania could only mean that we wanted governments hostile to the Soviet Union.[45]

Since General de Gaulle had suggested a Western bloc just before the Council met, the Russian radio and press attacked this idea all during the conference as something aimed at the Soviet Union. Their own Eastern bloc was purely defensive, but a Western bloc would certainly be offensive. This is the bed rock principle upon which all balance of power contests are founded. Our own arrangements are always entirely defensive; those of others are

[41] **McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia, 1941–1946*, p. 699.** [42] ***Ibid.*, pp. 698–700.**
[43] ***Ibid.*** [44] **The *New York Times*, September 22, 1945.**
[45] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–100.**

plainly offensive. In 1949, as these lines were written, who in the West did not know that Russia's Eastern bloc was a deadly offensive threat to the West, and that the Atlantic Pact was a purely defensive reply?

Personalities also clashed ominously in the Council. Molotov's eternal reiteration of the same arguments was met by explosions from Bevin. After one of these Molotov "sat there, impassive and tight lipped," and then said in his softly modulated voice that the previous Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow had succeeded "because there were Cordell Hull and Eden."[46] On another occasion Bevin called Molotov's attitude Hitlerian, and Molotov was near the door before the term was withdrawn.[47] Throughout the conference Byrnes attempted to prevent these clashes and to keep the discussion on a non-personal basis, even when Molotov finally precipitated a crisis which broke up the conference.

Deadlock. When the Council meetings opened Molotov had unexpectedly agreed that the five foreign ministers should take part in all meetings, although the Potsdam agreement permitted a different interpretation. The French and Chinese Foreign Ministers were to vote only on certain matters, but it transpired increasingly that they sided with the American-British team, so that soon Molotov found himself always a minority of one. Consequently, on September 22, he took the position that a "mistake" had been made and demanded that the French and Chinese Ministers absent themselves except when treaties were under consideration to end armistices they had signed. A telegram from Truman to Stalin failed to induce a reversal of this ***volte-face***, and after a few days the conference adjourned, without any communique being issued.

The shock to public opinion in the West was pronounced, yet at this time it was still possible for objective analysis to be made. Herbert L. Matthews noted that Russia began with her fear of isolation and the Western powers with their "profound objections to the Eastern bloc which Russia has created in her frantic search for security." Now both sets of fears were stronger than ever. The Russian effort to get back to the Big Three had been "an elementary reaction of self-defense." The Council of Foreign Ministers had given the Soviet Union "what she considered the best possible reasons for becoming convinced of the validity of her fears. That was, perhaps, the greatest and most lasting harm done by the London Conference." Matthews added that Russia had all history on her side when she tried to narrow down the peace-making to the few great powers. From the peace of Utrecht in 1713 to date "that was the only way anything ever got done."[48]

This was true, yet the smaller allies had to be brought into the peace-making in some degree. It was these twin necessities which Byrnes later succeeded in reconciling.

[46] The *New York Times*, October 2, 1945. Molotov, said the *Chicago Tribune*, on September 28, 1945, "conducts his diplomatic negotiations by a combination of pushing and screaming."

[47] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–6.

[48] Herbert L. Matthews, the *New York Times*, October 7, 1945.

Toughness Approved. The Bymes-Bevin diplomatic offensive in London had produced deadlock, a status which was generally regarded in Washington with approval. Drew Pearson wrote that in his report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Byrnes "really wowed 'em." Most Senators thought his tactics had been clever. His report that Molotov had the nerve to suggest that Russia sit in on the control of the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, if we insisted on interfering with Russia's domination of the Dardanelles, "made a strong impression on the Senators."[49]

James B. Reston reported that the Committee members had applauded Byrnes' tough line with Russia. They had not questioned whether the tough line was right, but only whether it was tough enough, and whether it was his intention to "be tough" or only to "act tough."

Double Standard. While approving his pressure in East Europe the Senators had criticized him sharply for letting Russia in on an advisory committee for Japan. In the State Department the trend was also toward firmness, though some pointed out that our policy was "liberal, if not radical in its proposals for other countries and generally conservative where our own vital interests are concerned."[50]

In this connection the astute French correspondent Pertinax revealed on October 16 that the Russians had laid claim to bases in Spitzbergen at Potsdam on the assumption that the Americans would retain footholds in Greenland and Iceland. When this news became public another writer accepted it as positive proof of Russian aggressive intent. Russia could want Spitzbergen bases, it was said, for no other purpose than to bomb Boston and New York. This led me to examine a globe and I learned that the Spitzbergen islands are an offshore appendage of the Eurasian continent, far closer to Moscow than to New York, not to speak of Leningrad.

In his article Pertinax added that competent observers of international affairs suspected that Molotov's intractable mood at London had been motivated by knowledge of "the preliminary studies and investigations made in Washington with a view to setting up a network of naval and military strong points in the Pacific, the Atlantic and elsewhere."

Our motive in desiring farflung bases was, in the beginning, purely defensive. Twice in thirty years we had been attacked by powers living far away from us. We wanted to guard against that in the future, even from Russia. The Russians, however, would not be sure that American bases on their side of the oceans had purely defensive purposes.

Walter Lippmann also was conscious of the split in our thinking. In the Pacific, north of the Equator, we had stated officially that in this vast area, and in Japan, ours is to be the deciding voice. This might be the right solution, but it was certainly not impressive in Eastern Europe "when we invoke the principle that this is one world in which decisions must not be taken unilaterally."[51] We were very realistic where our own vital interests were concerned, but very idealistic where Russia's vital interests were involved.

[49] ***The Nashville Tennessean*, October 13, 1945.**
[50] **James Reston, the *New York Times*, October 14, 1945.**
[51] **Walter Lippmann, *The Nashville Tennessean*, October 21, 1945.**

On their side the Russians also practised a double standard. They expected acquiescence in the organization of Eastern Europe as a security zone for themselves and quickly opposed any attempt by the West to organize Western Europe. Their own purposes in East Europe were purely defensive, but any organization of West Europe would be offensive, aimed against them. They took it for granted also that they should expand both in East Europe and in the Mediterranean and could not understand why the latter development should seem dangerous to the West.

Contemporary with the London Council meeting two omens came out of Russia. On September 14 Senator Claude Pepper, of Florida, had an interview with Stalin in which the Russian ruler mentioned Russia's request to the United States for a loan, some six months ago. Questioned on whether the money would be spent on war production he said that would be ridiculous, suicidal. The U.S.S.R. had already demobilized nearly 4,000,000 men and was continuing the process. What she needed most was to repair the damages of war. If the loan were granted to her it would be repaid in full.

Stalin was emphatic that Germany and Japan must be prevented from becoming aggressors again. He thought we were being too lenient with the Japanese and that the Ruhr should be taken away from Germany. It was essential that our two countries "find a new common ground for cooperation in peace time." He asked only that the Soviet Union be judged objectively.

This interview was given at the opening of the London Council meeting. At its close, on October 2, the proposed visit of Marshal Zhukov to the United States was cancelled. As the Russian Commander in Berlin, Zhukov had developed a warm friendship with Eisenhower. The two had gotten on famously together. Zhukov had invited Eisenhower to Russia and the American General had had a fine reception in Moscow. On October 2 Zhukov's return visit to the United States was postponed "because of illness," after New York City authorities had begun to erect the reviewing stands, and it never took place. Before long Zhukov was transferred from Berlin and he disappeared from the limelight for many years.

SHOULD THE A-BOMB SECRET BE KEPT?

The sudden revelation that man had loosed the cosmic force of the universe itself precipitated three main lines of debate: ***(a)*** whether we should share the atomic bomb production secrets with other nations, meaning the Russians; (6) whether we should strive for control of atomic weapons by the United Nations; and (c) whether inside the United States atomic energy should be controlled by the military or by civilians.

In later times it may seem strange that the first question was seriously considered. Yet the reality of the debate is attested by the constant warning of the atomic scientists that the secret could not be kept and the equally constant reiteration of members of Congress and others that it must and would be. A poll of Congressmen in late September showed 76 out of 86 opposed to divulging the bomb secrets, probably a fair sample of sentiment in Congress.

Nevertheless, a great many people believed that it would be the best policy to share our atomic knowledge freely with the Russians and others.[52] Walter Lippmann argued cogently that the scientists were the only ones who could be the guardians of the atom. No one else could know enough about it. Therefore the widest diffusion of atomic knowledge was the best insurance. The sharing of this knowledge, a continuing process as new advances were made, would mean frequent and regular meetings of the scientists, and those of forty countries would be much better guardians against nefarious use of atomic energy than the scientists of three nations.[53]

The scientists were nearly all agreed that other nations could make bombs in something like five years. There was, accordingly, strong reason for freely sharing what we could keep only momentarily. When General Eisenhower was asked in a House Military Affairs Committee hearing on November 15, 1945, whether we should keep the atomic secrets during the two to five years we could expect to have a monopoly, he replied: "Let's be realistic. The scientists say other nations will get the secret anyway. There is some point in making a virtue out of necessity."[54]

There was indeed great point in so doing. The free sharing of atomic knowledge would do two things: it would at once reduce the great tension which the Hiroshima explosion had set up and it would put the Russians under a very heavy moral obligation not to enter an atomic arms race. We had a second chance to get an agreement for international control of atomic energy that could be entered into freely by everyone, with no compulsion hanging over anyone's head and with both sides having a common interest in control.

To the hard-boiled, materialistic mind such considerations were of course the most dangerous phantasy. No nation had ever revealed a military secret to its competitors, let alone the most tremendous of "secrets." Of course we would keep it, as long as we could, and try to keep far ahead, technically and in bomb stockpiling, during our monopoly period. In the absence of some inspired leadership this was the reasoning that was bound to prevail.

British Opinion for Sharing. In Britain there was a remarkable outburst of opinion in favor of risking something and treating Russia as an ally to be trusted, instead of an enemy to be feared. The Americans had had no bombs fall in their cities, but the British could remember vividly what it was like, especially while technicians were momentarily working heroically to deal with a delayed action blockbuster before it went off.

On November 4 Mallory Browne sent a full review of British sentiment to the ***New York Times.*** Irritated and alarmed by our dilatory hoarding policy the British press was almost unanimous in bluntly voicing the view that atomic energy must be "regarded as all humanity's heritage" and that any temporary advantage from keeping the secret a few years "would be more than offset by the antagonism that this would arouse in Moscow." The

[52] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 265.**

[53] **Walter Lippmann, *The Nashville Tennessean*, October 4 and November 16, 1945.**

[54] ***Nashville Banner*, November 15, 1945; Tris Coffin, *Missouri Compromise*, Boston, 1947, p. 217.**

London ***Times*** asked what hope there was for confidence while the most powerful weapon yet devised was "maintained as the prerogative and monopoly of one power?" Both the conservative ***Spectator*** and the left-wing ***New Statesman and Nation*** took the same strong line, the latter maintaining that the Russians were difficult to deal with, not because they were over-confident but because the slaughter of their people from Stalingrad to Berlin had given them an anxious sense of insecurity which the American monopoly of the atomic bomb had greatly exaggerated. The ***Spectator*** said that Russia was in a deplorable state of mind and that "any suggestion that she is being put on a different level from her Western Allies, a lower level, makes her impossible to deal with." Withholding the atomic secrets made Russia an inferior military power and shattered confidence between the Allies, on the ground that Russia could not be trusted. There could be no other reason.

These judgments, Browne continued, were "entirely typical of British opinion" at that time. The British started from the premise that if peace was to be preserved and atomic warfare prevented the confidence of Russia had to be won by trusting her with the atomic bomb secrets.

One can hear the scorn and derision with which this view would have been greeted in 1949 and after. Fewer British citizens and very few Americans would then put themselves in the Russians'place and ask: "How would we feel if we were labelled as the set of rogues who could not be trusted by their Allies?" Since the Russians have acted after Hiroshima as we would have acted had we been so labelled, we are certain that they could never have been trusted.

After Hiroshima there was a brief period when farsighted action might have laid the foundation for a new world but, as so many thinkers pointed out, man's social vision was not ready for the atomic age. Our scientific progress from the bow and arrow to the atomic bomb had been stupefying, but we were still creatures "full of prejudice and fear and selfish national desires."[55] Therefore Americans must fear and distrust Russians, and vice versa, exactly as the primitive tribes did. On August 18, Norman Cousins published his famous article, "Modern Man Is Obsolete"—"a self-made anachronism becoming more incongruous by the minute. He has exalted change in everything but himself. He has leaped centuries ahead in inventing a new world but he has not prepared himself to live in that world."[56]

If the Russians had perfected the atomic bomb would they have shared the secrets involved with us? The answer is almost certainly "No." They are specialists in secrecy, with centuries of experience in it. They would have given nothing away. Nevertheless, this does not fully solve our own problem. Roosevelt and Hull had labored long and patiently to break down Russia's suspicions and bring her into the comity of nations and, when the dismal pre-Munich history is remembered, they had had remarkable success. Russia was also so incomparably more wounded by the war than we were that it was incumbent upon us to keep her inevitable state of mind constantly in our calculations. If mature, curative statesmanship was to come out of any national capital after the war it had to come from Washington. If, also, Russia

[55] **James Reston, the *New York Times*, August 12, 1945.**
[56] ***Saturday Review of Literature*, August 18, 1945.**

was to get help in recovery from terrible devastation the help had to come from the United States. It could come, apart from wholly inadequate reparations seizures, only from us, and a marvellous new source of industrial power could be of tremendous aid in Russia's recovery.

All reason, surely, was not on the side of the original decision that we must not trust the Russians with atomic energy.

Decision Delayed. President Truman's first statement about the atomic bomb, on August 6, 1945, said that it had never before been the habit of American scientists or the policy of our Government to withhold scientific knowledge. "Normally, therefore, everything about the work with atomic energy would be made public."

But, he added, "under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge the terminal processes of production or all the military applications, pending further examination of possible methods of protecting us and the rest of the world from the danger of sudden destruction."

The "present circumstances" were that we did not trust a powerful ally which had loyally fought through the war in Europe with us and was ready to do so in the Far East. The President promised, however, to "give further consideration and make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can be a powerful and forceful influence toward the maintenance of world peace."

With the deadly smoke of Hiroshima hanging high in the heavens it was difficult to foresee how atomic power could be "a powerful and forceful" keeper of world peace, unless through the fear that future bombs would be dropped.

Even if Mr. Truman did not picture himself as the world's atomic policeman, what would the Russians think?

On the same day Secretary Stimson issued a statement giving a history of the great atomic quest which ended as follows: "Every effort is being bent toward assuring that this weapon and the new field of science that stands behind it will be employed wisely in the interests of the security of peace-loving nations and the well-being of the world."

Here were the obviously good intentions of a high-minded statesman. The bomb was to be used "wisely" to protect the peace-loving nations from those of evil intent. And who were the latter? The Allies would have the power to police Germany, Japan and Italy for a long time. Who else would drop A-bombs on the peace-loving nations? Who, too, was to see to it that the Russians used atomic energy "wisely" for the well-being of the world?

These were great questions for which answers would eventually be proposed. But would the Russians then accept the answers?

In the weeks after Hiroshima, while the Japanese war was being formally wound up, it was natural that our officials should relax on the atomic question, especially since they had made the fundamental decision not to share freely the decisive steps in the creation of fissionable material and its assembly into bombs. The famous Smythe Report had given a great deal of information about atomic energy—far too much, many said—and more did not seem

immediately required. There were also many other post war issues and problems to take up governmental attention.

The Campaign of the Scientists. Yet as the weeks passed the atomic scientists became almost frantic with anxiety. They had been thinking about the future while the bomb was being prepared. They knew that the greatest decisions ever made by man were called for. Realizing that free sharing was unlikely, they concentrated more and more on urging international control, usually by the UN Security Council.

To stir their fellow countrymen to action the scientists made public statements, usually by invitation, almost daily, explaining the terrific power of the new weapon, the horrors it could unleash and the urgent necessity of pushing on to international control. The greatest of the scientists all assured the public that there was no defense against the atomic bomb, especially if successfully hitched to long range rockets. One explained that 40,000,000 Americans could be killed in a day and another that two-thirds of the human race could be wiped out in an atomic war.

Never before had a group of informed American citizens risen more earnestly or more unanimously to the effort to ward off mortal danger and to secure a great advance in social organization. We are deeply indebted to the scientists for the splendid effort they made. It was natural, too, that all the advocates of real world government, and countless new converts, should chime in, feeling that the fear of the bomb would enable us to take a long and much needed leap ahead.

Yet the noble effort of the scientists to harness the mighty force their government had commanded them to turn loose backfired in a way never anticipated. They unwittingly convinced a large part of their countrymen that we had better not let the Russians get hold of such a terrific force and that maybe a preventive war would not be such a bad thing. A lecturer who was a good internationalist did his work so well that many people in an audience of United Nations supporters were convinced that if it was going to be that horrible we had just better drop the bombs over there, far away from the U.S.A. and have it all over with. The response of more nationalistic Americans to the terrors of the A-bomb needs no elaboration.

Finally, on September 28, 1945, David Lawrence wrote in alarm that the world was still thinking in terms of further use of the A-bomb. It was “truly amazing” that the recent discussion in President Truman’s Cabinet had centered merely on whether the bomb secrets should be shared with Russia and others. No one in authority had proposed that it be banned completely from further use in war.[57]

Stimson’s Plea for a Direct Approach to Russia. The policy of seeking an atomic agreement directly with Moscow was ably championed by Secretary of War Stimson. He had been deeply disturbed at Potsdam by the desire of the Russians to secure bases in the Mediterranean and especially by the atmosphere of dictatorial repression which he felt about him. The “courtesy and hospitality of the Russians was unfailing,” yet the Americans were

[57] ***Nashville Banner*, September 28, 1945.**

acutely aware that they breathed the air of a police state. It acquired for him, and for the other Americans at Potsdam, "a direct and terrible meaning."[58]

The effect of this factor upon the thinking of our leaders at Potsdam is to be considered in evaluating their decisions there concerning the atomic bomb. It seemed to Stimson that permanently safe relations could never be established between two states so differently based. He came to the conclusion that no system of control for atomic energy could be accepted until the Russians had put their constitution of 1936 in force, to provide real freedoms for the Soviet peoples.

After returning to Washington Stimson was compelled to retire to the Adirondacks for rest, and with time to think he realized that the Red leaders would never liberalize their state at our demand. He began to think, also, that the atom might be the central problem, not the Russians. Eventually, he concluded that individual rights could come in Russia only slowly and gradually and that his life-long policy of making a man trustworthy by trusting him should be applied to the Russians.

He therefore submitted to President Truman, on September 11, 1945, a memorandum which is one of the most significant documents of that memorable year. Stimson pointed out that "unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of cooperation and trust" a desperate arms race would result. He considered satisfactory relations with Russia to be "virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic bomb." It was vital to make sure that when they did get it they would be willing and cooperative partners. Our relations might be "perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our motives and purposes will increase." It would inspire them to all-out efforts to solve the problem themselves.

It was his judgment that the Russians would be more likely to respond to a direct and forthright approach from the United States. He emphasized "perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States—backed by Great Britain but peculiarly the proposal of the United States. Action of any international group of nations, including many small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets."

As the outline of a direct approach to the Kremlin, Stimson suggested that the Big Three agree to stop all work on atomic bombs, that those which we had be impounded, and that an agreement be made never to use the A-bomb in war unless all three governments agreed to do so.

This program for seeking agreement with the Russians early and directly—it was only a month after Hiroshima—was advanced by the ablest elder statesman in the President's Cabinet. Stimson had been Secretary of War and Secretary of State in troubled periods before he headed the War Department throughout our greatest war. If anyone was entitled to be listened to in his

[58] **Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 637–48.**

last public endeavor, he was the man. At the last Cabinet meeting he attended, on September 21, 1945, the day of his retirement, he urgently expressed the same views—a prompt effort to achieve control of atomic warfare by direct negotiations with the Russians.

In this historic session Stimson appeared to win the majority of those present. Dean Acheson, Robert Hannegan, Henry Wallace, Robert Patterson, Lewis Schwellenbach, Philip B. Fleming and Paul McNutt in general agreed with Stimson. Fred M. Vinson, Tom C. Clark, James V. Forrestal and Clinton P. Anderson demurred. Three others favored delaying any decision for six months.[59]

In later times it seemed almost incredible that so many had supported the exchange of scientific information on atomic energy with the Russians. Yet at that time Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, thought we would profit from the exchange. He thought it a good way to find out whether we could trust the Russians and it would "announce to the world that we wish to proceed down the path of international good will and understanding." However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States "retain all existing secrets with respect to the atomic weapons," and of course the Stimson approach was never tried. Truman "respected and trusted Stimson," but not to the extent of trusting the Russians.[60]

Two years later Stimson thought that the chances of success were less than he had anticipated, but he still believed that "the existence of any chance at all would have justified the attempt, so great was the objective at stake." By 1950 this seemed truer still. By then the policy of distrusting the Russians, and insisting on the ultimate in guarantees, had been repaid in distrust, brash and vituperative, many times over.

A Policy of Secrecy Announced. On October 3, President Truman sent a special message to Congress urging at length that a comprehensive law be passed to nationalize all atomic energy processes inside the United States. He also gave notice that he would initiate discussions first with Great Britain and Canada, our associates in the discovery of atomic energy, and then with others, in an effort to secure international control of atomic energy and prevent "a desperate armament race which might well end in disaster." He emphasized "that these discussions will not be concerned with disclosures relating to the manufacturing processes of the atomic bomb itself."

A few days later, on October 8, Mr. Truman was vacationing at Reelfoot Lake in Tennessee. In the evening he asked the reporters over to Linda Lodge and in reply to questions told them that though he had not discussed the retention of the industrial "know-how" of atomic production with Canada and England he was sure these countries would agree on keeping it secret. He explained that our refusal to share the bomb secret had no bearing on current relations with Russia. It had always been difficult for English-speaking persons and Russians to understand one another, due to the difficulty in translating the two languages.[61]

[59] **Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 525–7.** [60] ***Ibid.*** [61] ***Nashville Banner*. October 9, 1945.**

In his account of this event Truman remembers explaining that the Russians did not have the "practical know-how," "the industrial plant and our engineering ability to do the job." They and our other allies would have to get these things "on their own hook, just as we did."[62]

The response to this casual and off-hand manner of registering a momentous decision, which had been hitherto implicit but never spelled out, was strong. Marquis Childs wrote that "the scientists have lost. We have all lost." Scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer testified that "you cannot keep the nature of the world a secret." From Los Alamos, New Mexico, 400 atomic scientists predicted bombs "thousands of times more powerful" than those dropped on Japan and warned that lack of action toward international control for "even a few months will be preparing the world for unprecedented destruction." Alexander Uhl noted that already the sense of urgency had slipped away so that one would hardly know by the news from Washington that we had to face the reality of a new world.

Samuel Grafton exclaimed, with true prophetic vision: "What a strange sensation will shoot through us on that day when some other nation, some nation which owes us nothing for the data, announces and proves that it, too, has the atomic bomb!" Walter Lippmann added that "we are not likely to convince mankind that we believe in liberty if the best we can think of to do with our knowledge of the atom is to make a monopoly of it maintained by an hysterical censorship." How could one expect to break down a political censorship in Bulgaria when we maintained a scientific one in the United States? But from Washington, William S. White reported that in Congress "the mood for clutching the secret tightly, rather than for letting out a single phase of it, appeared wholly predominant."[63]

Before a Congressional committee scientist Leo Szilard described two schools of thought, one favoring the use of atomic energy for industrial and civilian use, the other wishing to make more bombs "so we can blast the hell out of Russia before Russia blasts the hell out of us."[64] Drew Pearson observed: "If we can head off the war with Russia that the brass hats are talking about, and secretly preparing for" it would save civilization. He favored extending the Good Neighbor Policy to Russia.[65] Both of these candid statements were disquieting, but it was an editorial writer in the ***Nashville Tennessean*** who, on October 12, 1945, made the most strikingly prophetic observation. Said he: "If the formulators of our foreign policy get the unfortunate idea that the compelling mission of the United States is to fence in Russia with a power ring in the Pacific and throw up a ***cordon sanitaire*** from Berlin to the Adriatic against the U.S.S.R., they will condemn the United Nations to an early death and the world to the prospects of another early world war."

A full year and a half before the Truman Doctrine was uttered the ***Tennessean*** editor had sensed what the small whirlwind then starting would be like

[62] Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 533–4.

[63] The *Nashville Tennessean*, October 11,19 and 21,1945 ; the *New York Times*, October 14; *PM*, October 18.

[64] *Nashville Banner*, October 19, 1945. **[65] The *Nashville Tennessean*, October 17, 1945.**

when it developed. The only item in the Truman Doctrine that he did not foresee was the detail that our policy formulators would simply build the fence all the way around Russia and plant the posts in the Mediterranean first.

Atomic Arms Race. On October 19, 1945, Mr. Fyke Farmer of Nashville, Tennessee, an earnest advocate of world government and of international control of atomic energy, had an interview with President Truman in which the President expressed the opinion that we alone possessed the physical resources and the organizational skill to make atomic bombs. Asked directly if the armament race was on, Mr. Truman replied: "Yes, but I think we will stay ahead."[66]

Two days later the eminent British savant, H. G. Wells, one of the greatest seers of his time, made his last prediction. "This world is at the end of its tether," he said. "The end of everything we call life is close at hand and can't be evaded."[67]

"A Sacred Trust." On October 27, President Truman made a foreign policy speech on Navy Day. Declaring that our policy is based firmly on "righteousness and justice" and that there would be no "compromise with evil," he laid down twelve fundamentals, all of them the highest moral and democratic principles, as we understand them. Half of them struck against Russia's position in Eastern Europe by implication. For example: "We shall refuse to recognize any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power." The ninth fundamental prescribed the solution of all Western Hemisphere problems in neighborly fashion, "without interference from outside the Western Hemisphere."

Urging the people of the United States, Russia and other lands "to take the course of current history into their own hands" he avowed that "the atomic bombs which fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki must be made a signal, not for the old process of falling apart but for a new era—an era of ever closer unity and ever closer friendship among peaceful nations." He did not say how these two episodes in mass destruction, which had spread fear around the world, could prevent "the old process of falling apart," but he declared that the A-bombs in our hands were "no threat to any nation" and added that "this new power of destruction we regard as a sacred trust."[68]

To the majority of Americans this seemed a very natural policy. The public opinion polls never revealed any time when the American people were willing to give up the atomic secrets without a guarantee that effective international control would be established. In November 1945, 60 per cent thought we should keep the secrets and 40 per cent said "No." In March 1946, 31 per cent thought Russia should share the secret, 52 per cent thought not and 17 per cent had no opinion.[69]

The remarkable thing about these polls is not the majority for retaining the

[66] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, October 20, 1945.**
[67] ***Ibid.*, October 22, 1945.**
[68] ***International Conciliation*, No. 416, contains all of the official statements on atomic energy in the second half of 1945.**
[69] ***Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1946, pp. 104–5.**

secrets as long as possible, but the large minority who were for sharing them freely. The minority was so large that vigorous official leadership in favor of a policy of sharing would almost certainly have made it a majority. It is a very noteworthy thing that without such leadership a third of our people should have been willing to take the risks of sharing in an effort to avoid another balance of power struggle. That this many people thought confidence was a better foundation for the future than iron bound guarantees is more significant than the feeling of the majority that we should hold on to the bomb unless the world met our terms.

The scientists almost unanimously warned that our atomic supremacy was momentary, but the politicians and the military men believed that our advanced industrial techniques would prolong the period very considerably. Major General Leslie C. Groves, who commanded the whole atomic project, estimated that even with the most fortunate circumstances "the most powerful of nations" could not catch up with us during a period of from five to twenty years. Rear Admiral William R. Purnell also testified that no other nation was equipped industrially to make atomic bombs. He doubted that Britain could do so in five years.[70]

Commenting on the President's Navy Day speech, David Lawrence asked why there was so much current emphasis on the defense of the United States. While paying formal homage to UN, many of the speeches of our military and naval leaders since VE Day had emphasized "most vehemently the need for big armaments to protect the United States against unidentified potential enemies." Throughout history there had always been danger in building armaments for abstract purposes. Other nations would do the identifying and begin to take counter measures.[71]

Nothing, of course, was more certain. On October 30 General George S. Patton urged that we stay "armed and prepared" for an "inevitable" third world war. Otherwise the United States would probably be destroyed.[72] In his report Air Chief General Henry H. Arnold called for "absolute air superiority in being at all times, combined with the best anti-aircraft ground devices." This was "the only form of defense which offers any security whatever." On December 8, Arnold added that, in addition to a far-flung spy network "we must use our most brilliant scientists to develop better weapons more quickly and more effectively. We must take advantage of the bases we now have to be closer to an enemy's vital points with our weapons than he is to ours. We must use the most modern weapons of all kinds so that we can beat any potential opponent to the draw."[73]

Arnold added that this policy of "offensive readiness" did not mean that we should ever become an aggressor nation. As a good patriot he was doing his best to provide for our future security. But would the Russians understand that absolute American air supremacy, equipped with the latest scientific

[70] The *New York Times*, October 10, 17, 1945.

[71] *Nashville Banner*, October 30, 1945. Later Mr. Lawrence became one of the strongest prosecutors of the Cold War.

[72] *ibid.*, October 13, 1945.

[73] The *New York Times*, November 12, December 9, 1945.

weapons and based close to their vitals, had only defensive intent? It is the innermost law of balance of power arms races that what is meat to one contestant is poison to the other.

Foreign Policy Adrift. On November 3, Lippmann wrote in alarm that our foreign policy was out of control. Decisions of the utmost moment were being made in bits and pieces, such as the termination of lend-lease "abruptly and brutally," and by many different agencies and people. We had in fact "drifted into a race of armaments with the Soviet Union" on the atomic bomb question, military programs and power politics. Nobody had planned it but we were "all being sucked into a conflict," and we were not using a fraction of our power and influence to avert it. "Let no one deceive himself: we are drifting. We are drifting toward a catastrophe."[74]

This warning from the nation's most respected columnist should have done something to stop the drift, but it did not. There was no statesman's hand at the helm to steer, and too many people were interested in promoting the drift toward catastrophe, especially since the unexpected windfall of atomic bombs promised an easy way of disposing of "an enemy" on his home grounds.

The Truman-Attlee-King Declaration. During October the British people became so acutely uneasy about the drifting on atomic energy policy that Prime Minister Attlee expressed a desire to discuss the subject personally with President Truman, and he was invited to come to Washington, along with Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada. Shortly before Mr. Attlee's departure Herbert L. Matthews wrote from London that "there is no longer any doubt that the Labor Government has swung around under great popular pressure to the conception that atomic energy should be a world heritage, and that whatever may be gained by withholding the secret over the next five or ten years would be lost politically in international relations with Russia." It was the feeling in England that the next five or ten years were not important, since nobody could consider another world war for a much longer period. Therefore possession of the bomb secrets by Russia would not greatly matter and "Russia's good will might as well be purchased or bargained for now."[75]

It was added that Attlee would try to get the bomb turned over to the Security Council, preferably to the Five Great Powers on it. However, he would not press for a rigid settlement now if American opinion was opposed. He could hardly do so, since Britain's whole future was dependent on receiving a large American loan.

While the three Anglo-Saxon leaders deliberated, a dispatch from Ottawa described nervous tension in Canada comparable to that before some of the great battles of the late war. It was felt that whether the secret of the A-bomb was kept by a few or turned over to the Security Council there could no longer be a feeling of national security.[76]

This was the blunt and bitter truth. Even the largest nations could never feel or be as safe again, no matter what controls might be devised. Men might

[74] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, November 4, 1945.**
[75] **The *New York Times*, October 30, November 1, 1945.**
[76] **P. J. Philip in the *New York Times*, November 11, 1945.**

seek greater safety in much larger governmental units, but the old security could never be recovered—unless by some miracle the biggest nations learned to act with moderation toward each other.

The Three Nation Declaration on atomic energy was issued in Washington on November 15, 1945. Recognizing that "there can be no adequate defense" against atomic bombs, that "no single nation can in fact have a monopoly," that no system of safeguards would provide an effective safeguard against the making of A-bombs "by a nation bent on aggression," the declaration recalled that "the basic scientific information essential to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has already been made available to the world." However, it had been decided that "the disclosure of detailed information concerning the practical industrial (and military) application of atomic energy" would not contribute to the devising of "effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards."

The Three atomic powers therefore proposed the creation of a United Nations Commission which should make specific proposals for effective control of atomic energy. "The work of the commission should proceed by separate stages, the successful completion of each one of which will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken. Specifically, it is considered that the commission might well devote its attention first to the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information, and as a second stage to the development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials."

Tests for the Soviets. This paragraph was the crux of the proposal. The first step should be "the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information." The body of the document had stressed that this should be information "for peaceful ends." This would enable us to gauge how far along the Russians were with their atomic researches, while they would presumably acquire from us some further details about the use of atomic energy "for peaceful ends." This would require the Soviets to make a dent in their most deeply held complex—fear that foreigners would acquire vital security information—and it would point toward the eventual opening of their entire realm to UN inspectors. In turn this would mean that the world would acquire intimate knowledge about: ***(a)*** Russia's great post-war weakness; ***(b)*** her industrial and military strength; (***c***) Soviet police methods; and (***d***) the far lower standard of living than that enjoyed by the West.

These probabilities raised two crucial questions for the Soviets. They believed they had survived the German onslaught because they had successfully veiled their real strength from the Germans. Could they now trust the other Western nations with full security information? The other issue concerned their entire system of government and production. Could they trust their people to remain loyal to both, if exposed to widening knowledge of the freer and more prosperous conditions in the West? The leaders might believe that this gap would be closed in a generation or two, but would their people remain convinced?

In answering these most decisive of questions the Soviet leaders were bound

to be deeply influenced by the entire history of their relations with the West since 1917, while the West would think only of the future. Were the Reds proving their good faith by opening up and letting us see what they had? With us this matter of good faith was decisive. Since we did not trust the Russians not to drop A-bombs on us they had to win our confidence by proving, one step at a time, that they would not do so.

If they successfully passed the test on Step One, then they could come up for Test Two: "the development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials." We desired to know what deposits of uranium or thorium existed in the Soviet Union. To gather this information over the vast expanses involved would require a great deal of searching and, again, inspection. The Russian leaders might look upon Stage Two with deep misgivings but they were required to pass examination on it, for "the successful completion of each" stage "will develop the necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken."

If the Russian Government successfully passed the first two stages then others could be considered, ending finally in the receipt of "information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy." It was a stiff course, and there must be no failure at any stage.

In later years few Americans doubted the wisdom of prescribing this course. Knowing that we are the most advanced, trustworthy and enlightened people in the world it was only natural that we should require the Russians to prove their sincerity and trustworthiness. When President Truman announced on October 27, three months after Hiroshima, that "the possession in our hands of this new power of destruction we regard as a sacred trust," he knew that "because of our love of peace, the thoughtful people of the world know that that trust will not be violated, that it will be faithfully executed," in spite of our hasty first use of the A-bomb in war.

Mr. Truman's consciousness of rectitude was total. On the other hand, the Russian leaders were the head of another very proud government, one whose achievements during our common war had astounded the world and perhaps surprised the Russians. Would they take the course, entering at the first grade and continuing loyally through to the eighth, or wherever the graduation point might be?

Men being what they are, full of the sense of their own rightness, in Moscow as well as Washington, there was hardly more than one chance in a thousand that they would register for the course. Being human, they would choose to wait a few years, until their own scientists and their own system had proved that they could master atomic energy.

They were the more likely to make this decision because of the three months' delay during which our distrust of them had been well advertised to the world. Many Americans sensed, and some saw clearly, that this long delay had been fatal to international control of atomic energy.

"The Years of No Solution." On November 17, 1945, two days after the Three Nation Declaration, Oppenheimer observed that it would have been "an enormous step forward" if the recent offer by the three nations to give

the atomic bomb to the United Nations Organization on a reciprocal basis had been made "on the tenth of August by the Big Five powers." There were a few key words in the whole problem of the atomic bomb, he added. They were: confidence, international cooperation "and perhaps control."[77]

We had begun belatedly at the other end of this spectrum, with control coming first and confidence last.

Lippmann wrote that there was nothing in the declaration that could not have been proposed at Potsdam or on the day of Japan's surrender. The failure of our high officials to do so could perhaps be explained, but not easily excused. Then, he continued, it would have been greeted as an inspired act of statesmanship. Now, as the ***Herald Tribune*** pointed out, we must use the proposals to repair the mischief which their prompt issuance would have done so much to prevent.[78]

It was to be another seven months before the UN Atomic Energy Commission met. On the day that it did, Cousins and Finletter wrote that it was almost a year since the explosion of the bomb at Hiroshima, "but during that time the making of a policy to deal with it has had nothing of the bristling urgency and determination that went into the making of the bomb." Instead there had been "a policy of drift, default and delay. It is doubtful whether ever in our history there has been an uglier or more ominous frittering away of critically valuable time."[79]

Secretary of State Byrnes had given far too optimistic a view when he said of the Truman-Attlee proposals, on November 16: "They represent a very modest first step in what is certain to prove a long and difficult journey."[80] How illusory the journey was to be the Association of Oak Ridge Scientists explained on the same day. The greatest atomic secret, by far, was that the bomb could be made to work. Now everybody knew the exact problems to be solved. The Smyth Report had told what the successful methods of getting Uranium 235 were; it described how Plutonium is prepared; it outlined the problems in setting up the atomic bomb. All that remained to be learned was "the details of the processes: how the machinery is designed, what chemicals are used, etc.," and "any group of scientists, knowing these general facts, can work out the details just as we did." It could not be denied that the scientists of Russia or France could work out these missing details, "and quickly."[81]

Here was Rule One in the politics of atomic energy, straight from the men who knew that it was the basic fact, but they could not get it over to the policy makers. In this situation no Great Power could be put through a long catechism to prove that it could be trusted to receive and handle atomic energy, under rigid regulation and control. What would have been the response of Truman and Byrnes, of Vandenberg and Connally, if they had been required to give the same proofs of their present sincerity and accept the same guarantees of their future good conduct, without ever being permitted to have a single atomic bomb?

[77] The *New York Times*, November 18, 1945.
[78] The *Nashville Tennessean*, November 19, 1945.
[79] The *Saturday Review of Literature*, June 15, 1946, p. 5.
[80] The *New York Times*, November 17, 1945.
[81] The *Nashville Tennessean*, November 18, 1945.

Samuel Grafton stated fairly the dilemma our leaders were in. If Mr. Truman gave away the A-bomb manufacturing secrets and we were ever atom-bombed he would be eternally disgraced. If the secrets were discovered independently he would be hounded for clutching an illusion and breeding world distrust in the process. The result was "to force Mr. Truman to find ever more complicated ways of not doing anything about the bomb." Thus the Truman-Attlee-King statement was "equipped with two forward speeds and two reverse gears, all operating simultaneously." No nation could have an atomic monopoly, yet we were going to keep ours. The secrets could be distributed only when the necessary confidence had been developed and we would strive to create it by working in a spirit of no confidence. By challenging others to make themselves fit to be trusted we issued a declaration of distrust.

What finally came out, Grafton continued, was a statement which instead of solving the atomic problems "perhaps makes a solution impossible," for the effect of the communique was to rule out a world conference, or a Big Three meeting, at which all questions, including the bomb, could be placed on the table. Instead, we set up a schedule of years, "and these are the years of no solution." It was wrong to ask any finite man to hand down a complete solution of the question, but it was not wrong to suggest that we "ought not to embroider drift and call it a solution."[82]

This was the situation. We had issued a declaration of distrust which set up a schedule of the years of no solution.

The scientists protested promptly. Ninety per cent of the brain power which had produced the bomb joined in a resolution which said in effect that "they were unimpressed by the communique and were frankly scared." They demanded that the President call an immediate conference with Great Britain and the Soviet Union "to prevent a competitive arms race." One of their number, Dr. Irving Langmuir, associate director of research of General Electric Company, warned again that there were many reasons for thinking that Russia could reach the stage of having an immense stockpile of A-bombs quicker than we could. He had been to Russia lately and mingled with their scientists. He gave them as little as three years, if the Soviet state really concentrated on it.[83]

Langmuir pleaded that "we must break down the barriers between ourselves and Russia. Neither of us has the desire to go out and conquer the world. The Russians desire peaceful development as much as we do." This was simple common sense. No good could come from an atomic arms race, and final disaster could easily result. But other simple ideas were more powerful: ***(a)*** we distrust the Russians; (***b***) they would never give us anything; ***(c)*** we made the bomb and it is ours. These were age-old attitudes, easily grasped by everybody. They required no break with the past—not even an effort on our part. Only a prompt exertion of statesmanship could keep them from taking deep root. With our leadership sharing them, we were already on

[82] The *Nashville Tennessean*, November 18, 1945.

[83] The *New York Times*, November 17 and 18,1945. Langmuir later told how army agents had tried to persuade him not to go to Russia, in the belief that a man with scientific secrets in his head "might be tortured or drugged."—*Ibid.*, December 1, 1945.

our way to a world test of strength with the Soviet Union, just as if the weapons were still machine-guns.

The Russian Reaction. During the three months since Hiroshima these simple ideas had already prevailed. In Russia, too, equally simple ideas were taking firm root. Various writers had suggested soon after the President's Navy Day address, that the Russians would not be as certain, as he was in all sincerity, that his sacred trust over atomic bombs had been established for their benefit, among others. Yet the Russian attitude did not begin to be voiced notably until Molotov's address of November 6, on the 28th anniversary of the October Revolution.

In it he observed, mildly enough, that

> .. it is not possible at the present time for a technical secret of any great size to remain the exclusive possession of some one country or some narrow circle of countries.
>
> "This being so, the discovery of atomic energy should not encourage either a propensity to exploit the discovery in the play of forces in international policy or an attitude of complacency as regards the future of the peace-loving nations."

At the close of his address there were two significant paragraphs.

> "In our days of advanced technology and extended employment of science in production where it has become possible to harness atomic energy and other great technical discoveries, attention in economic planning must be focused on problems of technology, on the problem of raising the technological power of our industry and training highly skilled technological trainers. We must keep level with the achievements of present-day world technology in all branches of industry and economic life and provide conditions for the utmost advance of Soviet science and technology.
>
> "The enemy interrupted our peaceful creative endeavor, but we shall make up properly for all lost time and see to it that our country shall flourish. We will have atomic energy and many other things, too."

The three sentences suggested two things: that the industrial uses of atomic energy had great appeal to Soviet economic planners; and that they did not mean to stay behind in atomic achievement, or in any other scientific matters. But at this time no American dreamed of being suddenly astounded by heavy Soviet sputniks hoisted into the heavens.

After the November 15 communique the Russian response was prompt and vigorous. On November 18 the Moscow ***New Times*** carried "the sharpest and frankest article yet published about current international affairs," saying that "The atomic bomb is a signal for reactionaries all over the world to agitate for a new crusade against the Soviet Union." The bomb, allied policy in Germany and the Far East, and the failure of the London Conference were all being used by enemies of peace to provoke war. The article, by A. Sokoloff, specifically accused "a reactionary Catholic press in Britain" and the Hearst-McCormick press in the United States. Quoting Paul Winterton as saying

that Russia could be reduced to a second rate power by the atomic bomb and that her influence could now be counteracted in Europe, he asked: "What is this if not an appeal for elimination of the Soviet Union from participation in European affairs?" Commenting on a writer in the ***Manchester Guardian***, he asked: "Isn't it clear that his words contain a frank appeal not only for the isolation of the Soviet Union, but for attacking her as quickly as possible?"

He added: "It is unthinkable in our country to have a situation such as exists in foreign countries where official representatives sing hymns of praise to international collaboration while influential newspapers and magazines openly make appeals for war."[84]

This thrust indicated one of the key dilemmas of our time. A free press, free to say anything it likes, is essential to democracy. Yet a few powerful press and radio figures, perhaps a hundred persons but conceivably only a dozen, can both convince the Russians that we are headed for war with them and rapidly condition the American public for such a war.

By December 15, C. L. Sulzberger wrote from London that without question the chasm of mistrust and mutual suspicion between Moscow and the West had broadened during the last two months. The irritable Moscow press and radio, which certainly reflected the Kremlin's views, was extremely suspicious of what it called "the atomic policy," upon which Sulzberger added this comment: "The insistence by the inventors of mankind's most horrible weapon on withholding the secret—if it is such—from their ally has produced a most evident reaction in Moscow."[85]

The Soviet authorities had been slow to give this reaction public expression. Now that reaction was deeply matured. The Soviet leaders believed the worst when on November 7 Churchill rejoiced in President Truman's "sacred trust" policy and said: "The possession of these powers will help the United States and our allies to build up a structure of world security."

After the ***New York Times'*** representative Brooks Atkinson had returned from a ten months' stay in the Soviet Union he wrote, on July 7, 1946, that after the Moscow Conference many foreigners "believe that the Politburo made a deliberate decision to return to the ***status quo ante bellum*** and to regard foreign nations with a capitalist economy as inevitable enemies of the Soviet Union." It is quite possible that such a decision was made early in 1946, but if so the reasons for it could hardly be found in the Moscow Conference of December 1945, since at that meeting the Western powers compromised fairly enough with the Russians. Such a decision was far more likely to be motivated by the decisions on atomic policy in the autumn.

Sharing Impractical. On November 22 Prime Minister Attlee, reporting to the House of Commons, fully associated himself with the policy of withholding the final atomic details. He explained that they could not be divulged by formula or blue-print. Foreign scientists would have to be taken to the

[84] Brooks Atkinson, the *New York Times*, November 19, 1945. See the statement of Upton Close that "from this date on Russia must take her place as a second-rate war power in the world."—*Nashville Banner*, November 22, 1945.

[85] The *New York Times*, December 16, 1945.

atomic plants. To do this for all nations would be a matter of very great difficulty. It would take a long time and he could "see no reason for singling out particular nations." He preferred to "await the growth of confidence and the development of safeguards."

British opinion continued to be troubled over the advisability of this policy. The first reaction of the London ***Times***, which had previously condemned the conditional sharing of bomb secrets was unfavorable, saying: "Long-term diplomatic drawbacks of secrecy in encouraging unwarranted suspicion and mistrust may well outweigh, on any view of the transaction, such temporary advantages as may be thought to derive from it." After further consideration, also, the British continued to feel that the cart was being put before the horse in not reaching a direct understanding with Russia, as the Russians wished, before referring the problem to the UN.[86]

Many Americans also felt that our responsibility for beginning the arms race was clear. Professor Harold Urey, one of the top atomic scientists, testified before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy on November 29, 1945: "We are making bombs and storing them and are thus a threat to other countries and we are guilty of beginning the arms race."[87] Most Americans, of course, were sure that atomic bombs in our hands could not be a threat to anybody.

The Cold War Begun. By Thanksgiving Day 1945 the pattern of the coming years of Cold War was clearly outlined.

Roosevelt and Hull had, throughout the war and in the structure of the United Nations, patiently constructed a basis for long-time collaboration with the Soviet Union. This work of high statesmanship was endangered first by Western dislike of the Soviet organization of East Europe. We disliked the fact, but even more the methods used, symbolized by the knock on the door in the night.

There was certain to be a period of strain over East Europe, though under normal post-war conditions the peak of this strain might have passed by mid-summer 1945. But after Hiroshima all previous calculations were upset. The most portentous event of centuries had occurred. Suddenly the West had a weapon such as diplomats had never had behind them. Strongly disliking Russian policy and activity in East Europe, they quickly used the A-bomb partly, though only partly, to check Russia in the Far East.

Thereafter we generously released a great deal of atomic information, far more than the Russians would Jiave but withheld the production details without which the Russians could not make atomic bombs or build industrial plants for a few years. The Russians reacted to the distrust repeatedly voiced in the West from August to November, and to the diplomatic offensive which the new Western leaders began promptly after Hiroshima, by firmly resolving to hold their ground in East Europe and to work out the atomic energy details for themselves. In the place of the expected post-war security and relaxation they had a new and more deadly kind of insecurity and a stern challenge to

[86] **The *New York Times*, November 16, December 3, 1945.**
[87] ***Ibid.*, November 30, 1945.**

the validity and continuance of their way of life. Having survived the worst that Germany could do to them, and with all power in their hands to meet the new challenge of the atom, the Soviet leaders resolved to "have atomic energy and many other things, too."

By November 15 1945., Ihe conditions for an atomic arms race had been completely prepared. This date, when the West invited the Russians to go to atomic school and prove their trustworthiness, marked the formal public opening of the world struggle between the West and the East. To make it wholly certain that its fleeting atomic ascendancy would not be "given away," the United States laid down conditions which precluded world control of atomic energy. After November 1945 the atomic arms race would go on until: ***(a)*** an increasingly nervous and angry West decided to use its atomic ascendancy in a "preventive" war; or (***b***) both sides eventually concluded that an atomic war would be ruinous to the "victor"; or (c) an atomic war destroyed both sides.

There would be many negotiations but no agreement on the control of atomic energy, unless and until the second conclusion might be reached. The most dangerous arms race in all human history had begun. There had been many others in the past and they had all ended in disaster—less and less limited disaster. Now man had embarked on the last armament race. This time the disaster would be limitless.

In this undeniable fact lay the only hope that men filled first with suspicion, then with fear and finally with hatred would manage to control themselves just short of catastrophe. It was a slender hope, but one which every one who believed in humanity was compelled to nourish in whatever ways are open to him—unless the ways open should all finally be closed, even in the democratic West.

The Atomic Rivals. On July 15, 1945, there was no reason to expect more than the normal post-war disagreements between the Allies, sharpened somewhat by ideological differences, and four months later, at the parting of the ways, men of good will could still believe this to be true.

On November 14, 1945, Under Secretary of State DeanAcheson made a speech on "American-Soviet Friendship" which had the balance and wisdom of statesmanship in it. He noted that "For nearly a century and a half we have gotten along well—remarkably well, when you consider that our forms of government, our economic systems, and our social habits have never been similar." The contrast between our political institutions was no greater today than in the time of Jefferson and the Czar Alexander. By any standard the record of our relations was good.

He was not for a moment forgetting the tremendous events of 1917 and 1918 or the sixteen year blackout of diplomatic relations, which the war period had done much to repair.

Was all this long history without a war accidental? No, Acheson replied, it was due to the "immutable facts of history and geography." There had never been any place on the globe where the vital interests of the two peoples clashed, "and there is no objective reason to suppose that there should, now

or in the future, ever be such a place." Both had the resources to create the high living standards which each desired. "Thus, the paramount interest, the only conceivable hope of both nations, lies in the cooperative enterprise of peace."

There was no hint of the Truman Doctrine in Acheson's mind, but it had already matured in Truman's.[88] Asking his hearers to understand what our feelings about security would be if most of our country from the Atlantic to the Mississippi had been devastated, Acheson asked the Russians to depend upon persuasion and firmness, instead of coercion, in organizing their security zone, and to understand that we desired bases far from home in order to keep danger far from us. There was both "time and area within which to solve all questions arising out of the need of our two countries for security."[89]

This was the voice of reason and common sense. Without the advent of the atomic bomb, too, it would have been difficult for the two post-war titans to clash dangerously. The U.S.A. would have had no hopeful means of pushing Russia out of East Europe, but with the advent of the A-bomb everything became possible and everything was to be feared. Within a year the incredible war, between two nations on the opposite sides of the earth, was on everyone's lips. At the end of two years it did not seem that the tide of war fever would ever recede.

Acheson's speech just quoted was delivered in New York city before the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, a fact which would soon be deeply shocking. Two years later the same organization was on the Attorney General's public list of subversive organizations. No government official could think of setting foot on its platform, or even of being a member of the organization. Being friendly toward Russia had become a new and dangerous kind of "treason."[90]

[88] See the authoritative articles by Arthur Krock in the *New York Times*, March 23, 25, 1947.

[89] Acheson's address is reported briefly in the *New York Times*, November 15, 1945. The full text was printed in an excellent small town weekly, the *Southwestern*, Joplin, Missouri, November 16, 1945. Acheson's metamorphosis into the principal exponent of "positions of strength" is one of the most important aspects of the succeeding chapters.

[90] In 1945 President Truman, Secretary of War Patterson, General Eisenhower, Admiral King and others sent messages to the meeting at which Acheson spoke.

In 1949 the Rev. Dr. John H. Melish, beloved rector of the Episcopal Church of the Holy Trinity in Brooklyn for forty-five years, the church of Henry Ward Beecher, was ordered to vacate his pulpit by his bishop because his son, who assisted him, was a leader in the same National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. A large majority of his parishioners staunchly stood by him, but Justice Steinbrink, himself a Jew, upheld the bishop's authority and gave the church's congregation assembled in his court room a long lecture, with many religious references, designed to secure their submission to authority.

The Judge listed the sins of the younger Mr. Melish as follows: he had associated "with at least two avowed Communists" in the Brooklyn Non-Partisan Legislative Conference of 1944, had written an article entitled "Religion and Anti-Soviet Propaganda" for the *Churchman* in 1943, had written an article for the *Daily Worker* in 1944, had sponsored in 1946 a "Win the Peace" Conference which "urged the sharing of atomic energy with Russia," and had been until a month ago chairman of the National Council of Soviet-American Friendship.—*New York Herald Tribune*, April 20 and 21, 1949.

This controversy continued, the congregation resisting the bishop until he finally closed the church, some eight years later—a striking example of the way in which our effort to "contain" another society disrupted our own.

CHAPTER XIII

RISING TENSION

NOVEMBER 1945–JULY 1946

During the last weeks of 1945 long speeches began to be made in the United States Senate revealing the deepest aversion to the Soviet Union and a corresponding desire to deal with her sternly.

Stop Appeasing Russia. Senator Burton K. Wheeler, of Montana, led off, on November 27, with a speech filling twenty-three pages in the ***Congressional Record***, less a moderate amount of interruption. Wheeler was one of the many isolationists who were catapulted into the war by Pearl Harbor. Now that the war was over they were ready to say "I told you so" with a vengeance. Wheeler declared that Truman had "inherited an almost insoluble situation —one which some of us foresaw was the inevitable consequence of policies pursued before Pearl Harbor." Now, "something terrible is happening to America and the world___ We confront the greatest crisis in human history."

Before explaining what the catastrophe was, Wheeler proclaimed triumphantly that the entire world was out of control. He read quotations describing bad conditions all over the globe. Then he launched into a long assault upon the Soviet Union, defining the issue as not communism, but "power —sheer, naked and unadulterated power." He listed all the territories annexed by Russia, from Finnish Karelia to Bessarabia. Then he called the roll of the satellite countries dominated by the Soviets, from Finland all the way around to the Far East.

Why had all this happened? "The only reason why, to this moment, Russia has had a free hand to liquidate all potential opposition, both among organized patriotic resistance groups and among the disorganized helplessly miserable masses, is because we have been willing not only to shield her and keep the facts from the American people but also because, by our abject appeasement for the sake of a specious unity, we have deliberately played her game for her."

Being a very able lawyer, Wheeler had chosen his point of attack shrewdly. The great bulk of the American people knew that Allied appeasement of the Fascist dictators had been an abysmal failure. Americans also hate being suckers, especially a second time. If therefore they could be convinced that they were starting down the slippery path of appeasement again, or already sliding rapidly down it, they would be certain to react sharply. It would, moreover, be relatively easy to make that charge stick. The great backlog of pre-war distrust and fear of Communist Russia could be stirred to red heat without too much effort.

Proceeding, Wheeler charged that "our appeasement, our betrayal of principles, our abandonment of human beings to a fate worse than death have made Europe and Asia a veritable chamber of horrors." He inserted dozens of quotations, many dealing with the raping of German women by Russian troops, to show how horrible conditions were, and asserted that "we dare not look for one moment longer with the blurred vision of hate, of revenge, of fear, upon an enemy whose predicament now threatens the greatest human catastrophe in history."

After further pages of material to create sympathy for Germany, and charging that "every step" which Russia had taken since the San Francisco Conference showed that she intended "to go her way for power, power and more power," he declared that "we must quit appeasing Russia and let her know once and for all that we did not fight this war to let her enslave the people of Europe."[1]

The charge that Russia controlled Eastern Europe merely because we appeased her was, of course, without foundation. She was there because the pre-war Allied effort to turn Hitler to the East had backfired. Far from wanting to prevent her entry into East Europe we had been keenly afraid she might stop on her own borders, but myriads of Americans would forget their history and bristle at the idea of appeasing the Reds.

Russia a World Aggressor. On December 4 Senator James O. Eastland, of Mississippi, took up the cudgels in favor of Germany. He quoted five long rape stories from the Patterson press, ***The Washington Times*** and ***The New York Daily News***, before asserting that "even communistic periodicals are admitting that ten to fifteen million Germans will die of starvation this winter."

Germany had served both as a neutralizing agent and a barrier between the Oriental hordes and the West for 2000 years. Now "we find in Czechoslovakia savage, barbarian Mongolian hordes stalking the streets of western civilization as conquerors" and thinking of engulfing Western Europe. We could not permit Germany to become a satellite of Russia. Germany was the keystone of Europe. We must hold Western Europe. He shuddered to think what a union of Russia and Germany under the banner of communism would mean. The American people "must realize that Russia is a predatory, aggressor nation, and that today she follows the same fateful road of conquest and aggression with which Adolph Hitler set the world on fire."[2]

This speech came close to justifying the Nazi racial theories and very near to saying that we had backed the wrong horse in supporting the savage Russians against the civilized Germans. It implied also, as had Wheeler, that we should change sides and back the Germans against the Reds. Before long many Americans would be planning to arm Germany again. But the really pregnant part of Eastland's speech was the charge that Russia was another aggressor, just as bad as Hitler.

1 ***Congressional Record,*** **Vol. 91, Pt. 8, pp. 11013–36. Sec pp. 11013, 14, 25, 30, 31, 32 and 36.**

2 ***Ibid.,*** **Vol. 91, Pt. 9, pp. 11, 371–81.**

This was another analogy that would be widely accepted without examination, as it was repeated over and over again in coming months. Together the cry "No More Appeasement" and the slogan "Another Aggressor" made a potent combination. The moral was perfectly plain. If another aggressor is on the march we must stop this thing now. Delay only makes matters worse.

Probably the Senators did not originate these slogans. Russian control of Eastern Europe would be enough to set them afloat, even if the excesses committed by the Russian troops, especially after VE Day, had not added fuel to Western resentment. A Stop-Russia movement was inherent in the great expansion of Russian power. It mushroomed so rapidly that before two years had passed a large majority of Americans would be sure that Russia was out to conquer the world.

Ederfs Appraisal. Contemporaneous with Eastland's charge that Russia was an aggressor, just as dangerous as Hitler, Anthony Eden discussed Russia's motives in the House of Commons, on November 22, 1945. Chiding the Russians for thinking that any plans for the organization of Western Europe must be aimed at them, he avowed his full belief that Russia's arrangements in East Europe were directed against a German resurgence. They were not aimed at Britain. He was "convinced it is the literal truth. We know that Russian arrangements are not aimed against us."[3]

This was the testimony of one of the most responsible of all British statesmen. He knew, as did any student of the war, that Russian policy in East Europe was dominated by the most powerful and poignant defensive purposes and emotions. But the immensely powerful anti-Russian and anti-Communist influences in the United States, both lay and clerical, gave no recognition to history. Russia in East Europe was a brutal, barbaric aggressor, obviously out to conquer the world.

Atomic World Power. Opportunely, too, the atomic bomb had provided a weapon with which we could stop this new menace. It enabled us to defend the United States against Russian "aggression," easily, surely and cheaply. Senator Edwin Johnson, of Colorado, leading member of the Military Affairs Committee, explained it to the Senate on November 28. We had the blueprints for a new plane with a flying range of 10,000 miles. "Therefore, with the strategic location of airfields from the Philippines to Alaska, on the coast of Asia, from Alaska to the Azores in the South Atlantic, we can drop, on a moment's notice, atomic bombs on any spot on the earth's surface and return to our base."

We dared not contemplate a defense program of lesser scope, Johnson said. Would the world like it? He thought most of it would, but no matter: "With vision and guts and plenty of atomic bombs, ultra-modem planes, and strategically located air-bases the United States can outlaw wars of aggression. . . ." The courage to do it was also the price of survival.

And the United Nations? "The world organization which I am thinking of is one designed to stop war with the atomic bomb in the hands of the United

[3] The *New York Times*, November 23, 1945.

States as the club behind the door, to be used only when a bandit nation goes berserk."

Evidently there was still such a nation loose in the world. Johnson strongly opposed the talk of inevitable war with Russia, but he admonished her: "Don't make the fatal mistake of pushing us around. We won't take it."[4]

Senator Johnson meant well by the world. He did not mean to hurt anyone. All he asked was the power to atom bomb "on a moment's notice" any nation which misbehaved. The Russians would have nothing to worry about so long as they conducted themselves properly, according to his standards.

MOSCOW CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1945

On Thanksgiving Day Secretary Byrnes remembered that the three Foreign Ministers were supposed to meet every three months. He cabled to Moscow and an invitation to meet there was promptly issued.

Atomic Prelude. Before he left Washington Byrnes called in about a dozen Senators to tell them what he proposed to say to the Russians about the atomic bomb. Some Senators got the impression that he was going to assume Russian cooperation in international control and to discuss the bomb question frankly with them. They promptly suggested that he should not assume cooperation and that no additional secrets about the bomb should be discussed until the Russians had opened their atomic laboratories and factories to inspection. The meeting was long and sometimes angry. It included protests that the Senators should be consulted, not informed about what the Secretary proposed to do.[5]

Decisions. Aided by three meetings between Byrnes and Stalin, which were marked by a "combination of frankness and cordiality" on Stalin's part, the conference reached agreement on several issues.[6]

Most important was the formula for making treaties of peace with the German satellites. The first draft of the treaty for each country would be drawn up by the powers which had signed the armistice, France being added to the group which would prepare the Italian treaty. In Finland's case only Russia and Great Britain would participate. The Big Three would write the treaties for the Balkan states.

When all the drafts were ready they would be submitted to a conference of twenty-one states, including all those which had done some real fighting in the European theater. India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ethiopia were added to the European Allies and the United States.

After consideration by the peace conference the final texts of the treaties would be drawn up by the same powers which had prepared the original

[4] ***Congressional Record*, Vol. 91, Pt. 8, pp. 1085–7.**

[5] **James B. Reston, the *New York Times*, December 19, 1945. Nervousness about the bomb was increased by the statement of British atomic scientist Dr. M. L. E. Oliphant, on December 18, that an atomic bomb filled partly with a deadly gas given off in uranium piles could kill every living thing for a thousand miles around. This would mean that three bombs properly placed could depopulate the United States.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, December 19, 1945.**

[6] **Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 118.**

drafts. They would be submitted in each case to the other allies who had declared war, but would come into force when ratified by all of the armistice signatories, i.e. by the Great Powers, and by the enemy states in question.

This was substantially a victory for the Russian position, yet it provided for public review and debate of each treaty by the smaller allies concerned. It was a fair compromise between the Russian desire to keep decisions in as few hands as possible and the Anglo-American insistence upon democratic procedure.

The Council also set up a Far Eastern Commission, with headquarters in Washington, to formulate policies and standards for the fulfilment of Japan's treaty obligations and to review policy directives of the Supreme Commander, General MacArthur. An Allied Council for Japan, with its seat in Tokyo, was created to meet with the Supreme Commander. Each of its members had the power to suspend certain of his directives, pending appeal to the Far Eastern Commission. All of the states which had fought Japan were named members of both bodies.

Other measures provided for: ***(a)*** a Soviet American conference in Korea and a joint commission to prepare a provisional democratic government for her; (***b***) the withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops from China; (c) a three-power commission which would proceed to Rumania and help King Michael install a member of the National Peasant Party and a representative of the Liberal party in the cabinet, as a preliminary to free and unfettered elections with full freedom of press, speech and assembly; and (***d***) action by the Soviet Government to see that two representatives of democratic groups were added to the Bulgarian cabinet. After the completion of these measures the Western powers would recognize the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments.

The last section of the Moscow communique provided for the establishment of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Byrnes had placed this item first on his proposed agenda, but Molotov moved it to last place, to show his nonchalance about the A-bomb. When they came to the subject he objected seriously to the key requirement about proceeding by stages, but subsided when its indispensability was insisted upon. The Washington atomic energy agreement of November 15 was approved, with a stipulation safeguarding the rights of the Security Council. The Russian leaders never mentioned the atomic bomb at either the London or Moscow Council meetings, except to refer jokingly to Byrnes and President Conant, of Harvard, having perhaps little atomic bombs in their pockets.[7]

Atomic Postscript. When the communique was issued, Senator Vandenberg hurried to the White House in anxiety about the atomic energy part of it. The listing of "inspection and control" as the final stage suggested to him and other Senators that, after all, Byrnes had agreed to disclose the vital secrets at some earlier stage. Having been reassured, Vandenberg issued a calming statement.[8]

[7] Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 266–8. The Council finished its labors at 3:30 a.m. on December 27, At 7:30 a.m. Molotov and Vishinsky were at the airport to see the Americans off.

[8] Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, December 30, 1945; also December 29.

In his radio report on December 30 Byrnes discussed the matter of atomic secrecy as follows: “it was intended and it is understood that the matter of safeguards will apply to the recommendations of the commission in relation to every phase of the subject and at every stage.”

Progress. When Byrnes returned he was surprised that a portion of the press greeted the Moscow agreements as “appeasement.” Much of this criticism, he recorded, “unfortunately came from people so unreasonably anti-Soviet in their views that they would regard any agreement upon any subject as appeasement.”[9]

The Moscow meeting had gone far toward recognizing the inevitable in Eastern Europe, by providing for steps looking toward recognition of all the East European regimes. The Tito Government in Yugoslavia was recognized on December 23. The great power veto was also extended to the peace settlements and the control of atomic energy. If these were debits, the impasse among the powers had been broken and machinery established for the making of peace. Byrnes was justly congratulated by Cordell Hull on the splendid progress made at Moscow. Hull added that “Understanding, confidence, friendliness, and the whole spirit of international cooperation have greatly improved the work of this conference.”[10]

However, Byrnes’ conduct of the Moscow conference lost him the confidence of President Truman, and after an interval, his post as Secretary of State. He had neglected to keep in touch with the President, had issued a communique about the conference and asked for national radio time without consulting him. When Truman read the communique he did not like it. “There was not a word about Iran or any other place where the Soviets were on the march,” and after studying the conference records he concluded that Byrnes had “taken it upon himself to move the foreign policy of the United States in a direction to which I could not and would not agree.”

He therefore reprimanded Byrnes strongly and on January 5, 1946. read personally to him a letter in which he insisted upon protest “with all the vigor of which we are capable against the Russian program in Iran. . . . Another outrage if I ever saw one.” There wasn’t a doubt in his mind “that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean.” Unless Russia was “faced with an iron fist and strong language” another war was in the making. Then after outlining a strong program for the Straits, Japan, China, Korea and the settlement of Russia’s lend-lease debt, he closed with the declaration: “I’m tired of babying the Soviets.”

This memorandum was “the point of departure in our foreign policy,” Truman declared later. “T’m tired of babying the Soviets,’ I had said to Byrnes, and I meant it.”[11]

After all, then, Byrnes had not succeeded in making peace at Moscow, or greatly forwarding it, as the world thought, except as he had laid down

[9] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 122.**
[10] ***Ibid.*, p. 238.**
[11] **Truman, *Memoirs,* Vol. I, pp. 548–52.**

procedures for making the satellite peace treaties which carried through Behind him was an angry President, still smarting from not being able to do anything at the Potsdam conference about the "Russian occupation of Eastern Poland and the occupation of that part of Germany east of the Oder River by Poland." "It was a high handed outrage," he said, and in the Japanese war "we found later that we didn't need Russia there and tha; the Russians have been a headache to us ever since."[12]

Therefore, while everyone thought that tensions were being relaxed and peace made, the Truman Doctrine was boiling in the President's mind. He had been unable to prevent Stalin from moving Poland westward and occupying East Europe, but he would see to it that Russia achieved no other gains from the war. It is a little difficult to set down the occasions on which we had babied the Russians, but Mr. Truman's inability to block the consolidation of their war time gains seemed like that to him, and there would be no more of it.

THE LONDON UN SESSIONS—JANUARY, 1946

Russian Aims in ban. During November 1945 it became evident that Russia was making an effort to retain control of the province of Azerbaijan in North Iran, which her troops still occupied under the war time agreement with Britain. An autonomy movement received Russian support, to the point that 1200 Iranian troops were stopped from marching into the province. It appeared that Russia expected to consolidate her hold on it before Russian troops were due to leave on March 2, 1946.

British-Russian rivalry in Iran was of long standing. In 1907 the Russo-British Entente had been founded mainly on a division of Iran into three zones, with North Iran conceded as the Russian sphere. If Russia had been a victor in World War I she would doubtless have kept this area, whose people were racially and linguistically a part of the large body of Azerbaijanians north of the border.

Since Russia was a loser in 1918, she not only gave up North Iran but found British troops occupying her own great oil fields, just north of the Iranian border, and when Turkish troops occupied Batum they slaughtered 30,000 Armenians in September 1918. During the Russo-Finnish war of 1939–40, as described in an earlier chapter, the Franco-British allies long pondered plans to bomb the Baku oil fields from the Middle East. Russia therefore had some reason to be nervous about her vital oil supplies, if power rivalry was to be the order of the day.

Two other motives were involved. Because of anxiety about her oil fields the Russians had been demanding the return of two Turkish provinces, Kars and Ardahan, near Baku, which had been ceded to Turkey during Russia's weakness after World War I. This demand had been featured in the Moscow press during the Moscow Conference in December. Linked to it was Russia's bid for a share in the military control of the Dardanelles. Since both demands were rebuffed by the West, Soviet control of Azerbaijan would both outflank

Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, pp. 551–2.

Turkey and be an important step toward a warm water exit on the Persian Gulf. The outflanking theory was at once put forward in Middle Eastern diplomatic circles in Paris. The Russians, wrote Herbert L. Matthews from London, "as always, are seeking security and in this case security for their great and vulnerable oil region," from which they drew 80% of their oil. Involved also was their perennial longing for warm water ports and, above all, the Dardanelles, "the chief bone of contention between Britain and Russia ' for centuries."[13]

Russia's desire for an oil concession in North Iran was another leading factor. For decades the British had been taking great quantities of oil from South Iran. The Russians desired to exploit North Iran, partly because they feared that their own fields might be drained by wells south of the border. It was sometimes said that Russia did not need oil, but this was not true in view of the fuel needs of any large expanding economy and of the recent war damage in her own oilfields. She also naturally desired to share in Middle East oil takings, since the West had fabulous holdings in Iran, Arabia and Iraq.

Social Conditions. Another consideration offered justification for aggressive action to communist minds. Iran was still governed by feudal landlords, who kept the people in a state of squalor hardly equalled anywhere on the globe. A hint of the situation was contained in a dispatch of February 28, 1946, saying that the rebel forces were overrunning some of the 130 villages owned by Mohammed Zolfaghani, and he and his private guerillas were putting up a stiff resistance.[14]

Investigating for the ***New York Times*** Clifton Daniel found in Iran that less than one per cent of the land was owned by small holders. The rest was in the hands of landlords, 75 per cent of whom lived in the towns. Some holdings exceeded 100 square miles in extent. On these great estates the people lived in a state of peonage, the croppers commonly receiving one-fifth of their crops. In some villages 90 per cent of the people had malaria, and infant mortality exceeded 50 per cent. It was widely recognized that the government was narrowly based on a ruling class representing perhaps 2 per cent of the people. There was no tax on land. Tax evasion was rife and the bribery of tax collectors was generally practised. All civil servants were so poorly paid that graft was inevitable and what moneys were collected were sucked into Teheran and largely disappeared in costly administration.

The result was "a nation in rags." Abject misery was graven on most faces. Even in Teheran anyone standing on the street would be approached by a beggar every five minutes. Many observers agreed that the country was ripe for revolution. Iranian friends of the Soviet Union looked "to Iran's great neighbor for deliverance from economic feudalism." Daniel added that Azerbaijanians on either side of the border were indistinguishable in speech and appearance.[15]

[13] The *New York Times*, November 28, December 30, 1945.
[14] *Ibid*., March 1, 1946.
[15] *Ibid*., December 7, 10, 1945.

Iran Charges Aggression. Byrnes and Bevin had made strong efforts to discuss the Iranian crisis at Moscow in December, but without success. When the United Nations Assembly and Security Council met in London for their organization sessions, early in January 1946, the Iranian delegate consulted Bevin and Byrnes about bringing the case before the Security Council. Both were very reluctant to have the Council hale Russia before it as its first act. Bevin tried to dissuade Iran, and Byrnes had sought to forestall a UN crisis by settling the matter at Moscow. Concluding, however, that if he moved they would support him, the Iranian delegate brought up the question on January 15, reserving the right to make a formal charge if an early settlement was not reached. Four days later he did so, saying that Russia was interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.

Russian Countercharge: Greece. Believing that Britain had instigated or abetted the Iranian move, Russia retaliated, on January 21, by indicting the presence of British troops in Greece. Vishinsky charged that they were used to exercise pressure on the Greek nation, suppressing the democratic elements and supporting the reactionary ones, a situation which might ultimately endanger the peace.

In addition to the retaliatory impulse, the Russians felt that the British had , broken the spheres of influence agreement made at Moscow in October 1944 by their insistence on free elections in Eastern Europe. If Russian troops could not make a Russian sphere in Iran they wished to know what Western troops were doing in Greece, Indonesia, Syria-Lebanon, Iceland, and other areas.

Before the Russian charges about Greece there had been much protest in the British press, and in the Labor Party, about Britain's role in Greece. Now suddenly the entire British press united to condemn Russia's tactics.[16] The explanation was a feeling that if Russia insisted on an exclusive sphere of control in East Europe she should leave the Mediterranean and the Middle East to Britain. This was the reverse of the Russian feeling that since they had conceded Greece to Britain, she ought not to interfere in the Balkans. Originally the Russians had adhered to their bargain, as Churchill attested in his letter of March 8, 1945, to Roosevelt.[17]

In the Security Council, on February 2, Bevin vehemently denied the Russian charges, asserting that British troops had saved Greece from terrorism, massacres and mayhem. Besides they were there by the desire of the Greek Government. This was of course warmly attested by the Greek representative. Bevin could not "submit to the condemnation of the Soviet Government either by inference or implication." He would not accept any resolution which looked forward to the withdrawal of British troops from Greece.

For the United States, Stettinius held that no threat to the peace had been shown and when the Polish delegate agreed the issue was dropped. Perhaps necessarily the Russians had framed their charge too broadly. It was obvious

16 The *New York Times*, January 25, 1946.
17 *Ibid*., October 18, 1947.

that British domination in Greece did not at that time threaten the peace of the world.[18]

British Troops in Indonesia. Defeated on Greece, the Ukrainian delegate at once charged, on February 7, 1946, that the British troops in Indonesia had been used for political ends. He quoted a protest of the London ***Daily Mail*** against the use of Japanese troops as order-keepers in Indonesia and alleged heavy slaughter of the natives by British heavy weapons in an effort to repress Indonesian nationalism.

To all this Bevin replied that the job of restoring order to Indonesia had been given to Britain by the Allies, that the British had been fired on first and that after the British Commander, General Mallaby, had been assassinated it had been difficult to prevent excesses. The British had been forced to use the hostage system. He denounced as a "lie" the charge that "we ever attacked the Indonesian movement."[19] Again he was supported by the legal government, the Netherlands, which was naturally glad to have British troops do what it could not. Bevin was adamant against the Ukrainian proposal to send an investigating commission to Java to report on the facts. That would be an indignity against the British Government, since it would imply support of the Ukrainian charges.

Naturally it would be hard on British pride to be investigated. Yet it was an old established practice of the League of Nations to try to get the facts by means of a committee of investigation. The ***New York Times***, on January 23, had held it to be the duty of the UN to appoint investigation commissions for all the situations complained about, including Indonesia, but Bevin would not hear of it and the Ukrainian resolution was defeated, on February 13, by a vote of 7 to 2.[20]

Allied Troops in Syria-Lebanon. Western majorities were sufficient to vote down the charges of the angered Russians. But before the British delegation could draw its breath the representative of Lebanon charged, on February 14, that the presence of British and French troops in Syria and Lebanon constituted a dangerous "threat to the peace." In the preceding cases the legal governments had defended the presence of British troops. Now Syria and Lebanon made it plain that the troops had not been invited and that they were not welcome. Independent nations, it was affirmed, should not have to bear the indignity of foreign troops on their soil. The Syrian delegate then related how in December 1945 Britain and France had agreed that their troops should remain in Syria and Lebanon indefinitely, and had so notified the natives. Could anyone deny, he challenged, that this was interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states?

Foreign Minister Bidault replied for France, that complications of this sort were a natural outgrowth of the war and that France and Britain were willing to negotiate for the removal of the troops. In the meantime the world should

[18] ***Journal of the Security Council*, No. 7, pp. 87–100; No. 7, pp. 104–5, 109, 112, 116–26.**
[19] ***Nashville Banner*, February 7, 1946.**
[20] ***Journal of the Security Council*, No. 10, pp. 181–8; No. 11, pp. 196–7; No. 12, pp. 212—15, 252,**

trust these two powers to produce a satisfactory settlement. Sir Alexander Cadogan, for Britain, concurred.

Then for two days delegates to the Security Council spoke, without dissent, to the effect that the British and French troops should be withdrawn at once. On February 16 the United States introduced a resolution which expressed confidence that the troops would be withdrawn at the earliest possible date and requested that the Council be kept informed on the status of the negotiations. The resolution was at first declared adopted, but Vishinsky reminded the Council that he had not voted for it, since it was not specific enough in directing the withdrawal of the offending troops.[21]

A Russian Veto. The Soviet Union had used its veto power for the first time and in a case in which its vital interests were not threatened. Britain and France announced at once that they would carry out the resolutions favored by the majority anyway, and the case was dropped from the agenda. The Western world then resounded with denunciations of the Russians for maliciously blocking the pacific processes of the Council. The Russians, reacting partly against the idea that UN was created to protect the small states against Russia, had instead used UN as a forum for prosecuting the Western powers.

IRAN

Moreover, they still maintained their position in Iran. After heated debate the Council had kept the Iran question on its agenda, on January 30, pending direct negotiations. The Soviets denied all allegations of interference in Iran's affairs. On March 6 the State Department announced that it had dispatched a note to the Kremlin calling for complete withdrawal of Russian forces in Iran, requesting a prompt reply. On the 25th the Security Council reconvened in New York City and at once took up the Iran dispute, Gromyko opposing all consideration of the case. He found some support from Dr. Najera, of Mexico, who was not convinced that international peace and security was threatened. However, all members except Russia and Poland soon agreed that the case should be put on the agenda for discussion.

This was a fundamental decision, since it involved the right of a small state to present its case to the Council. If that could not be done the UN would be of small value in restraining aggression.

Gromyko then asked for further postponement until April 10, pending further negotiations. In late January a new Prime Minister had been elected in the Iranian Parliament, by a vote of 52 to 51. Ahmed Quavam succeeded Hakimi and at once began negotiations with the Russians. It was clear that the Russians hoped that under further pressure he would accept their terms by April 10.

Postponement until this date being rejected, Gromyko walked out of the Council, on March 27, refusing to participate in its sessions on the case. The Council then relaxed and amid some levity heard Hussein Ala, the Iranian representative, elaborate his charges.

[21] *Journal of the Security Council*, No. 15, pp. 275–302.

On April 2 the Iranian Government sent a message saying that Soviet armed forces were still interfering in its affairs and that the negotiations had yielded no positive results. The next day the Soviet Government telegraphed that an agreement had been reached and that the troops would be withdrawn within six weeks. Therefore, on April 4, Byrnes moved that proceedings be deferred until May 6, at which time both governments would be asked to report "whether the withdrawal of the Soviet troops had been completed."

On April 15, 1946, the Government of Iran informed the Council that it wished to withdraw the case, but the American and British delegates held that duress seemed to be involved. On May 21 Iran notified the Council that the Soviet troops had been withdrawn as of May 6, but this too was not considered sufficient evidence for dropping the case. Then, on May 29, Hussein Ala received orders from his Government to say no more about the dispute and there was no further consideration thereafter, though the case was not formally closed.[22]

Russia Contained. An agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union had been signed giving the Russians an oil concession in North Iran on a 51 to 49 division of the profits, a basis highly embarrassing to the British who turned over to Iran only about 20 per cent of their oil gains. The agreement was, however, conditional, since the Iranian Parliament had passed a law forbidding the giving of any oil concessions while foreign troops remained in Iran. All that Quavam could do accordingly was to promise to bring the Russian oil concession before Parliament for ratification. When he did so it was rejected, over his protest, on October 22, 1947, and he resigned, on December 10. The pro-British Hakimi became Prime Minister again.

Lacking confidence in the strength of the Iranian army, Quavam had not ventured to send troops against Azerbaijan until December 1946. Then the Russian-sponsored government collapsed, though the province did succeed in retaining somewhat more autonomy than before.

In May 1947 American Brigadier General Schwartzkopf, head of the Iranian gendarmerie, came to the United States to secure equipment for his force and for the army of Iran. In June Iran was given $25,000,000 worth of military supplies on credit, but no heavy weapons.[23]

Russia had been defeated, temporarily at least, all along the line. She was forced to withdraw from Iran and she got no oil.

After March 2, 1946, the date before which she had agreed to withdraw her troops, she was legally in the wrong. It was upon this point that Secretary Byrnes kept attention focused throughout the dispute. He went to New York to conduct the case himself and did so with complete firmness. A real victory for the position of small nations in the United nations was won.

Russia was also "contained," forced back even, in a region where her interests were vital and where she felt them to be urgent. The AP correspondent in Moscow reported that foreign observers were almost unanimous in agreeing that the Russians could not understand: ***(a)*** that the point of

[22] See the *New York Times* for the relevant dates and Department of State Bulletin No. 14.

[23] The *New York Times*, May 31, June 21, October 22, December 10, 1947.

legality justified the expulsion of Russian troops from Iran while British and American troops remained in a dozen far-flung places over the world; (***b***) why Russia could have no oil in Iran while the British and Americans did; and (c) why the Security Council should be used to embarrass the Soviet Union before the world.[24] On May 6, as the Iran case ebbed, ***Pravda*** attacked the British-American policy "in the bluntest and most smashing criticism of that program" that had appeared in the Soviet press.[25]

In the United States there was general agreement that Russia's tactics had been provocative and offensive to the other members of the Council. She had: ***(a)*** denied its right to deal with the controversy and Iran's right to be heard; (***b***) insisted on postponement and walked out when it was not granted; (***c***) put the severest diplomatic pressure on Iran and then argued that the Council was denying Iran's sovereignty when it refused to drop the case; and (***d)*** kept troops in Iran beyond the deadline and then failed to report to the Council when they were out. The impression made upon the British ***New Statesman and Nation*** was "not that of a Machiavellian Power pursuing a calculated course of aggrandizement, but rather of a blundering and suspicious giant, throwing its weight around and hurting itself and everyone else."

Impasse. In the Security Council there was considerable sympathy for Soviet objectives in Iran. It was understood that war damage had reduced Russia's oil output by 5,000,000 tons annually and that Soviet officials were deeply worried about the future, building synthetic oil plants and urging conservation. It was appreciated also that Moscow had reason for being concerned about the internal situation in Iran, which lay only an hour's flight from the Baku region—Russia's jugular vein—notoriously corrupt, long under British influence and now submitting its army and police to American training. The United States had become very agitated whenconditions were bad in Mexico and would become more so if the Russians monopolized the Oil concessions there, backed by a ring of air bases below Mexico.[26]

There was real tragedy in the situation, or so it seemed to me after observing most of the Security Council sessions. On the merits of the case there was much to be said for Russia's concern about Azerbaijan. Yet the merits were never presented or considered. All of the controversy turned on points of procedure. Here the Russians either were wrong, or they put themselves there. The whole affair humiliated and embittered them and created a permanent grievance. There could be no doubt that they would await a favorable day for ending Anglo-American dominance in Iran, and the Middle East, especially since "a large section" of the American press continued to breathe "continuous hatred and threats of war" against Russia.[27]

On the other hand, Byrnes had tried to negotiate the issue in Moscow and had been rebuffed. Iran had a right to appeal to UN and it was essential that she be heard. Russia's conduct was illegal and it was difficult to see any

[24] **Eddy Gilmore, *New York World-Telegram*, March 30, 1946.**
[25] **The *New York Times*, May 7, 1946.**
[26] **James B. Reston, the *New York Times*, May 9, 1946.**
[27] **Marquis W. Childs, the *New York Post*, April 2, 1946.**

alternative except to oppose it and insist upon the right of the Security Council to consider the case.

Yet there was no legal way for Russia to gain any of her objectives in Iran.A The great landlords in the Iranian parliament would never willingly grant an oil concession to Russia, since that would bring Communist influence into the zone of the concession. They had good reason to believe also that the Russians would not be satisfied with less than real control of the region concerned, as well as of Azerbaijan. They were certain therefore to keep the Russians out and to rely on the British and Americans to back them. The Westerners might exploit Iran's resources on less favorable terms, but they would leave the landlords in control of Iran, especially since the latter were supported by American arms and military instructors.

TTieir rule could only be preserved by British and American support. The correspondent of the ***Chicago Daily News*** telegraphed that the leftist Tudeh party, allegedly Russian inspired, was the only strong political group in Iran. He had talked with many of its leaders, mostly professional people, and found them full of love for their wretched country and fed up with British domination, a sentiment in which the Iranian workers fully joined. They wanted a government "friendly" to Russia both in Tabriz and Teheran.[28]

One thing was certain. The long series of public fights in the Security Council from January to May 1946, touched off by Iran's appeal, left the three Great Powers embittered and estranged. Russia had been stopped, and the formal authority of UN upheld, but no way had been found for UN to tackle the basic problems in Iran, its dangerous social unrest, and the clash of Britain and Russia for oil and control. In his address to the Overseas Press Club in New York, early in March, Byrnes had opposed "unilateral gnawing away at the status quo" and disclaimed that it was sacrosanct anywhere. It was "not in our tradition to defend the dead hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege." Our diplomacy "must not be negative and inert," but "marked by creative ideas, constructive proposals, practical and forward looking suggestions."

This was eminently sound doctrine, and it is to be regretted that some way was not found to apply it to Iran.

We Stop Russia. Instead, Secretary Byrnes felt compelled by Russia's acts and by the American-British pressures upon him to concentrate all his energies on forcing Russian troops out of Iran. In the process the United States became the leader of a stop-Russia coalition.

A turning-point came in early 1946, when very heavy pressure was concentrated on Secretary Byrnes from three directions, the President, the Congress and the British Government. Lord Vansittart cried out angrily that to pursue the mediator's role was "self righteous abstention" and when Byrnes changed his course sharply Vansittart commented that he had "evolved into a statesman." Byrnes was much more popular in Washington also when he became the tough prosecutor of the Soviet Union.[29]

[28] **Paul Ghali, *New York Post*, April 4, 1946.**
[29] **Walter Lippmann, the *New York Herald Tribune*, June 1, 1946.**

During all these months the British Labor Government followed the Churchill policy toward Russia without the slightest deviation. It was not until after the United States had also accepted it and moved out in front that cautionary British voices began to be heard. Late in May Field-Marshal Smuts, elder statesman and Premier of South Africa, made a speech in London advocating that the British Commonwealth group should assume the mediator's role between the two behemoths, interpreting one to the other and thus preventing war. This would surely accord with the interests of the British Dominions, whose greatest interest is to avoid another war.

By this time a great British leader could aspire to take up the mediator's role, but the United States could hardly regain that strategic situation.

CHURCHILL'S FULTON SPEECH

Stalin's February Address. On February 9, 1946, Premier Stalin made a speech which stirred fears in some quarters. He opened with the Marxist explanation of world wars, monopoly capitalism fighting for markets and raw materials. He did distinguish sharply between the two world wars, the latter having become an anti-fascist people's war, during which the Soviet social system had shown itself the best and strongest. It had survived because the Communist Party had reversed the usual development and built heavy industries first. Now the fundamental task was to restore the devastated areas, to increase goods for mass consumption, to surpass the world in scientific achievements and to organize "a new mighty upsurge of national economy." Three or four five-year plans might be necessary to raise production to, among other things, 60,000,000 tons of steel annually.

This figure was at once said to be ominous, since it was coupled with Stalin's warm praise of the Red Army, but any belligerent intent in his speech had to be deduced by implication and by somewhat strained interpretation.[30]

Preliminary Conference. The same could hardly be said of Winston Churchill's famous speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri—in President Truman's home state—on March 5, 1946. During several weeks spent in Florida he carefully matured his blast, after flying to Washington on February 10 for a conference with President Truman which was reported to concern his speech.[31] That the content of the speech was discussed hardly admits of doubt, since it was to be a world-shaking event.

As the momentous day approached, Churchill returned from Florida to Washington and the President journeyed with him to Fulton to present him to his audience and to bless the occasion. As Churchill said in opening his speech: "The President has travelled a thousand miles to dignify and magnify

> our meeting here today[99]

[30] See the text in the *New York Times*, February 10, 1946. Brooks Atkinson reported that it was "spoken in a conversational tone and without bombast."

[31] UP dispatch, the *Nashville Tennessean*, February 11, 1949.

The Address. The urgency of the occasion was soon evident. In the grand prose cadences which had thrilled so many millions of Americans during the war, Churchill declared that "Opportunity is here now, clear and shining, for both our countries. To reject it or ignore it or fritter it away will bring upon us all the long reproaches of the aftertime.', Constancy of mind was essential and persistency of purpose.

What for? "Our over-all strategic concept" was to protect the myriad cottages or apartment homes of the wage earners "from the two gaunt marauders—war and tyranny." The Missouri folk had not been conscious that these two monsters were about to attack them until Churchill described "the frightful disturbance in which the ordinary family is plunged when the curse of war swoops down upon the bread-winner and those for whom he works and contrives."

It was evident that the situation was serious, for Churchill went on to urge that the UN "must immediately begin to be equipped with an international armed force" and a certain number of air squadrons. He asserted that it would be "criminal madness" to cast the atomic bomb adrift "in this still agitated and ununited world." No one would be able to sleep so soundly if some Communist, or Neo-Fascist state had invented the bomb. God had willed that this should not be.

Then he came to the second danger which threatened "the cottage home," tyranny, the "police governments" of Eastern Europe. It was "not our duty at this time, when difficulties are so numerous, to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries whom we have not conquered in war," but we must "never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom. . . ."

The inference was clear that we could not go to war to drive the Communists out of Eastern Europe ***at this time***, but we must keep the matter in mind and we must keep on insisting that "the people of any country have the right and should have the power" to exercise all the rights of Englishmen and to enjoy all of the governmental processes and freedoms of the Anglo-Saxon world, which Churchill enumerated in full.

Then "at this sad and breathless moment" he came to "the crux of what I have travelled here to say"—no prevention of war or successful UN without an alliance of the English-speaking peoples, continuance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint use of all naval and air force bases all over the world, doubling our mobility.

Otherwise, "The Dark Ages may return, the Stone Age." "Beware, I say: Time may be short. Do not let us take the course of letting events drift along it is too late." A shadow had fallen. Nobody knew "what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intends to do in the future, or what are the limits if any to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies." From Stettin to Trieste there was "an iron curtain." He saw enormous and wrongful inroads into Germany.

Turkey and Persia were profoundly alarmed. And in front of the iron curtain "Communist Fifth Columns" were everywhere, "a growing challenge and peril to civilization." In the Far East there was anxiety, especially in Manchuria.

Having built up this picture of a terrible juggernaut operating all over the world which had to be tamed, Churchill then repulsed "the idea that a new war is inevitable, still more that it is imminent." He did not believe that Russia desired war, only "the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and. doctrines." Therefore "while time remains" he demanded he "establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries." Since nothing except overwhelming force could rapidly eliminate communism from East Europe and Russia herself, he did not explain how this was to be done.

In the meantime, what was needed was a "settlement and the longer that is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become" (i.e. our atomic monopoly would disappear). Therefore no balance of power, no working "on narrow margins," no "quivering precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure." What was needed was a great preponderance of power against Russia.

Then he drew on the great prestige which he had won before 1939. The last time he "saw it all coming and cried aloud," but "no one paid any attention." Surely we "must not let that happen again." There must be "a good understanding," that is, a showdown, with Russia "now, in 1946."

The old warrior and world strategist was off again, and with a terrifying start. He had waged war on the Reds in Russia to the limit of British tolerance during 1919 and 1920. Then throughout the twenties he had preached the menace of the Red revolution, never losing an opportunity to refer to the Bolshevik leaders "as murderers and ministers of hell."[32]

Forced to welcome their aid in 1941 to save Britain, he had incessantly attempted the impossible feat of using them to beat Germany while denying them the fruits of victory. Now he would mobilize the might of the United States to achieve what he had never been able to do before.

A Master Stroke. If, too, there is a Third World War, Churchill's Missouri speech._willI be the_pdmary document in explaining its origins. His was the first full-length picture of a Red Russia out to conquer the world. Backed by the immense authority of his war record, and by the charm of his great personality, it pre-conditioned many millions of listeners for a giant new ***cordon sanitaire*** around Russia, for a developing world crusade to smash world communism in the name of Anglo-Saxon democracy. In print Churchill's battle cry became the bible of every warmonger in the world. It said all they had wanted to say and with his great name behind it, it could be used endlessly with great effect.

At Fulton, Churchill also prevailed over Roosevelt and Hull, the great American leaders who had checkmated him in all the later stages of the war, preventing him from creating a gulf between East and West. At Fulton he did it. Had Roosevelt lived, Churchill would never have dared to propose that he come to the United States and issue a call for a world alliance to encircle the Soviet Union and establish Western democracy in Eurasia. If he had ventured to make such a speech in the United States he would have been

[32] Marquis Childs, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 7, 1946.

sharply disavowed. But with Roosevelt dead he was able not only to do that, but to carry President Truman along in his baggage.

Whether the idea of the speech originated with Churchill or Truman is not yet known. In the light of Truman's strongly hardened determination to quit "babying" the Soviets, he was probably the originator. It seems a little odd that in his ***Memoirs*** there is only one casual reference to an event of such outstanding importance, one of the chief landmarks of the Cold War.[33]

"***A Block-Buster***." This could be because many found it difficult to recall a more provocative and inflammatory utterance by a Western democratic leader who had any reputation for responsibility. This was so evident at the time that it did not seem that Churchill's speech would do great damage. The ***Memphis Commercial Appeal*** and the ***Newark Star Ledger*** welcomed it, but the ***New York Herald Tribune*** commented that Churchill had flung "a block-buster into the disordered and tottering streets of the city of man." The ***Washington Post*** noted that his international police was an "illogical appendage to a United Nations which is simply an association of nation states." The ***Boston Globe*** saw that Churchill invited the United States "to become the heir to the evils of collapsing colonialism, and inevitably their defender, all the way from North Africa to the China Sea." The ***Chicago Sun*** understood that Churchill was fighting for his world, one which no longer existed in reality and could never be reconstituted. "To follow the standard raised by this great but blinded aristocrat would be to march to the world's most ghastly war," added the ***Sun.*** "Let Mr. Truman's rejection of the poisonous doctrines declared by Mr. Churchill be prompt and emphatic."[34]

This, of course, was impossible. Truman had not only travelled far to "dignify and magnify" the meeting. He had applauded during the address, when his applause "could have been omitted without damage to either protocol or country."[35] Later Truman denied that he had seen a copy of the speech in advance, after an aide of Churchill's had announced that he had, but when a reporter gave him an opportunity to disavow the address he refused to comment on it. The President talked as if it had been just an ordinary case of free speech.[36]

Some Official Disclaimers. Secretary Byrnes was more forthright. He declared to his press conference that he had not been consulted about the Churchill speech. Asked whether the United States associated itself with the address he replied that the United States had nothing to do with it.[37] Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson also found it impossible to attend the dinner for Churchill in New York on March 15. After being scheduled to speak in Byrnes' place as the representative of the nation in the welcoming ceremonies at the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria, Acheson abruptly cancelled the engagement. Urgent matters had come up which made it impossible for him to attend.[38] The British Labor Government also stated formally that "the policy of His

[33] **Vol. II, p. 95.** [34] **AP Survey,** ***Nashville Banner*****, Mardi 6, 1946.**
[35] ***Newsweek*****, Vol. 27, p. 30, March 18, 1946.**
[36] **The** ***New York Times*****, March 9, 1946.**
37 ***ibid.*** [38] ***Ibid.*****, March 15, 1946.**

Majesty's Government ... is to be found only in the statements of His Majesty's ministers. . . . His Majesty's Government had no previous knowledge of the content of the speech."[39]

These were steps in the right direction, but the impropriety which the President had committed in going so far to listen to a long attack on a recent ally could not be repaired, or the damage to our foreign relations remedied. It was Truman's presence on the Fulton platform which electrified the Russians, putting them on notice that Churchill spoke for both the United States and Britain.

Consequences. As Grafton pointed out, the effect of the Churchill-Truman performance would be to call forth more Russian expansionism, more Russian offense or more dynamic defense. In Churchill's swirling proposals that America and Britain combine all their armed forces against Russia he had put Russia's nightmare into words. She would have full license to believe that she was encircled, with the world actively discussing mobilization against her. Vet our whole tradition required that we continue to work for settlements based on sense and accommodation "and not on these apocalyptic world visions."[40]

Lippmann's analysis pointed out that Churchill had stated all the reasons why the proposed Anglo-American combination would reinforce Britain's position in its threatened imperial parts, but "a united front in the region of empire will weaken, not strengthen, the western world in the contest of influence with the Soviet Union." We would lose our identity and our influence in Asia by merging ourselves with the British Empire.[41]

In Washington the Churchill speech suited many Congressmen exactly, but Senators Pepper, of Florida, Kilgore, of West Virginia, and Taylor, of Idaho, issued a joint statement saying that the Churchill program would cut the throat of the UN and destroy the unity of the Big Three, without which the war could not have been won and without which the peace could not be saved. They found it "shocking to see Mr. Churchill, who rose to power on the repudiation of Chamberlain, align himself with the old Chamberlain Tories who strengthened the Nazis as part of their anti-Soviet crusade."[42]

An Impropriety. Arthur Krock summed up majority opinion around the State Department and the Capitol as unfavorable to Churchill, for these reasons: (1) he should not have made his proposal in the United States; (2) he should not have made it in the presence of President Truman; (3) he should not have made it "at this critical stage of inter-Allied relations"; (4) it was bound to have a destructive effect on the United Nations; and (5) to have the opposite effect intended.[43]

Impact on American Public Opinion. The first four conclusions were obvious and the fifth should have followed, but it did not. A first poll of public opinion showed that of those who had heard of Churchill's proposal 40 per

[39] **A letter to Representative Ludlow, *Congressional Record*, Vol. 92, Pt. 10, Appendix A-2421.**

[40] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 8, 1946.**

[41] ***Ibid.*, March 10, 1946.**

[42] **The *New York Times*, March 7, 1946.**

[43] ***Ibid.*, March 13, 1946.**

cent opposed the idea altogether, and only 18 per cent approved it, yet another poll a month later showed 85 per cent approving the idea.[44]

Allowing for the fallibility of the polls, the effect of the Churchill-Truman initiative was bound to be cumulative. All peoples are highly susceptible to leadership and with each new friction between the Anglo-American team and Russia a certain number of irritated people would conclude that Churchill was right. There was no living with these Russians.

This was the more certain since Churchill had made an open, clamant appeal to fear. He had pulled out all the stops in suggesting that "the Soviet system, alien, secretive, harsh, implacable, could scarcely exist in the same world with the Western democracies."[45] He had done his best to stir alarm in every cottage and in every workman's mind, and to stimulate fear of this insatiable power which would destroy them unless something very drastic was done at once.

Anne O'Hare McCormick had this in mind in her commentary. She observed that "it is inconceivable that a leader as shrewd and foresighted as Stalin would draw a people yearning for peace into a new war," after the deluge of war just suffered, which had "battered Russia more than her Allies." This was the assumption upon which a firm policy must be firmly based. "At the apex of our power American policy cannot be based on fear."[46]

The London ***Times*** expressed the same sensible idea on the same day when it observed that "It would be an assumption of despair" to hold that Western democracy and communism "are doomed to a fatal contest."

This was severe condemnation from highly responsible sources. In a difficult time of post-war adjustment to new power relationships Churchill had appealed to a most improbable fear and preached a counsel of despair. Truman had aided and abetted him, to say the least.

Effects in Russia. The effect upon the minds of the Russians was deep and lasting. ***Pravda*** labelled its editorial "Churchill Rattles-ihe Sword." It compared him to Goebbels and noted that it was very characteristic that he spoke not in England, where he had been defeated for re-election in a campaign stressing the "Red danger," but in the U.S.A. In an interview Stalin labelled Churchill's speech as a dangerous act, one calculated to sow dissension. Churchill now took his stand with the warmongers. Like Hitler, said Stalin, he "also begins the work of unleashing a new war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations areJul]_ fledged nations, who are called upon to decide the fortunes of the entire world."[47]

[44] ***Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 10, pp. 24, 265.**

[45] **Marquis W. Childs, *New York Post*, June 26, 1946.**

[46] **The *New York Times*, March 6, 1946.**

[47] ***Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. 6, p. 7793. Harold E. Stassen in commenting on Churchill's speech warned that "the rattle of sabers can be heard even now." James Roosevelt, eldest son of F.D.R., said: "It is up to us and to every peace-loving man and woman in the entire world to stand up now and repudiate the words, the schemes and the political allies of the Hon. Winston Churchill." Harold Ickes reminded us "that without Russia we would still be fighting the war," a large truth which all too many had forgotten. —The *New York Times*, March 15, 1946.**

Brooks Atkinson wrote from Moscow describing "the outburst of fury" which Churchill's speech had loosed. It had enormously raised the pitch of political feeling in Russia. The Russian people were kept aware generally of threats to their security, but here was something specific. Like all other peoples, the Russians did not want war. "They have had a bellyful of carnage. They have not had time enough yet to recover from the deep poignant suffering of the fierce war years, when they lost more lives than both the British and Americans." They would therefore be slow to believe in the possibility of war again, without a bombshell such as Churchill's speech. It "had the effect of electrifying and depressing everyone" and it fell squarely into the familiar pattern of Soviet beliefs—capitalistic hostility, encirclement and the violent imperialism of a dying capitalist economy leading to war—this time against the Soviet Union.[48]

In other words, few things could have convinced the Russian people of the reality of great danger ahead so effectively as Churchill's speech did. He could and did do it better and more easily than any other living person, binding the Soviet peoples to their leaders as nothing else could.

In one day Churchill had also insulted and labelled as a monstrous danger to the peace the 200,000,(XX) people of the Soviet Union, who had suffered unutterably as Britain's ally and who believed that, to use Atkinson's phrase, "Soviet Russia represents a force for world peace." After he had returned to the United States Atkinson revealed that when the report of Churchill's speech was given out in Russia, with simultaneous political comment, "Moscow received it hysterically, as if the atomic bombs might start dropping before midnight."[49]

Results in Germany. Churchill's speech also encouraged the Germans to redouble their propaganda efforts to split the victors by spreading anti-Russian stories among the United States troops in Germany. C. L. Sulzberger telegraphed on March 10 that this campaign "accelerated immediately" upon the publication of Churchill's speech. However, one American garrison commander did issue a sharp order reminding his troops that the Soviet Union was an ally, that millions of Russians had died in the Allied cause and that American tolerance of German frauleins' anti-Russian opinions was leading to trouble.

Churchill's speech had given the embittered Germans full right to believe that they could successfully divide the Allies and recover their own might in a new and greater war of revenge upon the Russians, who had balked all their plans for world conquest.

Our Firm But Moderate Policy of Making Peace Condemned. The extent of the push which Churchill gave toward irreconcilable conflict stands out sharply by comparing his speech with those of Byrnes and Vandenberg a few days before. Reporting on the London UN sessions Vandenberg filled four columns with praise of UN, listing the credit items on the ledger of the London meetings. Then he asked "What is Russia up to now?" He named

[48] The *New York Times*, March 17, 1946.

[49] *Ibid.*, July 8, 1946.

the places all around the world where she was pressing for advantage, and asserted his belief that the two great rival ideologies could "live together in reasonable harmony if the United States speaks as plainly upon all occasions as Russia does; if the United States just as vigorously sustains its own purposes as Russia does____" The situation called for "patience and good will but not for vacillation."

Vandenberg agreed with the new Ambassador designate to Russia, Lieutenant-General Walter Bedell Smith, that "It is imperative that our national temperatures remain normal," that "both nations want nothing so much as peace and security" and that "the best way to win Soviet respect and confidence" was to say only what we mean and mean every word we say.[50]

On February 28 Byrnes made a speech which also indicated a tougher line toward Russia. Still he stressed that there had always been ideological differences in the world, and that "in this world there is room for many people with varying views and many governments with varying systems." The United States wished "to maintain friendly relations with all nations and exclusive arrangements with no nation." "We will gang up against no state," Byrnes declared. "We will do nothing to break the world into exclusive blocs or spheres of influence." Only an "inexcusable tragedy of errors could cause serious conflict between this country and Russia."[51]

This was the policy which Byrnes and Vandenberg had enunciated a few days before Churchill spoke. Neither had given the slightest indication of belief that an irreconcilable conflict existed, or that Russia had to be hemmed in and overawed with overwhelming power. Neither had suggested that democracy had to be enforced everywhere. Both had given every indication that they expected to make peace, though with difficulty.

It was this sensible attitude which Churchill contradicted completely. He taught that all civilization was in imminent peril of destruction by Russia. The time was terribly short and our lives and fortunes could be saved only by a swift mobilization of overwhelming power against her. He desired to gang up with a vengeance.

Toughness Prescribed. It was this policy which, backed by President Truman, prevailed. Byrnes had already felt strong presidential disapproval for the agreements with Russia which he had made at Moscow. Truman had been influenced by his military and Congressional advisers, Admiral William D. Leaker Senators Connally and Vandenberg, all of whom thought Byrnes had not been tough enough. This was the view of British Foreign Secretary Bevin, who had "rather openly accused him of weakness and appeasement."[52] Now after the supreme demand for toughness at Fulton our policy steadily hardened. Churchill's speech "marked the critical point where relations between the West and the East turned for the worse."[53]

ChurchilVs European Campaign. After an elaborate reception by the ***élite*** of New York City and two further speeches in pursuit of his aim, Churchill

[50] ***Ibid.*, February 27, 1946.**
[51] ***Ibid.*, March, 1 1946.**
[52] **Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*, May 26, 1946.**
[53] **Thomas F. Reynolds, *PM*, November 29, 1946.**

returned to Europe. Soon he was waging a campaign for a United Europe, as a means of pushing Russia out of Eastern Europe. At the University of Zurich, Switzerland, on September 19, 1946, he bewailed the tragedy of Europe, saying “that is all that the Germanic races have got by tearing each other to pieces and spreading havoc far and wide.” This hint that the Nazis might not have been so far wrong was followed by an appeal to France and Germany to establish “a partnership.” He gave warning that “time may be short.” At present there might be a breathing space while “we dwell strangely and precariously under the shield, and I will even say protection, of the atomic bomb.” If “at first” all the European states were not able or willing to join, those who could must do so at once. The implication was clear that the states of East Europe would be brought in eventually.[54]

This was made absolutely plain in his address on May 14, 1947, in which he said that “Our aim is to bring about the unity of all nations of all Europe.” He explained that “The whole purpose of a united democratic Europe is to give decisive guarantees against aggression.” He did not say who would defend the Soviet Union or the rest of the world against the might of a United Europe, with nearly 400,000,000 people and plenty of war-making "tradition and power.[55]

Moderation Advised. The ***demarche*** at Fulton, Missouri, launched the United States openly upon a policy of dealing with Russia as an incorrigible menace. On March 10, Cordell Hull revealed his deep alarm over the turn in events. We who are living, he said, must not allow the human race to commit suicide through selfishness, impatience and provocation. Addressing all the members of the United Nations, Hull offered a five-point program for overcoming what he termed the spirit of impatience. He urged each government to: (1) examine with sympathy and patience the views of others; (2) ascertain the true facts; (3) avoid the assumption of adamant positions; (4) refrain from exaggerating and over-emphasizing one’s own claims; and (5) refrain from making an appeal to prejudice.[56]

This was the voice of true statesmanship. Of course it needed to be heard in Moscow. Yet the voice of reason and moderation, of firmness and patience, could no longer have much effect in the West. There the implacable Truman-Churchill spirit had seized control. It was their policy of alliance against Russia and restraining communism by military means which was to rule for many a day—until its bankruptcy was demonstrated, as it would be, or another global war came.

The greatest danger was that we might get both the failure of this policy and the war. Yet there was a restraining factor which might compel us to turn our policies into less belligerent and more constructive channels. President Benes of Czechoslovakia stated it on March 9,1946, four days after Churchill spoke. “There will be difficulties,” said Benes, “but there won’t be war. There can be no world war today which would not be followed by

[54] **The *New York Times*, September 20, 1946.**
[55] ***Ibid*., May 15, 1947.**
[56] ***Ibid*., March 11, 1946.**

revolution—greater revolution than has taken place this time. Undoubtedly there are people who would like to see war between the East and the West, but the revolution which would follow such a contest would defeat the very ends for which they wished it."[57]

Walter Lippmann also foresaw, on March 15, that neither Russia nor the United States could conquer the other, but that they could become entangled in a war which would "go on and on as a terrible mixture of civil war, famine, annihilation and extermination at long range, which no one could have any plan fortopping." Two months later, after a trip through Europe, he thought thatlHepeoples of Europe could not be mobilized for such a war and if it did break out "the Continent would be plunged into the anarchy of a gigantic civil war, amidst which the great non-European powers would never know who was friend and who was foe."[58]

Atomic Ultimatum. The practical certainty that such a war could not be ended did not deter some Americans from wanting to starlit. Thus George H. Earle, former American Minister to Bulgaria, returned to make "America realize what a frightful menace we have in Russia." It was "the greatest danger that ever threatened America." Civilization's outlook was "the blackest in history." He urged that Russia be given an ultimatum to "get back to her own territory and if they refused I would use the atomic bomb on them while we have it and before they get it." He asserted that "If Russia had the atomic bomb there would be few Americans alive today."[59]

THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AT PARIS,

First Session

It was in the deeply envenomed atmosphere left by Churchill's indictment of Russia as a world menace which had to be quarantined by overwhelming force that the Foreign Ministers met again in Paris, on April 25, 1946. This time Molotov quickly agreed that the French should sit in on all sessions, but as Byrnes recorded, this "marked about the limit of his concessions."

The Iran case rankled deeply and led to Russian charges of American imperialist expansion. Vishinsky alleged that we sought bases in Turkey and Iran, little knowing perhaps how soon we would have them. Byrnes assured him that it was our policy to get all troops removed "from countries other than Germany and Japan at the earliest possible moment." The Russians, however, were in no mood to take their troops home. Molotov rejected the American draft of a treaty for Germany as wholly inadequate, and refused even to discuss Austria. There was no agreement about the disposal of Italy's colonies, though France and Britain vetoed some solutions, and deadlock over the Dodecanese Islands and Trieste developed. Though there was agreement on many minor points, on the main issues "Molotov was adamant. He was evidently determined to delay the withdrawal of his occupation armies."[60]

57 *ibid.*, March 10, 1946.

58 The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 15,1946; *New York Herald Tribune*, May 11,1946.

59 *New York Herald Tribune*, March 24, 1946.

60 Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 125–9.

No reaction to the Churchill Doctrine could have been predicted more certainly.

A Twenty-five Year Treaty Proposed. Russia had cooled even on the idea of a twenty-five-year treaty to keep Germany disarmed. This device for reassuring Russia about her security, and for getting Russian troops out of Europe, had been proposed first by Senator Vandenberg in January 1945.[61] In December 1945 Byrnes had discussed the idea with Stalin, who had said that if the United States proposed such a treaty he would support it.[62] But in April 1946 Molotov would have nothing to do with it. To most Americans it seemed a very generous offer. The ***New York Times*** even headlined it as a "Daring Venture." But in February, after the heated UN sessions of January, Molotov made no reply when a draft of the proposed treaty was forwarded to him, and when Byrnes raised the matter in Paris Molotov was not interested. It is difficult to believe that the Russians would have accepted the treaty, since they could hardly expect to establish new and friendly governments, by their definition, in East Europe in a short time, and until they were sure they would wish to keep their troops close at hand. If, however, any chance of their accepting a paper guarantee had existed it vanished with Churchill's speech, which put confidence only in superior armed force. Behind Secretary Byrnes' offer the Russians were too likely to see President Truman sitting on the platform at Fulton applauding Churchill.

Secretary Byrnes' report to the nation on the May meeting in Paris explained in moderate terms his position on the twenty-five-year treaty, Trieste, Italian reparations and other subjects. It plainly put the onus on the Russians for blocking the calling of the peace conference and threatened that if no agreement for its convocation were reached at the forthcoming session of the Big Four in Paris, beginning on June 15, the United Nations General Assembly would be asked to make recommendations about the peace settlements.[63]

On May 27 Molotov replied, insisting on the necessity for great power unanimity, alleging that a new method of pressure, threats and intimidation was being used and denying that the United Nations had any jurisdiction in the making of the treaties. He charged that the Americans and British acted together on all questions and said the proposed twenty-five-year treaty had been advanced "in the spirit of the notorious proposal of Senator Vandenberg." He maintained that at Moscow Stalin had assented to the idea of a mutual assistance treaty against German aggression. As proposed later the Byrnes treaty was nothing of the sort, but a proposal to enforce the future disarmament of Germany, before she was disarmed.[64]

From a comparison of the two statements it is obvious that both men believed they were right on the main issues. Each made a good case for his side, for example, on the subject of Italian reparations.

[61] **See Chapter XI above.**
[62] **Byrnes' report on the Paris Council Meeting, the *New York Times*, May 21, 1946.**
[63] **The *New York Times*, May 21, 1946.**
[64] ***New York Herald Tribune*, May 28, 1946.**

Bi-Partisan Accord. The deadlock in Paris produced perfect accord between Byrnes and the two Senators, Vandenberg and Connally, who had been with him at every important session in Paris. They had evinced their displeasure at the concessions made at Moscow in December and a serious split had threatened after the sessions in London, but now that Byrnes was making no concessions complete solidarity was restored. Vandenberg was so pleased that he refrained from making a full-length speech in the Senate. Hailing the advent of "a positive, constructive, peace-seeking, bi-partisan foreign policy for the United States," Vandenberg was "willing to let the record stand" where Byrnes had left it in his radio speech.[65]

By this time the bi-partisan approach, which Roosevelt and Hull had developed to carry the United States into the United Nations, had led to the capture of both the State Department and the White House by the bi-partisan combine. In it, too, it was the voice of Vandenberg, the representative of the minority, which was controlling. The attitude of the Executive toward Russia had to be stem enough to satisfy him.

Two Postulates. Questioning whether Byrnes was altogether wise in promptly replying to Molotov's ***Pravda*** statement, the ***New York Herald Tribune*** thought that some postulates would have to be accepted if the differences were to be bridged in even passable fashion. It suggested two, the first being that the Russian attitude is as sincerely held as our own. The Russians put "quite as passionate a conviction" behind their use of words like democracy and freedom as we did. Their fears of our system were "doubtless as genuine and quite as well based" as the fears which we entertain of them, for the two systems were almost completely antithetical and each tended to undermine and destroy the other, unless an effective truce could be established.

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The second postulate was "that no power possesses a monopoly of either wisdom or virtue, especially in Germany, where all were pursuing uncertain, self-contradictory policies and where no power was sufficiently disinterested or "right" to be entitled to dictate the solution.[66]

This attitude contrasted with that of Henry Luce's ***Life*** magazine, which published full-page advertisements declaring that Russia and the West "never will agree" around a table. A two-inch headline asked "Why Kid Around?" There was no misunderstanding, but there was a world power conflict, which had to be fought hard and sleeplessly.[67]

Arming Latin America. As one means of prosecuting this struggle President Truman proposed to the Congress, on May 7, 1946, a program for arming the Western. IJemisphere. If the world was to be partitioned mRTzones we would fortify oursl Three years later a lifelong student of Latin American affairs recorded the results in Latin American domestic politics. Peru bought $6,000,000 worth of U.S. arms and in a few weeks its government was overthrown. Venezuela imported a million dollars worth of arms and its government was tossed out shortly afterwards. In both cases unusually democratic

[65] ***Nashville Banner*, May 21, 1946; Joseph and Stewart Alsop, the *New York Herald Tribune*, May 22, 1946.**

[66] ***New York Herald Tribune*, June 4, 1946.** [67] ***Ibid.*, May 28, 1946.**

governments were ousted.[68] Latin American military cliques, already prone to upset governments, were feeling strong enough to suppress even the most democratically elected and supported ones.

Both in East Europe and in Latin America the military security of the giant powers was bad for free elections in the small states. Our armament of Latin America, under the guise of preventing the Russians from taking over the continent, was to go on until eight governments were overthrown by military upstarts and a visiting Vice-President of the United States and his wife were stoned and spat upon in 1958.

Attitudes Toward Fascism. The difference in attitudes between Russia and the West was brought out strikingly in connection with the effort of the Security Council to take some action against the fascist government of Spain. The Council was working toward a diplomatic quarantine of the Franco Govemment, as a potential threat to peace, against the opposition of the British and American Governments. They argued that the step would help Franco more than it would hurt him. In Moscow Brooks Atkinson found that to the Russians the continued existence of the Franco regime was "a concrete, recognizable and immediate threat to peace." Although Americans might now have a weary attitude toward fascism "the Russians retain the hatred and physical revulsion to fascism that they possessed during the war." To them fascism was a living evil, "almost a physical presence that they have no difficulty in reconstructing from the ashes of graves, burned villages and millions of terrible personal experiences." We might take a more detached attitude but they regarded it as a perversion of logic to leave fascism in power anywhere, after so much of the world's life strength had been used to destroy fascism. He added that "after their success in stamping out fascism in the Balkans and Poland during the past year" the Russians were not likely to have much respect for legalistic distinctions invented for Franco's benefit.[69]

In the United States the idea of using Franco Spain as a military base against Russia was not yet openly expressed, but the proposal to use a united Germany as a bulwark against Russia was finding important public support, as if that idea had never had a very thorough tryout under Hitler.[70]

THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AT PARIS

Second Session

When the Council of Foreign Ministers met again in Paris, in mid-June, 1946, deadlock again ensued until on June 27 Molotov suddenly began to make concessions. He agreed that the Dodecanese Islands should go to Greece. Then he accepted the American proposal to postpone decision on the Italian colonies for a year, with reference to the General Assembly if agreement could not be reached. These concessions amounted to a renunciation, for the time being at least, of Russia's desire for a foothold in the Mediterranean.

[68] Samuel Guy Inman, in a lecture at the University of Kentucky, April 2, 1949.
[69] Brooks Atkinson, the *New York Times*, April 29, 1946.
[70] Samuel Grafton, the *Nashville Tennessean,* May 17, 1946.

Italian Reparations. On July 4 Molotov accepted July 29 as the date for the opening of the peace conference and then, after six hours of debate, the Anglo-Americans finally accepted the Soviet demand for $100,000,000 reparations from Italy, to be made up from surplus Italian industrial equipment, Italian assets in the Balkans and the balance from current Italian production, for which the Russians would supply the raw materials.

If this appeared to be a point for Molotov it was based on strong considerations. The Italians had sent several hundred thousand troops into Russia. They had helped to destroy Minsk, Kharkov and many other Russian cities. Even though Italy had changed sides it would be a bad precedent for her to escape reparations altogether. On the other hand, we had argued for months that we had already given Italy $900,000,000 worth of supplies and that we could not also pay reparations for her. This was a strong argument. The final compromise required Italy to repair a little of the damage she had done in Russia by means which did not come in any important degree out of American aid.

Trieste. An accord was also reached on the general lines of a settlement for the troublesome Trieste issue. The French line through Venezia Gaulia was accepted as the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, and Trieste would be a free state, though much detail remained to be ironed out.

This, again, was as good a compromise as the power conflict would permit. On economic grounds the city should have gone to Yugoslavia. The majority of the people were Italians, but the city had absolutely no Italian hinterland. It was the best outlet to the Adriatic Sea for Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia. It is of vital importance to all of these states and of no commercial importance to Italy. All that the Italians can do in Trieste is to levy handling tribute on the commerce of the Danubian states, a situation which in normal circumstances would have deprived Italy of the port. It would have gone to Yugoslavia.

Yet it was of great strategic importance and given the power struggle the West had to hold it, if possible. Since its claim to do so was weak on economic grounds, the Free State solution was a fair compromise.

This settlement was achieved, said the ***New York Times***, after strong pressure by Byrnes, who had been "diplomatically the aggressor in recent sessions to a degree that actually worried the anxious French."[71] French officials felt, with good reason, that the careful mediation of Premier-President Georges Bidault had saved the meeting from deadlock.

Agreement by Negotiation vs. ***Majority Votes.*** Yet another crisis quickly arose. Molotov wished to retain a veto over the procedure of the peace conference, not entirely without reason. The editor of the ***New York Herald Tribune***, on July 8, 1946, thought that the Western powers—with their pressure for the conference, for "calling in world opinion," for "broadening the debate—were asking for it." From the beginning, the conference was "a little too obviously a device for summoning up a voting majority to carry

[71] C. L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, July 2, 1946.

issues against Russia which the Western powers could not settle directly." If voting majorities in an international conference had "any real meaning or any true democratic basis" the case would be different Since this was not true, said the editor, the Russian case was basically sound. Long face-to-face diplomatic battles were exhausting, but the results were "surer than the majority resolutions of conferences summoned to evade or override the real differences which exist."

This is a basic consideration which is seldom considered in the West We do not stop to think how we would feel if the Russians always wielded a heavy majority of votes against us.

Nevertheless, the procedural clash was compromised, for the time being at least, and the way cleared for the Paris peace conference to consider the treaties for the satellite states.

Tension Unavoidable. On July 7, Brooks Atkinson returned from a ten-months' tour of duty in the Soviet Union for the ***New York Times*** and wrote three articles which, though partly an expression of the frustration which built up in all foreign correspondents in Moscow, contained a great deal of significant information and had an important effect upon our thinking.

Russia was governed by a dictatorship of thirteen men in the Politburo, who feared and repressed all internal opposition and regarded external opposition as equally hostile. The police regimentation of the people frightened him, but the Russian people did not seem to mind, since they had never known anything else. The Government was not imposed on the people against their will and they trusted their leaders. The Government was not corrupt. It did not put the interests of one group ahead of what it regarded as the true interests of the whole and the people had faith in it.

Atkinson explained the religious character of the Communist movement and its belief that the world was its province. The Soviet leaders did not want war. They knew more about its horrors than we did. They also did not want, at present, to defy world opinion, as their recent retreats on Iran and Turkey
y proved. Normal, intimate friendship was, however, not wanted. It was not possible. Though the Russian people were sincere and good-hearted we had "to live with the Russian nation in an atmosphere of bitterness and tension." There was no other way.[72]

[72] **Brooks Atkinson, the *New York Times*, July 7, 8, 9, 1946.**

CHAPTER XIV

ATOMIC IMPASSE

JANUARY 1946–JULY 1949

The year 1946 is notable for the long and persistent effort to achieve agreement on the international control of atomic energy, an effort which raised the hopes of many millions of believers in international cooperation very high, though the end of the year found little chance of agreement remaining.

In fulfilment of the December agreement at Moscow to work for atomic control through the United Nations, Secretary of State Byrnes appointed, on January 7, 1946, an advisory committee "to study the subject of controls and safeguards necessary to protect this government."[1] The committee consisted of Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Dr. VannevarBush, Dr. James B. Conant, Major General Leslie R. Groves and Mr. John J. McCloy.

At its first meeting, on January 14, this group concluded that the UN Atomic Energy Commission would expect the U.S.A. to present a plan for control and that an able group of men should be designated to prepare such a plan. The resulting Board of Consultants was composed of:

Mr. David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, who acted as Chairman; Mr. Chester I. Barnard, President of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company; Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, of the California Institute of Technology and the University of California; Dr. Charles Allen Thomas, Vice-President and Technical Director, Monsanto Chemical Company, and Mr. Harry A. Winne, Vice-President in Charge of Engineering Policy, General Electric Company.

THE ACHESON LILIENTHAL REPORT

The Board met promptly and devoted its full time and energy to the problem until its report was issued on March 17. It rejected international inspection as a means of control, on the ground that it would be ineffective. The number of inspectors would have to be very large. Their work would be detective in character, policing and auditing, which would not attract the real scientists who would alone be capable of doing the work. The result would be friction with governments and failure to know what each nation was doing.

An Atomic Development Authority. To avoid this result the Consultants proposed that all atomic energy activities, the world over, be controlled by an Atomic Development Authority, which would own or control directly all

[1] **"A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy," State Department publication 2498, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C.**

supplies of uranium and thorium and all plants for the production of fissionable materials. These plants would be distributed over the world in such a way as to preserve strategic balance. That is, no one country would have enough plants to be able to gain atomic supremacy by suddenly seizing them. Enough plants would be left in other areas to enable the rest of the world to start ahead in an atomic arms race, or to attack the aggressor at once.

The report held that there were three dangerous activities: the provision of raw materials; the production of the fissionable materials, plutonium and U235; and the use of these materials for the making of atomic weapons. All of these activities should be concentrated completely in the hands of ADA and strictly forbidden to all others. On the other hand, certain safe activities could be conceded to national or private agencies by a license from the ADA. These were: research reactors for which the Authority would furnish denatured plutonium or U235; the construction and operation of reactors for the making of radioactive materials, the fissionable materials used to be denatured and obtained from ADA; and the construction and operation of power piles, to be supplied by the Authority with denatured plutonium or U235.

Power plants for peaceful purposes could thus be operated, provided that they used denatured fissionable materials from the plants of the Authority, and provided that they were so constructed that uranium or thorium could not be introduced into them. This would ensure that the materials supplied by ADA would gradually be consumed in these power plants and that they could not become independent units, “breeding” or increasing the amount of fissionable materials as they operated. Great confidence was placed in the effectiveness of denaturing the materials supplied. The dénaturant could be removed, but this would be a complicated and difficult process.

These specifications would permit the U.S.S.R. to have atomic power plants, presumably within the limits of the fissionable materials produced by the primary ADA plants located in the Soviet Union. The necessity of locating plants to “permit the disposition of by-product power and heat in areas where they are most needed” was specifically recognized, along with the problem of disposing of “the vast amounts of by-product power” produced by “an international agency operating geographically within a national economy.” It was estimated that “if atomic energy were developed on a large scale about half of it might be available for competitive exploitation.”

The Consultants were certain that any attempt at control merely by inspection and regulation would fail. Only if the controllers had the affirmative, constructive functions of development assigned to them in the ADA plan could there be continuous, harmonious management of both the dangerous activities and the peaceful uses. “If the only legal ownership and development of uranium ore is in the hands of an international agency” then the detection of evasions would be tremendously simplified. The mere fact of mining or possessing uranium would establish guilt. It would not be necessary to prove that the product of a mine would be used illegally. “The very opening of a mine” would be sufficient. Similarly any move to build a plutonium pile would be illegal.

Beyond these advantages the ADA would in practice be a real organ of world government, for a limited but crucial purpose. The consultants believed it would substitute cooperative, constructive international effort for national competition in the evasion of inspection.

A Sincere Effort. It has been suggested frequently that the Lilienthal Board knew that this idealistic scheme was bound to fail, but that they proposed it as a means of enlisting public opinion behind the preservation of the American atomic monopoly.

I do not believe that for a moment. The Chairman of the Board, Mr. Lilienthal, had had years of successful, thrilling experience in blazing a new trail in human relationships. He had seen a new idea, the Tennessee Valley Authority, very largely remake the lives of several millions of people, improving their living standards very sharply, conserving their soils, preventing age-old floods and developing private business of every kind, along with a cooperative community spirit on a new and unheard of scale.

It was very natural that Lilienthal should expand the basic ideas involved in TVA to the larger and more complex problem of atomic energy control. Knowing how TVA, with its broad yet limited objective had expanded the lives of the people it served, without decreasing anybody's liberty, he was bound to vision a great release of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the many peoples of the world. This aspect of the project would appeal strongly to the two business men on the Board, though they may have shrunk at first from the expansion of governmental authority to the world scene. That the plan would appeal to Dr. Oppenheimer, as the representative of the deeply uneasy company of scientists who had created the A-bomb, goes without saying. His scientific mind would want something thorough and effective.

The result was that the Board gave their minds the free scope which the vast problem required and they produced a plan which, if accepted by the U.S.S.R. would: ***(a)*** free the world from the greatest threat which has ever hung over it; and ***(b)*** also launch it upon a course of world cooperation which would quite probably enable the United Nations to evolve fairly rapidly into an effective world government.

The plan was bold and imaginative. It was also technically practical and workable. These were great attributes. On the other hand, it left out of account the chief human and political factors which would cause its failure. This was not originally the fault of the consultants. It was Secretary Byrnes' duty to search out for the Board of Consultants the best authority on Russian history since 1917 that he could find, and add an economist who had specialized on Russia, and to supplement them by some American engineer who had worked long in the Soviet Union. An army officer with Colonel Faymonville's deep understanding of Russian psychology would also have been very useful.

Men like these, joined with the other members of the Board, might have produced a plan of control that the Russians would accept. I only say that they ***might*** have. As the great endeavor did develop, the Consultants consulted other men like themselves. They spent "days consulting with numerous scientists, industrial experts, and geologists, authorities in the technical fields

concerned with atomic energy." This was their obvious duty, but the report contains no suggestion that they talked with any social scientists or any independent experts on Russia, when it was urgently imperative that they should obtain the assistance of "numerous" men in these fields.

Russian Objections. Had this indispensable contribution to any study of the problem been made, the following considerations would have been demonstrated :

1. ***That the Soviet Government was altogether unlikely to admit foreigners to free residence and travel in the Soviet Union for the purpose of controlling an activity believed to be vital to Russian defense.***

Against such permission would be arrayed: (a) the centuries old Russian suspicion of foreigners, so deep as to be almost second nature; (***b***) the total conviction of Russia's rulers that they had won the war against Hitler because they had destroyed his fifth column and kept him in ignorance about Russian defense capacities and preparations. The Consultants thought of the ADA men as really loyal and responsible to it, putting national allegiance behind them. The Russians would be certain to regard them as camouflaged spies of the United States and British Governments, as indeed a percentage of them were almost certain to be, if only a minority.

2. ***The Red regime would run the following large risks in allowing foreigners to circulate freely over its territories***:

(a) that the police state side of its activities, including data on its forced labor system, would become widely known in detail abroad; ***(b)*** that information about the much higher standard of living in the Western world, already dangerously prevalent because of the travels of Russian troops, would become still more widespread in the Soviet Union; (c) that knowledge of the civil liberties and personal freedoms enjoyed in the West would become disseminated, adding to the discontent germinated by ***(b);*** and ***(d)*** that the terrible state of Russia's weakness due to the devastations and unproductive expenditures of the war would become vividly known to her rivals, precipitating stronger diplomatic pressure upon her, perhaps even military pressure.

The Consultants did not "contemplate any systematic or large-scale inspection activities for the Authority except those directed to the control of raw materials," and they hoped to limit these, "but at all times the right of access to any region for re-survey in the light of new knowledge would be necessary." Coupled with the right to "inspect and visit at frequent intervals" the safe atomic plants permitted to the Soviet Union, these activities were sure to appear to Russia's rulers as equivalent to fairly widespread knowledge of Soviet activities and contact with Soviet citizens.

3. ***The international ownership and management of the basic atomic energy plants would probably be even more objectionable to Soviet state-socialist industry executives than to American capitalists.***

The latter would dread and resent the competition of a new source of

power, if they could not control it, but the Soviet state-planners and executives would tend to regard an important segment of power production beyond their control as something unnatural and intolerable.

4. ***Soviet planners would almost certainly attach far more importance to atomic energy as a source of power***.

The United States is rich in other kinds of developed power: coal, water and oil. In 1945 the Soviet Union had these same sources, but far less developed. It has also vast areas of desert, tundra and frozen lands in which the older kinds of power are not present, or are very inadequate. In Russia the transportation of coal or of electric power is an immense problem, for its area is nearly three times as large as the United States. In some great regions it is almost prohibitive in effort and cost. Soviet executives would therefore grasp at atomic energy as a kind of power which might have great importance in their huge out-of-the-way places. In the North the heat generated would also be an attractive consideration.

They might greatly overestimate the practicality of atomic power, but they were almost certain to dream about it and to build great plans upon it whicli would undoubtedly be circumscribed by the restraints of the ADA. The Lilienthal report discussed the principle of strategic balance no less than six times, enough to raise grave doubts in Soviet minds as to the extent that atomic energy development would be permitted in the U.S.S.R. The U.S.A. might well choose not to develop atomic power, in which case the U.S.S.R. could make little headway with it. Would Russia be allowed as many primary plants as the United States? Or would the ADA divide the world into several areas, say the U.S.A., Britain, West Europe, East Asia, India, Latin America and the U.S.S.R.—all restricted to the same number of primary atomic plants?

The latter conclusion is the more probable. The Atomic Scientists Committee of Great Britain, which approved the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, explained that new large-scale plants should be "distributed throughout the world" so that seizure of plants by any nation would leave the other nations in possession of "an overwhelming superiority in the production of fissionable material."[2]

The application of this principle could hardly have any other effect than to limit permanently the development of atomic power in the area of the globe where it could receive its widest application. In any event the allocation would certainly be made by a commission controlled by the United States, already far in the lead in atomic energy production. Wouldn't it be better for Soviet tycoons to bide their time, push hard on the production of atomic energy and thus develop it for power purposes without let or hindrance?

5. ***Did Russian national pride and sovereignty permit acceptance of the Li lient ha I plan?***

In the immediate background there was the hasty use of the atomic bomb against Japan, the many American statements indicating or flatly saying that the Russians could not be trusted with the atomic secrets, the long wait before

[2] ***Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 15, 1945, p. 6.**

any start was made toward international control, and the making of that move subject to a careful gradation of stages which would make it impossible for the Russians to attack their neighbors by preventing them from ever getting their hands on any atomic bombs.

The preliminary statement by the Acheson Committee which accompanied the Lilienthal report was careful to make it clear that atomic information would be turned over to the ADA only in cautiously controlled stages. Four were suggested, with the observation that various others might be developed by further study. The transfer of authority over physical things, plants for example, would also proceed slowly by stages and meanwhile the United States would continue the manufacture of bombs.

Writing in ***The Nation*** for April 13, 1946,1. F. Stone correctly foresaw that "It is on this question of timing of the disclosures that the whole fight may be lost, and it is on this question that attention must be focused." He noted that the report asked for "an immediate quid for a distant quo" and that the report itself put into words the very thought that would alarm foreign opinion, when it said: "should there be a breakdown in the plan at any time during the transition, we shall be in a favorable position with regard to atomic weapons."

Neither the events beginning with Potsdam nor the Acheson-Lilienthal prospectus suggested that the Russians would be entrusted very rapidly with atomic energy. If there had been mutual confidence and good will among the Allies the Soviets might have hoped to get along faster by going the ADA way than by going ahead on their own. Already it was plain, however, that this was not the case and that Russia would receive atomic facilities only when the increasingly hostile governments of the West decided that another stage might be ventured.

These were the principal considerations which would determine the Kremlin's response to the American initiative as Moscow pondered its reply from March 17, 1946, when our plan was published, until the UN Atomic Energy Commission met in mid-June.

From the American standpoint the Acheson-Lilienthal groups had produced a perfect plan for preserving the American monopoly until it could gradually be turned over to a world authority, which would continue to be under the guidance and control of the United States and Britain, through the votes of their many friends and satellites in any United Nations body. To us it was an act of unparalleled generosity. We would actually share our greatest discovery with the Russians, helping them to set up atomic energy plants and asking in return only that they join us in making it impossible for any nation to suddenly attack another with A-bombs. This was all that we asked the Russians to give up, we believed.

From their viewpoint the Russian leaders were likely to conclude that acceptance of the plan would, or might, imperil their military security, endanger their entire political and social system, and limit its ability to push the industrialization of the Soviet Union by the untrammelled development of atomic power, without offering any advantages other than a lessening of American and British post-Hiroshima tensions.

Whether a different plan would have met greater success may well be argued. Perhaps no plan could have succeeded. What we have to deal with is the plan offered and, as I see it, we must conclude that it was a brave pioneering effort toward world government which would not advance our objective of achieving security against atomic attack by the Russians. Having survived the mightiest military assault ever delivered on this planet, and having achieved an amount of world power they would have thought incredible ten years before, the Soviet chiefs were almost certain to regard our terms as too high.

THE SOVIET PROPOSAL

The Soviet reply to the Acheson-Lilienthal plan was delivered by Andrei Gromyko at the second meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission meeting at Hunter College, New York, on June 19, 1946.[3]

The Russian proposal hailed the epochal nature of the conquest of the atom, mentioned its first use as a weapon and held it to be "the general opinion that humanity stands at the threshold of a wide application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; for the good of the peoples as a means of raising their standards of welfare and their living conditions; for the good of and with a view to the development of science and culture." There could be no effective system of peace unless the discovery were placed in the service of humanity and "applied to peaceful purposes only."

The Soviet Delegation therefore proposed a draft treaty forbidding the production and use of any atomic energy weapon and calling for the destruction within three months of all stocks of atomic bombs. The high contracting parties would enforce the treaty within six months by passing "legislation providing severe punishment for the violation of the terms of this agreement."

There was no historical warrant for believing that such a treaty would be effective. The First Hague Conference in 1899 had secured agreements that undefended towns would not be attacked or gas used as a weapon. Yet virtually all towns were soon objects of attack and gas was used by Germany in World War I. It was not used in World War II because the diminishing control of the air made its use too risky for the Nazis after the period of their blitz victories was over. If a new war came the chief deterrent to the use of atomic weapons would be the fear of retaliation, a fear, however, which would operate much more strongly upon the Russians than upon us, because of our greatly superior ability to deliver A-bombs over their cities.

This fear might be a strong deterrent in the future, but it had no present value to the Americans, since they had decided in the beginning that the Russians could not be trusted with atomic bombs. To them such a treaty was worse than useless. It would be positively dangerous in promoting unjustified relaxation. When pressed hard to explain how the treaty could be effective, Gromyko could only reply, on July 31, that the entire structure of the United Nations depended on the desire and determination of the member states to

[3] **See the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* July 1946, the *New York Times* for June 20, 1946, and United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, *Official Records,* No. 2.**

cooperate for peace and international security and that no system of control would be any good unless based on international trust and confidence.

This might be true, but we did not intend to place any confidence in what the Russians would do with atomic energy. We wanted a foolproof system which would make it forever impossible for them to have any atomic bombs, unless they gave the whole world vibrant warning of their belligerent intentions by seizing ADA atomic plants. We certainly had no intention to destroy our own atomic bombs without being certain that the Russians were not making any, and if in possession of fissionable materials they might quickly make them at any time.

Such assurance was not ruled out in the Russian proposal. Indeed it proposed to charge the second of two proposed committees with "The elaboration and creation of methods to forbid the production of weapons based upon the use of atomic energy and to prevent the use of all other similar weapons of mass destruction." The Soviet plan also called for "Measures, systems and organizations of control in the use of atomic energy to insure the observance of the conditions above-mentioned in the international agreement for the outlawing of atomic weapons," and "the elaboration of a system of sanctions for application against the unlawful use of atomic energy."

If words have any meaning these Soviet proposals involved the creation of some kind of international control organization, yet the Russians long resisted international inspection as an infringement of their sovereignty.

THE BARUCH PLAN

The American position was stated by Bernard M. Baruch, our Representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, on June 14, in a moving address which solidified a large majority of the American public behind a stiffened version of the Lilienthal report.

Mr. Baruch phrased the alternatives sharply: "a choice between the quick and the dead" and "World Peace or World Destruction." To avoid the latter fate "we must provide immediate, swift and sure punishment of those who violate the agreements that are reached by the nations. Penalization is essential if peace is to be more than a feverish interlude between wars."

The offenses for which a nation should be punished, and the necessity of making sure that punishment would be certain, were made explicit as follows:

> "Now as to violations: in the agreements, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible, should be fixed for:
>
> "1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
>
> "2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;
>
> "3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the Authority;
>
> "4. Wilful interference with the activities of the Authority;

"5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body.

"It would be a deception, to which I am unwilling to lend myself, were I not to say to you and to our peoples, that the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization only by concurrence of each of the five great powers—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, France and the United States.

"I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.

"The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to die. The time between violation and preventive action or punishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to the course to be followed."

The illegal seizure of an Atomic Development Authority plant might permit "a malevolent nation" to produce a bomb in twelve months, or even less, showing "how imperative speed is in detecting and penalizing violations."

The belief that a great government could be punished and penalized rested, of course, on the atomic bomb itself. Without it everyone would agree that the imposition of sanctions on one of the two greatest powers in the world would mean a world war, though perhaps one in behalf of law and order. With the bomb it seemed feasible for a vetoless UN Security Council to bring the offender to time by dropping atomic bombs on the seized atomic plants or upon his cities, without any great and painful military effort. As time elapsed this would gradually be recognized as an illusion, but in the afterglow of Hiroshima it seemed that an effective sanction was at hand.

That the end of our accumulation of bombs was to be the last step in a long chain of prior developments was explained in these terms:

"When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes, we propose that:

"1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;

"2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty, and

"3. the Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic knowledge."

A later paragraph seemed to say what could hardly have been meant, that our safety would have to be guaranteed against all weapons of mass destruction, and against war itself, before we would destroy our A-bombs. It read:

"But before a country is ready to relinquish any winning weapons, it must have more than words to reassure it. It must have a guarantee of safety, not only against the offenders in the atomic area, but against the illegal users of other weapons—bacteriological, biological, gas—perhaps—and why not? against war itself."

The Veto Issue. As a deep and wholly sincere patriot Mr. Baruch meant to secure total protection for his country from atomic attack by the Russians. Nothing was to be left to chance or to the future. The United States would continue making bombs until the Atomic Development Authority was in complete control of the world, atomically speaking. Then if "a malevolent nation" seized one of its plants punishment must be swift and certain, without any delay due to the Soviet Union's veto power in the Security Council.

Baruch's veto on the veto was wholly logical. If the Russians seized their ADA plant they must not be able to come into the Security Council and prevent quick sanctions against them. Nothing could be more obvious. Nevertheless, the frontal attack on the veto attempted more than could be achieved. The Russians were still sore and smarting from their defeats in the Security Council during the first half of the year, especially from the spanking they had received in the Iran case. The certainty that the West controlled heavy majorities in the UN made the veto more precious than ever to them as a defensive weapon. To attack it was to make failure sure.

Having advance knowledge of the veto prohibition, Alfred Friendly suggested in the ***Washington Post***, on June 9, 1946, that it would be an "unparalleled tragedy" if the negotiations failed on this issue. This opinion was supported by Vera M. Dean, Research Director of the Foreign Policy Association, who wrote that "it was tactically unfortunate that the United States, irked by Russia's frequent invocation of the veto in the Security Council, raised that issue in the Atomic Energy Commission," since this could readily be interpreted in Moscow "as a sinister backdoor move to deprive Russia of the veto which, along with the United States, it had insisted on including in the United Nations Charter."[4]

The issue was, moreover, one which would not be important in the eventuality. If the Russians seized the facilities of the ADA in the Soviet Union the West would be so positive that aggression was intended that no formal veto by the Russians would stand in the way of retaliatory action. The same point would be reached also, though more gradually, in the case of "wilful interference with the activities of the authority." If the West were really alarmed by Russian acts, Russia's veto would not prevent counter action.

Nor would the absence of the veto right prevent the U.S.S.R. from resisting any sanctions taken against her by a majority vote of the Security Council. The veto power is inherent in any world power as great as the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A. Both governments wield such tremendous power, and are so keenly alive to the fact, that neither would permit itself to be punished militarily by vote of any council or commission. If the veto were "abolished" by a vote of such a body it would still be there. In fact the will to resist the

[4] ***Foreign Policy Bulletin,*** **October 11, 1946.**

will of the other, and mainly lesser, powers would be stronger than before. As Samuel Grafton observed, "Nothing has made the veto firmer and harder or has insured its life more than the effort to abolish it."

Actually, he continued, the veto is not the issue. It "became an issue when Russia and the West failed to agree; but our chief problem remains this failure to agree and not the absence of a legal gadget which could stop the mouths of one party to the disagreement."[5]

Mutual Trust Required. Aside from the impossibility of abolishing the Russian veto, or of applying sanctions to the U.S.S.R. without precipitating a third world war, reflection upon the probable course of developments suggests that there would have been danger of constant trouble of a grave character in the operation of the American plan. The instinct of the West would be to keep the number of primary plants in the U.S.S.R. low, for military reasons. We tended strongly also to minimize the use of atomic energy for power, not only because of our superior power resources but also because of a strong feeling that the military danger was so great that the use of atomic energy for power might be foregone altogether. If therefore the Russians insisted on another power plant and were voted down by a majority in the Atomic Energy Commission, as they almost certainly would be, a crisis would arise and if the Russians took drastic action or denounced the atomic charter war could easily result. The opportunities for friction between the AEC and the U.S.S.R. would be continuous and explosive.

Trying to think through the operation of ADA in Russia reveals the dilemma upon which we were impaled. If the Russians would only put their whole confidence in us and give the ADA free scope, trusting us not to turn it against them as a great atomic alliance and believing that we would help them develop atomic power rapidly and generously, real peace would result. Our purposes were not aggressive. We sought only safety for ourselves. If they would only submit loyally to ADA all would be well, with them and us too. A grand cooperative project would advance us all rapidly toward world government and permanent peace.

Conversely, too, if we trusted the Russians we could accept their proposed treaty outlawing atomic bombs and let it go at that. Knowing that they meant us no harm we could go about our business and sleep soundly at night. But since our distrust of the Russians was very great we had to have guarantees, absolute guarantees, made iron bound and fool proof far into the future. To gain our confidence at all they had to give up the veto to begin with, as an advance payment signifying that they would never make us any trouble.

On their part the Russians, feeling that our atomic bombs were a threat to them, demanded that they be reassured by the destruction of the bombs. Then perhaps they would be reassured enough to consider an inspection system. The trouble was not in the Baruch plan; it was in the world. Nations which could not come together in sympathy and understanding could not be saved by legalistic formulas.[6]

[5] **Samuel Grafton,** ***New York Post*****, July 29, 1946.**
[6] ***Ibid.*****, June 19 and 21, 1946.**

Stages. The matter of stages illustrated further the impossibility of agreement on the Baruch plan. Since we did not trust the Russians we would proceed with the greatest caution by stages. The first stage would be a worldwide search by ADA prospectors to locate and catalog all of the known sources of uranium and thorium. ADA officials would necessarily be chosen from various nations, but would be mainly Western since the West had the great bulk of the atomic "know how." They alone had the "proven competence" required. Accordingly, the West would acquire a great deal of military information about the U.S.S.R. which would not be compensated by corresponding Russian gains. In the Russian view their military security would be gravely, perhaps fatally weakened by the minute examination of their realm which would be involved at the very start of the plan.

The last stage in the proposed sequence would be the stoppage of American bomb manufacture, the destruction of our bombs and the turning over of the secrets of their manufacture to the AEC, upon which Russia would be represented. The day on which this supreme discretion would be exercised could not be fixed in the atomic charter. It was left, in the majority report of the AEC in September, to a two-thirds vote of that body. The real gains of the plan to Russia might accordingly be postponed repeatedly and indefinitely, as the West waited for sure proof that the Russians were non-aggressive, cooperative and willing to play the game according to the rules as the West interpreted them.

Was Acceptance Expected? The extreme improbability that the Russians would ever put themselves in this position has led the British scientist Blackett to suggest that some of the American support of the Baruch plan may have been given by those who knew it would fail and that no control would result.[7]

Doubtless important elements did hope that this would be the outcome. After Gromyko had made his proposals, on June 19, the conservative columnist David Lawrence wrote from Washington that there was "quite a sigh of relief here" among those who had never wanted to give up the secret. They had feared that the Russians might accept the Baruch plan.[8] However, this feeling of relief was certainly not shared by Baruch and the able men of affairs who were his principal advisers.[9]

They had been slow to accept the Lilienthal plan as the basis of their plan of action, but long and close study of it had convinced them that it was a great plan, one which would really make the United States, and everybody else, safe from a sudden atomic attack. Careful thought convinced them also that it was the only plan which could achieve this great objective. Deeply steeped in American traditions and in the success of American methods, they came to believe that the plan was not only good but practical.

[7] P. S. Blackett, *Fear, War and the Bomb*, New York, 1949, p. 157; published in England under the title *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, London, Turnstile, 1949.

[8] The *New York Sun*, June 21, 1946.

[9] John M. Hancock, Ferdinand Eberstadt, Herbert B. Swope, Fred Searls, Jr., and Thomas F. Farrell. The group was composed of two bankers, an engineer, a mining expert and a former newspaper man. I was a member of Mr. Baruch's staff, on an intermediate level, during the summer of 1946.

The Lilienthal group had had the same experience. They had been driven by degrees to the plan they proposed. In short, everybody who studied the great problem was forced to come to the same conclusion, that only the heroic step ahead which the Consultants proposed would regain for us the security we had lost at Hiroshima.

Having gone through this stimulating educational experience themselves, and knowing that others had, the Baruch group came to hope and believe that when the Russians went through the same process they would arrive at the same conclusion. After the first round of formal meetings had indicated deadlock the negotiations were accordingly turned into the Scientific Committee, which suited the Russians since one of the two committees they had asked for in their plan was a committee for the exchange of scientific information, at all levels.

This committee had many meetings. The scientists got on well together, so well that the Russians were occasionally restrained from getting too chummy by their political overseers. The discussions all pointed toward the feasibility of international control technically, and the Technical Committee so reported, without dissent.

The difficulty was that the political gulf still remained.

THE CARNEGIE PLAN

At this point it is pertinent to examine another American plan for the international control of atomic energy, the draft convention proposed by the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[10]

The Carnegie report was a complete detailed draft of a treaty. It accepted the report of the Carnegie Subcommittee on Inspection of Raw Materials that a control system could be based on international inspection and built the treaty upon a basis of mutual cooperation between an International Atomic Energy Commission and national commissions in each signatory state. The authority of the IAEC to regulate and control all atomic energy activity was spelled out in great detail. It had full inspection powers, and the power to allocate raw materials among the member states on the basis of need for peaceful purposes. The Commission was to be composed of representatives of the five great powers and of four others. Its decisions were to be by majority vote.

These powers of the AEC were balanced by the full authority of the national commissions to carry on atomic activities in their various domains. The national commission alone had this power. It was bound in many specified ways to enforce the authority of the AEC, which in turn ordinarily

[10] **The Subcommittee members were: George A. Finch, Chairman; Joseph P. Chamberlain, Percy E. Corbett, Malcolm W. Davis, Clyde Eagleton, Manley O. Hudson, Herbert L. May, James T. Shotwell, Edgar Turlington and Louis B. Sohn. The parent committee, under the leadership of Dr. Shotwell, fathered several active subcommittees composed** of **experts in such fields as geology and mining, nuclear physics and law. For text see *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* July 1, 1946.**

worked through it. Each had its field, but working unity was the goal. All military activity was forbidden, unless by authority of the Security Council.

The veto power of the great powers was accepted. In case of violation, reported or suspected, the Commission was bound to invite the suspected state to supply explanations and to join in investigation on the spot. Meanwhile all signatory states would suspend every kind of atomic relations with the state being investigated, including transit and transportation. The Commission's report to the Security Council, which would be simultaneously published, could include recommendations for action. Pending such action all signatories were bound, according to the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, "to retaliate immediately and with all the means at their disposal against any State" which used atomic weapons without a specific authorization of the Security Council.

The Carnegie draft might have been rejected by Russia, because it was based on international inspection and because it provided for essentially the same stages as the American plan did. On the other hand, the paramount authority of the Security Council was accepted, and there was no attack on the idea of national sovereignty. The inspectors and officials of the AEC were forbidden to give orders to any local officials. A national assessor would accompany them for that purpose.

The draft did not guarantee complete security to any signatory. It did not attempt to put it beyond the ability of a great power to violate the treaty. No state was assumed to be malevolent, to be controlled but never trusted. On the contrary, by assuming throughout a willing partnership between the national commissions and the AEC the draft laid a basis for cooperative relationships and for rivalry in living up to obligations. It was erected upon the only foundation which could carry the structure of an undertaking so great, the assumption that the member States would act in good faith to regulate atomic energy for the common good.

Being much more flexible than the official American plan, it left provision for the possible legal use of atomic weapons, by authority of the Security Council and in retaliation for atomic attack, and created an assumption that power development could proceed rapidly in the countries which needed it most, subject to continuous regulation and proof of peaceful use. Undoubtedly the principle of strategic balance would have led the States and the AEC to see that development was not excessive in any one state.

To those who could not see how you could abrogate national sovereignty in one vital field, as under the Lilienthal-Baruch plan, without going the whole way into giving a world state enough powers to prevent war itself, the Carnegie draft seemed dreadfully pedestrian, quaintly like the League of Nations. Certainly, too, it did not leap ahead dramatically. Yet, if accepted, it would have established day-to-day international cooperation in a crucial field. The AEC would have been controlled by the West. The veto would have continued to protect the U.S.S.R. against legal sanctions. The large but not total amount of inspection provided for would have given a corresponding assurance against any surprise atomic aggression, and if it occurred instant

world-wide retaliation would have been both legal and arranged for in advance—in itself a strong deterrent against aggression.

The Carnegie draft did not attempt to restore to North America that nostalgic degree of safety which we had when fleets of American planes could burn an entire Japanese city in a night or demolish a German city with TNT between dawn and dusk, without any fear of retaliation, but it offered a basis for the world control of the atomic menace which might have led to a treaty. At least there was a fair chance that the conciliatory, impartial spirit of the draft might have led to hard negotiation over the definite, detailed provisions concerning inspection and stages, the two key issues posed in the draft.

To avoid any appearance of countering official policy the Carnegie plan was published too late to have any effect on the course of events. When it was issued, on June 17, 1946, the Baruch plan had already received the allegiance of American public opinion. Mr. Baruch's great personal prestige, coupled with the pioneering nature of the proposals, had convinced a great majority that here was a generous offer which the Russians ought to accept. A heavy preponderance of our editors and commentators in press and radio agreed that it was a constructive, forward-looking plan and all public opinion polls showed a large majority in agreement with them. To a somewhat lesser extent this was also true throughout the West, and continues to be true. In the ideological conflict which had already begun the Baruch plan was a marked triumph for the West.

IMPASSE

The Internationalists Quiescent. The diffidence of the Carnegie Endowment in advancing its plan until too late to have influence symbolized the failure of the great body of long term American internationalists to affect the atomic energy negotiations, or the debacle in Russo-American relations after the war. Bemused by the vision of swift passage over into the promised land which was contained in the Acheson-Lilienthal report, our internationalists failed to hold up firmly and early the cautionary signals that their decades of hard experience would have suggested. They waited until the demand for the abolition of the veto polarized all the extremists on both sides. Even then there was no pronounced protest, or organized effort in behalf of moderation. The deaths of Roosevelt and Willkie doubtless demoralized to some extent the large body of moderate internationalists who should have influenced the post-war developments. The violence of the Russian press also helped to silence them, and the violence of our own press and radio largely completed the process.

Nationalist Opinion Vocal. The only pronounced opposition to either the Lilienthal report or the Baruch plan came from the isolationists and nationalists. The Hearst press greeted the Baruch proposal as "An Abject Abandonment of U.S. Sovereignty." Russia might "agree" to abstain from abuse of her power, but "We know too well the utter unreliability of Russian promises and agreements to ever rely upon any of them. Soviet Russia never honors any agreement except in its breach."[11] But there was little dissent about the

[11] **The *New York Journal American*, June 17, 1946.**

generosity of the American plan. Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Senate Atomic Energy Committee, speaking at the Democratic National Convention in 1948, described the Baruch plan as just, generous and "unique in the history of international relations. Never before had a great nation voluntarily offered to give up a winning weapon which it alone possessed, for the sole purpose of promoting the cause of peace and international understanding." This offer was "the most generous in the history of nations." It had become "a beacon to all nations except one."[12]

Making some allowance for campaign oratory this continued to be the American view of the impasse over atomic energy control. Russia's opposition to the plan made it automatically popular with many people. An editorial in the ***Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists***, June 1947, noted that "many of our conservatives ... applaud the Baruch plan only because they noticed that the Soviet Union is violently opposed to it. Otherwise, how could one explain the fact that many a Senator has praised Baruch as a patriot, while denouncing Lilienthal as an internationalist." The editor thought it strange that men should condemn the international control as a sacrifice of our sovereignty and then praise it when "coupled with a second sacrifice of sovereignty—renunciation of the veto."

Deadlock on the Veto Question. It was the expectation that Russia would refuse to give up the veto power and reject inspection of its industrial activities which led the London correspondent of the ***New York Herald Tribune*** to report, June 17, that the belief that Russia would negate the plan "amounts almost to a conviction in official circles here." By June 20 Lippmann had apparently come to the same conclusion, for he attacked the Baruch veto proposal in a strongly worded article. The Baruch plan itself was founded on a powerful American veto, the right to reject any atomic agreement which did not satisfy us, a rejection which would kill any proposed treaty.

On the other hand, Lippmann continued, the Russians could not later veto the control provisions of any treaty which they had once accepted. That is, the day-to-day activities of the ADA spelled out clearly and with precision in the treaty could not be vetoed. As for the other fear revealed by Baruch's veto of the veto, the fear that the Russians would secretly break the treaty by making atomic weapons, that was a contingency which no treaty could solve. The Constitution of the United States was silent on the great issue of what to do if a state seceded or nullified federal law. The United Nations Charter was also mute on the same crucial issue. In both cases the reason was the same; the only remedy left would be war and no veto could prevent its application. It was therefore not true to say that the Constitution or the Charter protected "those who violate their solemn agreements." Nor could any atomic treaty prevent the signatories from violating its provisions.

The veto proposal, Lippmann concluded, was based upon misconceptions of what a treaty could do, both negatively and positively. The idea was dangerous because it would give a majority of other nations the right to vote

[12] *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (hereafter referred to as *B.A.S.)*, September 1948, p. 262.

the United States into war in the future, even without our consent. He did not believe that the Senate could bind any future Congress to go to war. The problem of how or whether to coerce a great power could not be solved in advance.[13]

This view was contested by the ***New York Times***, on June 21, in comparing the Russian and American plans. The ***Times*** thought that any treaty must guarantee the world against an atomic ambush. The international control agency must have "authority beyond any veto power." The ***Herald Tribune*** on the same day thought that the Russian plan had chilled the prospects for agreement but had kept the avenues for negotiation open. Lippmann believed it to be more favorable to the United States militarily than our own plan, since we would be left with the atomic know-how and the means for making atomic bombs quickly for a long time. Merely getting rid of our present supply of atomic bombs would not prevent dangerous national rivalry in developing atomic energy, but neither would it abolish our long head start in the field.

A Legalistic Debate. The dismal outlook for any agreement between the Soviet Union and the West was revealed by two informed comments following the presentation of the American and Russian plans.[14] Anne O'Hare McCormick observed that the quarrels in the Security Council had focused attention on the disagreements among UN members. The dramatization of disputes might be said to have "perpetuated the atmosphere and psychology of war" to such an extent that "the thinking of governments has literally gone stale." She hoped that the Baruch proposals might turn the minds of peoples and governments from the negative to the positive approach to security.

Four days later, on June 23, in a well balanced, impartial article James Reston revealed his conviction that this hope would not materialize. The debate on atomic energy was like all the others. It was "a legalistic debate centering on the specific and the technical" which evaded thecentral issue that the big states did not trust each other and were making "very little progress in removing the source of their distrust." It was generally admitted on both sides "that with good faith either plan could be made to work." Ably summarizing the fears and unilateral actions of both sides he noted that the press on each side daily fomented these fears and attacked the acts of the other side in the United Nations, "where both think they are acting for defensive reasons and fear that the other side is acting with aggressive purpose."

BIKINI

The atomic deliberations in New York were punctuated on July 1 by the test explosion of an atomic bomb at Bikini lagoon in the South Pacific. The target was a large fleet of 98 warships, containing samples of almost every

[13] Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald Tribune*, June 20, 1946. The *Nashville Tennessean* reasoned (July 18 and August 9, 1946) that the veto "simply would not be applicable" to the body of law laid down in the atomic treaty.

[14] The *New York Times*, June 19 and 23, 1946.

kind of fighting ship, including some German and Japanese vessels. It was a large operation, involving 40,000 men. Its purpose seemed to be to demonstrate that the atomic bomb had not made navies obsolete.[15]

Two bombs were exploded. The bomb dropped from the air fell wide of the central ship target, but nevertheless sank five ships and badly damaged fourteen others. It was the underwater explosion, on July 24, which provided the most disturbing evidence, since the ships were covered with such a deadly coating of radioactive material that nothing less than the scraping off of all paint and rust and the replacement of all wooden decks could make the ships habitable, if indeed this would serve.

The peril to mankind of loosing so much radioactivity in the air, water and on the land was sharply dramatized, but there was no marked effect on the atomic negotiations. ***Pravda*** asserted that the tests proved that the United States was not aiming at the restriction of atomic weapons but at their perfection. Intent to influence the negotiations was charged.[16]

THE STRUGGLE OVER DOMESTIC CONTROL

At the end of July a long and closely fought struggle over the domestic control of atomic energy came to a close with the enactment of the McMahon bill. The outcome of this conflict had great implications for the future of the United States and important ones internationally.

The May-Johnson Bill. When President Truman urged the enactment of a law for the domestic control of the atom, on October 3, 1945, the Army was ready with a bill which had been drawn up by a civilian committee after several months' work including conferences with leading atomic scientists. It was promptly introduced in the House by Chairman Andrew D. May of the Military Affairs Committee and Senator Edwin C. Johnson was ready to sponsor it in the Senate. However, Senator Vandenberg objected strenuously to its reference to the Senate Military Affairs Committee, asserting that atomic energy was not a military question and that the Foreign Relations Committee had just as much right to jurisdiction. Since he was supported by Senator Connally and several other Democrats the bill was tabled and a deadlock developed over the question of jurisdiction.

It was broken by the happy thought of a new junior Senator from Connecticut, Brien McMahon, Democrat. He proposed that a special Atomic Energy Committee be appointed and on October 23 the Senate agreed. After a few days' hesitation the President pro-tem of the Senate, Senator McKellar, followed the usual custom and appointed McMahon chairman of the committee of eleven. The other members were the leaders of the two important committees which had stymied each other. This totally unexpected and unpredictable development had very great consequences.

[15] In his *No Place to Hide*, Boston, 1949; London, Hodder, 1949, Dr. David Bradley, who took part in the Bikini tests, says that they did not go according to plan. "The target fleet which was to have steamed back to Pearl Harbor and the Golden Gate, invincible as ever," would remain at Bikini until they could be safely disposed of.

[16] The *New York Times*, July 4, 1946.

In the meantime, Representative May was driving the bill submitted by the armed forces through his committee with his usual efficiency. On October 9 he held a five hour hearing and declared the hearings closed. Four days later he refused to reopen them, but on the 18th he did grant one more session.[17] The McMahon Committee held hearings during the first half of December and in January McMahon presented a bill calling for strong civilian control of atomic energy. Faced with apparently solid support of the Administration for the May-Johnson bill the atomic scientists had formed a federation, on November 9, bringing together 90 per cent of the 1300 scientists who had worked on the war time atomic project. This formidable body pulled strongly for civilian control, while General Groves advocated a board of part time commissioners, with retired army men on it but no scientists. They were not "disinterested." Secretary of the Navy Forrestal closed his testimony to the committee with the statement that "we must not limit the military until the world has reached the pattern we all hope for."[18]

On January 31, Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace testified that the peculiar wording of the May-Johnson Bill "would set up the most undemocratic, dictatorial arrangements that have ever, to my knowledge, been proposed to Congress in a major legislative measure."

Truman For Civilian Control. Two days later McMahon read to the reporters a letter from President Truman, which McMahon had drafted himself hoping to express the views of the most influential members of his committee. "The government must be the exclusive owner and producer of fissionable material." Devices for using it should be made "fully available for private development through compulsory, non-exclusive licensing of private patents." There must be "genuine freedom to conduct independent research" and guarantees that controls over the dissemination of information would not stifle it. The atomic control commission should be composed "exclusively of civilians."[19]

The Vandenberg Amendment. McMahon had made it difficult for the armed forces to denounce the principles of his bill, but he could not keep his own committee from emasculating it. On March 12,1945, after the committee had had dinner with General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz, it voted to provide for a military liaison committee, composed of army and navy men, which would be appointed by the President. It would have the right to know the full proceedings of the committee and to appeal to the President on any matter concerning national security. The amendment was proposed by Senator Vandenberg and adopted first by a vote of 6 to 1 and later by a poll of 10 to 1 when all members were present. Vandenberg declared that world conditions made it imperative to give the military a major role.[20]

Chairman McMahon was alone in opposing this development, and he was similarly helpless when Senator Thomas C. Hart, of Connecticut, a former

[17] *Ibid*., October 10, 14, 19 and 31.

[18] A lively and penetrating account of this struggle is contained in Tris Coffin's *The Missouri Compromise,* Boston, 1947. See pp. 218–24.

[19] *Ibid*., pp. 223–5.

[20] UP dispatch, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 13, 1945.

Admiral, proposed an amendment to create an advisory committee of nine to advise the civilian commission.

The Vandenberg amendment appeared to be satisfactory on its face, yet in operation it would have given the military men the controlling voice. If they did not like what the civilian commission was doing they could always go to the President and tell him that the national security was affected or endangered and it would be very difficult for him to deny them. McMahon quickly realized this and though completely isolated in his blue-ribbon committee he declared on March 14:

> "Of course the military should be consulted on the military aspects of atomic energy and this is as far as any civilian commission should be required to go.
>
> "The military is noted for its reactionary position in the field of scientific research and development. The most successful weapons of war throughout history have been conceived and developed by civilians and the atomic bomb was no exception.
>
> "It is because I am concerned about the nation's security, as well as the development for peaceful use of atomic energy, that I want civilians to control this force unhindered by the military."

Asserting that the Vandenberg amendment would give the military men power to "check every telephone call, every memorandum written and the hiring of personnel," McMahon declared that he would carry his fight to the floor of the Senate and, if necessary, to the country.[21]

Strong Public Protest. Then it developed that McMahon was not alone in the nation. His courage rallied support. On March 21, representatives of 59 civilian organizations met in Washington to organize a drive to defeat military control of the atom. The Federation of Atomic Scientists delivered a petition to the McMahon committee with 8,000 important names on it. Many other bulky petitions poured in, along with resolutions voted by organizations in all parts of the country. Some 70,972 letters were received, all but a half dozen backing civilian control. Of these 34,725 were directed against the May-Johnson bill and 24,851 against the Vandenberg amendment.[22]

Civilian Control Restored. Beneath this avalanche of protest the McMahon Committee thought again. The meeting was held on April 2 and in a new Vandenberg amendment the military liaison committee lost jurisdiction over the "common defense and security." Its territory shrank to "the military applications of atomic energy." It would also be appointed by the Secretaries of War and Navy, and would exercise its right of appeal to them, instead of to the President. Senator Vandenberg told the press that he "found in exploring the situation that we all have a common objective in view."[23]

Military Control Provided in the House. The principle of civilian control, thus secured and buttressed by public demand, remained firmly in the Senate

[21] **The *New York Times*, March 15, 1946; the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 13, 1946.**
[22] **The *New York Times*, March 28, April 12, 1946.**
[23] ***Ibid.*, April 3, 1946.**

bill, but Andrew May was still to be reckoned with. He was on the point of reporting the May-Johnson bill to the House, in the wake of the Vandenberg amendment, when the outcry against it deterred him. So he waited until the McMahon bill came into his hands, while rumours spread over Washington that the scientists were a bunch of Communists trying to seize control of the government. General Groves was at May's elbow, advising him about amendments.[24]

One amendment placed two military men on the five man atomic commission. Another authorized the Army to continue its atomic work independently, which would mean control of the big atomic plants. The Army was also authorized, with Presidential authority, to keep on making atomic bombs. "We are very definitely giving the Army more control," declared committee member J. Parnell Thomas, Republican, of New Jersey.[25]

Senate Victory. After a confused and angry debate in the House the McMahon bill was passed with enough amendments to militarize it thoroughly. Then it went to a conference committee of the two Houses, where McMahon and his assistants patiently conducted an educational seminar for the representatives of the House. Little by little they were won over. Vandenberg did yeoman service for the Senate bill. Every minor point was conceded to the House while the major issues were held back.

Then another unexpected event occurred. The senate War Investigating Committee which had been investigating Andrew May's war time connections with a Mid-Western munitions combine, announced that it was summoning May to testify. That evening May's physician announced that he had had a heart attack and he retired to Kentucky and disappeared from public life.

The McMahon bill emerged from conference without any important changes and became law on August 1, 1946. Reflecting our acute preoccupation with the A-bomb it was the greatest grant of power ever made by the Congress at any time. Nevertheless, the commission was so hedged about with restrictions that its work was seriously hampered. For this reason no satisfactory team work with Great Britain and Canada on atomic research could be developed. Nor could the Congress or the American people know what the great atomic empire was doing. Even the McMahon committee could not know how many atomic bombs we had, a fact which was hidden also from nearly all Executive officials. Both military and foreign policy became to a large degree blindfolded. The "atomic jitters" produced the twin illusions that secrecy equals security and that the A-bomb is an absolute weapon.[26]

Partly for these very reasons it was a fortunate thing for us that the accidents of McMahon's advent to leadership and May's sudden exit from it enabled public opinion, led by the atomic scientists, to achieve civilian control of atomic energy. An able commission was eventually confirmed, after a long drawn out fight by Senator McKellar on Chairman Lilienthal, composed of

[24] Coffin, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 233; the *New York Times,* June 20, 1946.

[26] Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert of the *New York Times,* 'Two Great Delusions About the A-Bomb," the *Times Magazine,* July 10, 1949, pp. 9 and 32.

David E. Lilienthal, Robert F. Bacher, Sumner T. Pike, Lewis Strauss and W. W. Waymack.

Thereafter this commission rebuilt the atomic organization and devoted the great bulk of its energy to making A-bombs. The effect upon the Soviet bloc was not reassuring, but the American people and their allies felt that the bombs were not intended for offensive use and that they were not in the hands of military officials who might honestly advise on tense occasions that their preventive use was imperatively demanded. Had this been the case world tension would have been higher than it was in the uneasy years which followed.

DIPLOMATIC SPARRING IN PARIS AND THE UN

The Paris Peace Conference. On July 28,1946, the conference to make peace with the satellite states met in Paris. Twenty-one nations were represented, those which had fought the Axis or its satellites.

Battle was at once joined over procedure, whether recommendations to the Council of Foreign Ministers should be made by ordinary or two-thirds majorities. Molotov, feeling that he might be able to control a third of the votes plus one argued for the two-thirds vote and contended long against deciding things by "a game of votes." Unanimity was the goal. The Russian preference for decisions among the smallest possible number of great powers was so evident that many of the delegates were offended and voted with the Anglo-American side more consistently than they might have. The Soviet charge of bloc formation had the effect of consolidating a hostile bloc.[27] On August 9 the conference voted, 15 to 6, for recommendations by majority votes. Byrnes denounced the talk of an Anglo-Saxon bloc as "loose and wicked." The ***Herald Tribune***, on August 10, doubted the wisdom of this statement in a dispute in which there was much right on both sides.

Eventually the conference debated the draft treaties prepared by the Foreign Ministers and many other details not decided by them. It adopted 53 recommendations by a two-thirds majority and 41 by a simple majority, before it adjourned on October 15. Of these 47 and 24 respectively were accepted by the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, near the end of its session on December 11, when Molotov ended six weeks of additional opposition and accepted them rapidly.[28]

The Paris Peace Conference had been something new in the history of international relations. There was very little negotiation in it. Instead there was a long series of public speeches ventilating charges and counter charges. In the end the Russians held their ground on virtually all important points. They succeeded in demonstrating repeatedly the unfairness of making decisions in Eastern Europe by the majority votes of small and distant countries. On the other hand, it was not possible for the democracies to agree that the lesser allies who had actually fought the Axis should have no voice whatever in the fixing of terms of peace for the Axis satellites.

[27] **For texts, see the *New York Herald Tribune*, August 7, 1946. Also Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 138–55.**

[28] Byrnes, ***Op. cit.*, pp. 153–4.**

More fundamental was the question whether our strategy had been right in making peace with the satellites first, instead of attacking the central problem of Germany at once. Lippmann questioned this decision sharply on October 15. He contended that Byrnes and his senatorial colleagues had failed because they were attempting the impossible. They had been trying by force of argument to reduce the power and influence of the Soviet Union in territories occupied by the Red Army. In other words they had been trying to talk the Soviets out of their conquests in Eastern Europe, challenging them where they were strongest and where we had least to offer. Then, argument having failed, we had resorted by means of the Paris Conference to appeals to majority votes and public opinion. In this effort we had lost again, since we could arouse Western opinion but could not reach opinion in the Soviet orbit. It was an unequal propaganda contest. At Paris the new Soviet satellites had all been obliged to commit themselves publicly and irrevocably, thus consolidating the Soviet position in East Europe. If the same method were applied to Germany it would end in auction bidding between the East and the West for the favor of the German nationalists. Soviet power in Eastern Europe and in Germany could be reduced only as part of a world settlement.[29]

> We had spent a year in making peace with the satellites in the Russian orbit in the vain hope that such treaties would compel the Red army to retire from Eastern Europe, said Lippmann. If we were ever to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union we would have to begin with a serious discussion of the world distribution of power among the Big Three.[30]

At the UN Assembly. On October 23 the United Nations Assembly meeting was opened in New York by President Truman. Afterward Molotov ignored diplomatic protocol by walking up to the President to tell him that he had made a great speech. Mr. Truman had said: “The exercise of neither veto rights nor majority rights can make peace.”

In his opening speech Molotov maintained that there was no doubt or hesitation in the Soviet Union that peaceful competition and friendly co-operation between nations were “entirely in keeping with the interests of our country.” He strongly opposed the Churchill doctrine and objected to the Baruch plan as attempting to protect in veiled form the monopolistic position of the United States. He denied that the atomic bomb was a decisive weapon against ground troops. Calling for action on an earlier Soviet proposal to count the troops and air bases of members of the United Nations in the territory of other members, he proposed that the manufacture and use of atomic weapons be banned and a general reduction of armaments initiated.

Molotov’s counter attack was broad. He fixed attention on Spain and Greece. He called attention to British and American troops dispersed in many parts of the world. He appealed from our preoccupation with the atom to a general reduction of arms.

The Western powers countered by amending the troop count proposal to

[29] **Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 15, 1946.**
[30] ***New York Herald Tribune*, October 29, 31, 1946.**

include all troops in home countries. Molotov fought this move, coming out the short end of seven of the eight ballots involved, "but retained good humor and equanimity all the way."[31] Eventually the troop and bases count was dropped over Russia's objection after she had almost secured an impromptu British acceptance for a count of both troops and weapons—A-bombs !

Atomic Control and Inspection Accepted. In the matter of general disarmament Molotov made greater progress. This was partly because, on November 28, he quoted a recent statement by Stalin that "strict international control of atomic energy is necessary" and followed it up by declaring that "special organs of inspection" should be established, within the framework of the Security Council. He asked for two commissions, one to control the general reduction of arms and the other to police the prohibition of atomic energy use for military purposes.[32]

This was far from an acceptance of the American plan for the control of atomic energy but it was a clear acceptance of international inspection as a means of implementing "strict international control."

Sir Hartley Shawcross for Great Britain welcomed the proposal but warned against words, pious resolutions and "a mere sham, a fraud to be used for the purposes of political propaganda or to lull unsuspecting peoples into a false sense of security." Others suspected that Russia would insist that only Russian "inspectors" operate inside the U.S.S.R. Vishinsky was hammered repeatedly, on the 29th, to determine whether the Security Council could veto inspection.

Some suspicions were lessened slightly, on December 4, when Molotov stated that the U.S.S.R. would consider the adoption of three points as essential first steps toward disarmament. The third was that "it is necessary to establish a reliable system of international control over the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons which will allow for inspection in all countries." Since the United States' resolution was closest to that of the U.S.S.R. he would take it as the basis for discussion. He proposed an amendment to establish, within the framework of the Security Council, special organs of inspection. To dispel any misunderstanding about the application of the unanimity rule he stated that in establishing control commissions the Security Council would act by the unanimity rule, laying down the rules under which they would operate. After that the unanimity rule had nothing to do with the work of the control commissions. No permanent member could "veto" the implementation of the control system. Any attempt to prevent an inspection would constitute a violation of the Security Council's decision.[33]

This statement did not guarantee that the U.S.S.R. would accept a system of inspection free and untrammelled enough to satisfy the West, but it did establish that the Soviet Union would accept international inspection for the control of armaments and that the veto would not apply to its day to day Kooperation. In case of a serious dispute the veto would still apply in the Security council against any sanctions against the U.S.S.R. Obviously everything

[31] John G. Rogers, *New York Herald Tribune,* November 28, 1946.
[32] The *New York Times,* November 29, 1946.[33] *B.A.S.*, January 1947, pp. 6–8.

would depend upon the willingness of the Soviet Union to make the system work. That, however, would be true of other nations as well.

The American Plan Adopted

On December 5, Baruch urged the American plan for atomic control in the Atomic Energy Commission, warning that "the world is not to be fooled by lip service. The world will resent and reject deception."[34] On the 16th he pressed for a quick vote, a move which was resisted by Canada. General McNaughton felt that the passage of the Assembly resolution made necessary a rewording of the American draft. Other delegates were reported to be disturbed.[35] On December 20, the UNAEC voted 10 to 0, Russia and Poland abstaining, to accept the American plan in principle, subject to redrafting. The Canadian delegation objected especially to going beyond the Assembly resolution to press for the abolition of the veto on sanctions.[36] Britain also sought to de-emphasize the elimination of the veto on punishments.[37] Baruch, however, demanded that the veto on violations be specifically excluded. Otherwise the United States would not take part in any atomic control plan and the American people would withdraw support from the United Nations, if there was any possibility that a criminal state would escape the consequences of its acts. Both Britain and France urged that the veto be not mentioned. The commission seemed to be about evenly divided.[38] On the 29th the ***Herald Tribune*** thought there was "a queer and disheartening air of unreality" over the controversy, with "the primary target of the American drive—Russia" contributing nothing but eloquent silence, but the ***Times*** was hopeful that Russia would take "the logical final step, by which she and other nations will surrender the power to do evil in return for guarantees of lasting peace."

On the 28th Gromyko countered by asking the Security Council to create the disarmament commission called for by the Assembly, with instructions to report a plan for general disarmament within 90 days. On December 30 the UNAEC adopted the Baruch plan, including the veto on punishments, 10 to 0, Russia and Poland abstaining. In a statement before the vote Gromyko made no criticism of its technical findings and accepted as "indisputable" the necessity for a control system with real powers to control and to insure that nations fulfil their obligations under it. Sanctions, he insisted, must be subject to the unanimity rule in the Council.[39]

In reviewing the veto issue once more, Lippmann insisted that it was unreal, since there would never be "a violator" of the proposed atomic treaty. No nation would dare to violate it unless it had first assembled what it believed to be a winning coalition of nations. Then the veto would not matter,- The problem was not to insure that Russia would never use her veto, but to

34 **The *New York Times*, December 6, 1946.**
35 **UP dispatch, *Buffalo Evening News*, December 20, 1946.**
36 **Thomas J. Hamilton, the Toronto *Globe and Mail*, December 24, 1946.**
37 **Peter Kihss, *New York Herald Tribune*, December 27, 1946.**
38 ***Ibid.*, December 28, 1946; the *New York Times*, December 28, 1946.**
39 ***New York Herald Tribune*, December 31,1946.**

achieve a world wide settlement which would prevent two rival coalitions between which there could be no mediator.[40]

Thus ended, for years at least, any serious prospect of achieving control of atomic weapons. The attempt foundered on the rock of the veto, an obstacle which had become terribly real in the view of most Americans, and was a chimera in the opinion of others. Whichever it was it prevented the further exploration of any paths toward armament control, either the bright vision which came out of the Lilienthal Committee or the more prosaic routes proposed by others and opened up in the late 1946 negotiations.

On January 5, 1947, Baruch and all of his principal advisors resigned from the American delegation to UNAEC. On February 18 Gromyko submitted twelve amendments to the American plan. He rejected interference with the veto, but agreed that violations of atomic controls could be treated as "international crimes" and that article 51 of the UN charter applied to them. Inspectors should be "unhindered by national or local authorities," but the right of inspection should not be unlimited.[41]

Compromise Not Considered. On January 20, the Council of the British Atomic Scientists Association said it was unfortunate that the veto question should have been raised to such prominence in the early phase of the discussion. It was clear that there could not be two independent bodies responsible for the enforcement of international agreements. Since the ADA could not supersede the Security Council, it had to be subject to the Council in matters of policy. It could not take upon itself the functions of defining and punishing a violation of the agreement.

The British scientists also questioned whether it was essential that the ADA should have full ownership of plants, involving the right to decide whether power plants could be built, or power used. Perhaps only the right to see that dangerous products were consumed in power plants would be sufficient.

It was desirable also that the right of inspection should be "circumscribed as far as possible and should not be used as a means of excessive prying into legitimate industrial or other activities." Inspection which limited itself to satisfaction that a given mine or plant was not handling large quantities of uranium or thorium, or that it was not a separation plant, should supply a basis for compromise.[42]

These proposals offered a reasonable and promising basis for a control system, one not absolutely perfect but probably workable, but they got little support in the United States. Scientist Harold C. Urey, of the University of Chicago, was able to see that the government of the U.S.S.R. believed that the proposed ADA "supported overwhelmingly by the western democracies would result in economic and military domination of the Soviet Union," but Senator Brien McMahon was so convinced of the righteousness of the American plan, by repeated examination and re-examination of it in the early hours of the dawn, that on May 21, 1947, he proposed a world assembly to invite all peace loving nations to adhere to the plan and to declare that

[40] Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald Tribune*, December 31, 1946.
[41] *B.A.S.*, March, 1947. **42 *Ibid* p. 42.**

any nation which refused by a specified date to accept the plan would be "denominated an aggressor." He asserted that "for the first time in human history the failure to agree to a sane, effective and righteous control of a weapon of war constitutes in and of itself an act of aggression."[43]

If a man as liberal and God-fearing as Senator McMahon could come thus to the brink of a preventive war, the number of more bellicose Americans who had arrived at that point must have been large. Dr. David Bradley has recorded the comment of one of the editors of a well known magazine, who said: "The very possession of atomic energy by a foreign country constitutes, to my mind, an act of aggression—and should be taken care of now."[44]

LATER DEVELOPMENTS

A Russian Control Plan. Perhaps it was a realization of this state of mind in high American places which led the U.S.S.R. to propose on June 11, 1947, something like the outline of a Soviet control plan. An International Control Commission would establish its own rules. Its personnel would be selected on an international basis. It would periodically inspect mines and plants, carry on special investigations when suspicion arose, observe the fulfilment of prescribed rules, request information and explanations and make recommendations both to the governments and to the Security Council.[45]

The Soviet scheme was detailed enough to have served as a basis for negotiation in a different atmosphere, or perhaps if advanced a year earlier, but in the developing "climate of enmity and suspicion between the United States and the Soviet Union" it was riddled, on March 29, 1948, by a report to the UNAEC on the part of the representatives of Great Britain, Canada, China and France, the British delegate reporting. This long document rejected the Soviet demand for a prior prohibition of atomic weapons and showed in the greatest detail that the Soviet inspection plan would not give the security embodied in the American plan.[46]

Third Report. The UNAEC therefore presented a Third Report, on May 17, 1948, ending its work and referring its assignment back to the Security Council. The vote was 9 to 2, the Soviet Union and the Ukraine opposing.[47]

Simultaneous Treaties Conceded. When the General Assembly met in Paris in the autumn of 1948 the United States sought "to obtain an overwhelming condemnation of the Soviet Union as the one power responsible for the deadlock of atomic energy control negotiations, and to have the General Assembly sanction ***sine die*** suspension of the UNAEC."[48] The Soviet Union countered this drive with an offer to negotiate a control convention simultaneously with a treaty to outlaw the atomic bomb. Up to this point Russia had always insisted that outlawry must come first. This concession, coupled with a widespread feeling among the small powers that the negotiations must not end even if without result, led to the passage of a resolution asking the AEC to try again.[49]

[43] ***Ibid.*, June, 1947, p. 139; July, 1947, p. 192.**
[44] ***New York Herald Tribune Weekly Book Review*, May 29, 1949.**
[45] ***B.A.S.*, August, 1947, p. 219.** [46] ***Ibid.*, May, 1948.** [47] ***Ibid.*, June, 1948.**
[48] **Editorial, *B.A.S.*, November, 1948.** [49] ***B.A.S.*, January, 1949, p. 9.**

The Deadlock Analyzed. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists felt that the Russian concession of two simultaneous treaties should have been matched by an offer on our part to drop the veto question. The Russian idea of a prior treaty to outlaw the bomb had always been trivial and ineffective. On the other hand, the veto question obscured the true spirit of our plan, which was to create a common stake of all nations in the development of atomic energy. This community of interest was to have been the main deterrent to violations and the knowledge that they would not remain secret the main safeguard. The veto issue had changed the spirit of the whole plan, focusing attention on the capacity, or incapacity, of the UN to impose sanctions on the U.S.S.R.[50]

In other words, the American plan could succeed only if we managed to convince the Russians of the advantages, to them, of a great cooperative undertaking. It was bound to fail if the emphasis was upon the certainty of means for punishing them. This was like asking a man to join a ball game after signing a written contract that he would be soundly thrashed the first time he violated the rules or irritated the umpire.

In his long analysis of the failure of UNAEC, Edward A. Shils, a sociologist of the Universities of Chicago and London, held that the veto issue had opened the breach and kept it open. On their part the Soviets had been dilatory, slow in deciding against management control and slower still in coming to accept inspection. They had also refused constantly to clothe their June 11, 1947, proposals with reassuring details. Throughout the whole period the Russians had been rigid and stiff necked, yet the Americans had done nothing to telescope the period during which other nations would be under Control while we still retained bombs. Nor did we make any concessions to the Russians on the prohibitory convention, such as an offer to outlaw the use of A-bombs, but not their production, on the model of the poison gas treaty so often cited by the Russians. The two apparently spectacular concessions made by the Soviets had not been matched by anything comparable on our part. Indeed,Shils concluded, American zeal for ourcontrol scheme seemed to have been replaced by the desire to use our morally advantageous position for propaganda purposes.[51]

What Followed? What could be done next was the subject of a number of articles. Daniel F. Cavers, of the Harvard University Law School, demonstrated that the Commission had left virtually untouched the three major problems involved in the application of its control plan: (1) sanctions without veto, (2) strategic balance, and (3) stages. Discussion of the latter would show, for example, that ADA plants would have to be distributed among the two blocs of nations, presumably equally, not among fifty nations.[52]

British scientist M. L. Oliphant felt that some better method of negotiation would have to be found. In the early days of the UNAEC, “where there was no discussion, no spontaneity, but only political speech, the scientific advisors present knew they had failed.” British physicist N. F. Mott thought the best hope now lay in falling back upon inspection, perhaps centering around two

[50] ***B.A.S.*, November, 1948.**
[51] ***Ibid*., July, 1948, pp. 205–10.**
[52] ***Ibid*., December, 1948, p. 355.**

atomic research laboratories, each containing scientists from both the U.S.S.R. and the West. He warned that in any atomic war between these two giants Britain would be destroyed by the improved V-2 weapons armed with atomic warheads if the Russians could occupy the channel ports, and atomic bombs could not stop them from doing so. This sobering thought was also stressed by the Council of the British Atomic Scientists in July, 1948. The Council was sure that Western Europe would be devastated but did not believe that either of the titans could win a war quickly, over a great power possessing widely dispersed industries, with atomic weapons alone.[53]

TOWARD AN ATOMIC BLITZ

Such considerations did not restrain some American military men from publicly considering the use of the A-bomb as a means of mass destruction. On May 17,1948, ***Newsweek*** reported a speech by General George C. Kenney, commander of the Strategic Air Command, and on July 5, 1948, ***Life*** featured an article by General Carl Spaatz, retired Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. Assuming that we might be forced into war soon by Soviet aggressiveness, both discussed in a matter of fact way the atomic bombing of Soviet cities and industrial centers. The editors of ***B.A.S.*** thought it was both morally and politically wrong for generals and magazines with mass circulation to combine in such propaganda. It was politically wrong because it advertised an intention to war on the masses of the Soviet people and warned all peoples that we would make such use of our power. Articles of this kind also soothed in advance the moral revulsion which we should have against such slaughter. Having already achieved the leadership in the mass killing of civilians, were we now being conditioned for genocide itself? Americans should awaken to the realization that if the world is not organized for peace they themselves "will become co-responsible for the most gigantic and indiscriminate mass murder in history."[54]

In a second article in ***Life***, August 16, 1948, General Spaatz himself warned that "In Germany we ruined an industrial and commercial complex that must be rebuilt if Europe is ever to stand on its own feet again. In Japan we persisted in carrying the war to the home cities of an already beaten enemy." We might win another war, "but what sort of victory would it be, and what would be its rewards, if it required the destruction of half the world?"

"At the First Sign of Aggression." Others were not deterred by such a prospect. Lt.-General James H. Doolittle asserted in a public speech that "the fact that we and we alone have the atomic bomb and the means of delivering it with assurance and precision to any point on the earth is the greatest deterrent to Russia's planned aggression." We must, he continued, "be pre-[v] pared, physically, mentally and morally, to drop atom bombs on Russian centers of industry at the first sign of aggression. She must be made to realize that we will do so, and our own people must be conditioned to the necessity for this type of retaliation."[55]

[53] ***Ibid.*, December, 1948, p. 365.**
[54] ***Ibid.*, September, 1948, p. 258.**
[55] ***New York Herald Tribune*, May 1, 1949.**

What American generals would say if a similar threat were uttered from Moscow does not need to be detailed. Nor do we need to imagine how the average American would feel if told that Russian A-bombs would descend upon his cities "at the first sign of aggression." That is an exceedingly elastic term. It could cover any step to promote or conserve American national interests, as we conceived them.

By 1949 it was a commonplace that the United States commanded air bases all around the perimeter of the Soviet Union. On March 20, 1949, the ***New York Times*** published a map showing our bases encircling Russia, except for a south Asiatic gap.

"Within a Week y A month later Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, told the world what these bases were for. Speaking in the House he explained that if there should be another war we would have, after the signing of the Atlantic Pact, "ample land bases and within a week we could blast every nerve center" in the Soviet Union. Of course troops for occupation would be necessary, but why not let our allies "contribute some of the boys necessary to occupy enemy territory after we have demoralized and annihilated [it] from the air?"[56]

This diplomatic masterpiece put into few words the idea of the atomic blitz which dominated the thinking of so many American leaders in the first post-Hiroshima years. For us it would be a cheap, bloodless operation. Usually no occupation was envisaged. Cannon added the embellishment that if there was bloody ground work to do, our Allies would be good for that. This was hardly an alluring prospect for the average European, as he did not wish to be liberated from Russian occupation by great American air fleets.

"Promptly and Without Compunction." Usually the previews of the atomic destruction of Russia were preceded by the qualifying phrase "if Russia attacks," but occasionally this preliminary was dispensed with. On February 12, 1946, Dr. Virgil Jordan, President of the National Industrial Conference Board, an organization supported by large corporations, made an address at the Union League Club in Philadelphia. His distinguished audience included many leading American industrialists, and his address was published both as a pamphlet and in ***Vital Speeches*** for May 1, 1946.[57]

Dr. Jordan excoriated the New Deal, denying that there was "that New Deal revolution which was indigenous, native or natural to the mind or morals of America." It was as much and as fundamentally a foreign invasion as

[56] ***New York Herald Tribune*, April 18, 1949.**

Within a few days the following report of "Man Eater Cannon's" lucubrations appeared in every newspaper in the Soviet Union: "With the signing of the North Atlantic pact we received the necessary bases. The only thing we now need is planes to deliver the bomb. We must deal a blow at Moscow and other cities of Russia within a week after the beginning of a future war. In three weeks we must turn into ruins every military center of the Soviet Union. It is unnecessary for us to send our troops there in a future war as we did during the last one. We must equip soldiers of other countries and let them send their youth to death instead of our sending our youth there."

[57] **The *Philadelphia Record* reported, on February 13, an attendance of 500 at the dinner. The report of Dr. Jordan's speech was headlined: "Use Atom Bomb As Police Club, Speaker Urges."**

though an army of Nazi soldiers, administrators and economists, or Soviet commissars had landed in Chesapeake Bay and occupied the capital. But the source of "such a conspiracy to sterilize the strength and paralyze the purpose of America" was to be found in "the alarming image of Communist Russia and its manners, morals and economics."

Russia, said Jordan, is a "primitive, impoverished, predatory Asiatic despotism" which "rests today as it did in the time of Tamerlane or Attila on a vast pyramid of human skulls." It is "empty of any real capacity, power or purpose except that of plunder and oppression. Soviet Russia is insolvent in everything but in resources of insolence, intrigue, treachery and terrorism, bankrupt of all assets but brutality and bluff, which since the war she has capitalized to the utmost in the forced march of communist imperialism through Europe, Asia and the Arctic, almost to the shores of Alaska."

In these words of hatred Dr. Jordan dissolved that Great Power which had in a short space of time created a heavy industry strong enough to provide the fundamentals, and the trained army, for defeating the mighty German war machine. In the same spirit he transferred Russia's advances in Europe, Asia, "and the Arctic," whatever that meant, from war operations into "the forced march of communist imperialism" ***after the war.***

Lumping the democratic socialism of England with the dictatorial socialism of Russia, as if they were not the bitterest of enemies, Jordan constructed a fatal encirclement for the United States. He alleged that the ideas accepted in England and Russia "assume it as an imperative condition for their success that this country be brought within the same system permanently." "The brutal fact is," he asserted, "that the war has left us facing an encircling world of beggars or robbers, whom it has bankrupted of spiritual and material resources for peaceful, self-supporting life henceforth."

Being thus encircled, what were we to do? It was "either-or," everything or nothing, either "socialist serfdom" or "economic freedom" for the whole world, a choice from which the bankrupt UN could not save us. On the contrary, it was "a massive device directed to the end of immobilizing, sterilizing, sapping and dissipating the power of a free America in the determination of world affairs."

The grim "dilemma" facing us was this: "We have in our hands, almost alone, the decisive instrument of overwhelming military and industrial strength." The American people are forced to subdue the world "or it will destroy them." Let us therefore "proceed to the inescapable task before us swiftly and in the full confidence that at this crucial moment we still command the power to implement and complete it."

"Let us first offer" [Jordan continued] "the utmost capacity of our economic power for reconstruction to every people who will undertake to abolish all national military expenditure and disarm down to the level of the local constabulary. Let us, secondly, demand the unlimited right of continuous inspection and control of every industrial operation and process, of every public policy which may have the most remote relationship to armament and warfare. And finally, let us make, keep and improve our atomic bombs for this imperative purpose; let us suspend them in principle over every place in

the world where we have any reason to suspect evasion or conspiracy against this purpose; and let us drop them in fact, promptly and without compunction wherever it is defied."

" ***Pax Americana.*** No Nazi exponent of the right of Germany to rule the world had ever stated the claim more baldly. Jordan, of course, stated his purpose in high terms, to give the world "peace and freedom." Otherwise, "America and all that it connotes or signifies in human welfare will finally be forever erased."

In this fashion was the doctrine of inevitable war married to the dogma of preventive war. The ***Pax Americana*** must be established at once and enforced by the atomic bomb. Jordan knew that our power was overwhelming both militarily and industrially. He so stated, but he had no confidence in the ability of American capitalism to maintain itself in the future. If it didn't smash the powerless, "insolvent," "bankrupt" Soviet Union now, then all was lost. This derelict monster with an impossible economic system would erase America finally and forever.

Illogic could hardly go further, or more effectively convince the Russians that the United States is aggressive, bent like the Germans on world imperialism or downfall. All Marxist doctrine aside, there can be no doubt what we would think if we read similar statements from highly placed Russian leaders, some talking calmly of obliterating many millions of Americans, at the first sign of aggression, and others demanding the total abolition of armaments outside the Soviet Union, a demand to be enforced with atomic bombs, dropped "promptly and without compunction."

It is important to remember also the date of this wild demand for American world hegemony. It was February 12, 1946, before the Russians had rejected our plan for the control of atomic energy and while the Cold War was still young. In other words, it expressed the long term feelings of the speaker. The Russian leaders would be naïve indeed if they did not take account of utterances like these by highly placed Americans. The American people should also assess their full significance, for no world imperium enforced by atomic bombs could be administered by a free people. We would have to accept fascism in order to maintain the attempt to rule the world.

The feelings of a powerful segment of the top strata of American society are a factor of permanent importance. Fear of communism merges into hatred of democratic socialism, the New Deal, the Fair Deal and every other governmental limitation on the unlimited acquisition of wealth and economic power.

SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES

1. *Could An Atomic Blitz Destroy the Soviet Government?*

In 1949 a strong segment of the psychology of the Cold War was based upon the belief that in the A-bomb we had achieved a weapon which could swiftly and cheaply destroy the Red monster in its lair. From a ring of friendly bases around the Soviet Union the great American planes would take off and within hours Moscow, Leningrad, Vladivostock and scores of other cities would be smoking, radioactive ruins.

The most fervid thinking of this type did not go much further. With their cities and industries smashed, and many millions of dead or wounded, the Soviet Government would cease to exist and those of the "enslaved" Soviet peoples who remained would gladly throw off their chains and espouse free enterprise again. Slightly less embattled thinkers granted that enough nuclei of the Communist Party would remain to continue the war, and even to occupy Western Europe, but added that our bombers would smash their supply lines so thoroughly that the Red armies would have to go back home again. It would be bad for Western Europe again for a time. Even Britain might be severely mauled, but it would not be necessary to conscript and send over any great American armies. The bombers would do the job, and at the cost of only a few billions. We would be rid of the Red nightmare forever and the world could breathe again.

A much larger number of people whose anti-Soviet feelings were not so virulent doubted that it would be quite that simple, but believed that if the Russians overstepped somewhere the line laid down by the Truman Doctrine, our A-bombers could smash them so thoroughly that, though all arms would have to be used, it would be a relatively cheap war, one which would settle everything by smashing the last remaining Ism.

We Would Win. Probably a larger number still, of those who felt that the Reds must be scotched while we were much the strongest, believed that the war would be very costly and probably long, but were nevertheless sure that we would "win" it. This probability was so strong as to amount almost to a certainty, given an all-out effort on our part. Our undamaged technology was so superior to the devastated Russian industrial structure that the final military result could hardly be in doubt, a knowledge which fortified our leaders in taking the offensive in the Cold War at vital points. It was this knowledge, said Warburg, which made our foreign policy "reckless and irresponsible."[58]

Belief in the world sovereignty of the A-bomb also dominated military thinking. The ***New York Herald Tribune*** observed, on April 15, 1949, that "there cannot be much mistake about the present tendency. It is all in the direction of concentration upon the Air Force, upon the strategic bombing theory of warfare and upon the atomic bomb."

"Smash the Soviet MonsterThe most ruthless advocate of the A-blitz was Major George Fielding Eliot, wartime military writer for the ***New York Herald Tribune.*** He argued that we had, in mid-1949, 552 big planes which could drop on the Soviet Union ***in one mission*** twice as much destructive force as we dropped on Germany in two years of intensive warfare. We had enough A-bombs to blast all of Russia's industrial centers, centers of authority (i.e. cities), railway centers and oil fields. The bombers would get through to the targets. Then the Soviet armies in West Europe would lose heart and become relatively harmless (instead of exacting a terrible vengeance upon the Europeans). The American National Guard divisions and the British Territorials could probably take care of them. «

[58] **James P. Warburg, *Last Call for Common Sense*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1949, p. 19.**

If the Soviet Union were not promptly destroyed by air Eliot thought West Europe would become a hostage against the destruction of Russia by A-bombs. The Russians would threaten the complete massacre of the West Europeans, if Russia were A-bombed. Therefore "the only way to prevent, or mitigate, such massacre would be to strike quick and hard at the centers of Soviet power, and so shatter the will and smash the strength of the Soviet monster that his reactions against helpless people will be no more than dying convulsions." Consequently, "Every man, every pound of metal, every effort that is not imperatively needed for the maintenance of security should go into the creation and delivery of offensive air-atomic blows against the source of our danger—the Soviet Union itself."[59]

Eliot called his book ***If Russia Strikes***, a clear misnomer since he made it wholly plain that if she did not strike in 1949 we must strike her some time before 1952 when she would presumably have A-bombs. He stated flatly that "We cannot allow the present Soviet government to come into possession of the atomic bomb plus the means to deliver atomic bombs in North America." If the Soviets had this power they might seize Alaskan air bases and destroy our cities, or do so from submarines off our coasts. Therefore "we must use our military superiority to support an ultimatum" which would require the Soviets to accept our atomic control plan, "or suffer the destruction of its atomic plants by our own atomic weapons."[60]

Blackett's Challenge. The first sharp challenge to the atom-blitz theory was delivered by an English physicist, Nobel prize winner P. M. S. Blackett, in his ***Fear***, ***War and the Bomb.*** He reasoned that even total destruction of Russian factories would not be felt critically in the field for many months, during which the Red armies could occupy West Europe and seize its factories. He asserted that thousands of American A-bombs would be required to produce decisive results and pointed out that Russian A-bombs would be very valuable in West Europe as tactical weapons, for such use as destroying docks and harbors. He believed also that great formations of planes would probably be necessary to get one A-bomb laden plane through a long distance attack over hostile territory and argued that repeated deep penetration was likely to be a very expensive operation. Until such time as jet propelled bombers came into use the jet propelled fighters would have such an advantage as to compel long range bombing in very great force, and require the previous winning of at least partial air superiority. Finally, he pointed out that the most successful atomic bombardments could hardly do more damage than the thorough destruction achieved by the German Army in Russia, yet the Russians fought on.

Was the Destruction of Russia Practical? The consequences of destroying the life and livelihood of the Soviet peoples, with all their hopes and dreams, were callously brushed aside by George Fielding Eliot. Whatever was left "it would not be the Soviet rule, for the heart would have been blasted out of the

[59] **George Fielding Eliot, *If Russia Strikes,* Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1949, pp. 235, 213, 206–52.**

***Ibid.*, pp. 21, 251.**

Soviet system, the arteries cut." The "major cities would lie in ruins," but "the peasants, by and large, would survive and could feed themselves and their families." There would be no central authority left, no guidance for local authorities, only "a series of local military or civilian regimes, largely agricultural in their economy," burdened with the refugees from the cities, "torn by the clash of personal ambitions and long smothered hatreds." Meanwhile, the American bombers, using A-bombs now only "for particularly suitable targets," would be smashing any remaining core of resistance, ending up with the destruction of Central Siberia.

Then we could come home in the consciousness of duty well done. We wouldn't even have to try "to police Russia at all." This was just "a bogeyman," said Eliot. We would simply leave them to survive or perish in the midst of their ruins.[61]

This seemed simple and easy until one reflected that the very type of mind which would destroy the homes and wealth of the Soviet peoples so casually would at once begin to fear retaliation. Maybe we had overlooked some A-bomb factory. What if some surviving Soviet scientists got together and discovered a successor to the A-bomb? These were the kind of doubts which would begin to assail our nation killers. They would have to make sure that the Russians never rose again.

This factor aside, what was to be said of the wisdom of destroying with A-bombs all organized life over one-sixth of the earth's surface, if it could be done? It was idle to say that the peasants would still feed themselves, and tens of millions of city refugees "by and large." Soviet agriculture was collectivized and farmed overwhelmingly with machines, tractors and combines, all of which would be useless when we had smashed Russia's oil wells and the whole machinery of civilization. There would be no way of preventing a gigantic famine, one speeded by the raging spread of typhus, cholera, and scurvy, the malnutrition diseases which are always endemic in Russia. For scores of millions of helpless people there would be no succor, either of food or medical care, no housing, no consumer goods of any kind. People would have to fight with tooth and claw, with club and gun for what little sustenance and shelter would be left, with no prospect that there could be more.

What the state of mind of the Soviet peoples would be also needed to be thought through. They would be glad to be rid of the secret police and labor camps, but how would they feel about seeing the great industrial civilization which they had built, with much enthusiasm and infinite sacrifice, and rebuilt after the Germans had done their work, lying in poisonous radioactive ruins? How would the ultimate survivors of famine and pestilence feel about the certainty that the Americans would never permit them to rebuild their heavy industries again, even if they could?

Warnings from Eisenhower and Bradley. It is difficult to believe that the American people had begun to grasp what was involved in the floods of talk and thinking about atom bombing Russia. Fortunately some few of our leaders did speak out. While he was still Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower

[61] George Fielding Eliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–2.

said at St. Louis: "I decry loose and sometimes gloating talk about the high degree of security implicit in a weapon that might destroy millions overnight." This was the timely voice of moral indignation, but Eisenhower also spoke as a responsible strategist, continuing: "Those who measure security solely in terms of offensive capacity distort its meaning and mislead those who pay them heed. No modern nation has ever equalled the crushing offensive power attained by the German war machine in 1939. No modern nation was broken and smashed as was Germany six years later."[62]

On February 4, 1949, General Omar Bradley, also speaking as Chief of Staff, warned against "too heavy trust in air power, against reckoning our safety on phantasy rather than facts." Bradley cautioned that "by reckless reliance upon a knockout blow in the opening months of a conflict, we might unwittingly risk defeat" and attacked the immorality of the A-blitz idea, saying: "Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than about living."[63]

Caution from British Military Experts. This anomaly was spelled out further by the British military expert, retired Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. Referring to our preoccupation with the atomic bomb, he asked: "Whither can all this striving to destroy lead us? To a veritable religion of death, in which the scientist becomes an immolating priest and humanity the sacrificial victim."[64]

These were strong words, but not strong enough. It was easy for fear or hate-blinded men to plan the atomic killing of many millions of people, but the enormity of the thing in practice would recoil on our own souls, at the same time that a world-wide revulsion against us steeled a great part of the human race to resist our world sway.

Another moral factor had also escaped the A-blitz advocates. The British military authority, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, stressed it in giving his opinion that superior air power alone could not prevent the Red Army from advancing across Western Europe. Questioning the "very prevalent view in the West" that the Soviets could not maintain their equipment and machines, he reminded us of the "unimpressionability" of the Russians and "their exceptional capacity to carry on without proper supplies."[65]

Other factors overlooked by air blitz advocates were the ability of the Red Army to move on foot, clinging to tanks or flat-cars and by animal power, and its unsurpassed ability to live off the land. Though equipped with all modern weapons it was still very close to the hard life of the peasant and able to live and fight with a primitive, animal vigor and endurance which made it able to endure privation better than some others.

In other words, the Russians could take an atomic blitz as perhaps no other people in the world could. As in the last war the killing of millions of them, and infinite devastation of their land, would only steel them to fight on. It needed to be remembered also that from Napoleon to Hitler the Russians

[62] Quoted by Max Werner in the *Daily Compass*, New York, July 1, 1949.

« *Ibid*., July 1, 1949.

[64] J. F. C. Fuller, *The Second World War: a Strategical and Tactical History*, New York, 1949, p. 411; London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948.

[65] The *New York Times*, June 28, 1949.

have always scorched their own land thoroughly as a war weapon. Nor would the destruction of property affect them as it would us, since most of it belongs to the state, and they believe the state would reconstruct it. So far it had.

Furthermore, it should have been foreseen that the destruction of Russia's cities, if it could be done, would automatically create millions of desperate guerrilla fighters, who would not only have a supreme motive for fighting but would find in it their best means of survival. The entire history of World War II proved that communists in every part of Europe were unsurpassed guerrilla fighters.

Another closely related factor should have given our A-blitz advocates long pause—the certainty of a deadly civil conflict in virtually every European country, not to speak of many others. Class war would engulf some nations in bloody strife that atom bombs could not smother. Even families would be divided; brother would kill brother.

Asked if he thought a war with Russia would be a short war, ended by atomic bombing within a few months, Lieutenant-General Walter Bedell Smith, fresh from his ambassadorship in Russia, replied that he could not imagine a short war, because: "It's often said that a civil war is the most terrible of all wars, because that's the only war in which fighting men have a pretty good idea what they are fighting for. A war with Russia would be a civil war of humanity, and I can't think that it would be anything but a prolonged, protracted, disastrous war, which nobody would win. Nobody wins a modern war anyway. .. ."[66]

Admiral Gallery. It remained for Rear Admiral D. V. Gallery, Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles, to deliver a broadside attack on the advocates of atom-blitz. Writing in the ***Saturday Evening Post*** for June 25, 1949, he noted that starting in the previous December the country had been snowed under with gamble propaganda assuring "Quick and Sure Victory—at Bargain Rates." The drive centered in the Air Force Association and William Bradford Huie, with the aid of the ***Reader's Digest.*** The threat of "instant and devastating retaliation from the air" would keep the peace, or secure victory if war came. The Air Force Association had been "promoting this doctrine with consummate skill" for two years. There was great danger that the campaign would succeed "on the basis of hysteria, whipped up by publicity stunts and sensational headlines." Already the thirty day blitz idea had become a sort of religious crusade.

Noting that the very fact that this crusade offered something for nothing, a painless war, ought to arouse our suspicions, Gallery put his finger on the astounding assumption of the A-blitz promoters. They calmly planned war against a whole population, against the common people. The newspapers

[66] A radio interview printed in full in the *American Mercury*, June 1949. Smith said flatly that "life wouldn't be worth living" if there wasn't hope that we could come to a basic understanding with the Russians. Nevertheless, the *New York Times* on April 15, 1949, reported that Smith "indicated tonight that he believed the odds favored eventual war with Russia unless the Communists change their tune." See *Harpers Magazine*, August 1949, p. 30.

carried stories saying that after painstaking study our experts had selected seventy strategic targets in a possible enemy country for destruction in case of war. It was as simple as that: seventy cities; seventy air groups; seventy bombs! The prophets of blitz openly advocated the simple destruction of cities, mass killing unlimited. Faced with the choice of blitzing Paris, Rome and Brussels they "might win the war in thirty days and lose it for the next 300 years."

On technical grounds Admiral Gallery, a top notch air man himself, observed that bombers could not operate deep in enemy country beyond the range of escort and that fighter escort was "out of the question when you talk about 3,000 mile bombers." The whole quest for cheap and sure security from war was a will-o'-the-wisp. In war between two powerful nations the issue would be settled only by blood, sweat and tears "at a cost of billions of man-hours and millions of lives." In General Bradley's words, victory would come "over dead bodies—those of our soldiers on the ground."

Toward National Suicide. This was the result of an A-blitz war toward which all past experience pointed, millions of American soldiers driving millions of Russians out of the whole of a Europe so ruined that twenty Marshall plans could not begin to restore it, or to assuage the hatred of the people of the continent.

No better way of creating legions of passionate communists could be devised, and no surer method of arousing the people in the entire Russian orbit to their defense could be invented than the constant public advocacy of such a war. Actually, the Russian leaders had never believed that an atomic blitz could succeed. They were firm believers that a mighty coordination of all arms was essential to victory in war. It was, however, certain that they would use the American atomic blitz campaign to convince their peoples of American aggressive intent.

If attempted, an A-blitz of the Soviet Union would have been an adventure which, pursued wildly and savagely at the start, would either have failed disastrously or by its very success dragged us relentlessly into an effort to police and rule Eurasia—an undertaking which would have broken our backs economically, politically and morally.

2. *Would the Soviets Attack American Cities as Soon as They Had A-Bombs?*

This assumption had been made numberless times and by so many high authorities that in 1949 it was treasonous to question it.

How did this obsession originate? Its origins were many. The Russian leaders were such diabolical people that of course they were planning to destroy us. They were out to conquer the world; therefore the mass destruction of our cities on the first night they had enough bombs. But beyond the phobias of our Red-haters was the fact that so many of them had been yearning and planning to stage an A-blitz on Russia. Having told themselves that this would be a natural and righteous thing to do—are the Reds not anti-Christian?—they took it as a matter of course that the Reds must be planning to do the same thing to them. One could not admit even to himself that the Russians could be less barbaric than he was.

Not a Russian Method. In the background, also, was the established fact that it was the Anglo-Saxons who had set the pattern of mass destruction in war. The British began it, partly because the RAF had planned such a campaign long in advance, and partly out of frustration. They could not think of any other way to strike at Hitler. The German blitz on London, which began September 7, 1940, did not begin until after many British attacks on German cities, and until Berlin had been attacked at night for six successive nights. Warning of reprisal was given by Germany, and Liddell Hart classes tlie German action as such. Later, an offer to stop city bombing was refused by the British,[67] and they began large-scale night attacks on German cities, bound to be indiscriminate, with the object of dehousing the German workers and destroying their morale.[68] The workers were dehoused and large numbers of them killed, but their morale was not destroyed.

Our own record in the European war appears to have been somewhat better. We did much more daylight bombing and bombed specific targets. It was in Japan that we used fire bombs and explosives in great quantities upon cities, with the object of breaking national morale. In Japan we had already practised the mass destruction and dehousing of civilians without limit before Hiroshima and Nagasaki appeared to set the seal of victory upon mass destruction warfare.

Thereafter it was easy to conclude that of course the barbarian Russians would do to us what we civilized Christian Americans had done to the Japanese. Yet there is no record of any Russian belief in or practice of mass destruction. In the first Finnish-Soviet war the official Finnish figures reported 646 civilians killed by air raids. When Russian bombers had full opportunity to carry out mass raids on Finnish cities they did not do so.[69] Against Germany they did not do any considerable amount of mass bombing. They had almost no aircraft for such purpose, nearly all of their planes being built for strictly military work in close conjunction with the ground forces. Nor does Russian military writing show any belief in the efficacy of mass destruction as a method of warfare.

How? If the Russians should desire to stage an atomic Pearl Harbor upon us the question arose, with what? When the Nazi threat arose on their horizon they appear to have discarded big bombers and concentrated on smaller defensive machines, a policy which paid them well. The ominous threat of American atomic attack might well produce the same reaction. Every big bomber built would cut sharply the number of jet fighters available to intercept the American bombers.

If, however, the Russians were equipped with heavy bombers for attack upon us, how were they to use them? Unlike our circle of bases around them they had no bases close to us, nor any likely means of getting any. Much was said of their hopping blithely across the North Pole to destroy us, but in

[67] Liddell Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare,* p. 72; London, Faber, 1946.

[68] See also Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, *Bomber Offensive,* London, Collins, 1947, and Air Chief Marshal, Lord Tedder, *Air Power in War,* London, Hodder, 1948.

[69] Blackett, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

1949 few thought that long and extremely hazardous route of attack a serious one. Even Major Eliot could not make much out of a Soviet effort to seize Alaska by air, from rail heads and industrial centers 3000 miles away. If the feat were accomplished then they could hurt us for a time, but he was forced to conclude "nothing decisive, nothing really crippling."[70] A few bombers might reach our urban centers but that would have been both silly and suicidal. A Russian blitz upon us could make no sense unless it were delivered with overwhelming power.

Possony estimated that at that time at least 10,000 atomic bombs would be required for an extermination attack upon our cities, a fantastic number from the standpoint of scarce uranium and costly manufacture. He took it for granted that surprise atomic attack would never again be achieved. Especially for a tremendous A-blitz the preparations would be so enormous that they could hardly be concealed. If the United States made appropriate use of its resources he found it incomprehensible that the United States should fear the new weapon. In no other field was President Roosevelt's dictum more justified that "There is nothing to fear but fear itself."[71]

What Profit? The corollary of our great atomic preponderance needed to be clearly understood. The Russians being much weaker in atomic production would be impelled to save their A-bombs for defensive purposes, to use against military targets in Western Europe if they should be attacked, or for such retaliation against the United States as they would be capable of. The certainty of overwhelming retaliation from the United States all but precluded an atomic attack on us, and the need to husband defense reinforced the same reasoning.

It was a matter of record that the Germans did not dare to use poison gas in the late war. Though in possession of a superb chemical industry and equipped with large stocks of gas, they could not use it, even in the agony of national defeat and disintegration, because they feared retaliation. This was an acid test. It indicated strongly that the fear of crushing retaliation was the greatest fear of all, one not only quite powerful enough to prevent atomic aggression by a weaker atomic power but to deter him from beginning the use of atomic weapons—with their deadly radiation capacity—at any time during a war.

In the pre-nuclear years it was difficult to see how any power except the United States could risk the first use of atomic weapons.

The Soviet Union had also suffered too deeply and too recently to gamble on an attempt to conquer the other side of the world by an A-blitz. It would be a decade before the Soviet Union could hope to have enough power to see such a mad adventure through and then more conservative use of its power would be safer and more profitable.

That the sorely wounded Soviet Union, with the largest and one of the richest land areas in the world to develop should desire our sudden destruction, and plan for it, was a figment of super-heated emotions. Only the certainty

[70] **George Fielding Eliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 178, 170–205.**
[71] **Stefan T. Possony, *Strategic Air Power*, Toronto, 1949, pp. 32–3, 137.**

that we had encircled them and meant to stage a blitz assault upon them could induce a people so situated to attack us. That could do it, but first the Russians would have to have power comparable to our own, a situation which was not on the horizon in the early post-war years.

3. *Did Mass Destruction Pay?*

Underneath all plans for atomic war was the practical question whether mass destruction pays.

The careful studies made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey had shown that despite the Anglo-American bombing of Germany total war production increased until the summer of 1944, when the ground armies were closing in on Germany from both sides. It was not until this late date that the Allied bombing campaign was equipped with the great numbers of planes and bombs necessary for saturation bombing. By this time, also, the previous attempts at bombing had led to the destruction of the defensive German fighter forces, opening Germany to bombing virtually at will. Thereafter saturation bombing nearly destroyed sixty German cities. Even then, however, the greatest effect upon German production was gained in the belated bombing of transportation, and the greatest effect on war-making capacity by the destruction of synthetic oil factories. Electric power plants, especially hydroelectric plants, the destruction of which would largely have paralyzed German industry were largely overlooked.

Was it then necessary to destroy so many German cities? The burning of Hamburg, killing 60,000 people, produced temporary panic in other German cities, but within five months 80 per cent of Hamburg's productive capacity was restored. A million German civilian casualties from bombing, 300,000 dead, did not win the war. The campaign to destroy housing ruined 3,600,000 homes and made twice as many people homeless, but it did not interfere seriously with war production.

Victory Delayed. In reviewing the whole story after the war, British Major-General Fuller, retired, believed that strategic bombing actually prolonged the war. He concluded that if Churchill had not allocated "half the resources of his country to make the enemy bum and bleed," he could have built enough landing craft and transport planes to end the war a year sooner.[72]

British Air Commodore L. MacLean has reinforced the same conclusion. Saying that the true story of the bomber offensive is unknown, he writes that it began to be an effective factor in the war only when it was "closely integrated with military requirements in the over-all invasion plan and was undeviatingly directed toward objectives which would positively assist the military operations leading to the occupation of German soil. We must, therefore, face the cold fact that, for some years, the bombing war was conducted at prodigious cost in money and trained lives, for no positive yield whatever."[73]

[72] J. F. C. Fuller, *op. cit.* pp. 234–5. Of course the advent of the H-bomb removed all doubt about bombing being the cheap and efficient way to destroy an enemy—and all his cities.

[73] L. MacLean, *The Fighting Forces*, December 1948. Quoted by Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times*, August 8, 1949.

In addition to the vast cost of the bomber offensive to us, including 150,000 of our top notch young men, it did a vast amount of damage to German cities which did nobody any good. From everybody's standpoint the bulk of it was sheer waste. We were led to believe that German military output was being greatly reduced, yet the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey records that from 1942 to the fall of 1944, while the great strategic offensive was being developed, "Germany's military output in aircraft weapons and ammunition was raised three fold; in tanks nearly six fold." Nor was the great bombing drive on submarine pens, shipyards and submarine building facilities any more productive. The Survey records that "the effect on output was negligible; the actual production of submarines was up to schedule throughout the period." Output was "well maintained until the end of 1944." Despite the great campaign against German aircraft factories in the first half of 1944 "aircraft production doubled." It was not until the bombers were diverted from "strategic" bombing to the work of demolishing the German transportation system and working closely with our invading armies that the German economy collapsed. Up to that time, says the Strategic Bombing Survey, there is no evidence that shortages of civilian goods ever reached a point where the German authorities were forced to transfer resources from the war production in order to prevent disintegration on the home front.[74]

Quoting the official history of ***The Army Air Forces in World War II*** to the effect that "Eighth Air Force claims were far more exaggerated than even their severest critics had assumed," Baldwin concluded that "There is no doubt that the effectiveness of the strategic bombing campaign was grossly exaggerated; not until strategic and tactical bombing merged and air power was harnessed with land and sea power to a common objective were the great potentialities of air power adequately realized."[75]

This judgment suggested that if this was the experience of strategic bombing over the nearby and small target Germany, even the A-bomb would not enable us to win a war with the 9,000,000 square mile Soviet Union without an all-out conflict involving all arms and all our resources.

Japanese Masses Burned. It might be that the same conclusion would not apply to the war against Japan. Yet there was the gravest doubt that the burning of Japanese cities was a justifiable way to win the war, or a necessary method. The Japanese leaders deserved all the fire which could be dropped on them. Yet we deliberately refrained from bombing the Imperial Palace. The Emperor was carefully preserved while 90,000 to 120,000 Japanese people were killed in the fire raid of March 9,1945, on Tokyo. As in Germany, it was not the evil leaders who perished, but the ordinary Japanese people; men, women and children, old, sick and young.

This continued to be true in other Japanese cities, and finally, to persuade the evil Japanese leaders to permit the Emperor to make peace, we atomized above 100,000 rank and file Japanese at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Granted

[74] The quotations from the *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey* are taken from an article by Hanson W. Baldwin in the *New York Times,* August 8, 1949, p. 14.

[75] *Ibid.*

that the war was shortened a little by these methods, was the mass killing of civilians justified thereby?

Cities Casually Destroyed. Another difficulty with the killing of cities is that it is almost certain to get out of hand or to be done irresponsibly and perhaps for non-military reasons. Blackett raises some legitimate questions. Why were the cities of North Italy bombed in 1943, after the fall of Mussolini, when the Italian partisans expected and had been promised arms and help instead? Why, also, was the huge Skoda works one-third destroyed on April 25, 1945, a few days before Czechoslovakia was liberated? Why were some of the finest cities of Eastern Germany demolished only a few months before the end, when it was clearly in sight? The lovely city of Dresden was destroyed only four months before VE day. It was crowded with refugees and 50,000 people were killed. Were some of these devastations carried out for political reasons, and others only because we had the habit and nobody stopped to ask why?

Again, the German cities Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dortmund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt and Bremen were subjected to severe area attacks. Yet their contributions to total German industrial production were very small. In the order named the percentages were : 0·3,0·9,1·7,0·3,0·9,0·5,0·2 and 1·2 per cent. In all of these cities there were just three big war plants, the steel works in Dortmund and the aircraft plants at Bremen and Leipzig, each of which could have been bombed separately.[76]

On what basis was the death of these eight cities decided upon? We have elaborate precautions to prevent the execution of one innocent individual. He must be clearly guilty, beyond peradventure of doubt, but when we are engaged in mass destruction the death of cities will be decided by a few military men, doubtless estimable men, who write down the names of the doomed cities on a piece of paper.

Does a board of generals gravely decide that ten more cities must die? Or does a single man condemn ten cities to death by putting their names on the list of the doomed?

Genocide Next. The next step was clearly genocide itself, the attempt to destroy a nation. The slogan, moreover, was ready at hand, already tried and true. We had to slay German and Japanese civilians in great numbers because they followed evil, dictatorial leaders. These men were now disposed of, but there were others whom we did not like, though they had recently been valued allies. They still ruled the Soviet peoples. Everyone agreed that the Russian people were kindly and good, but it seemed to be necessary to destroy many millions of them in atomic attacks on their cities, in order to rid them of their bad leaders.

The killing of a nation of 200,000,000 people was the next logical step in the psychology of mass destruction which we appeared to have accepted as an inevitable accompaniment of any future war. It was also a step which could

[76] "U.S. Strategie Survey Bombing Reports," quoted by Joseph E. Loftus in the *Scientific Monthly* for May, 1949, p. 317.

finally complete the brutalization of humanity to a degree that would recoil disastrously and inexorably upon ourselves.

In a careful article Baldwin recorded as a fact the acceptance in Washington of the city-killing mass destruction of civilians of all ages as the method of war against Russia. He said: "The assumption that we will use the bomb to defeat Russia is the basic assumption underlying the dominant strategic concept that, with the advent of Louis Johnson as Defense Secretary, has now gained the ascendancy," and he added: "It is the basic assumption underlying much of our political thinking."[77]

"Moral Suicide." The adoption of such a military plan was horrifying enough on military grounds, since it promised to lead us into endless slaughter and irreparable chaos, but the moral side of it was equally abhorrent. It was well phrased by Rev. Edward A. Conway, associate editor of the Catholic magazine, ***America***, on July 24, 1949 when he expressed the conviction that the policy of indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations had led this country to the brink of "moral suicide." He did not believe there was "any v question about the criminal iniquitous conception of such a doctrine which ould bomb civilian populations for a radius of four miles."[78]

Dangerous Politically. Was this method of warfare, and the threat of it, good politics? Professor N. F. Mott, President of the British Atomic Scientists Association, reasoned that security could best be obtained by weapons and policy which provide the greatest deterrent against aggression, but the least threat if none occurs.[79] Strategic bombing failed on both counts. If war came it would not be decisive militarily and it would swing world opinion against us. Used as a threat it is "of the most provocative kind, against which any Russian government is bound to take steps." The obvious Soviet reply was to deprive the Anglo-American strategic bombers of any bases on the European continent, either before hostilities start or in their early stages.

In other words, no other reason than the strategic bombing threat was needed to cause Russia to consolidate her hold on East Europe, and the same threat kept West Europe in peril of a preventive Russian seizure and doomed her to immolation if war came.

Renunciation Proposed. For these reasons Mott proposed that the American and British governments make a voluntary declaration as follows: "That in any future conflict they will not bomb civilian centers of population, either with atomic or any other weapons, unless our own cities or those of an ally are first attacked in this way."

This renunciation of our deeply cherished atomic threat would have deprived us of the dream of smashing the Reds cheaply and without much American bloodshed, but that dream was only a chimera anyway. The only real deterrent to Russian aggression, if aggression had been planned, was the certainty of having to fight a long war against the entire resources of the

[77] Hanson W. Baldwin, "What Kind of War?" *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1949, p. 27.
[78] The *New York Times*, July 25, 1949.
[79] N. F. Mott, "Can Atomic Weapons Keep the Peace?" *B.A.S.*, January, 1949, pp. 11–12.

United States and its many allies. Before the H-bomb nothing else would defeat them. The threat of atomic bombing did not bluff them, but it gave them the most powerful incentive to keep adding space to the vast cushion of it which they already enjoyed.

The renunciation of mass bombing which Mott proposed would have removed us from the terrible peril of embarking on genocide as a means of "defense," the peril of losing our own souls, along with the good repute of mankind, and of losing the right and the ability to live in a civilized world.[80]

4. *Would Atomic Hysteria Destroy Us?*

On May 12, 1949, Representative W. Sterling Cole, Republican of New York, revealed what he called a "strange and incredible occurrence." One Hans Friestadt, a graduate student and part time teacher at the University of North Carolina, had been granted one of a large number of fellowships financed by the Government for basic research. These grants had been recommended by the AEC and after Friestadt had received one it transpired that he was a Communist.

On May 17, the FBI revealed that it had investigated the case of the uranium oxide missing from the Argonne Laboratory in Chicago, one of the units working under the AEC.

The first press reports indicated that some three-quarters of a pound of U-235 had escaped to the Russians. On May 18, Senator McMahon announced that 1·05 ounces was involved. Of the 32 grams missing 25 had been recovered through an analysis of waste materials. Search for the remaining 7 grams and the bottle which had originally contained the oxide, was continuing.

"Incredible Mismanagement." On May 23, Senator Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa, a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress, held a press conference and demanded the resignation of Chairman David E. Lilienthal, of the AEC, charging that he was guilty of "incredible mismanagement." He attacked Lilienthal for his attitude about the lost uranium, referring to it as "two-thirds of a pound of uranium compound", and for the award of AEC research fellowships to bad risks. There was "perhaps even more serious evidence of maladministration" than was revealed by "these two highly publicized fiascoes."[81]

The next day the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was in urgent executive session from 10:00 **a.m.** until 7:00 **p.m.** After hearing Dr. Zinn, head of the Argonne Laboratory, and others, the Committee decided to order an independent investigation of the uranium loss. The committee was evidently made uneasy by the suggested possibility that the atomic secrets might escape. The very thought caused alarm. The entire committee was critical of the delay in calling in the FBI. The ***New York Times'*** report said that Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg "added his voice today to the swelling chorus of criticism of the AEC." Lilienthal had been in many respects "an able administrator," said

[80] Revealing a main source of his deep uneasiness, Mott said that a glance at the American Press would show that if war came "it is in the first instance by strategic bombing that the United States will wage it."

[81] The *New York Times*, May 24, 1949.

Vandenberg, "but these security phases are paramount, and my final judgment must be governed by the facts. The importance of the matter cannot be ignored."

On that very day the gravity of the crisis deepened when it became known that a security officer in the AEC plant at Hanford, Washington, had taken two bars of uranium and put them in a safe. It was three months before the "theft" was discovered. The General Electric Company, which operated the plant thought this was not a fair test, since no one except an individual given full clearance cojld have gained access to the area, but it looked ominous in Washington.

The AEC had ben sending radio isotopes abroad for research purposes, by a vote of 4 to 1, and the Committee now heard from Admiral Lewis Strauss, the dissenter, that he had contended that the United States should not take "a calculated risk, even if it was slight," of aiding weapon production abroad.

On May 26, Senator Cain, Republican of Washington, filed a bill to abolish the AEC and give control of atomic energy to the military.

On June 2 the missing bottle that had contained the U-235 was found in Chicago in the Argonne Laboratory's own "grave yard" of radioactive materials. The bottle was exhumed and identified in the presence of agents of the FBI. After this the great sensation of the missing uranium of necessity fizzled out, though not before the radio commentators had shaken the air waves and the headlines had shrieked alarm for many days.

The Congressional investigation of the AEC continued for weeks, it becoming constantly clearer that Senator Hickenlooper's charges lacked foundation. The outcry about the Communist student compelled the AEC to reverse its practice of not inquiring into the politics of fellowship holders who were engaged in non-secret research. All now had to take loyalty oaths and Friestadt was dismissed from his job at the University of North Carolina. This, however, was not sufficient. On August 2, 1949, the Senate passed a law to require FBI investigations of all fellowship applicants, inquiring into their loyalty and associations, and the House soon concurred.

"***Hog-Wild***" ***Investigations.*** This long continued furore stirred deep alarm in the minds of many serious observers. The ***Washington Post*** thought that blind attacks such as Senator Hickenlooper loosed played "into the hands of the cabal itching to clamp tight military control on atomic energy." The irresponsible and undocumented charges "that the AEC is shot through with Communist sympathizers are indicative of a fear obsession with a new force that the inquisitors know very little about." The country simply could not afford to become so fearful of anything that might help Russia as to ignore the handicap caused by the "creeping secrecy at home." The hullabaloo about Friestadt had given impetus to "the fantastic notion of loyalty tests for all persons receiving government support, however remote their connection with the national security." Under this notion the inquisition could be pushed to cover a large portion of the population.[82] Before long it was.

[82] The *Washington Post*, May 14, 24, 26 and 27, 1949,

The same reasoning applied to the Army's new habit of labelling as "unemployable" those whom some officer in the Pentagon did not believe were sufficiently conservative. In the same Spring Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, was so classified for work in Germany, and on June 15 four well known professors were added to the category. If they were "unemployable" in Germany among the ex-Nazis, how could they be tolerated among the Americans themselves?

In the same febrile season the House Committee on Un-American Activities asked colleges over the country, especially the ones with liberal reputations, to send in a list of their social science text-books. But if these were purged there would remain innumerable books in the college libraries containing ideas more dangerous than those expressed in the more cautiously written text-books. These would need to be burned.

Under the heading "End This Disorderly Conduct" Walter Lippmann asked whether all this inquisitorial activity might not be providing Communist propaganda "with superb material to frighten our friends and cheer up our opponents." Making all allowance for the good that some investigations had done, "the fact remains that these investigations are running hog wild. They are injuring not only individuals but the name and honor of the United States, and the very principles of free government." Government could not be conducted in the kind of uproar which prevailed.[83]

Atomic Jitters. These comments indicated the danger that our agitated conservatives would go on to destroy the very liberties and institutions they were so intent on preserving unsullied from any taint. The "atomic jitters" which more than one commentator noted also indicated the inability of the politicians and military men to wrestle with the atom. From the very beginning the scientists had, almost unanimously and unceasingly, told them that the atomic "secrets" were fleeting and temporary, but the laymen would not believe them. They insisted on guarding the atom themselves, when only the scientists had the knowledge to do so.

The result was that the frantic effort to clutch the secret rapidly gave us a psychological Maginot Line. Hanson W. Baldwin warned that "the positive and well-nigh hysterical approach of Congress to the atomic investigation sprang from the fallacious belief that so long as we retained a monopoly on the secrets of the atomic bomb our security was insured." The "outraged cries of protest, the wringing of hands, the stern denunciations and the loud lamentations which have accompanied the Congressional attacks are clear evidence of the panic that assails too many Congressmen, lest we be stripped of the 'security' that in so many minds the atomic bomb provides."[84]

This obsession with the black magic of the bomb alarmed no one more deeply than the scientists, for they knew that not only their liberties and those of all other Americans were imperilled but that the spy mania and Red hysteria were all too likely to stifle scientific growth and leave the

[83] Walter Lippmann, the *Washington Post*, June 14, 1949.

[84] Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert of the *New York Times*, in the *Times*, May 26, 29, 1949.

politico-military men clutching an obsolete weapon. The scientists understood well the aphorism of C. F. Kettering that "when you lock the laboratory door you lock out more than you lock in."[85]

The Association of Oak Ridge Engineers and Scientists wrote to Senator McMahon on May 29, 1949, recalling how in the early stages of the atomic project the scientists themselves had had difficulty in convincing the military men of the importance of war time security measures. After the war, the statement continued, "we were alarmed to see the same procedures extended to virtually all branches of government work, including those not even remotely connected with national security." Now there was an attempt to foist these procedures on academic institutions, by making a favorable FBI report a prerequisite for the granting of a government fellowship. "We feel that this general political atmosphere constitutes a grave threat to our American tradition of freedom of thought and speech."[86]

On August 5,1949, just as a Congressional conference committee was about to approve a law requiring FBI investigations of all student fellowship applicants, the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission submitted a report condemning the proposal in the strongest terms. The nine distinguished scientists and educators unanimously agreed that they were "horrified" at the prospect of "moving a semi-police apparatus into the realm of youth." The reputation of many young people might be adversely impaired by the rumors inspired by such a system. An atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion was "likely to be generated by the activities of Federal agents among many groups of friends in colleges, universities and in local communities." The area of interference with the private lives of citizens would be extended, with "a serious adverse effect on both the atmosphere of our educational institutions and the outlook of one age group of the entire nation."[87]

The Committee might have added that government fellowships were likely to be awarded thereafter not on the basis of a student's ability, or of his professors' recommendations, but on the basis of what jealous or gossipy schoolmates told the investigation agent, under full protection of their identities and testimony. Awards would be made on the basis of whether the FBI man thought the student was sufficiently reliable politically.

Because one communist student had been about to secure a little money for non-secret research work the Congress would spend large sums annually in long police investigations of thousands of applicants. Because they had seen the apparition of one Red student studying atomic energy the legislators would extend the methods of the police state into every college campus in the nation. There was only one word which could accurately describe this state of mind. It was mania. Grown men were so obsessed with hate and fear that they would destroy the very freedom they professed to be defending.

[85] Quoted in *The Control of Atomic Energy* by James R. Newman and Byron S. Miller, New York, McGraw, 1948, p. 15; London, MacGraw, 1948. This is an excellent account of the organization and work of the USAEC. It includes a copy of the Atomic Energy Act in the Appendix.

[86] The *New York Times*, May 30, 1949.

[87] *Ibid.*, August 6, 1949.

Scientific Stagnation Promoted. Nor was this the worst of the secrecy mania, since the FBI was now policing the scientists themselves, refusing clearance to anyone whom it suspected of not being totally "reliable." Dr. W. A. Higginbotham, of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, said in a public statement that he knew of at least 100 recognized atomic scientists who had failed to get clearance for government work and never learned the reason. He was certain they could have passed security had they been allowed to hear and answer the suspicions or charges held against them. The result was that a conviction was gaining ground in scientific circles that a man applying for AEC secret work might get into serious difficulty. Should he be turned down, for any reason, private laboratories dealing in government contracts would hesitate to hire him.[88]

As scientists in government service became more and more hunted, all were likely to develop anxiety neuroses. A casual word, indeed any act of their private lives, might be recorded by a secret government agent, and misinterpreted would perhaps mean professional and personal ruin. The atomic hysteria operated to kill the scientific goose effectively, and the widening Red jitters worked to make the lives of private employees uncertain. Private industries and universities holding AEC contracts began to impose loyalty oaths. Even insurance companies inquired into the associations of their agents before employing them. We might not go to the length of purging everybody in sight in a wild, uncontrollable outbreak of mutual distrust, as happened in Russia from 1936 to 1938, but we were moving rapidly toward the time when any citizen was likely to be hounded and proscribed for his political beliefs, unless they were wholly conservative.

Nothing could be more human or natural than that the over-clutching of the A-bomb secrets should cause stagnation in American scientific work and drive the scientists into seclusion or innocuous private employment. The same principle applied also to the gigantic clearing and screening of all government employees then in progress. Every person of ability and independence had to ask himself whether he should risk being pilloried for life by a government that would not depend on the loyalty even of its janitors. The wave of laws requiring loyalty oaths of teachers pointed in the same direction. These developments suggested that only mediocre conformists could man the nation's scientific work, its government and its schools, while the men of fear policed them.

It was in this fashion that those who had little faith in the soundness of American institutions threatened to pull down the temple they purported to defend. For fear of the police state they would police everybody. To clutch the bomb secret they would make sure that no non-conformist had anything to do with their precious black magic. Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer pointed out to the Joint Committee how self defeating this kind of policing could be. It was "contrary to all experience to suppose that only those who, throughout their lives, held conformist views would make the great discoveries of the future."[89]

What is Security? The logical end of the frantic effort to compel ideological uniformity would be that only men of sure conservative or reactionary mind

8[8] *Ibid*., May 29, 1949

[89] *Ibid*., May 18, 1949.

would have scientific training and opportunities, men too satisfied with the world as it is to penetrate the future in order to usher in a new world. "Security, above all, is spirit and morale and progressive, advanced thinking, and secrecy is the enemy of these." Secrecy, insisted Hanson W. Baldwin, "is not security, nor is the bomb an impregnable rampart. Security is things and people, and bombs, weapons and research and bases, intangibles as well as tangibles."[90]

In a 1949 Commencement address David E. Lilienthal pleaded with his countrymen not to become so bewitched by the atomic bomb as to rely on what they believe to be its black and secret magic to keep the country secure. "The foundation of the republic is the moral sense of her people, a sense of what is right and what is wrong. The faiths we hold are the chief armament of democracy."[91]

It was a measure of the stature of many influential minds that they seized upon the bomb as "a furious oversimplification of the world and its dilemmas." They elevated secrecy about it into the chief guaranty of national existence, to such an extent that our whole future was made to depend on a door or a window left unlocked. In the end we found ourselves "searching frantically for the national destiny in the shape of a bottle in an atomic dump."[92]

What Price Secrecy? Actually, if we had tried to tell the Russians how to build an A-bomb they would still have been a very long way from achieving one. They would first have to have fissionable material. And if our scientists had spent days telling the Russian scientists how to produce it, they would have had to build their own plants in their own way and by much trial and error work toward the bomb, in all probability a far weaker one than we would then have. How many months, or years would Russian bomb production have been advanced by a middle ground policy of non-secrecy?

To our horrified atom worshippers the answer was that five minutes would have been too much! Consider, however, where the opposite policy had led us. In addition to all the evils discussed above, it had hedged the Atomic Energy Commission about with all sorts of security restrictions which hampered its work, restrictions which have prevented the development of satisfactory teamwork with Canada and Britain on further research. Yet it was not our own genius which produced the bomb. It was a great team of scientists from many lands which did it. By walling ourselves in we threatened to defeat the very scientific progress upon which we so desperately relied for survival.

All Allies Distrusted. The result was that we did not even trust our closest allies. On July 14, 1949, a secret meeting was held in Washington. It was attended by fourteen top men in the American Government, Congressional and Executive, and presided over by the President. On Sunday, July 17, the ***New York Times*** related the purpose of the meeting. The British Government needed some help in its atomic project; certain metallurgical techniques in the final stages were giving them trouble. They wanted to know the answers. If given, they could soon produce A-bombs. They had "made the same request

90 The *New York Times*, May 26, 1949.
91 The *Washington Post*, June 6, 1949.
92 Samuel Grafton, *New York Post*, June 8, 1949.

last year, but it was blocked by objections from Senator Hickenlooper, then Chairman of the Joint Committee." The AEC was said to favor the request.[93]

However, immediate outcry arose in Congress. The British could not be trusted with A-bombs. Only we could have them. Senator William F. Knowland, Republican of California, and a member of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, served formal notice that he would fight any move to satisfy the British request. Unless Congress voted its approval or the Baruch plan was accepted he would vigorously oppose "any effort to transmit such atomic weapon information to any other nation on the face of the earth." Once the information was imparted it could never be regained. He believed this issue was "of great magnitude to the future of our Republic."[94]

This was the atomic delusion in a nut shell: (1) the atomic "secrets" give us security and power; (2) we will not share these blessings with our best friend on earth; (3) and if we clutch the secrets we can keep them. What is fair and right does not matter. Only our monopoly of the mighty atom counts.

The next day Senator Millard E. Tydings, Democrat of Maryland, extended the atomic interdiction to all of our new allies in the North Atlantic Pact, ratified in the Senate only the week before. Said he: "I think that is a weapon which is ours. We have the know-how. We are making them, we have the planes to deliver them, and it would be foolish to duplicate this effort over and over again in other countries [in the Atlantic Pact] even though they could."[95]

Practical reasoning? Perhaps, but if the British should want the comforting possession of a few A-bombs, ready to use against any invader, they could not have them. It was ***our*** weapon. They must defend themselves with lesser means.

Bowing to the demands that our atomic monopoly be preserved at all costs, Secretary of State Acheson issued a formal statement for President Truman on July 27,1949, in which he laid before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy a plan for maintaining the status quo, permitting exchanges in limited areas not involving arms or industrial usage, and promising that no change in this policy would be made without further discussion with the Committee, at which time "it could be determined what Congressional action is needed."[96]

Black Magic Clutched. It appeared that the Atomic Energy Act would have to be amended by a vote of Congress—if that were conceivably possible—and some of its strongest provisions relaxed before the President could accommodate the British, who had loyally pooled their resources with us in wartime to make the bomb, when they were pioneers in nuclear knowledge and well

[93] See also the authoritative article by Edwin L. James in the Sunday edition of the *New York Times,* July 17, 1949.

[94] The *New York Times,* July 24, 1949.

[95] *Ibid.,* July 25,1949.

[96] *Ibid.,* July 28, 1949. This pledge was sufficient for Senator Knowland, but Senator Wherry of Nebraska, Republican whip of the Senate, promptly demanded a law forbidding the President to disclpse atomic information to our allies without the express authorization of Congress. Wherry made it plain that the Truman-Acheson statement was only a gentlemen's agreement. That was not enough. It was his understanding that the President was "free to disclose to Socialist-ridden foreign governments the dearly bought secrets of the atomic bomb."—*Ibid.,* August 1, 1949.

ahead of us. Newman and Miller describe "the atavistic depths" in us stirred by the release of atomic energy, as revealed in the information section of the Atomic Energy Act, with its death penalties, heavy fines and imprisonment, three times directed against anyone who would give atomic information "with intent to secure an advantage to any foreign nation." Our legislative response to the greatest triumph of intelligence and the scientific method was "closely akin to the practice of magic among the most primitive tribes. Having in their possession a fearful image of the god of war, which makes them stronger than all their enemies, the tribe is obsessed with the fear that the image may be stolen or duplicated and their exclusive claim to the deity's favor forever lost."[97]

Secrecy is Not Security. The clearly outlined result of our obsession with the secret was our own scientific and perhaps political isolation, even from our friends. Obviously, if we could achieve absolute secrecy it "could only produce an absolute vacuum." The misconception that secrecy is security is very old, and "wherever it has triumphed freedom has died—and security has proved illusory."[98]

The creeping process of deliberately, and yet hysterically, destroying our own freedom was described in two unforgettable paragraphs by Chancellor Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago at the 237th Convocation of that University.

Toward an American Police State.

"We are told that we must be afraid of Russia, yet we are busily engaged in adopting the most stupid and unjust of the ideas prevalent in Russia, and are doing so in the name of Americanism. The worst Russian ideas are the police state, the abolition of freedom of speech, thought, and association, and the notion that the individual exists for the state. These ideas are the basis of the cleavage between East and West.

"Yet every day in this country men and women are being deprived of their livelihood, or at least their reputation, by unsubstantiated charges. These charges are then treated as facts in further charges against their relatives or associates. We do not throw people into jail because they are alleged to differ with the official dogma. We throw them out of work and do our best to create the impression that they are subversive and hence dangerous, not only to the state, but also to everybody who comes near them."[99]

To persecute people into conformity by the non-legal methods then popular, Hutchins continued, was little better than doing it by purges and pogroms. The lash fell only upon some for the sin of nonconformity, but the end result would reach all of us. Critics, even of the mildest sort, would be

[97] J. R. Newman and B. S. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[98] Hanson W. Baldwin, "Two Great Delusions about the Bomb," The *New York Times Magazine*, July 10, 1949.

[99] Dr. Hutchins' address was published in full in a number of newspapers by the International Latex Corporation. See the *Washington Post*, June 30, 1949.

frightened into silence. Stupidity and injustice would go unchallenged "because no one will dare speak against them."

"Tribal Self-Adoration." The Red hysteria and the atomic jitters had combined to create a state of mind which would have seemed impossible in this land of freedom a decade before. Hutchins accurately described it as a "tribal self-adoration." Its dreadful unanimity had been seen in full flower in Nazi Germany and it was sedulously fostered in Russia. Therefore we must also sink back to the tribal level.

Was Our Downfall Near? Or was there something deeper which is inseparable from our sudden ascent to the economic and military mastery of two-thirds of the world? In his great book, ***A Study of History***, Arnold Toynbee had charted the course of civilizations which have risen and fallen for the past 5,000 years. He found that when a civilization comes into sudden power and domination over its neighbors a new and fairly short cycle almost immediately sets in. A kind of mental ossification begins. Rigid controls are imposed and the dominance of the military increases rapidly. Religion, science and the arts decay. Time after time these symptoms have preluded the decline and fall of a civilization.[100]

"The bones of nations that have tried to be too strong litter the graveyards of History."[101]

[100] **The *Washington Post*, May 31, 1949.**
[101] **Hanson W. Baldwin, *Atlantic Monthly*, July 1949, p. 26.**

CHAPTER XV

STABILIZATION

AUGUST–DECEMBER 1946

In the summer of 1946 the iron curtain had not closed down. At least it was possible for a young Mid-Western American to go to Russia and travel as he pleased. John Strohm, President of the American Agricultural Editors Association, decided that the common people in America ought to know about the plain farmers of Russia. He would go and report. He travelled through Europe several months, asking the Soviet consul in each capital if his visa had come yet, and eventually he sent a telegram to Stalin which opened all doors. He went to Russia, laid out his own itinerary, travelled for two months, talking with whom he pleased, took more than 600 pages of notes and shot 1200 pictures with his four cameras. The only request made of him was the observation of the Soviet Minister of Agriculture: "Naturally, we hope you will just tell the truth."[1]

Strohm found a severe shortage of consumer goods, but was convinced that the government was working hard to alleviate it. The people, too, had great hope for the future. In all the homes he visited, the ikons were still displayed and in the cities churches were filled. All agreed that the priests must stick strictly to religion. On the issue of freedom of religion the Baptist pastor in Moscow was emphatic in his praise of the present government over that of the Tsars.

Everywhere he went Strohm found the warmest feeling for all things American, hearty appreciation for our lend-lease equipment, general understanding about the American origin of UNRRA goods, and genuine personal friendliness. What puzzled everyone was the talk of war between the United States and Russia. "We love the American people—why should they want to make war on us?" he heard "many times from sincere, hard-working" people. When he replied that the American people wanted only peace they asked: "Then why do we read in our newspapers that American military men are saying war is inevitable and the sooner it comes the better—for America?" A soldier begged him to "tell the American people that we don't want to go to war with them" and a Red Army captain embraced him with tears in his eyes, saying, "Please tell Americans that we must be friends." Strohm found the Russian people "confused at the references they read in their papers that America is talking about war, war against the Soviet Union. To them such a war is unthinkable."[2]

On August 11, 1946, five distinguished members of the American Committee for Russian War Relief returned from a 5,000 mile uncensored tour

[1] **John Strohm, *Just Tell the Truth*, New York, Scribners, 1947.** [2] ***Ibid.*, pp. 235–43.**

of Russia during which two members of the group, Dr. Louis D. Newton of Atlanta, Georgia, President of the Southern Baptist Convention, and Dr. Ralph W. Sockman, pastor of Christ Church, Methodist, New York City, preached in three Russian cities. Both agreed that they had found complete religious freedom in Russia and "a tremendous religious revival." Mrs. La Fell Dickinson, President of the General Confederation of Women's Clubs, another member of the party, attended an Orthodox church service which had an overflow outside and observed that the collection plates had to be emptied several times. She was profoundly impressed by the cordiality of the Russian people. She was surprised by the unusual number of bookshops, news stands and posted newspapers in the cities and by the way the people followed the Paris Peace Conference. She found the position of women in Russia "basically right."

The group moved about as freely as in the United States and took hundreds of pictures, both still and moving. Dr. Newton reported that the Russian people talked only of peace. "They don't want war and they are not talking war," he said, adding that they were the greatest hosts he ever had in his life.[3]

Freedom of the Press. In 1946 the Russian and American peoples wanted only to live in peace with each other, but their leaders could not agree upon the terms. They could not agree even about freedom of the press. Marquis W. Childs noted that at times our news stories about the Paris Peace Conference read "like the accounts of a big-time prize fight. Round by round we hear first that the American champion is on top, then the Russian."[4] Many newspapers spoke sharply enough about Russia's position and tactics. The ***New York Herald Tribune***, August 12, 1946, agreed that "certainly, some Western newspapers have been recklessly and inexcusably provocative," but thought there were many antidotes available for the mischief they do, though "none for the much more serious war-mongering which the Soviet press and radio produce daily, in the bland conviction that they are simply printing the revealed 'truth'." Yet the Soviet bureaucracy was as genuinely concerned and alarmed "about Western press freedom as any Westerner could be over Soviet suppression."[5] Molotov was certain his own press was "sturdier and freer" and he was "indubitably sincere on this point, as on many others."[6]

[3] The *Nashville Tennessean*, August 15 ; *New York Herald Tribune*, August 12, October 30, 1946. On November 7, the Archbishop of York, Dr. C. F. Garbett, reporting on his recent visit to Russia, said he was impressed by "a genuine religious revival there." The church had greater freedom than under the Czars.—*Herald Tribune*, November 8, 1946.

Norman Corwin, winner of the Wendell Willkie One World Award, said after his trip through Russia: "I was astonished to find no war talk in the capital. The ordinary people asked, 'But why should there be a war?' " He encountered no iron curtain during his stay. —*Ibid.*, November 9, 1946.

[4] *New York Post*, August 13, 1946.

[5] On December 6, 1946, William Philip Sims, Foreign Editor of the New York *World Telegram*, quoted a speaker who suggested that after the Russians had disarmed us through the United Nations they could walk out—"just as they walked out of the League of Nations after their attack on Finland."

From this statement the reader would never suspect that Russia was expelled from the League of Nations on that occasion.

[6] C. L. Sulzberger, the *New York Times*, August 11, 1946.

Russia's Purposes. On the other hand, Russian reactions puzzled some of the best American newspaper men. Paul Scott Mowrer noted that the Russians "seem really to believe that they are threatened by a hostile combination." He believed that the Russians had changed their propaganda line in the Fall of 1944, and it seemed to him "that Russia's idea is to do as it pleases inside its own occupation areas, while holding a veto over anything anyone wants to do elsewhere." Writing from Rome, Edgar Ansel Mowrer stated bluntly that "there are around Rome and elsewhere some Americans who seem to want war with Russia. There are many more who say they think war with Russia is inevitable." He drew a distinction between "those who oppose Soviet aggression, hoping to avoid war, and those who are already licking their chops at the thought of atomizing Russia before the Russians can wield atomics."[7]

Most observers forgot the effects of the two world wars, the intervention of 1919, twenty years of ostracism and the appeasement period on the mentality of the Soviet leaders. Others did remember. Sumner Welles thought that no conflict was "conceivable unless Russia's fears of the 'capitalistic West' had already reached a psychopathic stage." Unfortunately fear in one country bred fear in another. The fears and suspicions generated in the two countries during the preceding twelve months had "already reached fantastic proportions." He himself believed the underlying objectives of Soviet policy to be: "safety, reconstruction, the industrialization of the Soviet republics, and the development of natural resources as essential parts of a program designed to raise rapidly Russian living standards."[8]

In the same vein, C. L. Sulzberger, writing from Paris, felt that "One must always proceed on the assumption that both the United States and Russia are working here to obtain a fair settlement," and another leading correspondent of the ***New York Times***, James B. Reston, added the penetrating comment that the struggle between them was being waged by the two countries which had had the least experience in international relations. He concurred in the judgment that neither side wanted war and reported "a growing feeling" in Washington that President Truman had not done all he could to talk out with Premier Stalin the fundamental questions. Among these, as listed by Executive officials, were demands that the Soviets control the Comintern, halt the war of nerves, stop trying (a) to establish a Big-Five dictatorship in UN; (b) to infiltrate Iran; and (c) to establish a closed Soviet economic zone in East Europe.[9]

Strong American Diplomacy at the Dardanelles. On August 21, the United States delivered a note to Russia which barred the Russian proposal to Turkey for a share in the defense of the Straits. The note rejected The Russian proposal that the Montreux Convention should be revised to turn the control of the Straits over to the Black Sea powers. Only a revision that would relate the control of the Straits to UN would be acceptable, since an attack or threatened attack on the Straits by an aggressor would necessarily concern that body.

[7] *New York Post,* August 14, 29, 1946.
[8] *New York Herald Tribune,* August 21, 1946.
[9] The *New York Times,* August 11, 31, 1946.

The American note "led to the inference" that Russian insistence on its proposal would make Turkey a satellite, be a calculated move to dominate the whole Middle East and lead to the gravest threat yet presented to peace. This view was stressed by a "high official" who said: "We do not intend to be shrilly belligerent. We do intend to be absolutely and unshakably firm. We are not bargaining. We are not bluffing. We have taken an attitude and intend to stick to it. We want to make that crystal-clear to everybody."[10]

This attitude was pointedly emphasized by sending the giant American aircraft carrier, ***Franklin D. Roosevelt***, and other fleet units, to the Eastern Mediterranean. On September 9, our planes spelled out F.D.R. over the Greek port of Piraeus, partly as a gesture of support to the Greek government in its fight against communist rebels.[11]

War Brewing. From Tokyo Darrell Berrigan, the Far Eastern Editor of the ***New York Post***, reported on August 29, the flight of B-29s over Japan and South Korea. The American militarists who were there to democratize Japan gave him the impression they were really there to prepare for "inevitable" war with Russia. It was hard to tell whether they were motivated by a real fear or by the desire to get away from dull desk routine. In any event, Russia had become a bigger bugaboo than the Zaibatsu they were sent to eliminate. The vicious spiral was already working. We flooded "the Orient with ill-concealed, spies on secret missions to watch for Russian infiltration." The Russians moved troops around North Korea. Each side considered its moves strictly defensive. TTiere was "a war growing out of peace today" and there was "no basis for it but fear and distrust."

On September 3 the editor of the ***New York Herald Tribune*** was also of the opinion that the very grim prospect was for a hardening of the world division, with the new balance see-sawing uneasily "toward another colossal war when another generation grows up to fight it."

Byrnes' Policy Challenged By Wallace. This foreboding was shared by one member of President Truman's Cabinet Secretary of Commerce Henry A. WUaceOn September 12, he made a speech before two left wing organizations in Madison Square Garden in which he said: "The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get. To prevent war and insure our survival in a stable world, it is essential that we look abroad through our own American eyes and not through the eyes of either the British Foreign Office or a pro-British or anti-Russian press."

> Wallace did not advocate appeasement. He declared that
>
> "we most earnestly want peace with Russia, but we want to be met half way. We want cooperation. And I believe we can get cooperation once Russia understands that our primary objective is neither saving the British

[10] Bert Andrews, *New York Herald Tribune*, August 22, 1946. On the same day an ultimatum was sent to Yugoslavia, because of the shooting down of an American plane.

[11] The *New York Times*, September 10, 1946. Walter Lippmann supported the building up of American power in the Eastern Mediterranean, from which it could reach the heart of Russia, as preferable to lend-leasing our power through many other capitals and exhausting our strength in many minor theaters.—*New York Herald Tribune*, September 7, 1946.

Empire nor purchasing oil in the Near East with the lives of American soldiers. We must not allow national oil rivalries to force us into war.

"The real peace treaty we now need is between the United States and Russia. On our part, we should recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has In the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States."

At the same meeting Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, said:

"If we go on, as we are now going, appeasing the imperialists in the Republican party, there can be no end but war.

"The American people want us to give Britain der due but they also want us to give Russia her due. They know that we and the British have no right to tell Russiathat she can't defend the Dardanelles, for the Dardanelles are a lot closer to the homeland of Russia than the Suez is to Britain or the Panama Canal is to the United States."

The Pepper speech could be ignored, but that by Wallace couldn't, since he was a member of the Cabinet and since the President said at his press conference on September 12 that he approved the speech Wallace was going to make that night and there was nothing in it which conflicted with the address of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes at Stuttgart, Germany, on September 6. Byrnes had stated emphatically that we were not withdrawing our armed forces from Germany for a long period. He urged a federated Germany and opposed "any controls that would subject the Ruhr and the Rhineland to the political domination or manipulation of outside powers."[12]

Most of the press quickly disagreed with the President and dispatches from Paris reported that the Wallace speech "had cut the ground from under the foreign policy that Mr. Byrnes had labored for a year to develop and define." The ***New York Times*** asserted that Eastern Europe was our business when Hitler invaded it. Wallace was talking like Nye and Wheeler. He was leading us toward two worlds. His resignation was demanded by Representative ClarenceT. Brown, of Ohio, campaign director of the Republican National Committee. Paris dispatches also expected Truman to support Byrnes and ask Wallace to resign.[13]

On the 16th Wallace announced, after telephoning to the President, that he stood upon his statement and would make a new speech. On the 17th he made public a long letter about our relations with the Soviet Union which he had sent to the President on July 23, at the latter's suggestion.

Wallace's Letter to the President. In this letter Wallace was "troubled by the apparently growing feeling among the American people that another war is coming and the only way we can head it off is to arm ourselves to the teeth." He asked:

"How do American actions since V-J Day appear to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like $13,000,000,000 for the War and

[12] The *New York Times*, September 13 and 7, 1946. Actually the President had not read the Wallace speech.—Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. I, p. 557.

[13] The *New York Times*, September 13, 14, 17, 1946.

Navy Departments, the Bikini tests of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our weapons, production of B-29's and planned production of B-36's and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at the conference table.

"These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000 mile bombers and air bases within 1,000 miles of our coastlines, and we did not?"

Armed peace would not work, said Wallace, because "the very fact that several nations have atomic bombs will inevitably result in a neurotic, fear ridden, itching trigger psychology in all the peoples of the world, and because of our wealth and vulnerability we would be among the most seriously affected."

Attacking the central idea of our plan for the control of atomic energy, Wallace declared that the plan to proceed by stages was a fatal defect. We were "telling the Russians that if they are 'good boys' we may eventually turn over our knowledge of atomic energy to them and to the other nations. But there is no objective standard of what will qualify them as being good nor any specified time for sharing our knowledge." It was perfectly clear that the step by step plan in any such one-sided form was not workable. The entire agreement would have to be worked out and "wrapped up in a single package." We were in effect asking Russia to reveal the only two cards she had, our lack of information on her atomic energy progress and of her uranium resources. After we saw her cards we would decide whether we wanted to continue to play.

No wonder the Russians were not enthusiastic, Wallace said. They had put up their counter proposals for the record, but their real efforts were going into work on the bomb. Only deadlock could result from a continuation of our policy. He characterized the veto issue as completely irrelevant. It had no meaning with respect to a treaty on atomic energy. What action was there to be vetoed after the treaty was signed? He warned that the Russians would redouble their efforts to make A-bombs and that "they may also decide to expand their security zone in a serious way. Up to now what they have done in East Europe and the Middle East is small change, from the point of view of military power, as compared with our air bases in Greenland, Okinawa and many other places thousands of miles from our shores."

> "Our actions to expand our military security system—such steps as extending the Monroe Doctrine to include the arming of the Western Hemisphere nations, our present monopoly of the atomic bomb, our interest in outlying bases and our general support of the British Empire appear to them as going far beyond the requirements of defense.

"I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world, and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history. ... Finally, our resistance to her attempts to obtain warm water ports and her own security system in the form of 'friendly' neighboring states seems, from the Russian point of view, to clinch the case.

"Most of us are firmly convinced of the rightness of internationalization and de-fortification of the Danube or the Dardanelles but we would be horrified and angered by any Russian counter proposal that would involve also the internationalizing and disarming of Suez or Panama.

"We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications. The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda.... This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated by absolutist governments.

"We should not act as if we, too, felt that we were threatened in today's world. We are by far the most powerful nation in the world, the only Allied nation which came out of the war without devastation and much stronger than before the war. Any talk on our part about the need for strengthening our defenses further is bound to appear hypocritical."

Wallace urged friendly discussion with Russia of her long term economic problems. He proposed the sending of a trade mission to Moscow to consider the future trade between the two countries and a reconstruction loan to Russia. It would, he concluded, be fruitless to seek solutions for the many specific problems that face us without first achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. That would not be easy, but it could be done.

Byrnes' Resignation Offered. The next day Secretary Byrnes sent a message to the President saying that "if it is not completely clear in your own mind that Mr. Wallace should be asked to refrain from criticizing the foreign policy of the United States while he is a member of your Cabinet, I must ask you to accept my resignation immediately."[14]

On the same day the President had a long conference with Wallace at the White House, after which it was announced that Wallace would not make any more speeches until after the Paris Conference had ended. He would keep his post in the Cabinet. This led to another message from Byrnes insisting that Wallace must not criticize our foreign policy as a Cabinet member after the Conference adjourned.[15] Editorially, the ***New York Times*** insisted that there could not be two officials of the same Cabinet advocating contradictory foreign policies. The ***Times*** stressed "the essential indivisibility of the modern world," and demanded "why should it be necessary to beat this retreat from the idealism of the Atlantic Charter?" Byrnes was merely trying to draw a line somewhere.

[14] **Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 240.**

[15] ***Ibid.*, pp. 240–3; the *New York Times*, September 19, 1946.**

Wallace Dismissed. On the 20th the President became convinced that he must choose. He asked for Wallace's resignation and declared his complete support for Byrnes. In a radio talk the same evening Wallace maintained that he had begun talking about one world more than fifteen years ago and that we could not have peace except in one world. He wished to make clear again that he was against all types of imperialism and aggression, whether they were of Russian, British or American origin.

In commenting upon the crisis, James Reston said that it was generally agreed that "Mr. Wallace does not go out of the Cabinet as a discredited dissenter but as the victim of his own sincere beliefs and of a series of errors, most of which he did not commit. He wrote his letter of dissent at the President's request, brought it into the open with the President's permission, and did everything to meet the President's wishes except insincerity. His beliefs were not popular but they were not the main reason for his resignation either."[16]

Stalin's Replies to Werth. On September 24,1946, Stalin took a hand in the arguments stirred up by the Wallace episode. In reply to a questionnaire submitted by Alexander Werth, correspondent of the London ***Sunday Times***, Stalin replied that real danger of a new war did not exist at that time. He did "not think that the ruling circles of Great Britain and the United States could create a 'capitalist encirclement' of the Soviet Union even if they so desire, which, however, I cannot assert." He believed the "utilization of Germany by the Soviet Union against Western Europe and the United States of America to be precluded" by Russia's treaties of mutual assistance against German aggression with Great Britain and France, by the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and by the "fundamental interests" of the Soviet Union.

Asked whether he believed that virtual monopoly by the U.S.A. of the atomic bomb constituted one of the main threats to peace, he answered that he did not believe the bomb to be as serious a force as certain politicians were inclined to regard it. Atomic bombs were intended for intimidating weak nerves but they could not decide the outcome of a war. Besides, monopolistic possession of the atomic bomb could not last long and its use would be prohibited. In reply to the question as to whether he believed in the possibility of friendly and lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies he said, "I absolutely believe so," and asserted "I do not doubt that the possibilities of peaceful cooperation, far from decreasing may even grow. Communism in one country is perfectly possible, especially in a country like the Soviet Union."

With special reference to Great Britain, Stalin thought that "the strengthening of political, trade and cultural ties between these countries would considerably contribute to the establishment of such relations."

Commenting editorially, on the 25th, the ***Herald Tribune*** thought that Stalin

[16] **The *New York Times*, September 21, 1946. On the 18th the War and Navy Secretaries issued a joint statement in reply to Wallace's statement that one military school advocated a preventive war now. The statement said that they did not know of any responsible army or navy officer who had "ever advocated or even suggested" a policy or plan of attacking Russia.**

had cut the ground from under the encirclement thesis, which Russian propaganda had been featuring for six months, and concluded that the Kremlin might be groping after a real basis for peace. In London ***The Times*** said that Stalin's statement was "a timely and much needed recall to sanity and moderation in international relations."[17]

British Support for Wallace. The socialist British weekly ***New Statesman and Nation*** and the liberal ***Economist*** both endorsed the views of Henry A. Wallace. The former printed in full Wallace's letter to Truman and estimated that nine out of ten Britons would agree wholeheartedly with it. Foreign Secretary Bevin agreed that war was not likely at present, but added that no peace was possible without an end to the present war of nerves.[18] For the Conservatives Anthony Eden appealed for a "new approach to Soviet Russia," but American Acting Secretary of State Clayton "summarily rejected" Eden's suggestion for a new approach. The United States was satisfied with the course which she was pursuing toward the Soviets.

Commenting on Clayton's reaction, William L. Shirer noted that the doubters of Stalin's words were "the very people who take most seriously every word that he utters that seems bellicose and threatening." Shirer thought that even the President must know that the foundations for peace between the U.S. and Russia which President Roosevelt built with such care and skill had been destroyed in the last twelve months.[19]

Replying to the two British weeklies the ***Herald Tribune*** maintained that Russia's reaches for Trieste and the Dardanelles, together with her violent refusal to reopen international traffic on the Danube posed "a bald question of whether the West, continuing a long retreat, is to abandon the whole of Southeastern Europe and Turkey, with all key communications in the area, to the iron curtain of the regimented Russian economy, or whether the Western powers are somewhere to make a stand."[20]

Key Issues. More and more it appeared that Russian economic domination of Eastern Europe and the control of the Eastern Mediterranean were the key issues between the two great powers. Speaking in Paris, on October 4, Secretary Byrnes called on the Soviet Union to "decry not only war but the things that lead to war." He added that "nations may seek political and economic advantages which they cannot obtain without war." He hoped that Stalin's statement would "put an end to unwarranted charges that the United States is seeking to encircle the Soviet Union or that the responsible leaders of the Soviet Union so believe."[21]

Voting Majorities Ineffective. On October 15 the Paris Peace Conference of 21 nations adjourned, after nearly three months devoted to consideration of the draft treaties of peace for the former satellite countries which had been agreed upon by the Council of Foreign Ministers. By this time the more thoughtful editors were disillusioned with the practicality of settling issues

[17] ***New York Herald Tribune*, September 25, 1946.**
[18] ***Ibid.*, September 28, 1946.**
[19] ***Ibid.*, September 29, 1946.**
[20] ***Herald Tribune*, September 30, 1946.**
[21] **Alexander Kendrick, *PM*, October 4, 1946.**

with the Russians in conferences attended by many small states. Under the caption "Fifteen to Six" the ***New York Times*** thought, on October 12, that the Conference would hand back to the Big Four much the same set of problems which had been handed to it. On October 16 the ***Herald Tribune*** recognized that the voting system had been destroyed. "The hollowness of the mere massing of majorities, of professed appeals to 'world opinion' (whicli does not exist), and of most of the other devices upon which Western policy has relied, has been thoroughly and skilfully exposed by Soviet diplomacy."[1] Russia had made plain her ability to paralyze any future solution to which she did not voluntarily agree, but she had not abolished our veto.

The London ***Times*** decided that the whole idea of deciding issues in international conferences was fallacious. Nothing had been decided if the minority included a great power. The same principle applied to the veto. It was not something "new and extravagant," but the inevitable corollary of a voting system on major issues in international affairs." The European press also felt that the blaze of publicity in which the current peace parleys were held made negotiation difficult, if not impossible. One of the American correspondents in Paris summed it up as follows: "In the full glare of publicity the high delegates became politicians rather than statesmen, and each played the role of the stubborn strong man to the electorate back home." No party leader, or trade union secretary, concluded ***The Times***, would consent to negotiate on vital and delicate issues under the rules which the Paris conference has been misguided enough to impose on itself."[22]

Samuel Grafton noted that Byrnes and Molotov had had their first private talk only a few days before the Conference ended. Ever since the collapse of the conference of Foreign Ministers at London, when President Truman announced there would be no more Big Three meetings, we had had a year of diplomacy by speech making, that is, a period of struggle but not of negotiation. At Paris there had been a fantastic over use of "open diplomacy," including diplomacy by press handout, which meant conducting war in the press rather than doing business with each other. Grafton recalled the excitement which swept certain circles, especially the Republican contingent in the Senate, when the theory was proposed that the UN General Assembly might come to settle all disputes by vetoless majority vote. Now the Conference had demonstrated the futility of the majority vote thesis.[23]

Walter Lippmann argued that Byrnes had failed, not because he and his assistants, Senators Vandenberg and Connally, lacked patience, firmness or sincerity, but because they had tried to do the impossible. They had been trying "by force of argument to induce the Soviet Union to yield power and influence in the territory which the Red Army has occupied." A year had beenv lost in challenging the Soviet Union where we were weakest, because we had hoped, "quite vainly, that treaties of peace with the satellites would compel the Red Army to retire from Eastern Europe."

This approach was a fundamental departure from President Roosevelt's concept of making the peace on a global basis. By isolating and therefore

[22] **William L. Shirer, *Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1946.**
[23] ***New York Post*, October 7, 1946.**

overemphasizing this one region we had begun an auction for the favor of Germany which would be disastrous if our tactics were not reversed. If and when we renewed genuine diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and got down to realities, we would have to begin where Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin left off: "with an examination of the distribution of power among the Big Three."[24]

Was the Conflict Irreconcilable? In his radio report on the Conference Senator Vandenberg expressed his conviction that neither side wanted war and that there was too much war talk. He heard "much more war talk over here than I did in Paris." The AP correspondent Eddy Gilmore, just returned to Moscow after several months in the United States, also concluded, in a dispatch from Moscow: "abroad, talk is about war; here, it is about peace." The Russians were not being conditioned for war. In Canada alarmist warnings that Canada would be the battleground in any new war had created a difficult problem for the Canadian Government. It was convinced that short of extensive internal treachery invasion of this continent was not possible, but could hardly say so without charges of being remiss in defense of the country. The prophets of danger were frequently retired politically-minded military men on both sides of the border whose utterances got wide publicity. P. J. Philip reported that they had begun to build up "an atmosphere of uneasiness that was unhealthy and might become dangerous."[25]

On October 19 the Executive Committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America adopted a report of the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace on Soviet-American relations which held that Christianity and communism could coexist peacefully on three conditions: (1) the existence of conflicting beliefs must be considered as normal; (2) all men must renounce the effort to spread abroad their way of life by methods of intolerance; and (3) the United States must accept primary responsibility to secure international acceptance of the method of tolerance. The American people must avoid the "death trap" spiral of fear and suspicion which would result in war "merely because many people have erroneously thought it inevitable."

This declaration was countered by a statement of the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States on the conflict between Russia and the West, which insisted that "In an effort to preserve unity, fatal compromises have been made, either implicitly or by tolerance of shocking aggressions." The tragic fact was that the cleavage touched "issues on which there can be no compromise." The real issue was "the question of man as man" and his persecution by the Soviets in the occupied countries.[26]

[24] *New York Herald Tribune,* October 15, 29, 1946.

[25] The *New York Times,* October 13 and 20; *Herald Tribune,* October 13, 1946.

26 yvew' *York Herald Tribune,* November 17, 1946.

On October 6, Cardinal Spellman predicted before 50,000 worshippers that Archbishop Stepinac, on trial for treason in Yugoslavia, would be executed. The next educational building in his diocese would be named "Archbishop Stepinac Memorial." Spellman denounced the trial as an "outrage" and feared that we would "through callousness or indifference forget and repudiate men and nations still fighting for their freedom."—The *New York Times,* October 7, 1946.

Quoting the Vatican's decree excommunicating all those who had anything to do with

Interlude at Hyde Park. On November 3, the conflict over what to do about the Soviet Union was stilled momentarily at the grave of Franklin D. Roosevelt. At a pilgrimage of General Assembly delegates to Hyde Park, President Paul Henri Spaak expressed in a voice trembling with emotion the deep regret of the whole world that the former President was not alive to help it through these critical times. After Spaak had placed a wreath on Roosevelt's grave, Molotov and the other Russian delegates lingered until « the garden had emptied and then placed a wreath of their own, standing for a moment with bowed heads.[27]

Trusteeship in the Pacific. On the question of trusteeship for the former League of Nations mandates, the Soviet Union opposed in the General Assembly the interpretation of the United States that a "state directly concerned" referred only to the power administering a trusteeship area. This dispute was related to the determination of the U.S. Navy to keep the 1500 mandated islands seized from Japan at such heavy cost during the war. Because of its opposition the State Department was not able to present any kind of trusteeship proposal until very late in the Assembly. Then the plan called for a "strategic area" trusteeship under the Security Council, where we had a veto, instead of the Trusteeship Council. The United States was to be the sole trustee for the islands, with administrative, legislative and jurisdictional authority over them "as an integral part of the United States." The Soviet Union opposed the latter provision, as it did for all the other mandated areas, particularly the proposal of South Africa to annex the former German South West Africa.

The United States felt about the Pacific Islands much as the Russians did about East Europe. Each was told frequently that it had nothing to worry about in the future, and that it should rely on UN to protect it, but both wanted to make sure.

Franco Spain. There was disagreement also over what to do about Franco Spain. There was a widespread feeling in the Assembly that something should be done about this conspicuous survival of fascism. Two Polish resolutions barred Spain from UN membership, including the specialized agencies, and called for the termination of diplomatic relations with Spain by all UN members. The United States countered with a resolution which incorporated the first Polish proposal, but sought to avoid the second by calling upon General Franco to "surrender the powers of government to a provisional government broadly representative." The Assembly nevertheless adopted a resolution recommending the withdrawal of ambassadors from Spain and urging the Security Council to take adequate measures to remedy the situation if a government of the people was not formed in Spain in a reasonable time. Six negative votes were cast by South American states.[28]

Stepinac's trial, Albert Deutsch questioned whether religious freedom had been violated. The decree made it plain that the excommunication was based not on the contention that Stepinac was tried unjustly, but that he was tried at all in a secular court.—*PM*, November 5, 1946.

[27] ***New York Herald Tribune*, November 4, 1946.**

[28] ***Official Records*, First sess., Part 2, Vol. 2, pp. 230, 354; Vol. I, pp. 1159–1222.**

General Disarmament. The Russian proposal for general disarmament, on October 29, was startling to the West. Besides being good propaganda, the six point Soviet resolution sought to blanket the American plan for controlling atomic energy by a drive for general disarmament, which was difficult to counter logically, aside from the fact that we did not trust the Russians.

The Soviet move put us on the defensive, but did not, of course, prevent a counter drive to protect the jurisdiction of the AEC and to get inspection, which eventually drew from Molotov the statement that "the rule of unanimity in the Security Council has nothing to do with the work of the control commissions. Therefore it is incorrect to say that a permanent member with its 'veto' could prevent the implementation of a control system."

This concession smoothed the way for agreement on a broad resolution which recognized "the necessity of an early general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces;" urged the AEC to fulfil its terms of reference: and called upon the Security Council to draft treaties for the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, with strict provision for inspection.[29]

Here was a plan for a general attack upon the problem of competitive armament in an age of mass destruction weapons, which might have saved Western civilization, had both sides been willing to implement it. Conceivably the grand attack upon our number one problem might have had a better start if it had not been mixed up constantly with the troop count project, backed by Russian charges. The West replied with almost constant questioning of Russian sincerity on the disarmament proposal.[30]

It could not be defeated, but events and lack of desire on either side to realize it could, and did, make it a dead letter.

Private Talk. On November 25, at the request of Molotov, Byrnes and Molotov had their first private talk during the new session of the Foreign Ministers' Conference on the satellite peace treaties. It resulted in Molotov yielding a "major point" concerning the powers of the governor of Trieste. Janies Reston thought this might be a harbinger that the Foreign Ministers might be beginning to recognize the limitations of propaganda debates. "Open disagreements openly perpetuated" had been the rule for more than a year.[31]

Soviet Concessions. The next day the headlines reported that the Trieste deadlock was ended. "Soviet yields on new state," and on the 28th Molotov agreed to the principle of international control of the Danube, and to a conference on the subject.

Rapid progress in agreeing on the satellite treaties of peace followed Molotov's visit to Byrnes, during which the latter said he saw no hope of agreement and urged that the conference be ended. The next day Molotov

[29] *Official Records*, First Committee, First sess., Part 2, Vol. 2, pp. 257, 334—40; *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly*, First sess., Part 2, pp. 65–7.

[30] The writer attended several of the committee sessions and noted that Molotov's motives were often questioned, without his challenging those of others. On one occasion the *Herald Tribune* reported, on November 28, 1946, that the "hardest fighter and biggest loser" during the long session was Molotov, "who came out on the short end of seven of the eight ballots, but retained good humor and equanimity all the way."

[31] *New York Herald Tribune* and the *New York Times*, November 26, 1946.

began to yield, and "when Mr. Molotov decides the time has come to agree, he does it in a big way." Some 47 of the 53 recommendations for amendments adopted by the Paris Conference by two-thirds votes were accepted and 24 of the 41 which had been approved by majority votes.[32]

Tensions Relaxed. In appraising the terms of the final satellite peace treaties Lippmann did not think there was any substantial difference between the final drafts and the armistice terms fixed by the Soviets two years before. The same agreements could have been had when Byrnes was in Moscow a year ago. "Only then they were denounced as appeasement."

On the other side of the ledger, the Kremlin had had to recognize that it could not now take over Iran, Turkey and Greece. There had been a temporary stabilization of world power zones which made it incumbent upon the Anglo-Americans to find solutions for the great problems in China, in the colonial areas and the Middle East, and "the expansion of our strategic positions." Otherwise the Russians would undoubtedly come forward again.[33]

This analysis was sound. There had been a stabilization of relations between the victors of the war. The vacuums resulting from it had been filled by agreement, except in Germany and Japan, where possession was mainly in the hands of the Western powers, and even here it was still possible to consider the future of these countries on their merits. In Europe economic production was back generally to pre-war levels and there was remarkable social peace, no strikes and communists cooperating with Catholic parties in the governments. In East Europe some of the Soviet satellites "had enjoyed model democratic elections," notably Hungary.[34]

The two sides had spent a year of haggling mainly to try to keep an economic foothold in the territory of the other and both felt they had succeeded. Italian reparations had tied a portion of the industry of Italy to the Russian market and the agreement for a conference on the international regulation of the Danube seemed to promise the West an entry into East Europe. Indeed its entry might be welcomed, on a basis of equality. The new communist premier of Bulgaria proposed greater friendship with the Allies, and the Rumanian Government offered Western capital "a vast and profitable field of activity."[35]

The logical balance dictated by the result of the war had been reached. East Europe was lost to the West, politically and socially, but this result had been foreordained at Munich in 1938. The inevitable having been finally recognized, both sides coulcfafford to relax. Bevin thought the sun was rising at last, and Molotov gave the reporters in London cheery Christmas greetings. On December 19, ***Pravda*** condemned in sharp language an article in the Soviet Navy newspaper ***Red Fleet***, which had criticized the handling of the convoy to Murmansk during the war that lost twenty-four ships, and this amend was received with great satisfaction in London.[36]

In Britain a desire to mitigate the tension with Russia was strongly

[32] **Byrnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–5.**

[33] ***Herald Tribune*, December 24, 1946.**

[34] **Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, pp. 16–18. This is the most penetrating and authoritative book on post-war Europe.**

[35] ***Ibid.***

[36] ***HeraldTribune*, December 20, 1946.**

expressed by a rebel group in the Labor Party, which issued a report condemning the "varying degrees of anti-Russian intrigue and propaganda" in the British legations in East Europe. The career diplomats were prone to entertain "reactionary and dispossessed elements" in these countries and color their reports to London accordingly. In an effort to overcome the Tory mentality surviving in the diplomatic service, the report urged the sending of diplomats to new posts and their recruitment from other areas of British life.[37]

UNRRA Ended. In the United States the trend was still away from amelioration. UNRRA, the great relief and rehabilitation organization of the United Nations was ending its work, with only the worst wounds of the war healed, for reasons explained by the extremely conservative columnist Mark Sullivan. We had contributed 72 per cent of the large sums spent by UNRRA, but control of the spending was exercised by "over forty nations, of which we were one." UNRRA had sent relief wherever it wanted to, including Yugoslavia which had shot down one of our planes and to countries which [64]took positions contrary to ours or critical of ours at the peace conference in Paris." Moreover, when a committee of our Congress undertook to investigate the operations of UNRRA it had "asserted its immunity from Congressional process." Hereafter we would control the expenditure of our own money.[38]

A Republican Congress Elected. Sullivan spoke with some authority, because an event of very great importance to American-Soviet relations had occurred in early November 1946. The Republicans had won control of both houses of Congress. It had not been expected that they would get the Senate.

The principal reason for this surprising result, it transpired later, was that large numbers of Democratic and independent voters did not vote. They were dispirited by the loss of Roosevelt, upon whom they had relied so long, and discouraged by the ineptness of the Truman Administration. The dismissal of Wallace had also had a larger effect on the left wing of the party than the vote for Wallace in 1948 indicated. The labor organizations were also apathetic. These factors made for a small vote. It proved to be only 34,400,742 as compared to 48,025,684 in 1944 and 48,489,212 in 1948.

On their side, the conservative interests had conducted a wide advertising campaign throughout the war to discourage innovations after it, and to suggest that everything about our system was right. In the campaign of 1946 this drive moved over to the offensive and identified virtually all liberal ideas and individuals with communism. On October 7, Representative Wright Patman of Texas characterized this technique as "fascistic in concept and in execution." He alleged that the Republican campaign chiefs Representative Clarence

[37] ***Herald Tribune*, December 11, 1946.**

[38] ***Ibid.*, November 15, 1946.**

The General Assembly records bear out Sullivan's interpretation. There would be no more relief through any new international agency, but only on a bi-lateral basis, that is, by the Western powers to an individual country under a special agreement with it.—*Official Records*, Second Committee, First sess., Part *2*, p. 202.

Brown of Ohio and Carroll Reece of Tennessee asked "just like Hitler did, that the people put their party in power to destroy communism." They were ably aided, said Patman, by the publisher Frank Gannett, who had organized the Committee for Constitutional Government in 1936, headed by Edward A. Rumely, a convicted German agent in World War I, which had, according to Congressional records, spent $10,000,000 over a seven year period for 82,000,000 pieces of literature and recordings.[39]

The Cry of Communism Effective. Marquis W. Childs wrote that shrewd analysts had concluded that "the cry of Communism, which was raised by Republicans from one side of the country to the other," was one of the most potent forces in their victory. He noted that on September 30 FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover had "let loose a resounding blast against Communists in the U.S., saying more or less directly that they were at work at every level and in every organization." Hoover's charges were "repeated over and over again throughout the campaign."

Then Childs uttered a very prophetic warning: "This could be the prelude for the kind of Red hunt that took place after World War I."[40] He did not

[39] PM, October 7, 1946. Predicting that Patman would be nationally and soundly trounced for daring to use the word "fascist," Grafton observed that "conservatism has won a profound political victory, in making the term "Communistic," as applied to almost all liberal thinking, a piece of respectable, or semi-respectable coinage." But when the word fascism was uttered then the extreme conservatives, who controlled most of the avenues for vocalizing, developed a passion for accuracy in the use of words. For their opponents they were using the same trick the fascists used abroad, picking a name to which prejudice adhered and applying it to all their opponents, "putting them all into one bag and tying it shut."—*New York Post*, October 9, 1946.

[40] *New York Post*, November 30, 1946. In the address quoted, Hoover had warned that the Communist Party claim to some 100,000 members "has lulled many Americans into a feeling of false complacency. I would not be concerned if we were dealing with only 100.000 Communists. The Communists themselves boast that for every party member there are 10 others ready to do the party's work. These include their satellites, their fellow travellers and their so-called progressive and phony liberal allies."

In mid-1950 Hoover said to a Senate Committee: "Many Americans have been lulled into a sense of complacency by the claim that there are comparatively few members of the Communist Party of the United States of America. Personally, I would have no fear if the Communists could be brought out into the open, but so long as the party is a branch of a world-wide underground movement, inspired from abroad, they cannot be dismissed lightly. According to our best information, there is a total of 54,174 members of the Communist Party in the United States at the present time. ... Even though there are only 54,174 members of the party, the fact remains that the party leaders themselves boast that for every party member there are 10 others who follow the party line and who are ready, willing and able to do the party's work. In other words, there is a potential fifth column of 540.000 people dedicated to this philosophy."—*U.S. News and World Report,* June 23,1950, p. 11.

In the four-year period between these two utterances Hoover was still accepting the same communist boast that each communist could control ten other people, in exactly the same phrases. Of course he would not, under any circumstances, accept the word of a communist on anything else, but the chief of all our detectives accepted without question, and for all time, a communist boast that for each communist there were exactly ten fellow travellers and phony liberal allies of communism. Fortunately, by 1950 Hoover had, on paper at least, reduced the number of dangerous people to be watched from 1,000,000 to 540,000, still an enormous "potential fifth column," all "dedicated to this philosophy."

foresee that the imminent witch hunt would bite much more deeply and last far longer. Lippmann even hoped, on November 16, that the House Committee on Un-American Activities would be curbed. He assumed that the Republican majority would "strip Representative Rankin of the tyrannical power which he has usurped, and put an end to this man's lawless, subversive, and outrageous attacks on the constitutional liberties of the American people," but under J. Parnell Thomas the committee was to be still more irresponsible.

Organic Opposition to Russia. The election of an extremely conservative Republican Congress, to say the least, came just at the time when a stabilization of relations among the great powers occurred, and when a general letdown in the tension between them was indicated. The detente might still occur, but the triumphant Republicans, including most of the powerful Americans who hated and feared communism, along with radicalism and liberalism, were not likely to encourage it. As Grafton said, the Republicans were not a war party, as the communists alleged, but they had "an organic opposition to Russia." He suggested that conservative foreign policy was "a planless and possibly explosive mixture of contradictory elements, a real desire for the national comfort and frugalities of peace, plus a basic inability to live with the strange other half of the world."[41]

What he did not foresee was that a new crisis in Europe would come swiftly with the New Year and that when it did President Truman would outdo the Republicans in taking a strong line against communism, and Russia, everywhere in the world.

[41] ***New York Post*, November 21, 1946.**

CHAPTER XVI

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

JANUARY–JUNE 1947

The stabilization which took place in December 1946, with final agreement on the satellite treaties, was accompanied by a real relaxation of tension on Russia's side. The Soviets felt assured that their influence would be predominant in Eastern Europe. Their primary war aim had been achieved.

Signs of Relaxation. In Poland the Russians effaced themselves as much as possible. A correspondent who toured Poland for several weeks found them only 40,000 in number, seldom seen, quiet and well behaved. They were courteous to the Polish troops and sought to treat Poland as a sovereign state.[1] American doctors attending a medical meeting in Czechoslovakia "constantly looked for that iron curtain or evidence of Russian intervention or influence, but never found it." They moved "as freely as in the United States." United Nations news broadcasts from Lake Success, in Russian, were also accepted in the Soviet Union and relayed over domestic wave lengths. The broadcasts "complete from controversies to personalities" were approved by Soviet officials as impartial, indicating the the Soviets felt at peace with the wçrld enough to welcome a fairly important contact with it.[2]

Their sphere of influence having been recognized, the Russians moved to recognize our exclusive-custody, strategic-area trusteeship of the former Japanese mandated islands in the Pacific. A Russian note received in Washington on February 24, 1947, held this arrangement to be "entirely fair."

Russian production was also putting heavy emphasis on consumer goods.[3]

[1] **Marguerite Higgins, *New York Herald Tribune,* February 8, 1947. Another American woman who had been strongly warned about the Russian troops in the Soviet zone of Austria travelled through it freely and without the slightest incident.—Emma Ewing, the *Nashville Tennessean,* January 24, 1947.**

[2] **Dr. J. E. M. Thomson of Lincoln, Nebraska, the *New York Times,* January 26, 1947; February 26, 1947. On February 22, sixteen eminent churchmen, members of the Inter-Church Committee of the American Russian Institute issued a statement warning that suspicion, fear and hate could precipitate an atomic holocaust.—*Herald Tribune,* February 23,1947.**

[3] ***Herald Tribune,* February 23, 26,1947. On March 4, Richard Lauterbach, former head of the *Time-Life* bureau in Moscow, said of the Russians: "I don't care how strict their dictatorship is, they just couldn't make these people go to war unless they are invaded, and that's their one fear."—The *New York Times,* March 5, 1947.**

On January 23, Dr. J. B. S. Haldane, "British geneticist, author and socialist," told a communist rally in Madison Square Garden that given thirty years of peace the Soviet Union would give a higher standard of living to its people than any nation under capitalist economy.—*Herald Tribune,* January 24, 1947.

NEW FRICTION POINTS

These signs of amelioration, of live-and-let-live, were offset, at least in part, by new points of friction which developed early in 1947. Late in January ***Pravda*** chose to regard a speech made by Foreign Minister Bevin as a repudiation of the Anglo-Russian alliance and an exchange of letters between Bevin and Stalin did not clear up the matter. The Soviet press and radio still insisted that Britain and the United States were "coming out in a bloc against the Soviet Union."[4]

On January 17 this feeling received a sharp boost when John Foster Dulles, Republican adviser to the State Department, with the new authority of a Republican Congress behind him, made a speech urging Western Europe to unite economically around the coal and steel power of the Rhine basin as a bulwark against Soviet Russia.[5] When Senator Vandenberg repeated the same proposal it was vigorously condemned by ***Pravda*** on the 26th.

Three days later the Polish election, which established communist control, was the subject of a strong speech by Vandenberg, in which he went beyond the State Department's protest that a "free and unfettered election" had not been held and demanded that Russia's responsibility for the election be fully investigated and established. The UN had full jurisdiction to investigate. While he spoke only for peaceful procedures, Mr. Vandenberg told his Senate colleagues he did not see how there could be a thought of "resting the case on the mere filing of an unpursued indictment."[6]

The next day Senator Styles Bridges, of New Hampshire, "lashed at Soviet Russia with a bitter accusation" that she planned to turn Germany into a satellite and ally, and on the 26th ex-Govemor George H. Earle, of Pennsylvania, described Russia as "the source of 90 per cent of the evil in the world today." He urged the United States to "spend two billion dollars annually on atom bombers and then to tell the Russians that if they drop one such bomb on this country we will wipe out their land."[7]

In Chicago, on February 10, Dulles warned that any appeasement of Russia would bring dire consequences. Soviet dynamism could be kept within tolerable bounds if "it comes up against something that is vigorous, not because it encounters mushiness." Five days later the Soviet historian, E. E. Tarle, charged that Dulles plotted war. He was seeking to "establish hurriedly a military bloc of the United States, Britain and France." Echoing Winston Churchill, Dulles was trying to frighten the rest of the world with "the ghost of non-existent Soviet expansion." Later in the month Drew Middleton reported from Moscow that perhaps nothing had so established the difference of approach to the German problem as the announcement of Secretary of

[4] The *New York Times,* January 24, 29, 1947.

[5] French diplomatic circles understood that Dulles had made the speech with the approval of Senators Vandenberg and Taft and Governor Dewey. They approved of the proposal but not of its motive, fear of Russia.—*Herald Tribune,* January 24, 1947.

[6] The *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*, January 30, 1947.

[7] The *New York Times,* January 27; *Herald Tribune,* February 1, 1947.

State Marshall that Dulles would accompany him to the appnjadimg Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, as an adviser qiOcminaffairs.[8]

Russia "Aggressive and Expanding." Simultaneously, on February 10, an incident occurred in a United States Senate Committee which sharply exacerbated relations with Russia. Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson was being interrogated by Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee, who sought to compel him to make a statement condemning Russia's role in Eastern Europe. Acheson tried repeatedly to avoid doing so, since the hearing in progress was a domestic matter, saying: "I think it is most ill-advised for me and for the State Department and for the country to get into this sort of general talk," but McKellar persisted repeatedly, asking finally if Acheson didn't "believe that if she gets this bomb discovery she would take not only the remainder of Europe but perhaps the remainder of the world?"

McKellar was evidently intent upon committing Acheson to a strong anti-Russian position, regardless of the effect upon Russian-American relations and the strongly worded questions put to Acheson finally drove him into saying:

> "Senators, I don't think that that is a question which is capable of being answered in the way in which you asked it. I am quite aware of the fact that Russian foreign policy is an aggressive and expanding one. I think that one of the great efforts which everyone is making in the United Nations is to attempt to find means of solving problems of that sort. If those means and agreements can be found, then there is hope that there will not be major clashes. If they can't be found, then I think the situation is very serious."[9]

Acheson tried hard to avoid a provocative utterance, but he did label Russia as "aggressive," which was not far from saying that she was an aggressor. The Soviet Union protested promptly that this was inadmissible behavior on Acheson's part, "rude, slanderous and hostile." In reply Secretary Marshall quoted the stenographic record of the exchange with McKellar, explaining that Acheson's comment was not volunteered and that it was restrained. This, however, did not mollify Molotov, who sent a second note saying that our reply was unsatisfactory and that the Soviet Government retained "its opinion expressed in its note of February 14."[10]

The government controlled Soviet press had no grounds for complaint over the incident, since it had frequently vilified the motives of the United States, teaching the Soviet peoples that America tended toward expansion and aggressiveness, giving aid and comfort to reaction everywhere. Because of this preparation one Moscow correspondent wrote that "Few diplomatic incidents have stirred Russian readers more than" Acheson's remark, and another

[8] The *New York Times*, February 17 and 27, 1947. The *Nashville Tennessean* said editorially, on March 6, that nothing would be accomplished in Moscow if Dulles' views prevailed. He dismissed "the risks involved in restoring the German industrialists and cartellists to power—a development which would find Russia unyielding."

This was not strange, considering Mr. Dulles' long pre-war association with the same German interests.

[9] *New York Herald Tribune*, February 11, 1947.

[10] The *New York Times*, February 16, 18, 19, 1947.

telegraphed that "the optimistic tone of the Soviet press and radio that was evident in December and early January has disappeared, undoubtedly as a result of Mr. Dulles' speech and Mr. Acheson's statement." The two seemed to the Russians "to be inextricably linked."[11]

Vigorous Diplomacy. In its weekly summary of the news on February 23, 1947, the ***New York Times*** listed six evidences of friction between ourselves and Russia, including the beginning of regular American broadcasts to Russia in an attempt to counter Russian internal reports about America. To point up the deterioration of relations which had taken place since the first of the year, when "guarded optimism" had prevailed, the ***Times*** enumerated five formal notes which our Government had sent to Moscow in a period of six weeks. Two had protested Russia's failure to begin negotiations for a settlement of her lend-lease account; one called attention to her delay in turning over Dairen to the Chinese; one demanded that Russia join in a Big Three order to Poland requiring her to allow "free and unfettered elections;" and the fifth objected to Russia's action in limiting to twenty the number of American correspondents at the forthcoming Moscow Coniference.

Truman's Baylor Speech. On March 6, 1947, President Truman made a speech at Baylor University on foreign economic policy which was a virtual declaration of irreconcilable conflict against both communism and democratic socialism. He explained that freedom was more important than peace and that freedom of worship and speech were dependent on freedom of enterprise. Something "deeper than a desire to protect the profits of ownership" was involved.

Freedom of enterprise was limited when governments conducted foreign trade or when the governments planned the economy. In the latter case "Governments make all the important choices and he (the trader) adjusts himself to them as best he can."

This, said the President, "was the pattern of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" and "Unless we act, and act decisively, it will be the pattern of the next century. ... If this trend is not reversed the Government of the United States will be under pressure, sooner or later, to use these same devices to fight for markets and for raw materials." It would find itself in the business of "telling every trader what he could buy or sell, and how much, and when, and where." This was "not the American way" and "not the way of peace." The implication was plain that state trading (in the U.S.S.R. and its satellites) and government control of trade (in Britain and much of West Europe) led to war.

This was serious enough, but even more ominous were the assumptions that "the whole world should adopt the American system" and that "the American system could survive in America only if it became a world system."[12]

It is altogether unlikely that the President wrote this speech. It did not

[11] **The *Christian Science Monitor*, February 19, and the *New York Times*, February 17, 1947.**

[12] **James P. Warburg, *Put Yourself in Marshall's Place*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1948, pp. 12, 46.**

receive much attention in the United States, and to Americans the long passages about the proposed International Trade Organization and the necessity of lowering our tariffs, in a most cautious and orderly manner, stood out. It was abroad that the passages quoted above were noted as a firmly expressed intention of American capitalism to take the offensive.

The Baylor speech was closely studied by every European government as. a challenge by the strongest economic unit ever developed on earth, one which had just grown to gargantuan size on government orders. During the four war years, 1942 to 1946 inclusive, the American Government had poured 306 billion dollars into the coffers of American business, taking all the responsibility, building hundreds of new plants for business to operate, guaranteeing unlimited markets and immense profits.

The result of this exhibition of "free enterprise" was the growth of the great American corporations to such power that at the end of the war our Federal Trade Commission reported that the 62 largest manufacturing corporations had accumulated liquid capital sufficient "to purchase the assets of nearly 90 per cent of all the other manufacturing corporations in the United States."[13] Many of these tremendous economic giants were more powerful than the entire national economies of dozens of nations, but the Baylor speech declared that they must not have the competition of state owned or state planned economies. If American freedom of worship and speech was to survive, the regimented economies of the world had to go.

Coming from a government which controlled three-fourths of the world's invested capital, and more than half of its industry, the Baylor speech was a statement which would give all other governments pause. It indicated how easy it would be for the world's economic colossus to decide that all other economic systems were un-American and threats to American freedom. It indicated that the representatives of American capitalism who had come into key posts in Washington after Roosevelt's death held the same view about the[v] world that Lenin and other Communist zealots had. The world could not. accommodate diverse systems. It must be one or the other: communism or free enterprise capitalism.[14]

This ominous challenge, together with the sustained diplomatic pressure described above which Washington had kept upon Moscow, indicated that the Truman Administration was not inclined to accept the equilibrium which had been reached in December. Yet the stabilization attained might have permitted peace to be made in Germany had an act of nature not upset all calculations.

[13] **Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, p. 80.**

[14] **Wall Street men in high places included James V. Forrestal, former president of Dillon Read and Company, who became Secretary of National Defense. W. Averell Harriman and Robert A. Lovett of the investment banking firm of Brown Brothers, Harriman and Company, became respectively Secretary of Commerce and Under Secretary of State. Lovett's tenure in the State Department extended from July 1947 to January 1949. General William H. Draper, of Dillon Read and Company, very largely preserved the structure of German big business, cartels and all, first as one of General Clay's chief subordinates in Germany and then as Under Secretary of the Defense Department in Washington.**

A conservative banker from St. Louis, John W. Snyder, was Truman's Secretary of the Treasury.

The Occasion for the Doctrine

Paralysis in Britain. The apparently well founded hopes for peace at the end of the year were suddenly upset by a great snow storm which whirled into a high pressure area above northern Russia and descended on the British Isles, late in January 1947, covering them from three to twenty feet deep with snow which promptly froze into ice after one day of thaw.

Britain was paralyzed. Her tired miners, mainly older men, could not get into their deep, narrow, hard-to-work coal seams. The scanty supplies above ground could be moved only with slow, heroic efforts. It was several weeks before anything like normal circulation could be restored to Britain's economic veins, and by then $800,000,000 of desperately needed export production had been lost and the world had seen clearly that Britain was too weak to resume her former role as a great power. Up to that time the illusion had persisted that the power which had dominated the world for more than a century before 1914, and which had recovered after 1918, would take her place as a fairly strong third in the new galaxy of great powers. Actually, this was impossible. Another huge bite had been taken from her overseas assets. Now they were overbalanced by far larger debts owed to all the dominions—even $4,000,000,000 to India, now emerging into independence. What was left could not support a great navy and 1,400,000 troops scattered around the world, particularly if the British people at home were to have a decent standard of living.

Empire vs. ***National Health.*** The war had also taught the British people that they ***could*** have a decent life. The vast wealth amassed from the Empire had never reached great numbers of stunted Cockneys and others who lived on the margin of subsistence. But the very existence of the nation compelled fairer sharing after 1941. The young men had first to be well fed before they could become soldiers. The miners and workers had also to be provided with warm food to get the work of production done. Rationing, fairly enforced and universally observed, gave the poor as much as the rich. To give hope for the future the children and expectant mothers received special nourishment. Paradoxically, the health and well being of the British people rose, in a time of submarine blockade and war shortages.

Fundamentally, this was why the British people retired Churchill and the Conservatives in the election of July 1945, giving the Labor Party 393 seats and the Conservatives only 197. Many of the voters remembered the deceptions by which the Tories had won the election of 1935 and the horrible failure of their appeasement efforts, but the experience of fair sharing which war and the coalition government had enforced was fresh in everyone's mind. The people voted Labor in the hope of continuing it.

Yet Britain was too insolvent to treat her people decently and carry the burdens of a great power. If the winter crisis of 1947 had not forced her to reduce the latter, something else soon would have done so.

British Failure in Greece. The parlous state of affairs in Greece had been known to our government for several months. The British had explained to

Secretary Byrnes in the previous summer that they would have to cut their losses in Greece. Since the end of the war the British had poured $760,000,000 worth of supplies into Greece, without doing more than keep the country alive. Nothing was left over for reconstruction. This was due to three reasons: the thorough ruination of Greece by the Germans and Italians; the antagonisms and demoralization left by the civil war a year earlier; and the inability of the corrupt Rightist government to suppress a large scale communist-led guerrilla movement which ruled the mountains and controlled most of the, country outside the big cities. The government turned Rightist bands loose in the country, and they did their best to crush the Left, but the net result was to drive to the hills many embittered men who were not communists. The majority of the rebels were "not communists."[15]

The rebels also received aid from communist ruled Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania, Greece's northern neighbors. Besides arms, munitions and medical help the rebels were permitted to retreat over the border when hard pressed, to rest and be re-outfitted, particularly in Yugoslavia. The Western powers had tried to stop this aid through the United Nations, by sending a commission to investigate, which was still in Greece in March 1947, along with an official American economic mission headed by Paul Porter, but there was not much chance of success by this method against the opposition of Russia and her satellites.

The Greek Problem Presented to Us. This was the general situation when on February 24,1947, the British Ambassador orally informed Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, that the British Government would evacuate its army and cease to look after Greece on March 31.

As viewed in the State Department this notice created a crisis of the first magnitude, a turning point in world history. The Communist-led guerrilla bands, well supplied by Greece's communist neighbors, had during the preceding months created a state of chaos in Greece. Though communications were disrupted, refugees streamed into the cities, making a bad psychological administrative and economic situation rapidly worse. It was the combined judgment of Ambassador Lincoln McVeagh, Mark Ethridge of the UN investigating committee and Paul Porter, head of the U.S. Economic Mission to Greece, that skyrocketing inflation, strikes, riots and public panic would soon destroy the Greek government and the Communist would take over, unless large scale financial and military aid arrived soon. A series of cables from the three envoys was climaxed by one on February 23 which could "only be characterized as frantic."[16]

The Preparation of the Doctrine. The first meeting of State Department experts with Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson left some concerned by

[15] James Reston, the *New York Times*, March 7; Stewart Alsop, the *Herald Tribune*, March 5 and 7, 1947.

[16] Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, New York, Viking, 1955, pp. 74–6, 131. This is an account of the weeks covering the formulation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshal] Plan by one who was at the center of the deliberations in the State Department. It was Jones' duty to make the basic draft of the Truman Doctrine.

the responsibility of challenging the Soviet Union, others elated by the prospect, and some filled with awe. Acheson was to lead in the epochal turning point, since Secretary of State George Marshall was being intensively briefed for the approaching Moscow Conference on the future of Germany and would shortly leave for the Conference.

At a meeting with the Congressional leaders of both parties, on February 27, Acheson left them all deeply impressed by his account of the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union to encircle Turkey, thus laying three continents open to Soviet domination, and Germany—through the communists in France, Italy, Austria and Hungary. The Soviet Union was "aggressive and expanding" and Russia and the United States were "divided by an unbridgeable ideological chasm." Not since Rome and Carthage had there been such a polarization of power and it was up to us to block the Soviets in Greece and Turkey.[17]

None of the leaders of Congress questioned the assumption of protectorates over Greece and Turkey. Senator Vandenberg, supported by others, insisted that the President should explain the new policy in a message to the Congress and a radio address to the people, in the broad context which Acheson had made, and he reiterated this request later. The radio address was dropped only at the last minute, but on April 27 Acheson had an off-the-record conference with about twenty leading newspaper men, and other briefing sessions prepared the way for public support of the program. A Cabinet committee prepared "a program of communication with leaders throughout the country, particularly business people."

State Department officials were thrilled not only by the sharpness of the challenge about to be made, but by the fact that this was to be a group effort in which they could all share. Their years of frustration during the personal diplomacy of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Byrnes had suddenly ended under the new Marshall-Acheson leadership. "Tenseness and controlled excitement grew by the moment," as Acheson explained the issues to a large gathering of officials on February 28.

On the same afternoon a large meeting of State, War and Navy officials ,was held in which the view was unanimous that the new policy should be presented to the public in terms of "assistance to free governments everywhere" that needed help against Communist aggression or subversion. This view came from all parts of the assembly, which also wanted the world strategic situation to be explained to the people.

A paper written up after this discussion became the basic document for the President's address and it contained the statement that it should be "the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[18]

The enthusiasm with which Executive officials embraced the.Truman Doctrine indicated a receptiveness which had been maturing for some time. Certainly this was true of other high personages. Arthur Krock, dean of

[17] Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 135,139–42. The phrases in quotations are from Jones' paraphrase of the meeting.

[18] *Ibid.*, *pp.* 168, 145, 151–3.

Washington correspondents, wrote at the time that Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's personal chief of staff, was "a major participant in the councils." Leahy occupied an especially strategic and privileged position. He had a personal relationship to the President which brought them into daily contact. "For months" before March 1947 he had discussed the emerging Doctrine with Truman and, said Krock, "there is reason to believe that he greatly encouraged its development to the present status." This is probably an understatement, since Krock went on to relate, "on excellent authority," that Leahy's influence had "grown greatly with the retirement of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State," on January 20, 1947. They had "differed vigorously" on the most effective way to deal with Soviet aggression. With Byrnes out of office Leahy had had no opposition and the evolution of the Truman DoctrineVas accelerated,,"with the encouragement of the Admiral and much inspiration from the same source."[19]

In Roosevelt's time Leahy's anti-Russian views were considered, but they did not determine policy. With Truman he had more success. Leahy briefed him about the Soviet Union, probably far more than anyone else, from Truman's first day in office.[20]

Truman's Long Held Purpose. The President himself was ready to seize the occasion to quarantine Soviet communism. On March 23, 1947, an authoritative article was published in the ***New York Times*** by Arthur Krock, who stated that the Truman Doctrine had been in the President's mind a long time. Krock had unexcelled access to the minds of the highest officials in Washington, and a couple of years later he obtained from Mr. Truman that greatest scoop of a Washington correspondent's career, an exclusive interview with the President of the United States, which would hardly have been granted if he had set forth the history of the Truman Doctrine incorrectly.

In his article of March 23 Krock stated that after inquiry he had reached the conclusion that Moscow had better disabuse itself of the growing impression that Mr. Truman merely adopted the view of his counsellors. On the contrary, the President began to abandon hope of achieving peace and security by "a continued policy of appeasement and official treatment of Russia as a government friendly to the United States," as long ago as the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1945L"He made up his mind then that, when a fitting opportunity arose and one which Congress and the people would recognize as such, he would proclaim the new doctrine.

[19] Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, March 26, 1947.

[20] See above, Chapter XI. Each morning at 9:45 Leahy summarized for the President the intelligence reports received during the night. He interpreted not only military matters, but "political, social and economic developments," advising the President what to do "to ward off actual or potential danger to the country."

In this capacity Leahy tutored Truman on what had happened at all the Big Three conferences during the war. He "coached Roosevelt's inexperienced successor on the significance of Russia's emergence as a world power." He was "credited with being one of the principal architects of the 'tough policy' toward Russia," occupying as he did "a position of influence and power second to none in the nation."—Frank Gervasi, "Watchdog in the White House," *Colliers*, October 9, 1948, pp. 18, 76–7.

On several occasions he thought the time had come, but some of his important advisers talked him out of it." When the British note of February 24, 1947, announcing withdrawal from Greece, came it pointed to a situation which the President found suited to his "long held purpose." It only remained to put "Mr. Truman's now-matured policy" before the world suitably. The alternative of limiting the message to the immediate task in hand was rejected and Clark Clifford, "who must at first hand have heard the doctrine in its long period of oral formulation," was set to drafting "the global anti-Çommunist policy." The President insisted that the important word ***must***, instead of "should," be inserted in the master-key paragraph of the message, to make it read: "I believe that it ***must*** be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." When it was finally finished Mr. Truman "rehearsed its delivery several times with apparently growing satisfaction." It said what he wanted to say.

Two days later Krock reported the fear of the Republicans and the bipartisan economy bloc that "the President's anti-communist policy, in the global framework he gave it" would defeat their economies. Then Krock stated unequivocally that "both groups, having been advised that the President decided on the new policy long ago and was merely waiting for a fitting opportunity to launch it," resented the fact that nothing had been put in the budget for it.

The evidence is accordingly quite conclusive that Mr. Truman decided on the substance of his doctrine soon after the London Conference in September 1945, at which the Russians had refused to agree to anything. The President naturally did not credit his own atomic diplomacy, as applied at Hiroshima two days before Russia's entry into the war against Japan and afterwards in strong protests concerning Eastern Europe, with having anything to do with Russian obduracy at London. They had been obdurate, and when the first opportunity offered he would cease to treat them "as a government friendly to the United States" and quarantine them.

In his ***Memoirs*** (II, 105) Mr. Truman relates that the first draft of the message presented by the State Department "was not at all to my liking." In spite of all the high purpose recorded above by its draftsman, Joseph E. Jones, it was full of "all sorts of background data and statistical figures," sounding like "an investment prospectus." So Truman sent it back asking for more emphasis on general policy and it was rewritten for that purpose, but it still seemed to him "half-hearted." Therefore in "the key sentence" he scratched out "should" and wrote "must" and did the same thing in several other places. He "wanted no hedging in this speech."[21]

[21] **A contemporary account gave much credit for the message to Clark M. Clifford, one of the President's assistants, saying that he wrote seven drafts of the message and that the final text was "a good deal stronger than the State Department had originally intended." —Leigh White, 'Truman's One-Man Brain Trust,"** ***Saturday Everting Post,*** **October 4,1947, p. 108.**

On the other hand, Jones said that three substantive changes, one of them stressing the free enterprise issue, were eliminated from the final White House draft.—Joseph M. Jones, ***op. cit.*****, pp. 156–7.**

George Kerman's Dissent. From this concordance of agreement that the Soviet Union and communism must be publicly quarantined there was one strong and surprising dissent. From our embassy in Moscow George F. Kennan had sent long messages urging a stiffening of our responses to Russia in the post-war period. In March 1947 he was in Washington, already designated by Marshall as head of a new policy planning staff. At the moment he was occupied with lectures to the War College and he had no part in formulating the Truman Doctrine, though he knew it was in preparation.

On the afternoon of March 6 he came over to see how things were going and was shown the third draft, before the message had gone to the White House and been sharply stiffened. In its milder form the message disturbed Kennan deeply. "To say that he found objections to it is to put it mildly," said Joseph M. Jones. "He objected strongly both to the tone of the message and to the specific action proposed." He favored economic aid to Greece, but wanted to keep the military aid small. He was opposed to aid of any kind to Turkey, whereas the others regarded the defense of the Straits as the most vital consideration involved, though the Turkish end was softpedalled in the message.

It was the tone and ideological content of the message to which Kennan most objected, "the portraying of two opposing ways of life, and the open-end commitment to aid free peoples." Moreover, he felt so strongly that he voiced his objections to a number of people in the Department including finally Acheson, but "It was too late."[22]

This first reaction by Kennan to the Truman-Churchill Doctrine of a global quarantine of the Soviet Union and communism would have astonished the world had it been known soon after 1947, for his famous article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in the July 1947 issue of ***Foreign Affairs*** (which will be discussed later), caused him to be widely regarded as the father of the containment doctrine? Yet in the Tight of the revelation just quoted it would seem that Kennan was rationalizing and softening the doctrine rather than fathering or inventing it. On the contrary, his initial reaction was that the proclamation of a head-on collision between two ways of life and two great powers was much too sweeping, and that it was dangerous.

That Kennan foresaw the consequences of the cosmic conflict which was being declared is further evidenced by another article which he published in the August 1956 issue of ***Harpers Magazine***, which will be discussed hereafter. No more devastating account of the deadly and self-defeating fixations which gripped the national mind in the years after Churchill and Truman sounded the tocsin for world conflict with the Red devil has ever been written.

Did the Republicans Require Conversion? It has often been said that a planetary declaration of conflict with communism and the Soviet Union was necessary to pry from the famous 80th Congress Republican majorities the $400,000,000 desired as a first instalment for Greece and Turkey. This Congress, which had just taken its seat in January, was undoubtedly bent on reducing the budget and taxes. For two months they had been debating

[22] Jones, ***op. cit.,*** p. 155.

whether to cut the President's 37 billion budget by 6 billion or somewhat less. They would not like a big appropriation for foreign aid.

Nor was helping the corrupt Greek Government an easy thing to sell to Congress. On February 23 Stewart Alsop cabled from Athens that the main characteristic of this government seemed to be "its total impotence." Most of the Greek politicians had "no higher ambition than to taste the profitable delights of a free economy at American expense." Senator Vandenberg was reported to have told the President that if he expected to get the money he would have to "scare hell out of the country"[23]—an apt description of the technique which was employed. This motive may also have determined in part Vandenberg's requirement that the President lay it all down in global terms in both a Congressional message and a radio address.

However, he could have been mainly concerned about acquainting the country with the need for a tough cold war with the Soviets. A great many of the new Republican Congressmen had been elected as stout anti-communists and it was not likely that they would reject a more circumspect request for aid to a country beset by communist revolt. Actually the Congress resented deeply the crisis treatment to which it was subjected, giving it no choice but to appropriate the money or damage irreparably our national prestige.

It would seem that the over-riding reason for the doctrine was a new desire to draw a line publicly around Soviet Communism and stop what was believed to be its constant efforts to expand. Of course it was easy to persuade the Republican leaders to go along with such a crusade. After Acheson's briefing session with them, on February 28, Representative Charles A. Eaton, Republican of New Jersey, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, told the ***Herald Tribune*** correspondent "with feeling" that "the hour is here when the United States must announce that it accepts its own destiny as the chief world power. We must fulfil the demands of that position, no matter what it costs if we eventually, along with other free people, are to survive as free men."[24]

On the same day James Reston of the ***New York Times*** stated his understanding of the argument advanced to the Congress leaders—that our main objective for the past eighteen months had been the "stern containment" of the Soviet Union, to create a new balance of power in Europe and "to demonstrate to the Moscow Government that the United States was not going to preach and run this time." If Greece should fall into the Soviet orbit then Turkey would be next. Reston had correctly understood the first exposition of the "falling dominoes" theory which was to determine our action at other stages of the Cold War.

At first, the idea of "holding the bag" in the Mediterranean "struck Congress like a bolt from the blue," reported Anne O'Hare McCormick. To her this new crisis was "the final proof that the over-all settlement should have been undertaken first." The long wait and the protracted disputes over minor treaties had "made conditions in Europe worse and poisoned the atmosphere in which the German peace must be negotiated."[25]

[23] **James P. Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 14.**
[24] **Frank Kelley, *New York Herald Tribune*, March 1, 1947.**
[25] **The *New York Times*, March 3 and 5, 1947.**

Premonitions of Containment, Walter Lippmann foresaw the probable failure of underwriting all the old elements against the new forces among the peoples of Asia and urged the alternative of a broad settlement with Moscow. He considered that, like the British, we too are an island people and suggested that we scrutinize very carefully any military commitment on the Eurasian continent, within marching distance of the Soviet Union. We ourselves could become overextended.[26]

The ***Nashville Tennessean*** also anticipated, on March 2, that "given as we have been for more than a century to the making of grandiose commitments with small regard for the necessity to fulfil them," the British appeal would not lack a responding urge in us. Perhaps, too, we could take over all of Britain's power positions for twenty-five years or more before the uneasy equilibrium resulting from the attraction of the Moscow pole tipped over into atomic war.

There was still enough objectivity in the world to enable the ***New York Herald Tribune*** to recognize, on March 10, that the Soviet Union had much to offer nations like Greece. It "has a great deal more to export than bullets. It has energy and enthusiasm; it has order, full employment, the classless society, the end of grosser forms of social injustice. But the totalitarian subjection and the NKVD inevitably go with them." We also had many values to offer, but did we have the energy and self-confidence to export them?

Reston explained that hereafter President Truman would be willing to collaborate for peace based on justice, but he had "decided to assume Russian good faith no longer," a decision which won the solid support of Senators Vandenberg and Taft, and Representative John Taber, the latter a famous watchdog of the treasury. Reston thought it surprising that the relations between any two major countries could have degenerated so far and so fast. The two nations had cooperated throughout their history. Now, however, "mainly because of the growing activity and strength of world communist activities, our government was solemnly meditating a decision to use its resources to block this expansion. It was a surprising fact that the heads of the two governments had not yet made any detailed effort to negotiate a general settlement of their outstanding differences."[27]

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND ITS RECEPTION

The President read the message to a joint session of the two Houses of Congress on March 12, in an even monotone. He received light applause at three points. For the most part the Congress listened grimly and silently. On

[26] The *Nashville Tennessean,* March 2 and 6, 1947.

[27] The *New York Times,* March 9 and 11, 1947. Seven years later, on July 1, 1954, Brigadier General Hugh B. Hester (Retired) wrote to the *New York Times* that "it has been a continuous source of amazement to me, and I might add to countless others, that the top leaders of Great Britain, Russia and the United States have not met since 1945; nine fateful years in the game of the highest of all stakes with the first team on the sidelines."

He recalled that "however much one might hate Stalin despise Roosevelt and distrust Churchill" they had nevertheless built a very successful grand alliance based on personal leadership, the continued need for which was demonstrated by "nine years of frustration, confusion and failure."

the same morning the ***New York Times*** had predicted that Truman would "ring down the curtain on one epoch in America's foreign policy." As he read, there could be no doubt that this was the case.

In Greece, said the President, "a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery was able to create political chaos which until now, has made economic recovery impossible." The "terroristic activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists," had created a situation with which the Greek Government could not cope. We had considered how the United Nations might help, but the situation was urgent and the United Nations and its related organizations were not in a position to extend help "of the kind that is required."

Turkey also deserved our attention. It had been spared the disasters of war but needed modernization. Its integrity was essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

We could not "realize our objectives," unless we were "willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." This had happened, in spite of our frequent protests and in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania and other countries. The time had come when "nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life," one distinguished by free institutions and the other by terror and oppression. He believed "that ***it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure***." [Italics added.]

"If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority," confusion and disorder might spread east throughout the entire Middle East and west through the countries of Europe. He therefore asked for four hundred million dollars for Greece and Turkey and authority to detail civilian and military personnel to them.

All Revolution Forbidden. No pronouncement could have been more sweeping. Wherever a communist rebellion developed the United States would suppress it. Wherever the Soviet Union attempted to push outward, at any point around its vast circumference, the United States would resist. The, United States would become the world's anti-communist. anti-Russian policeman.

This, too, was not the full extent of the Doctrine, for its all inclusive language also forbade every kind of revolution, democratic or otherwise. It would be difficult to find a revolution anywhere which had not been the work of an armed minority. The people might later come to the support of the fighting rebels, but revolutions were notoriously made by comparatively small groups of determined armed men. According to the new doctrine this could not happen, if for no other reason because some communists would almost inevitably be mixed up in the revolution, or an alarmed government would allege they were. The President went on to say that the status quo was not ssacred, but he had made it so. So far as the United States was concerned the method by which this nation was born was outlawed. There would be no

more revolutions thereafter, in spite of the fact that many hundreds of millions of people lived a miserable existence under the misrule of a few. Revolution was finished. All of these peoples would have to stay put. If their rulers should decide to alleviate their condition somewhat, well and good, but they could not be coerced or subjected to "such subterfuges as political infiltration."

It is one thing to forbid revolution in a country where the democratic processes of peaceful change are fully established, and quite another to proscribe it where there is no democracy, or only a caricature of it. Instead of being loyal to his revolutionary heritage and welcoming democratic revolution wherever it might come, Truman spoke for the bulk of American conservatives and allied himself with reaction around the globe. This was not only morally wrong; it was blindness on a gigantic scale. For a century and a half it was our revolution, our new way of life, our example which moved the hearts and arms of men around the globe. For us now to declare that revolution was finished was to kill the American dream. It was to shut us out of the future at a time when a billion and a half people, nurtured in our revolutionary tradition, were determined to move upward into a better life. Instead of pitting democratic revolution against Red revolution, Truman presented to the communists the entire field of revolutionary activity and condemned his own people to the sterile and hopeless task of trying to prevent all forcible social change everywhere.

Fortunately there had to be an early retreat from this impossible position. In Indonesia we were soon to assist democratic revolution against Dutch imperialism, but the chief motive was still to save Indonesia from communism, not to give the islanders their just deserts. By placing us on the "anti" side, Truman conceded all dynamism to the Soviets and condemned his countrymen to a world-wide defense of the Western social order, including for many years the dying colonial empires.

Encirclement of the Soviet Union Proclaimed. The wheel had come to full circle with a vengeance. The isolationist United States, desiring only to be let alone, had become the world's policeman. Wherever public order was disturbed, we would be there. Wherever the Soviet Government or communism attempted an advance the United States would combat it. The most gigantic land power on the face of the globe, living on the opposite side of the earth from the United States, was to be fenced in at all points. Thus far and no farther! In the two previous balance of power struggles Germany had complained constantly that she was being encircled, but no one of her opponents ever dreamed of admitting that she was. Now Mr. Truman had proclaimed from one of the world's greatest rostrums the most gigantic encirclement ever conceived in the mind of man.

Churchill Triumphant. When the Truman Doctrine was announced Winston Churchill was jubilant. He had every right to be, since it was essentially the same doctrine he had enunciated at Fulton, Missouri, by Truman's "desire," only a year before. Not only was his doctrine accepted; it was applied to the_ one spot on the globe to which he attached most importance and where he

had used the most extreme measures to preserve British control and to reinstate the Greek monarchy.[28]

In Greece, too, the monarchists were equally triumphant. The argument of the Rightists was that since the United States does not want communism it will have to support any regime in Greece no matter how oligarchical. In Turkey a leading newspaper warned that no conditions accompanying the American loan should be accepted, and the statement of William C. Bullitt that the Soviet Union was preparing to attack the United States created a sensation.[29]

Europe Amazed and Alarmed. From Paris Harold Callender wrote that the ablest diplomatic officials in Europe, of French and other nationalities, regarded Truman's message as certain to compel a showdown between the Soviet Union and the Western world. They read it "with amazement, since they expected nothing so stern or forthright." It was "a revolution in United States foreign policy more notable even than American participation in the United Nations." To a "striking extent professional diplomatic quarters, and other non-Communist or anti-Communist quarters, echoed in only slightly attenuated form the Moscow charge of a new and expanding American imperialism." French journals commented uneasily on the pessimism of our attitude and on the sharpening of the issue.[30]

In London "rumbles of protest and ironical cheers from Labor M.P.s punctuated each effort by speakers in the House of Commons to describe President Truman's program of American aid for Greece and Turkey as a step toward world freedom and democracy." The ***Daily Herald***, official Labor party newspaper, said: "Our first reaction to President Truman's speech on Wednesday was one of uneasiness. Our second thoughts are no happier."

There was no spontaneous enthusiasm in Britain. Mr. Churchill spoke only for a minority. Most people were distinctly disturbed, especially because the United States was tending toward individual rather than collective action in international affairs. The ***Daily Herald*** doubted that we should "clap our hands because these two allies of ours are now glaring at each other across Balkan frontiers," and the ***Manchester Guardian*** said: "One feels that, faced

[28] In the *New York Times* on April 11, 1947, Churchill revealed his chagrin at the reception his Fulton speech had received. He had spoken in Fulton "at the desire of the President of the United States" and he "was surprised that such mild, mellifluous, carefully shaped and guarded sentiments should have caused so much commotion, not only in America and in my own country but elsewhere."

Continuing with his apologia for the start of the Greek Civil War in 1944, he had also been "astonished to see what a bad press" he got in America on that occasion. Even the Department of State had been "sourly critical."

[29] The *New York Times*, March 15; Constantine Argyris, the *Christian Science Monitor*, March 13; *New York Herald Tribune*, March 27, 1947.

At Town Hall, Barbara Ward, foreign editor of the London *Economist*, urged that the Middle East be built up through a Middle Eastern Commission of the United Nations to the advantage "not of a small class of sinister pashas and financiers but of the people as a whole."—*Herald Tribune*, March 14, 1947.

[30] The *New York Times*, March 13 and 17, 1947; Samuel Grafton, the *Nashville Tennessean*, March 24, 1947.

with the same situation, President Roosevelt would first have tried to do the same things through the United Nations by enlisting the support of other nations—including Russia, if possible. Peace, the status quo, the integrity of nations—these are not exclusive American interests but the interests of us all." As on the continent, one reason for lukewarmness was "that the picture, of the United States gallivanting about high, wide and handsome in the field of European power politics has been a rude shock." Some charged that the American public made too much of the Russian danger and had "become overheated, flustered and jittery as a result." Well-to-do circles in Britain were jubilant, saying that it was time that somebody stood up to Russia. Some of the 150 to 200 Labor M.P.'s who were critical of the Government's foreign policy saw the United States "dragging Britain into a ghastly show-down war with Russia." The labor critics included "many more members than the left-wing opposition to Mr. Bevin."[31]

Censure in Britain. On April 7 the Cooperative Party of Great Britain, one of the major arms of the Labor Party, and representing about 7,500,000 working people, "approved by a large majority" a resolution condemning, Truman's program of aid to Greece and Turkey as "a menace to world peace and the negation of the democratic principles for the preservation of peace for which the grave sacrifices of the last war were made." The party executive opposed the resolution, but the delegates insisted on its passage. They felt that "this attempt to by-pass the United Nations Organization will seriously impair the authority of the organization and destroy the confidence and hopes of free peoples everywhere."

Simultaneously a poll of 83 diplomats, representing 38 countries, showed 82 per cent of them regretting as a matter of principle that the United States did not come before the UN with the Greek and Turkish problems. In France General Charles de Gaulle urged the unity of Western Europe, to provide a balance between the world's "two enormous masses, both expanding."[32]

The Continent Shocked by the "Either-Or" Challenge. On March 30 Mallory Browne made a close survey of European opinion from London for the ***New York Times.*** In Britain he thought a vast majority welcomed the Truman Doctrine as evidence that the United States had come of age and would not withdraw into isolation again, but there was fear that Truman's "blunt challenge to Soviet Russia" might lead to a war in which Britain would be the first and worst victim. Many were afraid that another war would wipe out their island. In France and a number of other continental countries it appeared that "doubts prevailed over hopes." In Italy the enthusiasm of the favorable opinion was tempered by widespread fear that it meant war. The Czechs were equally fearful. In the Low Countries and Scandinavia,

[31] **Jack Tait, the *Herald Tribune*, March 18 and 21, 1947; Anne O'Hare McCormick, the *New York Times*, March 19, 1947. Mrs. Mary Agnes Hamilton, Director of the American Information Department of the British Foreign Office, stated to the *New York Herald Tribune*, May 4, 1947, that anti-Soviet feeling was much more marked in this country than in Britain. We took a much more dramatic view of things, perhaps because our columnists and commentators took extreme positions while competing for attention.**

[32] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, April 6; *New York Herald Tribune*, April 8, 1947.**

where some of the most politically mature peoples in the world live, most people appeared to have been "shocked by the strong language Truman used," and decidedly nervous over the consequences. Even the conservatives tended "to ask whether it was wise." From all the diversity of opinion one overwhelming impression emerged, that the United States had embarked on a course which would bring "either real peace or the annihilation of atomic war."

This contemporary judgment inescapably raises the question whether there was anything in the world situation in March 1947 which compelled the United States to stake the future of all humanity upon one world-shaking defiance of the Soviet Union.

Doubt and Disapproval from the Columnists. The uneasiness which the Truman Doctrine had stirred abroad was strongly reflected in the reactions of the nation's leading newspaper columnists. Walter Lippmann asked immediately whether the President had laid down a policy or started a crusade. He found the implications of the second part of the message stated so vaguely that no workable policy could be deduced from them. Calling them "big hot generalities," he declared that words of that sort "when pronounced by the head of a state in a time of intense crisis and of passionate confusion, are imprudent. The pronouncements of a powerful government should be defined and precise, lest they be taken as threatening more than it intends and as promising more than it can deliver. He quoted the saying: "Today they are ringing the bells: tomorrow they will be wringing their hands," and warned that a vague global policy which sounded like the tocsin of an ideological crusade had no limits. It could not be controlled or its effects predicted.[33]

After its vague globalism Lippmann felt the most serious defect of the message to be its treatment of the United Nations. Even if the UN was unable to act collectively it did not follow that we had the right to act unilaterally, or that it would be wise to do so even if we did. The heart and soul of the UN Charter was its covenant to consult with other members. It was adopted expressly to prevent nations from acting unilaterally and on their own judgment in matters affecting the interests of other nations. Our action threatened to "cut a hole in the Charter" which it would be very difficult to repair. The UN had not been any better equipped to act in Iran yet it had done so successfully. Now we were assuming the whole moral risk, instead of seeking to spread it.[34]

He was disturbed also that we should have thrown away our bargaining power with the corrupt, reactionary and "obviously unrepresentative" weak government of Greece. The basic fallacy of the Truman Doctrine lay in its assumption that the spread of communism could be checked by subsidizing the reactionary forces of the world. By this course we would "separate ourselves from the masses of the people almost everywhere" when it was our duty to align ourselves with the middle and moderate parties. We were "not rich

[33] *New York Herald Tribune,* **March 15, 1947.**
[34] *Herald Tribune,* **March 18, 22, 1947.**

enough to subsidize reaction all over the world or strong enough to maintain it in power." It was "an intolerable commitment" to intervene on one side of the Greek civil war, when our object should be "not to support the civil war but to settle it." Lippmann was almost alone in urging that we ought to look forward to a settlement with the Soviet Union. There had not yet been any serious negotiation. The interminable wrangles we had conducted with the Soviets were not negotiations, because we could not argue the Red Army out of the positions it held. He approved applying our military power at the Dardanelles, but only for the purpose of securing a treaty neutralizing the Straits, establishing boundaries in the region and distributing the oil concessions. Almost no one else had the vision to see that it was neither right nor feasible for us to monopolize indefinitely the world's greatest oil pool, lying on the doorstep of the Soviet Union.[35]

William L. Shirer deplored the fact that we had had no inkling of a policy for the valiant Greeks, while Churchill "stumbled from one blunder to another" until he had paved the way for the current tragic situation. The Greeks had been overwhelmingly republican in sentiment, yet we had stood by while Churchill restored the same King George II who had set up the Metaxas fascist dictatorship in Greece. General Marshall had just learned in China that it was folly to give unlimited support to reactionary regimes, yet we were off on that track again. He thought it as absurd for us to try to exert military pressure on the borders of the Soviet Union as it would be for the Soviets to use their military power against us in Mexico. "Even a puzzled civilian could predict the results in both cases with deadly certainty." He was also highly skeptical of attempts to quarantine the Soviet Union. That had been attempted by all the nations of Western Europe in the "cordon-sanitaire" policy after 1919. It had been attempted again on a gigantic scale by Adolph Hitler, with the support of Italy and Japan. Whether we could now succeed in a third attempt, by our own single efforts, "with a policy so hastily conceived that it was unknown to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ten days ago" remained to be seen.[36]

Samuel Grafton thought it was significant that those who defended the President's Greek program found themselves compelled to speak in derogation of the United Nations. When, two weeks later, the Vandenberg amendment to bring the UN into the picture was proposed, he thought that those who had originally decided between minutes that the Truman program was right, to the last comma, "must have been awfully hungry for it." They had been guilty of "a whale of a brush-off: they had brushed off world organization itself." He doubted that the Truman Doctrine, "with the ring of the centuries in it," could be compared with the Monroe Doctrine, which had kept European kings from interfering with American republics.[37]

Drew Pearson reported a long visit to President Truman by two Greek churchmen, whose presence in the White House "amazed" other Greek

[35] ***New York Herald Tribune*, March 29; April 3, 8, 10, 25, 1947.**
[36] ***Ibid.*, March 16, 23 and April 6.**
[37] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, April 8, 11, 23, 1947.**

Americans. They represented the extreme royalist faction in Greece and one of them had such a long police record, which Pearson quoted, that he was not permitted to enter the St. Sofia Church of Washington, even as a worshipper. Another Greek, John Maragon, also with a police record, and who soon went to prison, had privileged access to the White House. He too had a "passionate devotion to the King of Greece."[38]

Thomas L. Stokes, writing from Washington, described the "strange atmosphere of fear about this city." The basic phobia was communism, but he wondered if the basis of it might not lie in a guilt complex, connected with our undamaged, prosperous condition when the rest of the world was hungry and in ruins. Stokes noted with regret that the Food and Agriculture Organization of UN had spent four months in Greece last year preparing a plan for its reconstruction, which was formally approved by FAO in November. This reconstruction program, to cost about $100,000,000, had been known to officials for some time but had not been published until after the issuance of the Truman Doctrine, thus revealing that an alternative to it had been available all the time.

The FAO report, a 200–page document prepared under the chairmanship of President F. S. Harris, of the Utah State College of Agriculture, had been a complete plan for beginning Greek rehabilitation, the real antidote to communism. Yet, Stokes continued, instead of using it we had seen, almost overnight "the creation of an international 'crisis' over Greece." The dizzy drama had started with "a hush-hush powwow at the White House," all "very secret" in the usual publicity build-up mode. The "usual leaks providing long authoritative dispatches to whet the appetite" had set the stage for the President's entrance to the joint session of Congress with his request for military action in Greece.[39]

Marquis Childs joined in recommending the FAO plan to every Congressman, in preference to the military approach. To him the other way, the way of peace and reconstruction, was clear, and working through the FAO "would make plain that our action in Greece was not a personal and private adventure."[40]

Stewart Alsop, noting that Britain had long been subsidizing Greece quietly, described the astonishment of an experienced British diplomat at the American way. "My God," the diplomat exclaimed, "what a way to go about it!" The British had been genuinely surprised and shocked by the "enormous hullaballoo" that had accompanied the President's request for aid to Greece, and by the fact "that the policy of aid to Greece was made to seem hardly less thanks declaration of war on the Soviet Union." Alsop was sure that the Truman Doctrine must now "be followed to its logical conclusion," but that a well thought out master plan must avoid the piecemeal approach. World peace would "hardly survive a long series of Greek crises, with the Congress being bludgeoned and frightened every six months or so into sticking a costly finger into some new hole in the dike. The situation was serious because, with one or two exceptions, the existing regimes in the Near and Middle East were

[38] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 17, 18, 1947.**

[39] ***Ibid.*, March 18, 19, 21, 1947 .**

[40] ***Ibid.*, March 18, 1947.**

a bad bet. They were "rotten" and could not "last over a long period and in the face of Soviet pressure and propaganda."[41]

Under the caption "Appraising the Gamble on Greece and Turkey," Anne O'Hare McCormick assessed it as a translation into action of the resistance we had not been able to make effective in Eastern Europe. It was "a policy loaded with risks and incalculable costs." Her "guess was" that the President had made a major issue of the Greek crisis "to warn the Soviet leaders that they were running into the danger of war."[42]

R. H. Markham was certain that we dared not falter. We should "encourage all possible reforms, establish contact with the sad, bewildered Greek people, relinquish the belief that we can suddenly impose brotherhood and probity in Athens such as we haven't imposed on Boston, keep constantly in mind that we are engaged in an urgent campaign against world enslavement and display deep faith, broad understanding and patient heroism rather than the vain superficiality of which one now sees considerable."[43]

Urgency and Impartiality Questioned. Among the published comments of private citizens two were outstanding. James P. Warburg, banker and former deputy director of the Office of War Information, questioned the urgency of the Soviet threat to peace, asking: "What is so urgent that we must act alone, without consultation, without knowing how far our first step will carry us, and in such a way as to undermine the very structure of peace, which we have struggled so hard to erect?" He labelled the Doctrine "the lineal descendant of our policy of expediency toward Franco, Pétain, Badoglio and King George of Greece," and asked whether the obligation to combat totalitarian regimes extended to SpainJPortugaJ and Argentina? The country had a right to know if the President was talking "about all totalitarian regimes imposed by the will of the minority or only about a certain variety of totalitarian regimes imposed by a certain kind of minority."[44]

The Military Strategy Argument. In the ***New York Times*** for April 20 there appeared a letter from Professor Gilbert Macbeth, of Villa Nova College, which went to the bottom of the situation. He too argued that from the point of view of democratic principles a communist regime was not more distasteful than any other highly undemocratic system. If we intended consistently to fight communism we would have to withdraw from the United Nations or turn it into an anti-Soviet organization. If we were trying to advance the cause of democracy we would need to change the character of the reactionary Greek and Tufkish Governments, yet we were determined to keep them in power.

What was the real reason for our action? It was, said Macbeth, to be found in our rivalry with Russia as another great power, "with whom we would have just about the same differences if Russia were a democracy and not a

[41] *New York Herald Tribune*, April 25; May 16, 1947. The collapse of the Nuri regime in Iraq, in 1958, our kingpin in the Middle East, was a vivid verification of this prediction.

[42] The *New York Times*, March 26; *Herald Tribune*, March 30, 1947.

[43] The *Christian Science Monitor*, April 21, 1947.

[44] The *New York Times*, March 23, 1947; James P. Warburg, *Put Yourself in Marshalls Place*, p. 13.

communist state." The bugaboo of communism had been conjured up to appeal to the emotions of the American people, rather than to their intelligence. First the people heard about trying to keep Greece and Turkey from going communist, then about aid to the starving Greeks. These things obscured the real issue, which was: "Should we oppose the interests of another great power in these two particular countries?" He thought the practical advantages were doubtful. The airplane, the rocket and other yet unused weapons would "give the Russians almost as much offensive power from their present bases as from bases closer to the Mediterranean," and he asked whether in peace or war the United States really needed the oil reserves of the Near East? The real question was whether in the atomic age we "should risk the world catastrophe that the next war will be for the sake of some material thing that we do not need now and may never need."

These considerations suggested the best argument that could be made for the American control of Greece and Turkey, that they comprised a strategic situation which in Russia's hands would give her the domination of the world. George Fielding Eliot put this case clearly in the ***Herald Tribune*** on March 24. The world island—Europe, Asia and Africa—contained about 82 per cent of the world's people and resources. It was joined together in the Middle East by a land bridge between Europe and Southern Asia and between Asia and Africa. This same position controlled the shortest line of sea communications and the main lines of air communication between the two greatest concentrations of people in the world. Finally, the same area held the world's largest reserve of oil. If the Soviet Union, with its exclusion of all free commerce in our sense, controlled the Middle East it would be well on its way toward complete domination of the whole world island.[45]

Editorial Reaction. The nation's newspaper editors were more favorable to the Truman Doctrine than the columnists were. In its first editorial on March 13 the ***New York Times*** declared that "Mr. Truman did not challenge communism as such, nor suggest a crusade against it." He did not mention Russia by name, though he left no doubt about what he meant. "Nor did he detract from support of the United Nations." His message was "nothing less than a warning to Russia to desist from the physical aggression and the diplomatic attrition that have characterized her policy ever since the war." The next day the ***Times*** combated the principal questions which had been promptly raised. It denied that the new policy meant a crusade against communism, to be fought with the same weapons the communists used, that it was a declaration of war against Russia and that it undermined the United Nations. On the 30th the ***Times*** added the appeasement argument. The democracies had incurred the two previous world wars by failing to reveal unmistakably their "point of resistance." In re-examining the Doctrine on May 11 the ***Times*** did not waver in the slightest. "No one in his senses and not deliberately misrepresenting the situation would treat the Truman Doctrine as a military adventure."

[45] **This was the argument made by Sumner Welles in the *Herald Tribune* of March 12, 1947.**

In its opening editorial on March 14 the ***New York Herald Tribune*** insisted that the message was not a proclamation of American imperialism and it was "emphatically not a declaration of war upon Russia." There was probably a good deal of danger of war as a result of the message. That should be the least of our worries, but were we strong and wise enough to make Western capitalist democracy a success in places like Greece? The editor remembered Spain, Argentina and China and added that if we were "to demonstrate the validity of our system we must work constantly to ameliorate such places." By March 25 the ***Herald Tribune*** found the details "not exactly inspiring." The urgency with which the whole matter was invested was "an obvious deterrent to accurate evaluation of this program." The danger was "that the American people may come to believe that their security can be achieved by dumping sums of money at threatened points around the periphery of Soviet influence, as the French dumped concrete into their Maginot Line." On April 18 the editor reassured himself that there was "no reason to assume that this country must spread itself so thinly over the world it will be ripe for defeat." It was "not the purpose of the United States to challenge the Soviet Union to ah unending and mutually exhausting struggle, but to demonstrate to Moscow, as Senator Vandenberg put it, that 'there is a deadline of ideals beyond which we will not retreat'. "

The ***Christian Science Monitor*** had more doubts from the start. It was aware that the United States would be under added pressure to favor Rightist dictators, once the decision was made to direct its policy against Leftist dictators. The next day, March 14, the ***Monitor*** thought that the Greek-Turkish move "need not necessarily lead to war any more than does the effort of the United States to hold a line in Korea, or Japan, or Germany." Any resistance to Russian pressures could eventually lead to war and so could the extension of totalitarian regimes. The issue in Greece had to be met but there should be "less expression of suspicion and hate for Russia" and more efforts to prepare the United Nations to do the policing job, for we could not do it single handedly for long. Nor could the free nations hold Russia by propping up reaction.

The ***Chicago Tribune*** had no doubts or hesitations whatever. It declared, on March 13, that "Mr. Truman made as cold a war speech yesterday against Russia as any President has ever made except on the occasion of going before Congress to ask for a declaration of war. He gave notice that Russian communism is regarded as an enemy force which will be resisted wherever it is encountered, and that, if he has his way, the United States will go out of its way to seek encounters." The outcome would "inevitably be war." It would probably not come for a time but the issue was "already drawn. The declaration of implacable hostility between this country and Russia is one which cannot be tempered or withdrawn."

The Chicago newspapers were unanimous in opposition, though for different reasons. On March 15, the ***Daily News*** listed six reasons for condemning the President's speech as fallacious. We were inaugurating a change in foreign policy which committed us "morally to bailing out every tottering nation in Europe and liquidating its communists." The drain on our national resources

would finally make it difficult for us to aid anyone, yet we were "asking for a war with Russia."

However, the majority of the press followed the President's lead, urging that the alternatives were worse. Some recognized at the start, like the St. Louis ***Post Dispatch***, on the 14th, that Truman had committed the honor and prestige of the United States. There was now "no turning back."

JOURNEY THROUGH CONGRESS

The day after the delivery of the message Reston reported that it was "on the whole, a grim and even resentful Congress" which took up the President's message. His article was correctly headed: "Bewildered Congress Faces World Leadership Decision, Resents Truman Failure to Provide Full Data, Bemoans Need to Take a Stand." Several influential members were opposed to the military end of the program. Even Senator Vandenberg was resentful that the issue had been presented so quickly and with so little information. Most members were driven to a conclusion which they did not like, namely, that the President "under constant attack in Congress for not standing up to the Russians, must be supported or repudiated." Action had been asked by the end of March.

Arthur Krock's article in the ***Times*** of March 18 was headed: "Congress Seeks to Sugar its Bitter Pill." The Congress had been shying away from a new lend-lease financing of world economy. It had also refused to face world facts in the case of the British loan. Now to avoid bankrupting the leadership and reputation of the United States it was "about to embark on a much more serious enterprise than it ever has."

The next day it was announced that a naval-air task force would visit the ports of Greece and Turkey in the Spring. On the 20th, Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that there was "no possibility" of putting responsibility for extending aid to Greece on the United Nations. Turkey needed help because her army had been mobilized since the beginning of the war and this had put a severe strain upon the national economy which it was no longer able to carry. The general argument on this point later was that partial demobilization would be promoted by supplying modern weapons to the Turkish Army and improving Turkish roads and other communications. Acheson distributed an inch-thick loose-leaf book to the members containing certain materials classified as secret. On learning this two members tossed their copies back, asserting that they were unwilling to base their decision on secret information which would not be available to their colleagues and to the public. Two days later the book was made public.[46]

An analysis of the aid proposals showed that 62 per cent of the appropriation would go into arms. Discussion grew over ways and means to get the program related to the United Nations.

Discriminating Thinking by the Public. On March 27 a Gallup Poll showed 56 per cent of those interviewed favoring aid to Greece and 32 per cent

[46] ***Herald Tribune,*** **March 24, 1947.**

opposed. For Turkey the percentages were 49 and 36. On the question of sending military advisers, only 37 per cent favored aiding Greece in this manner and 33 per cent approved advisers to Turkey, 55 per cent being opposed. The same percentage disapproved of the by-passing of UN.[47] These percentages comprised a practical rejection of the program. Let economic aid be rendered, but not military, and do it through UN.

UN Cover Sought. This feeling was so strong that the Administration was compelled to go to the UN Security Council on March 28 with a statement on its aims in Greece. Delegate Warren R. Austin's speech began with references to the UN Commission which was investigating the situation on the northern borders of Greece and went on to give an account of our Greek-Turkish aid program. He maintained that "The United States is giving momentum to the United Nations by its present policy."[48]

On March 31 Senator Vandenberg proposed an amendment to the aid bill giving the United Nations power to end the program "if requested by a procedural vote in the Security Council or by a majority vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations." Any government of Greece or Turkey representing a majority of the people could also terminate the program.

At the other end of the Capitol Representative Fred L. Crawford, Republican of Michigan, asserted that the United States must force Russia to disarm under threat of the atomic bomb "even if this means war." Crawford declared American spokesmen should "shove their chins right up against the chins of Mr. Molotov, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Vishinsky" and "shove their stomachs right up against the stomachs of these gentlemen, physically, and say this is our program." "Tell them either to disarm or we will proceed." The next day, Senator Harry F. Byrd, Democrat of Virginia, demanded that the United States seek a "showdown" with Russia in the UN Security Council.[49]

On March 31 King George of Greece died and his younger brother, Paul, ascended the throne. The British Army formally ended its role in Greece, leaving the country "in approximately the same condition in which they found it." Civil war raged throughout Greece and ruin was being "heaped upon devastation." There was "little more democracy in Greece than in the brave 'democracies' of the Danubian basin."[50]

Congressional Queries. On April 3 the State Department replied to 111 questions submitted by Senators, in a document containing 96 single-spaced typed pages. To the question "Have we sought or will we seek any guarantees of political freedom in Greece from the Government?" the reply Was "No."

[47] *The Nashville Tennessean*, March 28, 1947.
[48] Text, *Herald Tribune*, March 29, 1947.
[49] The *Nashville Tennessean*, April 1, 1947.
[50] Seymour Freidin and Frank Kelley, *Herald Tribune*, April 1, 1947. A short time later the body of George Polk, an American radio commentator, who had been critical of the Greek Government, was found in Salonika Bay. Judging from a long letter received from Polk just before his death, which was quoted, Drew Pearson concluded that the Greek Rightists were responsible for his murder. Months later the Greek Government held a trial which convicted certain communists, some of them safe in the mountains.

The Greek Constitution contained these guarantees and only the disturbed conditions impeded "the operation of constitutional government." To the question "How can America ask Russia to retire within its national boundaries if America has no intention of remaining within her own?" the Department replied that it did not think it "appropriate To comment" on Soviet activities. When asked what evidence this government had to indicate that Soviet Russia was trying to establish governments in Greece or Turkey which Moscow would dominate, the Department replied solemnly that the President had not charged that any specific country was trying to do either. To the suggestion that the United Nations should have been notified before our action rather than after it, "an ingenious answer" was made, that the situations in Greece and Turkey affected the national security of the United States and required Congressional action.[51]

Russian World Conquest. Our Ambassador to Turkey, Edwin C. Wilson, told a secret session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 30, that Turkey was the key to the Middle East. On April 4 Senator Walter F. George, of Georgia, openly focused the program on checking Russia, saying: "I deliberately place my support of this bill on the belief that it is vital to us to check Russian expansion now." This was a marked change from his position on March 4, when he had stated that we must act in such a way that "we do not invite any open opposition from our friends the Russians in that area." Since then he had come to the conclusion that "If unchecked Russia will inevitably overrun Europe, extend herself into Asia and perhaps South America, and that this process of expansion may go on for a full century."[52]

This was an excellent example of the manner in which American leaders, especially after March 12, 1947, jumped to the conclusion that Russia was out to conquer the world. She had taken control of certain countries in Eastern Europe, contrary to our expectation that these lands would remain socially and economically in our system. Therefore it was Hitler all over again. The Russians were out to conquer the world. Our leaders, especially the conservatives, found it easy to believe that the two situations were entirely analogous. Thereafter each move made by the Russians in the developing cold war only deepened their conviction that world conquest was Russia's aim. There could be no other.

Appeasement Analogy. Passage of the bill by the date demanded, March 31, was not attempted. However, on April 5 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations unanimously urged swift action, "in words flavored with alarm and appeal," pointing "a warning finger toward the Soviet Union." The next day President Truman repeated the appeasement-Hitler analogy, saying: "We know how the fire starts. We have seen it before—aggression by the strong against the weak, openly by the use of armed force and secretly by infiltration. And we know how it ends." To forestall the end he declared that "we must act in time—ahead of time—to stamp out the smoldering beginnings of any

[51] **Arthur Krock, the *New York Times*, April 4, 1947.**

[52] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 4; the *New York Times*, April 5; *Herald Tribune*, March 31, April 5, 1947.**

conflict that may threaten to spread over the world." In Paris, the newspaper ***Le Monde*** commented upon this statement: "It amounts to saying that an isolated nation may take upon itself to act in place of the United Nations and therefore prejudice in advance the decision they might take."[53]

In giving his support to the Greek-Turkish program former Governor Herbert H. Lehman of New York said: "I believe that our Government must and does realize that unilateral action alone would prove in the long run to be as unrealistic as it is dangerous and that it recognizes the fact that a country which attempts to gain security exclusively through one nation or independent action may be opening the gates to disaster."[54]

UN Amendment Adopted. In the Senate, Senator Vandenberg persisted in his attempt to give the UN a veto over the continuance of the program. Before his amendment was adopted he changed it to preclude a veto even by a friendly power, of a UN request for ending the program.[55]

The anti-Russian substance of the Truman Doctrine led Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, one of the most militant opponents of our war against Nazi Germany, to break a long silence. On April 13 he joined those who were demanding Russia's disarmament, saying, "America's security depends on preventing the assembly of modem weapons by an aggressive power." The ***Herald Tribune*** viewed "this reinforcement with some alarm," but it did not go on to point out that Lindbergh represented a very powerful segment of American opinion which had fought fascism with the greatest reluctance but was ready for the strongest measures against Red Russia.[56]

Wallace's European Tour. The controversy over the Truman Doctrine was sharpened by the bitterness aroused by the continental tour of Henry A. Wallace. Invited to Britain by left-wing members of the Labor Party,""he had spoken to great crowds and over the radio. The London ***Times*** wrote on April 23, 1947, of the snowball effect of his visit in both Britain and France.

In both countries and in Scandinavia he opposed the military aspects of the Truman Doctrine and proposed instead a fifty billion dollar program of aid to war devastated countries, a third of which would go to the Soviet Union. Almost alone, he urged that the problem of the Dardanelles be solved by internationalizing all of the great straits of the world, including the Suez and Panama canals. He asserted that it might be comparatively easy to split the world in two, but neither side would be strong enough to keep it apart. Wherever he went he urged the Europeans to be the bridge between the two worlds, instead of deepening the chasm by joining up.

The effects of this appeal on the advocates of the Truman Doctrine were bound to be strong. There were many demands, in Congress and out, that Wallace be forced to come home, that his passport be revoked and that he

[53] **The *New York Times*, April 6, 8, 1947.**

[54] ***Ibid*., April 10, 1947.**

[55] ***New York Herald Tribune*, April 11, 1947. Arthur Krock stated that the State Department at first had been unhelpful in working out the UN amendment, and then its suggestions had invested the amendment with whatever weasel words it had contained.—The *New York Times*, April 10, 1947.**

[56] ***Herald Tribune*, April 14, 15, 1947.**

be prosecuted under the ancient Logan Act of 1796, passed in another time of reaction and hysteria, to forbid any private citizen to deal with a foreign government. He was accused of being a moral traitor, even though the application of the Logan Act against him was highly dubious. When Winston Churchill had visited the United States a year before to urge an American-British combination against the Soviet Union many people had felt his action highly improper, but no one had denied his right to speak. His government had also stated that he did not speak for it. Now, however, so much passion was vented on Wallace for opposing the Churchill-Truman policy in Europe that the furore sometimes obscured the Doctrine itself. Condemning those who went abroad to oppose their own government, Churchill himself accused Wallace of being a "crypto-communist," that is, "one who has not got the courage to explain the destination for which he is making."[57]

Final Enactment. The Greek-Turkish bill became law on May 22, 1947. As the Congress prepared to vote upon it, the ***Herald Tribune*** reported that "few if any members of Congress are preparing to vote for the bill with any enthusiasm." Only a few votes would be cast against it, but that was not a fair measure of the doubts about it. Many members had gone to great extremes to build up an elaborate "out" for their constituents in case the program backfired.[58]

One Representative, Lawrence H. Smith, Republican of Wisconsin, spoke his mind without equivocation. He said: "The bill is a war measure and from now on we move in. Hysteria has swept over us and we can look for a stiffening of our military situation. They rigged this thing up with red herrings and didn't have the moral courage—yes, the guts—to tell the people that this was really a war measure."[59]

As the time for final enactment neared, Seymour Freidin, reporting from Athens, described the remarkable "success" of what he called the "appalling" Greek Government. It had "managed to fritter away virtually all its foreign exchange, drive more people into the mountains, because they were being treated as outlaws for having dared to express opposition, and to hold a club over the Western powers that unless abundant aid is immediately forthcoming Greece would go communist." Then, when the aid was forthcoming, the Minister of the Interior had publicly opposed any international supervision of an amnesty for Greek guerrillas, on the ground that it would offend Greek pride and infringe on Greek sovereignty.[60]

President Truman signed the $400,000,000 Greek-Turkish assistance bill on May 22, 1947. A dispatch recording the event was headed: "Truman Signs Near East Bill, Acclaims U.N., Says Greek-Turkish Aid Shows that U.S. 'Acts' to Uphold World Body."[61]

Retaliation in Congress. In the last stages of the bill's legislative progress the House of Representatives took two steps which betrayed its resentment

[57] **The *Nashville Banner*, April 18, 1947.**
[58] **Jack Steele, the *Herald Tribune*, April 20, 1947.**
[59] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, May 11, 1947.**
[60] ***Herald Tribune*, April 22, May 12, 1947.**
[61] ***Ibid.*, May 23, 1947.**

over the Greek crisis. On April 30, by a vote of 225 to 165, largely on party lines, it cut the European aid bill from $350,000,000 to $200,000,000, and a week later Secretary of State Marshall complained that the proposed $60,000,000 slash in the State Department's outlay for the coming year was very embarrassing to the government's drive for world peace. He hoped particularly that the "Voice of America" radio programs would not be silenced.[62]

Communists Ousted in France and Italy. Early in May the communists were forced out of both the French and Italian cabinets, "the beginning of a kind of chain reaction to the new American line."[63] In Washington Herbert Hoover proposed that separate peace treaties be made with Germany and Japan, without reference to Russia.

In Rio de Janeiro a secret session of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies was called by a petition signed by 121 members. The Chamber spent a tumultuous three hours debating charges that Argentine dictator Peron was supplying arms to the Paraguayan Government for the current civil war.[64] There were however, no reports that President Truman would move against Peron.

The Hungarian Smallholders' Party Destroyed. In Hungary several members of the Smallholders' Party Government were ousted and Premier Ferenc Nagy, then in Switzerland, was forced to resign. The communists moved swiftly to take political control. In Washington, the ***Herald Tribune*** noted editorially, on June 6, "President Truman was exploding to his press conference over the Hungarian matter with that amateurishness which is so frequent a feature of his statesmanship. The air was sulphurous with such words as 'outrage,' 'terrible,' refusal to 'stand idly by' and so on." It was "the amateur touch—acting excitedly in a piecemeal way instead of analyzing problems as a whole." The texts of the diplomatic protests to Russia on the liquidation of the opposition in Hungary and Bulgaria were published on June 12.

The communist seizure of Hungary was widely regarded as a direct reply to the Truman Doctrine and it was in the sense that the Doctrine made it imperative for the Left to crush the Right in Hungary quickly. The "left parties remembered the blood hath that had followed the return of reaction after World War I." They knew that the dispossessed warrior-landlords who had ruled Hungary with fierce repression for a thousand years had gone into the Smallholders' Party and it was not difficult to weave plots around its leadership, some true and others false, and in purging the reactionaries to destroy the party, to such an extent that in the election of August 1947 its share of the national vote fell from 57 per cent to 15. Then the three parties into which the Smallholders had flooded were dissolved one after another as treasonable. Backed by the Red Army two very able communist leaders, one "an industrial genius," had brought about a complete social overturn, "with only a couple of hundred arrests and one execution." The Right had been

[62] The *New York Times*, May 1; *Herald Tribune*, May 8, 1947.
[63] Anne O'Hare McCormick, the *New York Times*, May 14, 1947.
[64] The *New York Times*, June 1; *Herald Tribune*, June 12, 1947.

crushed in Hungary more decisively than the Left had been in Greece in 1944–5. This would have happened anyway, without the Truman Doctrine. It only accelerated the process.[65]

X = CONTAINMENT

In July 1947 the famous article "By X" was published in ***Foreign Affairs.*** The title of the article was "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and the author was soon known to be George F. Kennan. It was widely accepted as the considered justification of the State Department for the containment policy.

It posed two postulates as motivating the conduct of the Soviet police state: (1) "the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism;" and (2) the infallibility of the Kremlin. Kennan did not find these concepts dangerous in any urgent sense because "the Soviet theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it."

This was the foundation stone of the X article. Being "under the compulsion of no timetable" the Kremlin does not get panicky under the necessity for a retreat.

> "Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts them philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, increasing constant pressure toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time."

Upon this comer stone Kennan built his containment thesis—"long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. No histrionics, no "threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward 'toughness.'" The Kremlin was "highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs." What was called for was "the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of

[65] **Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, pp. 296—319. See also Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York, Macmillan, 1948.**

In early July 1947 Joseph Harsch made a careful investigation of the situation in Hungary and reported from Budapest that the plotting of the old feudal elements was so amateurish and the inability of the Hungarians to keep secrets so incurable that communist charges of conspiracy were easily framed. The "staggering political sterility, absence of wise leadership, and incorrigible inclinations toward nepotism and corruption among the opposition leaders" made them easy targets. Even the name of Ferenc Nagy was tarnished by the financial success of members of his family after he became premier.

When invited to produce three-year plans for Hungary's reconstruction the other parties had not bothered to do so. The conservatives contented themselves with dreaming of the restoration of the great landed estates and the return of the common man to his "suitable" place. The result was that an astonishing number of anti-communists accepted the communist claim to represent the people, regardless of elections, admitting that the communists were the motive power for rebuilding and revitalizing Hungary.—Joseph Harsch, the *Christian Science Monitor*; July 8, 9, 1947.

constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvers of Soviet policy."

Containment of this kind would work because the Soviet peoples were "physically and spiritually tired," after the long ordeals of forced-pace industrialization, war and devastation. The older generations were burned out. Besides, there was the coming transfer of power, on Stalin's death, and on the analogy of the determination of the succession to Lenin a weakening struggle of ten years might again occur. "And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description." We might be witnessing the afterglow of a constellation which is actually on the wane. "This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its own conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced."

Our job for the next ten or fifteen years was to "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power," for no Messianic movement could face frustration indefinitely without adjusting itself "in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs."

This formulation of the containment theory demanded the closest attention, since it was written by a man believed by the highest authorities in Washington to know the answers to our Number One Problem, what to do about the Soviet Union. The X article was written, also, about the time of the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Lippmann greeted it as an expression of the State Department's mind "as of March 15 approximately," and its author as "the leading expert upon whose observations, predictions, and hypotheses the Truman Doctrine is based."

Lippmann's Analysis. During September 1947 Lippmann published a dozen articles analyzing the X bases of the Truman Doctrine, afterwards published in a small book,[66] in which he accepted the principle that the conflict with the Soviet Union was real, and that Soviet power would expand unless confronted with American power, but disagreed completely on the strategical soundness of the plan. He found it based on an optimistic prediction which left "no margin of safety for bad luck, bad management, error and the unforeseen." It was asking too much of us to stake our "entire security as a nation" on a long struggle in which Moscow would define the issues, select the ground and choose the weapons.

He doubted that the free and undirected politics and economy of the American people, as well as their temperament, were suitable to such a policy. It might perhaps be enforced by our air and sea power on an island like Japan, but containing the Soviet Union was a giant operation in trench warfare, where great hordes of docile people would surely have the advantage. Actually our "unalterable counter-force" would have to consist of "a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents and puppets," pitted

[66] ***The Cold War, A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, Harper, 1947.**

against the monolithic power of the Soviet Union. A weak ally was no asset and the Soviet borderland was "a seething stew of civil strife."

Already the failure of our diplomatic campaign in the borderlands of Eastern Europe, where the Red Army could not be argued out of its position, had "conjured up the specter of a Third World War" and, if the containment policy were pursued, either Russia would burst through the containment barriers or the diplomatic war would become a full scale shooting war. In either event Europe was lost, and knowing it Europe would act accordingly, seeking to escape by any means.

Containment vs. ***Peace.*** Lippmann's analysis of the containment thesis, which is only indicated above, was devastating. There were other significant things about the article, some of which Lippmann discussed.

1. ***Red Russia was not aggressive in the Hitlerian sense***.

This was one of the things most strongly emphasized in the X article. Unlike the three fascist aggressors the Soviets had no timetable. They believed so strongly that western capitalism had within it the seeds of its own destruction that they saw no need for having any timetables. Why incur the great dangers and devastations of do-or-die wars when final success was inevitable without them?

In this respect Kennan was a true and accurate observer, and because he knew there was no raging-tearing threat to the world's peace in Russia—on the Mussolini-Hitler-Hirohito model, with its own inner compulsions toward aggression—he did not urge a preventive war with Russia. Far from it. He merely accepted the Soviet's own method of competition, as he understood it, and advised meeting it with patient containment. He reported accurately that the Soviet peoples were dead tired and had no desire for war. So all that was necessary was just to push them back when the Kremlin sought to push out somewhere. He was not advocating war and didn't suppose that his policy would lead to it.

If, too, the vital difference between fascism and communism which he set forth could be understood widely enough there would be no third world war. The United States would not be full of powerful people assuming that they were back in the Hitlerian era, faced with "inevitable" war as the alternative to stultifying appeasement.

2. ***Russia's permanent interests as a state were ignored.***

In his concentration on the current ideology in Moscow Kennan forgot Russia herself. He showed no comprehension that Stalin's aims were also those of Peter the Great, and that whatever kind of regime ruled the Kremlin it would pursue certain objectives, especially the possession of warm water ports. Control of the Dardanelles was not a communist purpose; it was a permanent Russian. objective, dictated by geography.

3. ***No settlement of the conflict with Russia was envisaged.***

This was the most appalling thing about the article. It assumed that we were dealing with something which could not be reasoned with or dealt with.

It could only be contained, patiently and firmly restrained wherever it sought to advance. Soviet communism was conceived as a gigantic amoeba, a huge amorphous mass which had to be dealt with amorphously and impersonally.

In other words, diplomacy was abolished. Its central purpose, to settle conflicts, or at least to compose them for a time, was abandoned. We would not treat the Russian leaders as human beings, very hard headed ones, immensely proud of their achievements in industrializing Russia and winning the war, but as communist zealots who could be contained but not negotiated with.

This assumption mirrored the frustration which overcame nearly all Americans who lived in our Moscow Embassy or who negotiated with the Russians after the war. It was a natural reaction to the never-ending arguments involved, but a fatal one. In later years it grew in Washington into an obsession, one which clearly involved war, for if powerful heads of state are treated as people with whom one cannot reach any agreements they have no alternative but to attempt forcible solutions.

4. ***The destruction of the United Nations was implicit.***

If there could be no settlement of issues and conflicts with Russia the United Nations had no future, for it was designed to operate after the settlements of World War II. If no settlements involving the Soviet Union were to be made, UN would either be pushed aside like the League of Nations or "transformed into an anti-Soviet coalition." In either event, the United Nations as a universal society capable of ameliorating and resolving the troubles of the world on a world scale, would be destroyed, and we would be left with the nightmare of two giant world coalitions organized against each other.[67]

The Kennan article is of great historic value, because it is the fullest explanation and justification of the containment doctrine, by one who was not its author but who rationalized and justified it for President Truman.

It was the President who had to accept the responsibility for the Truman Doctrine, and it was he who willingly placed upon his countrymen the task of fencing in the largest land power in the world, one which was and is without any controlled access to warm water. To understand why he made this earth-shaking decision requires consideration of several questions.

TRUMAN DOCTRINE ISSUES

1. ***Why was the Doctrine promulgated at the start of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers?***

This meeting had been scheduled months ahead to begin on March 10. It opened on that date and two days later the President delivered his explosive message to Congress. Many people were puzzled by the simultaneity of these two events. Why did Truman choose the opening of the conference, which met to make a beginning on a treaty of peace for Germany, to explode his

[67] **Lippmann thought that the American and British representatives at UN must be acting on instructions to regard "the UN as expendable in our conflict with Russia" during the Greek-Turkish affair.**

bomb shell? What to do about Germany was the next question to be decided, and the greatest. Did the President mean to torpedo the conference?

An answer was supplied by Drew Pearson in his report of the White House conference with the Congressional chiefs, which so impressed them that they urged the recall of Secretary Marshall from Moscow for the time being, feeling that he could not accomplish much there. The President refused, saying that "What we are going to do will strengthen his hand in Moscow. A few days later Anne O'Hare McCormick, speaking of the President's message, said: "The place it was aimed at was the Moscow Conference," and on March 11 James Reston stated that Secretary Marshall had not gone to Moscow to plead for the writing of German and Austrian peace treaties. He had "not even gone to Moscow primarily to make peace with Germany, but to emphasize the cost of not making peace with the United States."[68]

These reports indicate fairly clearly that there was no hesitation about blanketing the conference with the Truman Doctrine. It was even expected that a dose of real toughness would bring hard-boiled Russian leaders to terms. If not, well and good, since the Administration did not attach much importance to the conference anyway.

In practice the opposite result was as certain as anything could be. Given their deep suspicions of the capitalist West the Russian attitude in the conference would inevitably stiffen. In Moscow, Howard K. Smith watched the Soviets change from an attitude of "some amicability to a stubborn resistance on every detailed point of discussion." The Russians concluded that Truman was preparing to solve the depression he had warned about by an armament program.[69]

2. ***Was the emergency in Greece serious enough to justify the crisis atmosphere created?***

Our leaders knew that the Royalist Greek Government was likely to disappear fairly soon, unless we continued the heavy backing which Britain had supplied. Yet the operation in prospect was not a tremendous one, when compared either to the costs of the war or to our current budget. Couldn't the burden have been accepted as one of the war's consequences without any great commotion? The Administration began to make headway in converting the rank and file, before the President went before Congress. The collapse of the Greek Government was not likely to occur on April 1. Its position was not that utterly hopeless. Actually it survived another two months with only the promise of further support, while the Congress was deliberating beyond its allotted time. The Congress, too, resented deeply the crisis treatment to which it was subjected, giving it no choice but to appropriate the money or damage irreparably our national prestige. A more normal procedure should have secured authority to take over in Greece, perhaps with the Turkish angle omitted.

More argument with the Congress might have been required, but there does not seem to have been any serious question of taking a milder course,

[68] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 16; the *New York Times*, March 11, 22, 1947.**

[69] **Howard K. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–1.**

for the reason that the President and his advisers wanted to seize the occasion to draw a line with Russia.

3. ***Was it necessary to by-pass UN?***

The defenders of the Greek-Turkish policy maintained that it was, because the Russians would have vetoed the program. This would have been the case, however, only if a security or "threat to the peace" issue were before the Security Council. The veto did not apply in the Economic and Social Council, whose subsidiary Food and Agriculture Organization had already prepared exhaustive plans for reconstruction in Greece.

It is true that as the Truman plan was presented to Congress, with its military aspects predominating, the Russians might have brought charges in the Security Council that the plan was a threat to the peace and to their security. Yet they could have done this anyway and did not do so, probably .for the reason that it would have been very difficult to make a legal case. There was nothing in the Charter which forbade helping another country, even by sending munitions and military instructors to train and advise its army. This was an old custom, practised freely by all of the older great powers. It was a normal procedure in South America. In Greece we were, of course, intervening in a civil war, but the invitation of the Greek Government to do so made our action legal, a cover which the fascist powers never had in Spain.

It was argued, however, that in any event the Russians would have obstructed action in the Economic and Social Council so long that the Greek Government would have been overthrown and they or their friends would have had to be represented in administering the aid program.

It might have been somewhat vexatious to have had the program administered through the UN, but there would have been the enormous advantage of having the direct participation of third parties in the endeavour. The authority of UN might not alone have made civil war unnecessary, without the military aid part of the program since the rebellion was supported by Greece's neighbors, but UN management would have practically precluded the success of the rebels and might have provided guarantees of amnesty which would have brought the majority of them down out of the mountains.

Actually, of course, our Government did not desire to stabilize Greece through the UN, because it intended to achieve a stroke of power politics on its own, with the maximum of emphasis on the authority of the United States. There was regret that the UN had not been "related" in some way to the move, especially when it developed that the American people strongly disapproved of our unilateral action and demanded that the UN be not ignored. At this stage our Government did its best to "notify" the UN, and under the Republican leadership of Senator Vandenberg it went so far as to give the UN the power to end the program by a simple vote, which we would honor regardless of a veto by friend or foe. This gift of a vetoless veto to UN was made in a body in which our majority was overwhelming on any East-West issue, and this paper concession did not lessen our ability to play the hand ourselves in Greece.

As the X article and the Truman message both demonstrated, we had no

desire to bring in UN, because both documents ruled out negotiation and settlement as objectives and relied in the last analysis upon force, force to put down the Greek revolution and force to contain the Soviet Union indefinitely thereafter.

4. ***Was a domestic political purpose incidentally involved?***

Stout defiance of a nation's chief rival has usually been good politics. There have been exceptions. The power of a government to influence public opinion is so great that even extreme appeasement could be made temporarily popular in Britain and France. But ringing defiance has raised the national hackles and won approval far more often, in democracies as well as authoritarian states.

President Truman was also under a special temptation to seize the anti-communist issue from the Republicans. The press of early 1947 contains many responsible estimates that the Republican cry against communism in the election of 1946, coupled with protests against the too soft Russian policy of the Roosevelt Administration and efforts to link the New Deal and the Democrats with communism, had won votes, probably enough to turn the election to the Republicans.

A leader as politically conscious as Harry Truman could not but be concerned about this development. On March 23, 1947, only a few days after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, he issued a sweeping order providing for the examination of the loyalty of all government employees, more than ,000,000 of them. This step was taken to prevent a hostile Republican Congress from playing havoc with his Administration, by hunting for "communists" all through it, but it was also a defensive political move. On April 20, Marquis Childs wrote that after the order was issued President Truman was reported to have said: "Well, that should take the Communist smear off the Democratic party!"[70]

The wholesale loyalty purge was a defensive move, but the Truman Doctrine had the effect of a sweeping political offensive inside the United States, and it is hardly likely that the President was unaware of this aspect of his action. The Republicans did not dare to charge partisan motivation, since the Doctrine had been combined with the Greek question in such a way as to pose the issue of national security and patriotism, but their chagrin was deep. By one bold all-embracing stroke Truman had made himself the world's leading anti-communist. He would fight its advance, either directly or by infiltration, everywhere on the globe, with money, with arms and with men if necessary. Nobody could go further than that, and because the Republicans had themselves fought communism so recently and so loudly they could do nothing but support the Truman Doctrine.

What appeared to be a winning issue had been taken from their hands. Thereafter they could only attack Truman for not enforcing his own doctrine forcibly enough. This they did, led by presidential candidate Dewey, in the campaign of 1948, with respect to China. After his special mission to China, General Marshall had concluded, before he became Secretary of State and

[70] The *Nashville Tennessean*, April *20*, 1947.

endorsed the Truman Doctrine, that armed aid to Chiang Kai-shek could not win the day for him and he tried to mediate the great Chinese civil war. He failed, and aid to Chiang continued, but his continuing losses led to bitter Republican charges that Marshall should never have meddled and that still more arms should have been thrown into Chiang's hands (to pass mainly into the hands of the Chinese communists).

The communist victory in China did punch the largest conceivable hole in the Truman Doctrine and the resulting bitterness of one wing of the Republicans was so deep that they had begun to force a revision of our policy in the Far East before the North Korean Reds invaded South Korea in July 1950.

At that point Truman was compelled to accept the full logic of his Doctrine and apply it to the Far East, as well as to the Mediterranean and Europe. Again his popularity rose sharply and impressively as it had after the issuance of the Doctrine, because in both cases a large group of people felt that he had done his duty energetically and courageously. There cannot be any doubt that the controlling reason for the Truman Doctrine was the reaction of Truman and some of his advisers to the acts of the Soviet Government, and its refusal to act, but the domestic political advantages were very obvious.[71]

5. ***Did the international political situation require the issuance of the Doctrine?***

In Greece a political vacuum yawned ahead, and in Western Europe a much bigger one was already plainly discernible. Some action was essential if the danger that communism would fill these vacuums was to be averted. The obvious move was large scale economic aid, to enable these countries to recover from the rigors of the great winter and from the deeper damages of the war. Such aid was indispensable, if there was to be any real recovery. Its proffer, too, would have been tangible and weighty evidence that the United States did not mean to abandon Europe to its fate, as after World War I.

On the other hand, there was a good case for a ringing political pronouncement that would tell the European peoples that we were behind them, that we were coming to their aid. Did such a declaration have to be anti-communist and anti-Russian? Was it imperative that global political war be formally declared and joined?

It is difficult to believe that this was the case, even on the showing of the Kennan article, which saw no acute, urgent menace in Soviet communism. The Soviets had achieved great political success as a result of the war, and their achievement in consolidating their hold on East Europe, in spite of our protests, had deeply nettled our leaders. The communist parties were vigorously active in Italy and France, as Fifth Columns if we like. Yet they were only ***fifth*** columns. The other four columns were lacking, in the absence of great economic misery. Russia's satellites were helping the communist-led rebels in Greece, but Moscow gave no sign of throwing decisive strength into that struggle.

[71] A public opinion poll indicated that Truman's popularity had increased from 61 per cent to 79 per cent from December 1946 to April 1947.—*Ibid.*, April 23, 1947.

On the contrary, the Kremlin had been well satisfied with the world at the start of the year. The satellite treaties had from its standpoint been successfully concluded. From ours the terms were somewhat bitter, but settlements had been made. The Moscow conference was meeting to attempt to settle the real question, what to do with Germany. That would not be easy but it meant a lot to Russia as well as to us. The Russians were not likely to disrupt a major diplomatic conference, at which they were hosts, by any rash, aggressive moves in Western Europe, or in Greece. They were assuming the continuance of peace making so strongly that even after the Truman Doctrine had ended any chance of practical accomplishment at the Moscow conference the Russians went on discussing the issues in Germany, ignoring the world salvo of the Truman Doctrine. Near the close of the conference Stalin told Marshall that the Moscow discussions had been only "the first skirmishes and brushes of the reconnaissance forces"on the German question. "Differences had occurred in the past on other questions, and as a rule, after people had exhausted themselves in dispute, they then recognized the necessity of compromise."[72] The Russians had amply proved that they were tough, long, hard bargainers, but they had no thought of abandoning diplomacy and risking their remaining lives and resources on political war.

It was the United States which did that.

The Moscow Conference. As the Moscow Conference adjourned, April 24, 1947, Sumner Welles wrote that it had run about in a vicious circle for six weeks. He urged the United States and the Soviet Union to reach a direct agreement upon the basis for an overall settlement. On the same day, Reston wrote that Washington was "in a black and cynical mood about the Moscow conference." On Capitol Hill there was nothing but "pessimistic resignation to an endless procession of relief and military appropriations."

On his way home Marshall said, April 25th, that East-West differences "have got to be reconciled," adding that "it is only a question how long it will take to do so." When Marshall had seen Stalin, on April 15, "the meeting was very much in the nature of a military 'briefing'" reported Joseph C. Harsch, the responsible Washington correspondent of the ***Christian Science Monitor***, on April 29. The presentation of the Marshall brief took about thirty minutes. Stalin then made some comments and asked a few questions on specific points, "but there was nothing that could be called a discussion," or "an attempt to negotiate." The meeting was "most friendly" and Stalin was courteous to his guest.

In his radio report on the conference, published April 30, Dulles explained why Russia's demands on Germany could not be accepted by the United States, adding that we had not come home discouraged. This was not the viewpoint of Representative Charles A. Eaton, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, who told the House Rules Committee on April 29 that "two worlds are in head-on collision. One of them is going to survive."[73] It was not difficult to persuade Eaton that this was true, but it is significant that he again posed the "either-or" choice the day after a secret

[72] *Herald Tribune,* April 29, 1947.

[73] *Ibid.*

White House conference, just as he had on emerging from the White House gathering on February 28. This horrendous choice was, of course, contained in the Truman Doctrine message when the President said, "nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life." No room was left for diversity, for many different kinds of systems. It must be one or the other.

6. ***Did the military necessity of the United States Justify our guardianship of the Turkish Straits?***

This is the most difficult aspect of the Truman Doctrine to assess. The geopolitical argument pushed to its logical conclusion justifies that part of the Truman Doctrine address which was frankly military.

The Soviets in control of Greece could outflank the Straits and dominate them. Then they could dominate Turkey and push on into the great oil fields of the Near East, through Iraq to Iran and down into Arabia. At this point they could control the land bridge between Europe and Asia and between Europe and Africa. They could also control the vital air routes in the same strategic area and end the freedom of the seas at Suez, the shortest sea route between the great populations of Europe and Asia. And everywhere they went their closed economic system could shut out our commerce, certainly our investments.

Then from Suez they could cross over into Africa, take North Africa away from the British and French, carry out social revolution everywhere and sweep down to Dakar, from which they could cross the narrow neck of the Atlantic to Brazil, conquer Catholic South America and come up to the Panama Canal, endangering that American waterway, so vital to our commerce.

This is the kind of fatal progression which we feared from Hitler, rightly and deeply. Once firmly in control of Europe Germany would undoubtedly have taken over Africa and challenged us in Brazil, where large German colonies were already Nazi organized and dominated. In conjunction with a victory of Japan in the East this would have placed us in a fatal squeeze, with the grimmest chances of maintaining our free institutions in the embrace of triumphant fascist empires, assailing us from without and from within.

If the Soviet Union was about to embark on this same raging imperial course, it was our bounden duty to prevent it. Yet the entire Kennan thesis, which rationalized the containment doctrine, denied that Russia was a threat of this character. On the contrary, she was tired, gravely wounded and full of inner contradictions of her own which would probably break her up. She was patient, would readily accept reverses, only needed persistent pushing back.

It is, of course, possible to reconcile these apparently contradictory lines of argument by saying that once in Greece the Russians would have infiltrated and advanced from the Dardanelles to Panama, by patient steps over a long period of time. Nevertheless, the two theories fairly well cancel each other. It would seem that we must choose one or the other as the basic justification for American control of the Turkish Straits.

Previous Negotiations Concerning the Straits. From our standpoint we had been fair and generous to Russia in our note of November 2, 1945, to Turkey

proposing: (1) that the Straits be open to all merchant vessels at all times; and (2) to Black Sea-power warships at all times, but; (3) closed to non-Black Sea warships, except for an agreed tonnage in peace time or when acting under the authority of the United Nations; and (4) a revision of the Montreux convention to which the Western powers belonged.

The Soviet counter proposals, presented to Turkey on August 7 and September 24, 1946, naturally accepted the first two points but proposed the control of the Straits solely by the Black Sea powers and their joint defense by Turkey and the Soviet Union, involving a Russian military base on the Straits.[74]

This is the camel's nose which our military strategists were certain would push down the whole geopolitical tent. It is also the same demand which the Russians made upon Hitler during the period of their truce with him, and may be taken as a permanent objective. Judging from all Russian history it is also the leading unsatisfied Russian territorial aspiration.

Permanent Dilemma. This fixed Soviet objective is also based upon as painful experiences as a great nation could have. The Straits are the Soviet Union's principal outlet to the sea, yet they have been closed for extended periods by war three times within the last fifty years, first during the Italo-Turkish war, 1911–12, then during the two world wars. During the first world war the Straits were closed by Turkey as an enemy. Winston Churchill almost blasted them open with Allied warships. His strategy was sound and its failure may well have prevented the survival of the Russian Czarist auto-cracy, since the short, direct route for Allied supplies to the munitions-starved Russians was blocked throughout the war] From the standpoint of the Soviet leaders as communists, this was not sucn a bad thing. In their capacity as leaders of the Russian state, it was a warning not to be forgotten. They cannot forget, either, that the Straits would certainly have been under full Russian control if the Czarist regime had been among the victors. During World War II the Straits were closed to Russia again, by Turkey's not too friendly neutrality, and by German air power based upon Greece and its Aegean Islands, including the large island aircraft carrier, Crete. This time the loss of the Straits was not fatal to Russia, because of the timely and heroic work of her allies in sending supplies in through Persia and the other round-about routes, and because of her own developed industrial strength.

Given these repeated and recent experiences Russian statesmen would hardly be human if they did not have a fixed determination to gain an armed foothold at the Straits, and from power politics standards they would be remiss in their duty if they did not have this objective. It is all very well for Russia's new rivals to make fair proposals concerning the Straits, but the Kremlin knows that if war came they could be closed against her again.

Her companion objective, the political control of the Straits by the Black Sea powers, is not reassuring for Western commerce, which has traditionally been predominant in the Straits. Until the Second World War British shipping

[74] **Harry N. Howard, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East," *The Annals*, May, 1949, pp. 182–3.**

led all others in that waterway, closely followed by Italian. After this war American shipping assumed first place, down through 1947. Until then the Straits were clearly a great international water way in which other states had greater commercial interests than Russia, though not as critical ones.

Is there any possible reconciliation between the long term Western rights in the Straits and the right of the Russians to strategic security there? Given any normal confidence among the powers a solution would not be difficult. The Russians could be conceded their base at the Straits, or a genuine internationalization of this waterway could be worked out through the United Nations, to apply also to the Suez and Panama Canals.

Our instinctive feeling about UN control of Panama is a measure of Russian feeling about the Straits. There are differences. We took Panama from Colombia and the Russians have never been able to take the Straits from the Turks, but both are vital life lines, one to us, the other to the Russians. The Russians need not be expected to give up their desire to control the Straits, either, before we surrender the physical control of Panama. Nor will they resent our standing guard over their principal doorway any fess than we would resent their arming of Colombia and Nicaragua tcfmake certain that the United States did not control Panama. Unless the impasse is broken by some impact of creative statesmanship the Russians will bide their time, arm and wait for the day when they can take total and undisputed control of the Straits. We have made no secret that Turkish control of the Straits means our access to Russia's vitals with atomic bombs, in the event of war. On the other hand, it would be very difficult indeed to prevent the Russians from sweeping down through Greece and closing the Straits as the Germans did, if they did not first seize them by direct attack. Nor would a Russian base on the Straits be likely to last long under Allied air attack from many nearby bases.

Sir Bernard Pares, English historian of Russia, assessed the long-term situation accurately when he wrote that the Truman Doctrine meant simply that the United States was taking over from England "the task of keeping Russia from the sea." This task had "nothing to do with Russian Communism." We could not offer friendship to a self respecting country on the principle: "We may do what we like, take what we like, but you may not. Freedom of the seas, yes, but not for you."[75]

This appraisal should give a fairly clear glimpse of Russian feeling about the Straits. The issue is removed from practical politics at present by the near certainty that the Turks would not concede a base to Russia, even under pressure from us, and that a forcible Russian seizure would precipitate a general war. Yet the issue of our military guardianship of the Straits, on the other side of the world, remains. In the long run it is an untenable commitment, except as a prelude to the disaster of a third world war. In the same perspective our monopoly of the great oil resources of the Near East, on Russia's doorstep, cannot be maintained permanently, unless Russia's power is prevented from developing by a third world war.

Power politics being what it is, and national leaders being usually very fallible indeed, we apparently cannot expect reasonable compromises or

[75] ***Herald Tribune,* July 18, 1947.**

solutions of problems like these, yet we cannot demand anything less if humanity is to survive, and especially if Western civilization is to continue. It is essential to bear in mind, also, that we assumed the military guardianship of the Straits at a time when we had a monopoly of atomic weapons which precluded any overt Russian move, at the Straits or elsewhere, even if such a move had been contemplated.

7. *Was the Truman Doctrine a declaration of war?*

Formally and legally it was not. This could be asserted with a perfectly straight face, and with ample legal documentation. The Soviet Union was not mentioned, nor the Turkish Straits. We had a right to aid any friendly government that we wished to help. Turkey felt pressed and there was a crisis in Greece. We had as much right to proclaim an anti-communist crusade—or holding operation—as the Russian controlled press had to proclaim the inevitability of Western capitalism's collapse and the wickedness of Western "imperialism."

All this is incontrovertible and, given both our deep vexation over the communist organization of East Europe and the geopolitical argument, some action on our part in Greece was foreordained. Greece would not be allowed to fall into the Soviet orbit. Some anti-communist connotation was also advisable to secure quick congressional approval.

These considerations still leave the question whether it was wise and statesmanlike to issue a global declaration setting limits both to communist expansion and Soviet expansion. It can readily be argued that this was the straightforward thing to do, to draw a line around both. Yet strategically it was a rash and unenforceable commitment. The Soviet Union already occupied the Heartland of Eurasia to its full limits, and all of our sea and air power, plus the A-bomb could not indefinitely prevent her from pushing out if she chose. Worse still, an open direct proclamation of encirclement was one of the best means of causing her to choose to push out.

The global containment Doctrine committed the United States to standing guard, not only at the Straits but all around the vast perimeter of the Soviet Union and its satellites. It pledged the prestige and resources of the United States, and especially the prestige of Mr. Truman, at virtually all points on the earth which mattered, either militarily or politically, leaving the initiative to the Russians and to local communist movements. Wherever either chose to fight we would accept the battlefield, no matter how remote or unfavorable. This was clearly a self-defeating policy, one fitted to squander our resources on the way to an immeasurable, unmanageable war.

Turning Point. The defenders of the Truman Doctrine announced with satisfaction that it was the end of an era, the period of "appeasement," and the beginning of a new era of firm containment. However, a full appraisal indicated that a much more fateful turn had been made, the turn from a post-war period to a pre-war atmosphere. The Truman Doctrine and the X article both ignored the problem of settling the Second World War, giving the impression that no settlement could be reached, that it was to be hereafter a matter of pressure

and counter pressure. Less than two years after the bombs stopped falling in Europe American diplomacy came close to abdicating. Its arguing powers were exhausted. Stronger measures would have to be taken.

In this sense the Truman Doctrine was an effective declaration of war, one which had formed in Mr. Truman's mind in the autumn of 1945, almost before the fumes of Hiroshima had drifted around the earth. It gave notice to both sides, and to innumerable millions of people all over the world who wanted no fresh conflict, that a new global struggle was joined.[76] It started trains of fear and hatred and action in many millions of minds, centering around Washington and Moscow, which ran for many years.

The judgment of James P. Warburg is likely to stand the test of history: that the Truman Doctrine message was "an ill-considered, unwise and ambiguous document," one calculated to arouse fear and aggressive hatreds" rather than to inform and persuade, one which opened "a Pandora's box of ugly emotions" in the breasts of "extreme Russia-haters, red-baiters and reactionaries of all sorts" and which brought the precariously balanced structure of peace to its moment of greatest jeopardy."[77]

Two years later Gerald W. Johnson, an experienced editor and biographer, came to the same conclusion. He wrote of President Truman that "the most grievous of all his errors was enunciation of the Truman Doctrine that involved us in the Greek adventure and might have brought on far worse evils had it not been partially retrieved by the Marshall Plan."

Johnson added that in 1945 the moral hegemony of the world was within Truman's grasp, "but it has slipped from his fingers."[78]

This is a measure of the loss involved in Truman's belligerence. It is easy enough to declare cold war, draw lines and hurl thunderbolts. It requires statesmanship to make peace and draw the nations nearer together.

Diplomacy is also required, an art which was almost forgotten after "we were captured by the illusion that the rivalry of nations can be regulated by public pronouncements, from which as a matter of prestige no one can recede, and the collision of irresistible forces with immovable objects."[79]

There can be no real understanding of the Cold War unless chronology is kept in mind. What came first? What was action and what reaction? The later event could not be the cause of the earlier.

Especially is it necessary to consider what followed the Truman Doctrine. Not everything which came after it was an effect of the Doctrine, but its effects upon Soviet policy and action were bound to be profound.

There does not seem to be evidence of any sudden turn of Soviet policy to

[76] *The United States and World Affairs, 1945–1947*, by John C. Campbell, published for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Harper, 1947, said the strong language of the message "gave the impression that the policy of attempting to cooperate with the Soviet Union had been given up, and that an eventual war between the 'two alternative ways of life' mentioned by the President was inevitable."

This was not the case, Campbell added, because the policy of firmness backed by power "*might* be the indispensable preliminary to a general settlement with the Soviet Union" (p. 480, italics added).

[77] Warburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–14.

[78] Gerald W. Johnson, "Truman's Third Term," *The Atlantic*, February 1950, p. 24.

[79] Walter Lippmann, *New York Herald Tribune*, December 30, 1947.

hostility toward the United States or toward the West after World War II. Frederick C. Barghoorn, a student of Soviet policy who works constantly with Russian language sources, speaks of "the gradual process by which the Politburo openly reverted to its pre-war line, and transferred the symbols of 'reaction,' 'aggression,' and 'imperialism' from Germany and Japan to Britain v and America."[80]

The first evidence of such transference which Barghoorn cites was the speech of President Kalinin to Communist Party secretaries in which he asked them to "speak frankly" to the collective farmers about the dangers to "our state structure and social order" still remaining after the elimination of Nazi Germany, which he characterized as "only the most immediate" danger. Then Stalin in his famous election speech of February 9, 1946 boasted of the triumphant survival of the Soviet system in World War II, a war that he ascribed to "the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopolistic capitalism," which was incapable "under present capitalist conditions" of peacefully adjusting the conflicts which lead to war.

The admonition by Kalinin hardly seems sensational, as of August 1945, after Truman's verbal assault on Molotov in the White House on April 23, 1945; after the bitter controversy over Poland and East Europe which followed; after the frictions at the San Francisco conference, the outburst of preventive war talk against Russia in the United States and the sharp turn of the Truman Administration away from the Roosevelt policy of working with Russia—not to speak of the great impact of the Hiroshima A-bomb in Moscow. Nor does Stalin's February 1946 reassertion of communist dogma about the relation between monopolistic capitalism and war seem extraordinary.

It was not until Andrei Zhdanov's speech of September 1947 that a post-war division of the world into two camps was proclaimed in Russia, "the anti-democratic and imperialist camp on the one side, and the anti-imperialist and democratic on the other." Attacking the Marshall Plan as a device for "the enslavement of Europe," Zhdanov accused the United States of seeking world domination. Because her "monopolists" feared the success of communism they had launched a world-wide crusade against communism, he charged.[81]

This was undoubtedly political warfare, but it can hardly be considered remarkable after the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, Kennan's elaboration of the American containment drive and the Marshall Plan—altogether the greatest peace time political-economic offensive on record. An offensive of this character was bound to bring replies, both ideological and actual.

[80] Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Soviet Critique of American Foreign Policy," *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, Winter 1951, pp. 5–15.

si *Ibid.*, pp. 9–12.

CHAPTER XVII

FROM THE MARSHALL PLAN TO THE COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

JUNE 1947–MAY 1948

Long before the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill had been signed it had become apparent that Britain's weakness left a vacuum in all Western Europe. Before the winter crisis of 1947, which affected all of Western Europe only less than Britain, the world went on assuming that a weakened Britain was still an important center of world power. She had been that so long that people found it difficult to believe a great pillar of world power had fallen. The façade was still largely there, supported by more than a million troops. The shock of the winter crisis was required to make it clear that in all Western Europe there was no surviving center of power.

When this was realized in Washington it was evident that new conceptions were essential, and that they could not be primarily military, as in Greece and Turkey. At the same time it was appreciated that the technique of scaring the Congress and the country, appealing to fear and anti-Red emotions, could not be made to work again immediately. On March 25, shortly after the Truman Doctrine speech, bold headlines had announced that a large aid to Korea bill would be next. It was apparently the plan to go right around the map, plugging up all holes with Truman Doctrine bills, but by June the Marshall Plan idea had replaced this program.

Acheson's Cleveland Address. The first indication of an important change of emphasis came in a little noticed speech by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson at Cleveland, Mississippi, in which he explained that our exports were running at sixteen billion a year, twice our imports, and asked where the foreigners were to get the dollars to cover this huge difference. To attack the problem he laid down five points, the third of which seemed to indicate a continuance of the Truman Doctrine policy. Since we could not meet all demands for aid, our assistance must be concentrated "in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trade policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations." There having recently been complete disagreement at the Moscow Conference over the meaning of the terms "human freedom" and "democratic institutions" the use of these terms could only mean that we would use our great economic strength to aid those countries which accepted our interpretation of them. In other words, we would help those countries which lined up against the Soviet Union. However, the speech as a whole was in such marked contrast to the

emotional anti-cmsading of the Truman Doctrine that it produced a strong and hopeful impression in Western Europe.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

Marshall at Harvard. At home the American public was hardly prepared for the famous speech of Secretary Marshall at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, which was pitched on a plane of dignity and reasonableness far above the Truman Doctrine. Marshall recalled the distortion of Europe's economy and its spoliation under the destructive rule of the Nazis and described the current inability of the cities to supply goods to the farmers in exchange for food. The inability to get sufficient food for the cities from the local peasantry then compelled the governments to use their scarce foreign credits to buy food.

This vicious circle must be broken by additional help from the United States over a three or four year period, in order to prevent "economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character" which would have serious consequences on the economy of the United States. However, this further assistance "must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may provide in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative." It was evident "there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take." The initiative must come from Europe and "the program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations."

Our policy was "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist." Any government that was willing to assist in the task of recovery would find full cooperation, but any government which maneuvered to block the recovery of others could not expect help from us. "Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States."

This paragraph was a warning to the U.S.S.R. and to the communist parties not to try to block a large planned program for the revival of Europe, but the invitation to participate clearly covered the whole of Europe, including the Soviet Union.

This was a far cry from the principle of the Truman Doctrine that the Soviets must be ringed in and contained. If the Marshall invitation had been issued before the Truman Doctrine, or rather in lieu of it, the Cold War might swell have been prevented. Coming after the recent promulgation of the Truman Doctrine the Soviets were bound to scrutinize it with extra suspicion, to see if it might be a means of implementing the Doctrine.

The UN By-passed. This was the more certain since the United Nations was by-passed again. Sumner Welles considered this to be "the same basic defect" which had been contained in the Greek-Turkish proposals. He pointed out that the UN Economic Commission for Europe, proposed by the United

States, had been in existence since March. Every European state, including Russia, was represented on it and no right of veto existed in it.[1]

Here again was a United Nations agency ready at hand for the administration of a program of aid to Europe and the failure to use it meant, as one contemporary historian recorded, that "there was little likelihood that the proposed new aid would go to countries under Soviet control.... Marshall's offer was not a proposal to revive UNRRA. It was a move to consolidate Western Europe as a counter-weight to the concentration of Russian power in the East. ... It was left to the Soviet Union to decide, for itself and its satellites, whether the offer was an invitation or a challenge."[2]

Molotov at Paris. The first Russian reaction to the Marshall proposal was a denunciation in ***Pravda***, on June 16, calling it an extension of Truman's "plan for political pressures with dollars and a program for interference in the internal affairs of other states." The next day Foreign Minister Bevin went to Paris to confer with Foreign Minister Bidault and an invitation was sent to Molotov to join in the talks. On June 26 Molotov arrived in Paris, at the head of an entourage of 89 persons, including many economic experts. This event indicated to the London ***Times*** that "the whole atmosphere of international debate had changed to a healthier and more hopeful mood."[3] Simultaneously, the French communists dropped their opposition to the Marshall Plan and the world had reason to believe that the dangerous cleavage between East and West might be on the verge of being healed. Surely Molotov would not have brought so many experts if he did not intend to do business.

Before he arrived Bevin had made a defiant speech on June 19, declaring that Britain would go ahead with or without the Soviet Union, and on arrival Molotov encountered the same atmosphere of "take it or leave it" on the part of Bevin. Molotov also resented the prior conferences between the British and French and disapproved of the plan they had ready for him, which required an overall European balance sheet, showing resources ad needs for the continent as a whole. The British and French felt that such a plan was necessary to meet Marshall's requirements, but Molotov objected to it on three grounds: (1) that it was an interference in the internal affairs of the European nations; (2) that there should be a distinction between former allied, neutral and enemy states; (3) and that the German problem was an entirely separate matter to be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers alone.

Bidault tried hard for a compromise but could not achieve it. On July 2nd Molotov made his final statement, in which he condemned "the creation of a new organization standing over and above the countries of Europe and interfering in their internal affairs down to determining the line of development to be followed by the main branches of industry in these countries." He maintained that "the European countries would find themselves placed under control and would lose their former economic and national independence

[1] ***New York Herald Tribune,*** **June 25, 1947. Albert Einstein also held that "It should be done supra nationally."** ***Ibid.*****, June 30, 1947.**

[2] **John C. Campbell,** ***The United States in World Affairs, 1947–1948,*** **p. 59.**

[3] ***The Times,*** **June 24, 1947.**

because it so pleases certain strong powers." This would mean, for example, that Poland might be put under pressure to produce more coal at the expense of other branches of Polish industry, or that Czechoslovakia might be required "to increase her agricultural production and to reduce her engineering industry."

Russian Objections. The Soviet Government could not venture along this path, said Molotov, renewing his proposal that each European country submit a separate list of its needs to the United States.

In conclusion, he warned that the Franco-British plan would divide Europe into two groups of states, in which case "American credits would serve not to facilitate the economic rehabilitation of Europe, but to make use of some European countries against other European countries in whatever way certain strong powers seeking to establish their domination should find it profitable to do so.'The Soviet Government considered it "necessary to caution the governments of Great Britain and France against the consequences of such action, which would be directed not toward the unification of the efforts of the countries of Europe in the task of their economic rehabilitation after the war, but would lead to opposite results, which have nothing in common with the real interests of the peoples of Europe."

Bidault returned to Molotov the warning about dividing Europe and asserted that the making up of a European balance sheet would not impose "a shadow of a suspicion of restraint" upon Europe. There was no question of giving directives. All that was proposed was the harmonizing of production targets in free discussion.

In his reply Bevin called Molotov's objections to the Franco-British program "a complete travesty of the facts and a complete misrepresentation of everything the British Government had submitted." The Marshall Plan was a way to really make Europe free—"not to provide for the domination of any one state." He regretted the threat that "if we continue this beneficent work we must face grave consequences." His country had faced grave consequences and threats before and would not be deterred now.[4]

When Molotov departed angrily from Paris the world was stunned, realizing that it was now really divided into two parts. This was the more probable since Molotov had decided nothing himself, referring everything to Moscow. He had had full possession of a telephone line to Moscow during the last twelve hours of the conference.

v Why did the Soviet Government throw away what was apparently a golden opportunity to bridge the East-West conflict? One probable answer is that the Kremlin did not believe that the Truman Doctrine policy was being reversed. The only indication of reversal was the single sentence in Marshall's speech, whereas for many weeks "there must have been thousands upon thousands of words transmitted to Moscow reporting the hostile utterances of Senators and Congressmen, of Cabinet officials and/or irresponsible private citizens of prominence."[5]

[4] ***New York Herald Tribune*, July 3, 1947.**

[5] **Warburg, *Put Yourself in Marshall's Place*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1948, p. 30.**

If the good faith of the Marshall Plan had been accepted, the Russians would still have been highly unwilling to supply the many detailed figures required about their national economy, since these were considered to be state secrets upon which the security of the Soviet Union depended. The Russians believed that the curtain of secrecy over their strength had deceived Germany and saved them when she attacked and they were still unwilling to reveal either the extent of their strength or their great post-war weaknesses. During the UNRRA period they had indeed given international officials from the West free circulation in the Soviet Union, for the first and only time, but only parts of the country were covered and no observers could assess the full extent of Soviet weakness.

The UNRRA type of aid which Russia now desired to have restored might well have prevented or alleviated the Cold War, but it was obviously impossible to restore it in a balance of power conflict. For the same reason Russia could not risk opening up Eastern Europe to Western capitalist influence and control. The chief underlying cause of the great power rivalry was the removal of Eastern Europe from its colonial relationship to Western I Europe and from Western capitalist investment. It was this removal of, West Europe's economic hinterland which made its plight desperate and the Kremlin had ground for believing that the Marshall Plan could not succeed, unless West Europe again received the raw materials and food products of Eastern Europe and supplied it with manufactured goods in return. But this would restore the old colonial relationship and also undermine the brave plans for industrialization which the new communist governments in most of the East European countries had under way. Worse still, from Moscow's standpoint, an extensive restoration of Western influence, coupled with dependence on the West, would most probably prevent these governments from consolidating their holds on the countries of East Europe.

For Moscow the Marshall Plan presented a real threat, but Russia was most inept in turning it back. The chance that the American Congress, newly schooled by the Truman Doctrine campaign in fear and hatred of the Soviet Union, would approve large funds for Russia's rehabilitation, or for that of any one of her satellites, was small indeed. Molotov could quite safely have left it to the Congress to defeat the Marshall Plan altogether, if the Russian orbit had any part in it.

Instead of remaining in Paris, to try for better terms or at least to temporize, Molotov departed brusquely, and convinced the American people that his purposes were sinister. He not only rejected their generous offer, but seemed intent on frustrating its fulfilment elsewhere. His departure also enabled Bevin and Bidault promptly to issue an invitation to all of the European states, Russia and Spain excepted, to attend a Marshall Plan conference.

This invitation was a sore temptation to each of the East European governments. All of them delayed action, except the Czechoslovak Government under Communist Premier Gottwald, which announced its acceptance in principle. However, when Gottwald and Foreign Minister Masaryk visited Moscow they changed their minds. Finland was the last of Russia's neighbors to refuse to participate, after long hesitation.

The- Cûmirjform Organized. Once the lines were drawn the alarm of the Kremlin was acute. The Russians had no doubt whatever that the Marshall Plan was merely a means of implementing the Truman Doctrine, and from their standpoint a very dangerous one.[6] They proceeded to bind their satellites together by a new series of trade treaties, twelve signed within the first thirty days. Trade treaties were offered also to France and Britain, and concluded with the latter country late in the year. Poland was permitted to send larger coal exports to the West.

On October 5, 1947 the formation of a new international organization of communist parties was announced in a formal communique. The representatives of the communist parties of all the Eastern satellites, Russia, France and Italy, had met in Warsaw and had decided to establish an Information Bureau with headquarters in Belgrade. The manifesto described the split among the victorious Allies as one between the Soviet bloc, trying to liquidate fascism and establish peace, and the Anglo-American countries aiming to strengthen their imperialism and choke democracy. The "Truman-Marshall Plan" was "only a farce, a European branch of the general world plan of political expansion being realized by the United States of America in all parts of the world." The document closed with a long and vitriolic attack upon the socialist leaders of Western Europe, by name, for being "traitors in this common cause."

Pincer Movement Against Socialism. This slashing attack upon democratic socialism in West Europe, together with many others, might have diminished the force of the American attack upon the same socialists, but the pressure upon them steadily increased as the Marshall Plan developed. A State Department report to Congress, on January 14, 1948, finally described the democratic socialists of Western Europe as among the strongest bulwarks against communism, but this did little to affect the pressure of the American Right Wing upon the socialists. The National Association of Manufacturers laid down the principle that "during the period of economic aid the participating countries should not undertake any further nationalization projects, or initiate projects which have the effect of destroying or impairing private competitive enterprise," and that "aid should be extended to private competitive enterprises in the foreign countries instead of to governments or their agencies."[7]

Neither side was willing to give any aid or quarter to the middle ground solution of the conflict, democratic socialism.

Communism and Chaos. The formation of the new communist Cominform at once recalled to most Americans the old Comintern which had been Russia's chief means of fighting the West down until the middle of the war, when it was dissolved. In both cases the basic purpose of the organization was defensive, but the tactics used were offensive, and they deeply offended the West. The Cominform was the institutional reply of the East to the Marshall

[6] Sir Bernard Pares, *New York Herald Tribune*, July 18, 1947.

[7] Warburg, *op. cit.*, p. 76. This excellent discussion of the Marshall Plan period contains the texts of twenty-one relevant documents in an appendix.

Plan, but it seemed to the West to be an aggressive move, a revival of old, bad tactics.

It was easy for Americans to fall into the groove of thinking the Cominform to be just another expression of the inveterate lust of communists for creating chaos. The role which chaos had played in creating communism was so well understood that the deliberate creation of chaos to foster communism was generally believed to be a standard communist tactic. It was clear that some strikes and sabotage in France and Italy were communist inspired, for political purposes, though not necessarily engineered from Moscow. However, it did not follow that all communist-led strikes were politically motivated. Some of the worst of them were fully justified by the inferior and grinding position in which labor found itself after the war.

There were obvious limits beyond which chaos would become a danger to communism, not an aid to it. In the years before 1933 the leaders of the Comintern (Russian, of course) had learned through bitter experience that chaos in Western Europe did not create the conditions for a communist seizure of power at all, but brought fascism instead. The communists had been far too weak to seize power against the army, the police, the peasantry and all the other power groups aligned against them. This continued to be true after the war. No European country went communist unless it was first occupied by the Red Army. Wherever communism gained control, also, it insisted upon order even more rigorously than any capitalist government did. In the weakness and desolation left by the war, too, the communist governments all feared any renewal of chaos. Nevertheless, many people in the West continued to believe that communists everywhere were intent upon extending their power by the creation of new chaos.

The creation of the Cominform drew the lines for a competitive struggle between the East and the West to see which could organize its part of Europe most effectively. In this competition the great economic power of the United States was a tremendous weight in the scales. The Soviets could attempt to counterbalance it only by applying the dynamism of communist methods to Eastern Europe. They could not supply much of the machinery needed for the industrialization of this area, but they did start with the advantage that it was a surplus area in natural resources, foodstuffs, manpower and virile peoples whose energies had never really been released in the past.

Planning Problems. When the sixteen Western European nations met to plan their application for Marshall Plan aid they were confronted with this basic dilemma: the United States wanted them to make a great overall plan for Western Europe, but did not want the individual nations in that area to plan their economies. The President's Baylor University speech, which they had absorbed well, forbade government controls of trade, an essential of socialist planning. A stream of objections to subsidizing socialist countries had also begun to float across the Atlantic. Yet if planning was bad in a national area, what made it good in a supra-national area?

Another portentous problem also confronted them. The first had to do with the unbridled American economy which was running riot at the expense of

other and weaker nations. Britain's experience with her American loan was a standing warning of the kind of disaster that might occur. The British had been kept waiting a long time for the loan, and the amount was scaled down from the five billions which they believed might put them on their feet to some three and a half billions. Then having built a bridge three-quarters of the way across the river, to use Warburg's phrase, we removed price controls late in 1946 and our prices shot upward, taking away more than twenty-five per cent of the purchasing power of Britain's borrowed dollars.

This was bad enough, but the free convertibility clause was fatal to the success of the loan. In pursuance of our desire to create a great world market in which American laissez-faire capitalism could operate freely, we had compelled the British to agree that on July 15, 1947, the controls over the pound sterling should be removed and their currency made freely convertible into all other currencies. The day came and, as the Marshall Plan nations met, dollars were already flowing out of Britain in all directions at a rate which was to exhaust the American loan in a few months, when about half of the time it was expected to cover had elapsed. Now the Americans proffered aid to Europe again, with no assurance that another spurt of American [v] inflation would not upset all calculations.

On August 20 our government was forced to agree to the reimposition of controls over the pound sterling, but not until great damage had been done to the entire economy of Western Europe, which was now hit by widespread drought, following the record damage of the preceding winter.

At the end of August the sixteen nation conference in Paris produced the first draft of its report showing a deficit of $28,000,000,000 over a four-year period. This figure brought a mission flying from Washington post haste which insisted upon reduction to $22,000,000,000. The Americans also insisted upon the adoption of liberal trade policies which pointed strongly toward a repetition of the free convertibility fiasco. The revised sixteen nation report was signed on September 20 and examined in the United States by three major committees. Its goals sounded much like a Russian five-year plan, but the reports insisted that they could not possibly be met without large trade with Eastern Europe. In presenting the program to Congress on December 19 the President cut the proposed amount to $17,000,000,000.

Interim Aid. In the meantime the desperate situation in Europe had finally compelled the President to announce on September 29 that an interim aid bill would be essential. A month later he called a special session of Congress which met on November 17, very late in the evening, to receive the recommendation that $597,000,000 be appropriated to see France, Italy and Austria through to the end of March. Then the China Lobby, led by the Luce publications and William Bullitt, forced the ear marking of $18,000,000 to China and cut the total to $540,000,000. An anti-inflation bill, designed to stabilize the value of the Marshall Plan dollars, was emasculated by the Republicans. This was not strange, since the President himself had labelled rationing and price controls as "police state methods," on October 16.[8]

[8] The *Christian Science Monitor,* October 17, 1947.

In the General Assembly of the United Nations Vishinsky attacked the whole capitalist system for the first time, on October 6, charging that capitalism was now entering its final or imperialist phase in which it aimed at world domination in order to bolster its sagging foundations. A month later, however, he maintained at a press conference that capitalism and communism could live side by side in peace and mutually beneficial cooperation. Basically there was no quarrel between the two systems and the Soviet Union was ready to cooperate with the capitalist world to the fullest extent on the basis of mutual respect.[9]

The Russian People Pacific. On October 26 John Steinbeck and Robert Capa, novelist and photographer, began in the ***New York Herald Tribune*** a serial report on their trip through Russia during the summer. They were depressed by the developing Cold War and particularly by their belief that "a man sitting at a desk in Washington or New York reads the cables and rearranges them to fit his own mental pattern." So they went to see how belligerent the Russian people really were, travelling through much of European Russia. They visited the ruins of Kiev, where German Kultur had done its work, and felt that one of the few justices in the world was to be found in the work of the German prisoners helping to clean up the mess. The German prisoners they saw everywhere did not seem to be underfed or overworked. They visited a collective farm, where eight houses remained of 362 which had existed before the Germans came that way, and made the acquaintance of a little boy who ran to his mother crying with wonder, "But these Americans are people just like us!" They visited many farm houses and in nearly every one there was a room with an icon comer and on another wall almost invariably another kind of icon, the hand embroidered white cloth frames which held the photographs of the dead—"the best they had, the strongest and the best educated, the best loved and the most needed." The farm people were always a little quiet in that room.

During their tour they "knew nothing about the things American papers were howling about—Russian military preparations, atomic research, slave labor, the political skulduggery of the Kremlin," though they learned that the Russians did not fear the atomic bomb. Stalin had told his people it would never be used in war. The travellers had found the Russian people to be kind and friendly, wanting the same things that all peoples want, peace above all. The two did not "know who started this vicious and insane game of stupid accusation and violent criticism." That was not very important. The important thing was "who is going to stop it?"[10]

This was a sharp question, the probable answer being that nobody would break the vicious circle of mutual suspicion, fear and hatred before the North Temperate Zone was laid in ruins. By this time the Russian press, radio, stage and screen were all busy giving the Soviet peoples the idea that the Americans were greedy imperialists and a large part of the American press gave its readers an equally distorted view of Russian aggressiveness.

[9] ***Ibid.*, November 8, 1947.**

[10] **See especially the *Herald Tribune*, October 26, 1947, and January 31, 1948.**

The American People Conditioned for War. A Canadian member of the UN radio division recorded his depression on reading the newspaper accounts of UN meetings. With the exception of the ***New York Times*** and ***Herald Tribune*** no other American newspapers that he saw "gave anything like an objective report of what had gone on, and even they were prone to slight coloration." American movies and newsreels also gave the same distorted view. Most newspapers in their editorial policies seemed to believe "that the more we find out about countries we don't like the more we will be convinced of their perfidy; while the more other countries get to know about us the more they will appreciate our shining righteousness. Frequently this pernicious piece of illogic is, of course, purposeful." He noted also that the 1947 Pulitzer prizes were awarded to anti-Soviet cartoons, articles and books and that the list of books about the Soviet Union distributed by the very influential book clubs "included almost solely works likewise derogatory to the Soviets."[11]

A letter writer to the ***Nashville Tennessean***, March 24, 1948, described the effect upon the public when she wrote that "anyone who reads the newspapers and listens to the radio is aware of the necessity of being ready to defend our country." The public opinion polls reflected this same awareness faithfully. The records of the National Opinion Research Center showed that at the end of 1945, 32 per cent of the American people expected another big war within 25 years. A year later the percentage was 41, and at the close of 1947 it was 63.[12] The conversion to a war mentality was already well along.

In the autumn of 1947 American leaders continued to sound the alarm against the Soviet Union. Former Secretary of State Byrnes published his book, ***Speaking Frankly***, about which the London ***Times*** said that Mr. Byrnes' "latest contribution to policy seems little better than a simple recipe for war" and the London ***News Chronicle*** commented that Byrnes had "talked deplorable and dangerous nonsense."[13] A few days later Byrnes made a speech in which he declared that if the Russian Army did not leave Eastern Germany the United States and other nations must band together to take "measures of last resort".[14] Then after this apparently decisive utterance Byrnes made a somewhat astonishing statement before the assembled bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church, saying: "I am deeply concerned with the state of mind, at times bordering on hysteria, that ascribes to our former ally, the Soviet Republic, all the ills and errors which two world wars have brought."[15] In March, after the communist seizure of Czechoslovakia, Byrnes urged that the United States "act immediately" the next time Russia made even an indirect move of aggression in Europe.[16]

From John Foster Dulles, leading Republican adviser on foreign policy, there came a similar rising crescendo of anti-Soviet sentiment. In early December Mr. Dulles, while an official adviser to Secretary Marshall in London, undertook private negotiations with General Charles de Gaulle

[11] Mayor Moore, "The Race Between the Pen and the Sword," Toronto *Saturday Night*, September 27, 1947.

[12] Elmo Roper, *New York Herald Tribune*, December 18, 1947.

[13] *New York Herald Tribune*, October 17, 1947. **[14] *Ibid.*, October 23, 1947.**

[15] The *New York Times*, November 6, 1947.

[16] The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 14, 1948.

concerning the disposition of the German Ruhr.[17] In January Dulles told a radio audience that the three year search for peace had entered a second phase in which action, rather than diplomacy, would be decisive.[18] On November 23 the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid assailed the Soviet Union for blocking trade between Eastern and Western Europe, ascribing Western Europe's plight largely to that cause.[19] On December 7 Harold E. Stassen, Republican candidate for the Presidency, asserted that the United States should stop shipments of heavy machinery or potential war materials to the Soviet Union.[20] On December 4 Representative Clarence A. Eaton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated: "We might as well face the situation that Russia proposes to conquer the world, either by infiltration or by force of arms."[21] On the same day Secretary of Defense Forrestal testified that "we are dealing with a deadly force and nothing less than 100 per cent security will do." Two months later Secretary of Commerce Harriman told the House Appropriations Committee that Russian aggression was "a greater menace than Hitler."[22]

Deflation in the U.S.S.R. On December 14, 1947, the Soviet peoples woke up to learn that they had undergone a new social revolution inside the U.S.S.R. During the war the peasants and middle classes had accumulated large amounts of cash, partly because of higher prices and salaries, but largely because consumer goods were not to be had. Not a few citizens became millionaires, in the sense of possessing more than a million rubles. The wage earners, however, had not fared so well, their wages being more rigidly controlled. The currency reform of December 14 accordingly aimed to redress the balance by destroying nine out of ten paper rubles outside the banks and one out of two rubles in the banks, though there was an even exchange for bank deposits under 3,000 rubles. Since wages were not lowered, the workers received a new incentive and production rose swiftly, partly because rationing was abolished in the same decree and the prices of consumer goods reduced. Inflation was effectively countered.[23]

Abortive Conference. On November 25, 1947, the Council of Foreign Ministers met in London to make another effort to settle terms of peace for Germany and Austria. Again three weeks were spent in futile discussion of the same issues threshed over at Moscow in March. At its close Secretary of State Marshall stated, on December 19, his belief that the most fundamental reason for the failure of the conference was the existence of a political vacuum in Western Europe and he expressed his conviction that no agreement would be possible until this vacuum had been "filled by the restoration of a healthy European community." Until this was done paper agreements would not assure a lasting peace, said Marshall, and he added: "Agreements

[17] ***Ibid.*, December 9, 1947.**
[18] ***New York Herald Tribune*, January 4, 1948.** [19] ***Ibid.*, November 24, 1947.**
[20] ***Ibid.*, December 8, 1947.** [21] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, December 4, 1947.**
[22] ***Nashville Banner*, February 27, 1948.**
[23] ***New York Herald Tribune*, December 15, 1947; Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe*, p. 55.**

between sovereign states are generally the reflection and not the cause of genuine settlements

America Over Extended? As 1948 opened, Lippmann warned that we were M morally and politically over extended." We could not at one and the same time finance a global air force, a navy commanding all oceans, universal military service, heavy military research, the Marshall Plan, the states around the Soviet perimeter, and the good neighbor policy.[24] The next day the $17,000,000,000 commitment was eliminated from the European Recovery Plan bill, which simply proposed that $6,800,000,000 be authorized for the first fifteen months of the Marshall program. In his annual message to the Congress on January 7 President Truman devoted strong emphasis to "one major problem which affects all our goals," inflation. He noted that inflation was "undermining the living standards of millions of families." Corporate profits had risen in 1947 from $12,500,000,000 to $17,000,000,000 after taxes. He urged the Congress to make available "the weapons that are so desperately needed in the fight against inflation." The Congress, however, paid no heed to his advice.[25]

On January 8 Secretary of State Marshall made his formal plea for the full ERP appropriation, warning that "the way of life that we have known is literally in the balance."

Reaction in the Saddle in Greece. In Greece the Royalist Government took the fullest advantage of the Truman Doctrine. In a series of dispatches from Athens Homer Bigart reported that Greek officials openly fed anti-American stories to the press, which our representatives had to answer. Ignoring the fact that no one but a Greek had been killed or captured in the civil war, the press complained that it was impossible to "contain the Slav hordes" with an army so small and poorly equipped. To such complaints our aid administrator, Dwight Griswold, replied that the army had plenty of good equipment and that there was no evidence of the presence of foreigners in the rebel ranks. Finally our mission revealed that fifty ship loads of military supplies and equipment had been unloaded in Greek ports up to January 20, 1948.[26]

[24] *New York Herald Tribune*, January 5, 1948.

[25] Two days later Thomas L. Stokes described suggested sample newspaper advertisements which the National Association of Manufacturers was sending to its members, in which profit figures based on sales would be used instead of profits measured on net worth. This would enable the General Electric Company, for example, to advertise its profits as only 7 per cent, instead of 22 per cent, for the year. The N.A.M. said bluntly "the average American does not distinguish between profit on sales and profit on net worth"—The *Nashville Tennessean*, January 11.

[26] *New York Herald Tribune*, January 16, 30, February 15, 26, 1948.

Currently Walter Lippmann reviewed the major error of the Truman Administration in its Greek policy. It had first "announced in the loudest and most provocative tones" what it was going to do before it had the money, men or even a plan, thereby destroying our influence with the Greek politicians, "who saw at once that we were so thoroughly committed that we would have to support them and could no longer draw back." Any experienced diplomat could have warned the State Department that this procedure would compel us to implement our policy "entirely with money and with power."—The *Nashville Tennessean*, January 15, 1948.

Auto-intoxication in Russia. In Russia the Communist Party was moving vigorously to break all cultural ties between the Russian intellectuals and the West. On February 11 the Central Committee of the party severely castigated the famous composer Shostakovich, and several others, for writing music which "strongly smells of the spirit of current modernistic bourgeois music of Europe and America." This was only one of scores of attempts to proscribe any thinking which might have even a remote Western flavor.

The motive was not only to isolate all Soviet intellectuals and citizens completely but to prove that Russian Communism could create a culture superior to any other. In pursuance of this aim the Party and the Soviet press began to claim Russian origin for every scientific invention which ever entered the mind of man. A long succession of such claims asserted that the steam engine, the telephone, electric light, radio and every other modem invention, were all Russian in origin, even if it was necessary to concede that the inventor worked under the Tsars.

These twin campaigns were pushed to ridiculous extremes, revealing not only fear of the West, but a great inferiority complex. Unfortunately, they convinced many millions of young Russians that they actually were living in a civilization unique and superior to all others.

THE COMMUNIST SEIZURE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In February 1948 the Communist party of Czechoslovakia suddenly seized complete control of the little democracy upon which many people had set their hopes of a bridge between the East and the West. The Czechs never liked the figure, replying that bridges got walked upon, and knowing in their hearts that if the East-West conflict became acute enough they would be coordinated into the East.

This had been predetermined by many things that had gone before. Munich had made them unable for a long time to put any dependence in the West. The German occupation had subjected them to six years of merciless slavery, leaving no doubt in their minds that they must depend on Russia for defense against any repetition of that agony. The war, too, had created the conditions for communist control, whenever a real pinch came.

Knowing which way he had to go, President Benes had journeyed to Moscow in December 1943 to make a treaty of alliance with Russia. It was well that he did so, since the Czech Communist leader Gottwald was already there, making plans and available to head a government of the "Lublin" type for Czechoslovakia, should the Kremlin so decide. The treaty of alliance recognized Benes' government-in-exile as the legitimate government and enabled him to return to Czechoslovakia, but he had to go by way of Moscow in 1945, when the Ruthenian tip of Czechoslovakia was liberated by the Russian Army, which had already established contacts throughout the country with the underground National Committees. These communist-led groups were to form the basis of a new and popular system of local government, as a departure from the too great centralization of government inherited from Hapsburg days. As it advanced, the Red Army and the

NKVD were accordingly able to strengthen the communist party everywhere, and to support it with the prestige of the victorious Soviet Union.

This was the more true since the Teheran and Yalta conferences had agreed that the Russian armies should liberate Prague, a decision made on principle, which in January 1945 also seemed to conform to the military situation. Afterward the Russian forces advanced more slowly and the Americans much more rapidly than expected, so that General Patton's army was held outside Prague until the Russians could arrive to free the Czech capital.

Dragon's Teeth Communism. The war also left Czechoslovakia without any important class of large property owners to oppose communism. Up to 1918 Austrians, Germans and Jews owned the big properties, landed and industrial. After that date the Austrians were removed and during the Second World War the Jewish owners were killed by the Germans, who in their turn fled in 1945 or were dispossessed. Most of the Czech owners had collaborated with the Nazis to save their properties and when the Allies won the war they lost them. These processes left a majority of the large properties in the country ownerless. In most cases there was simply no one to claim ownership. The only practical way of working the properties was to nationalize them, a step which most Czechs approved in principle.[27]

The expulsion of 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans to Germany also threw a vast number of properties, both large and small, into the hands of the state and the militant communist party managed to have a major hand in the redistribution of all these properties. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe they obtained two or three key ministries, seeming to defer to the other parties by letting them have a majority of the Cabinet posts. In every case the Minister of the Interior, controlling the police, was a Communist. In Czechoslovakia the Minister of Agriculture was Communist. When the landed estates were divided, Communists were accordingly rewarded and many new supporters gained from the non-Communists who received land. The normal operations of the Agriculture Ministry also furnished large opportunities to influence the votes of the farmers.

These circumstances largely account for the heavy vote received by the Communist Party in the election of 1946, when it polled 38 per cent of the total vote and became the largest party, entitled to the post of Prime Minister. Not all of the 38 per cent who voted Communist were indoctrinated Marxists. Doubtless a majority of them were people who voted Communist for other, materialistic reasons. The fact that the Communists had been heavily represented in Buchenwald and other German concentration camps, along with many Czech liberals, gave these two groups of Czechs a close bond. Comrades in arms are always likely to stick together.

Democratic Interlude. The 1946 election gave the three non-Marxist parties a total of 49 per cent of the popular vote, a fact which reassured them and led them to play their own party game more than the situation justified. The balance of power was held by the Socialist party, under the leadership of Zdenek Fierlinger who worked closely with the Communists, from his

[27] **Smith, *The State of Europe*, p. 348.**

ambassadorship to Moscow during the war down through his temporary premiership at its close to the end of the Republic. Like all European socialist parties, his party was divided into Right and Left wings, and late in the day it rebelled and ousted him from the leadership, thereby contributing one of the events which precipitated the Communist seizure of power. While the Socialists worked with the Communists the two Marxian parties represented 51 percent of the people and the same proportion of the parliament.

The Cabinet was a coalition, representing all of the parties, and in the main it worked harmoniously for the reconstruction and revival of Czechoslovakia for about two years. In this period Czechoslovakia was the marvel of most observers. Its government was led by communists, but it remained a democratic country. Freedom of press and speech continued. All the controversial literature of the West could be purchased freely and in great variety. Travellers who visited the country reported no evidences of a police state. The Czechs were happy and many of them shared the belief of numerous people in the West that Czechoslovakia might be the common meeting ground in which the East and the West could reconcile their most acute differences. This was probably an illusion, since the Communists were very unlikely to permit the democratic process to deprive them of their primary position in the state, especially since this position steadily grew stronger basically, through Communist control of the workers and peasants. Backed by the memory of the Red Army's rough behaviour, and by the knowledge that it was just beyond the border on nearly all sides of Czechoslovakia, the Communists were in position to take control of Czechoslovakia at any time after 1945. Lying in the Soviet orbit, as she did, it was probably only a question of time until she was communized. Nevertheless, without the compulsions of the Cold War her chances of maintaining a middle ground position would have been very much better.

Both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan made it certain that the crisis would come at or before the elections scheduled for 1948. The end of the Czech idyll was clearly indicated at the start of the Marshall Plan, when Czechoslovakia first announced her participation in the plan and then reversed herself after consultation with Moscow. The original decision of the Czech cabinet was unanimous, the Communist ministers included, and the decision to reverse was more nearly unanimous than the West believed. Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk told James P. Warburg in August 1947 that it was the Western press, especially the American newspapers, which made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to go ahead in the Marshall Plan. When our press played up the Czech decision as a break on the part of Czechoslovakia with her Soviet ally, the Czechs had no option but to reverse themselves. Masaryk was not summoned to Moscow for brutal disciplining, as was so widely reported. His visit, to negotiate a trade treaty, had been arranged a month before. He did not have to be bludgeoned in Moscow to do what the Western newspapers had made essential.[28] At the same time the original unanimous desire of the Czechs to participate in the Marshall Plan warned Moscow that it could not permit the democratic parties to take control of Czechoslovakia, lest they gradually ease her into the Marshall orbit.

[28] Warburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 238–60, especially p. 258.

There were many signs also that the Communist vote would drop in the forthcoming election. The democratic forces had grown considerably. Immediately after the war the Red flag predominated in national celebrations; two years later the Czech national colors were in the majority at all great demonstrations. When Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart visited Czechoslovakia in May 1947 President Benes assured him that the elections of 1948 would see a reduction of the Communist vote, though he expressed foreboding about the growing discord between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians.[29]

Sample polls also indicated a drop in the Communist vote. Even that great arbiter of all elections, the weather, had turned against the Communists. The great snows of 1947, which toppled Britain from her status as a great power, had been succeeded by searing drought which affected most of Europe but hit Czechoslovakia worst of all. Spontaneous combustion created widespread fires, destroying forests and crops. Food was so short that consumer goods had to be exported to pay for food. People were hungry and as usual the party in power was blamed. The Prime Minister was a Communist and his party the largest one in the government.

The same trends naturally encouraged the democratic parties to believe that they were certain to gain a parliamentary majority in the election and many of the party leaders began to plan to put the Communists out of the coalition and govern without them. This was precisely what had happened in France and Italy after the Marshall Plan was announced and largely because of it. From Moscow's standpoint there could be little doubt that the same thing would happen in Czechoslovakia, and no doubt that Russia's hold on the Bohemian bastion would be weakened. Given the Cold War this was a development which Moscow could not permit, since Bohemia is the strongest military position in Europe and under Russian control would be a great forward fortress of her defenses. No great power engaged in a power struggle would surrender such a position. The power conflict had become so acute also that the Czech Communists "being an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, could not take even a slight defeat if it amounted to a Soviet setback at a decisive moment. Such was the case in 1948."[30]

Communist Drive. In this situation the communist leaders moved first to break up the Slovak Democratic Party, which had polled 60 per cent of the vote in Slovakia. The Slovaks, living in the agricultural end of Czechoslovakia, had been exploited in the same way that all agricultural regions are by the industrialized areas. Largely for this reason they had been disloyal during the Munich period, falling in with Nazi plans to disrupt Czechoslovakia. They had established a Nazi puppet state and sent a sizeable army to fight Russia, spite of this treason the Czechs had spent the largest part of the national budget for new industrialization in Slovakia after the war, to make this

[29] Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, "The Czechoslovakia Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1948, p. 635.

[30] Quoted from the very informative memorandum "The Strategy of Communist Infiltration: The Case of Czechoslovakia," by Ivo Duchacek, issued by the Yale Institute of International Studies Duchacek was Chairman of the Foreign Committee of the Czechoslovak parliament from 1945 until the communist coup in 1948

backward part of the country a full partner. They had not held the treason of the Slovaks against them, but when the Communist leaders began to charge subversive plots against the Slovak leaders there was enough doubt in the minds of the Czech Democrats to prevent them from rejecting the charges and acting accordingly. Indeed there was no doubt that fascist tendencies persisted in Slovakia and that its post war record had been "shot through with very real plots against the government."[31]

A wave of Red terrorism to gain complete control of the labor unions began in early January, provoking strong Socialist protests. On January 9, the Secretary General of the Communist Party promised a purge of the army.[32] By this time the police force was 80 per cent Communist. The Communists also sought to push nationalization down to very low property levels.

Then the Communists proposed a series of provocative measures in the Cabinet in an effort to precipitate a crisis. When these tactics did not work they proceeded openly to complete their infiltration of the police. In February 1948 eight high police officials in Prague were ousted and communists installed in their places. The non-communists in the Cabinet mustered a majority to condemn this action and demand its revocation. When Premier Gottwald refused, they resigned. The democratic side was able to command a bare majority on this occasion because the socialists had ousted the pro-communist Fierlinger as their leader. Yet when the twelve non-socialist Cabinet members resigned they neglected to carry along with them the socialist members, who were subject to persuasion and who did nothing during the crisis. This left thirteen members of the Cabinet still in office and there being a quorum Premier Gottwald continued to rule, and to demand that the resignations of the twelve be accepted. This upset all of their calculations, since they had expected that an immediate dissolution of parliament would be forced.

Most historians of the crisis have condemned the democratic leaders for their ineptitude in resigning. Perhaps it was a mistake. Yet they could hardly overlook the open packing of the police command without inviting the kind of campaign and election that would have given the Communists control, though there is the possibility that a full communist coordination could have been avoided for a time, if the election did not diminish the communist share in the government.

Others have attached much importance to the poor health of President Benes, who had suffered two breakdowns, one of them a stroke, in the preceding summer. It is reasoned that a resolute man could have called the nation and the army to arms in ringing tones and prevented communist rule.

Before accepting the conclusion that events could have been ordered otherwise, either by the democratic Cabinet members or the President, it is necessary to consider the succeeding events. A great communist labor congress had already filled Prague to overflowing, making drastic military action difficult.

[31] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 350. The Roman Catholic Church also played a powerful role in Slovakia. Before the 1946 election the Church told the faithful, "You may not vote for a non-Christian party; when in doubt consult your parish priest."—G. E. R. Gedye, "Behind the Struggle for Czechoslovakia," *The Nation*, February 28, 1948, p. 232.

[32] Albion Ross, the *New York Times*, January 10, 1948.

Then on February 21, the day after the Cabinet resignation, the Communists called out 200,000 workers for a giant demonstration which threatened a general strike if the resignations were not accepted. The next day the labor congress issued an action program which contained attractive promises for many segments of the population. On the 23rd the Communists announced an alleged plot by the resigned Cabinet members to denationalize the factories, disturb the land reform and take the back track generally. This faked announcement served as an excuse for placing machine guns around key buildings, one of them the radio station, which gave only the Red side of the crisis. On the 24th the opposition newspapers were prevented from publishing, in one way or another by the workers, and "action committees" suddenly sprang up in every factory, shop and office, taking control to thwart the alleged plotters. The same evening still more tremendous demonstrations of workers, "stirring, overwhelming, frightening," shook the city—to such effect that the democratic parties collapsed, fifty leading members of Parliament, representing three non-communist parties, rushing to Gottwald to offer their cooperation, which was accepted on the condition that they purge their parties. The purges began at once. The Socialist party was forcibly coordinated and Fierlinger reinstated.[33] On the 25th, when Gottwald went to the tired, sick President for his decision, the streets were full of armed workers, marching with rifles on their shoulders.

Communism in Power. Benes accepted the resignation of the twelve, saying that "any other solution would deepen the crisis and lead to a sharp division of the nation, and eventually this could lead to chaos." It is difficult to imagine an experience sadder or more pathetic in any man's life than to have to preside twice over the death of the Western democracy that he loved, and that his great mentor, Thomas G. Masaryk, had so successfully established. Yet in both 1938 and in 1948 he was confronted with such overwhelming power that it is difficult to see what else he could have done.

At Munich, and before, his sworn allies in the West had not only deserted him but threatened his country with the most savage destruction by Germany if he did not surrender. In February 1948 a huge minority of his own people rose in such overwhelming might that he had no time to counter or deny them. He could only say: "You want a new form of democracy. My wishes are addressed to you and to the nation that this new way may be favorable for all." He could hardly do otherwise when Howard K. Smith was able to walk the streets of Prague from dawn to dusk during the five days of the 1948 crisis without seeing a single person weeping, nor in fact any expression of anger.[34] When the Germans marched into Prague in 1939 the people wept and cursed them unrestrainedly.

Of course Benes knew in his heart that the second tragedy was caused by the first. He could tell himself, too, that it was still possible to hope that the new way might not develop so badly, the Czechs being noted for their moderation, even in revolution.

[33] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 344–7. Smith was an eyewitness of the revolution.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 347.

Masaryk. For Jan Masaryk, son of a great father, the choice was equally painful and even less supportable. As Foreign Minister he was a non-party member of the Cabinet, one who loved the West but knew that if forced to choose he would have to go with the East. He told Smith in the summer of 1947, "it would kill me!"[35]

When the February crisis developed Masaryk resigned himself to the inevitable. He led his employees in the one-hour demonstration strike and after the crisis was over he said to a French newspaperman "there were people in this country who thought it was possible to rule without the Communists. . . . I have always been passionately opposed to this idea."[36] He had known nothing about the resignation of the Ministers until afterwards and considered it a mistake. After the crisis Benes begged him to remain in office and he accepted in his father's name a declaration from the new Communist Government, afterwards going alone to his father's grave on March 7, at which time he sent word to friends in England that he could carry on no longer.[37]

On the morning of March 10 his pajamas-clad body was found on the pavement several floors below an open window of his apartment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were many stories about his having been thrown from the window by the Communists, but they were not necessary to explain his death. On various occasions he had grieved to his friends about the great power conflict which was pushing his country toward a new crucifixion. The real trouble, he had said in December 1947, was ignorance. "The Americans knew nothing about the new Russia; the Russians knew even less about the New World." To Masaryk the containment policy.applied to Russia "was immature, negative and dangerous."[38] If only "the world could be cut in two parts and the antagonists allowed to drift into space all would be well," but this could not be. Instead, Masaryk was compelled to face an inevitable and intolerable choice.

Conclusions. Was the February revolution ordered by Moscow? The charge is often made because Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. A. Zorin arrived in Prague on February 19, the day before the democratic leaders made their decision to resign. His ostensible mission, to supervise deliveries of Russian wheat to Czechoslovakia was not very plausible, and his presence undoubtedly gave confidence and élan to the Czech Communist leaders during the crisis, after which he promptly departed.

It is not necessary to ascribe any greater importance to Zorin's visit. The correspondent of the ***New York Times*** wrote on March 21 from Prague that nothing had happened which could not "just as well have happened if the Soviet Russian Government had been completely without interest in the outcome, assuming that other states did not interfere." Once the communist party had attained the leading position in the state the revolution would have occurred under similar circumstances even if Russia had ceased to exist. This, however, does not obviate the equally apparent fact that the stage in the Cold

[35] ***Ibid.*, p. 40.** [36] ***Ibid.*, p. 339.** [37] **Lockhart, *op. cit.*, p. 642.**
[38] **Freda Kirchwey, "Masaryk," *The Nation*, March 20, 1948.**

War had been reached where it was essential to Russian policy that Czechoslovakia should cease to be a bridge between the West and the East. It was Lockhart's judgment, after a long experience with Russia, that "it is still rather more than an even-money bet that Russia's policy of consolidation in Eastern Europe is dictated more by fear of being attacked than by the desire to attack others."[39]

Nor did the Anglo-American power bloc have a pronounced grievance wTien Czechoslovakia was cemented into the Russian orhiL Everyone knew that she was already there, and in many ways the West had already treated her as a member of the camp of "the enemy." American credits had been cancelled and withheld and much of our press had spoken disparagingly of the strongly socialized Czech Republic. Very little had been done to support democracy in Czechoslovakia or to build up the morale of its leaders, who felt the lack of sympathy and support keenly, in contrast with the close bonds between the Czech Communists and Russia.

From the power standpoint nothing was lost in February 1948 that was not already lost. Nevertheless, the communist coup had a tremendous impact upon the West, dramatized as it was by the poignant death of Masaryk which brought the East-West conflict home to each individual, especially in Western Europe. People suddenly remembered that the Czechs were a long suffering, democratic people. They remembered, too, their own guilt in the crucifixion of the Czechs in 1938, the irrevocable step which had opened the flood gates to everything which followed. From the ideological standpoint many undoubtedly felt worse about the internal communist coordination of Czechoslovakia than they had about the Nazi rape of the little country in 1938 and 1939.

There was shock and warning also in the speed and smoothness with which democratic liberties had been erased in Czechoslovakia. All Europeans began to wonder if their own communist parties might not sometime repeat the same feat.

RISING WAR FEWER

Demands that a Line be Drawn. On February 28 Anthony Eden declared that the Western Europeans and the United States must unite now to save what was left of world freedom. When Russia proposed a treaty of mutual defense to Finland, on the 27th, a new alarm spread through the West, lest Finland's hour had come. However, the treaty eventually concluded did not make any serious inroads on Finland's independence. The Czech and Finnish episodes galvanized consideration of the ERP bill in the Senate, where Senator Vandenberg denounced the "subversive conquest" of Czechoslovakia and declared that "the Iron Curtain must not come to the rims of the Atlantic either by aggression or default." His entire speech was keyed to the theme of checking further Soviet expansion.[40]

The moment seemed also to Prime Minister Jan Smuts, of South Africa, to be perhaps the most critical in a thousand years. Changing his position toward the power struggle markedly, he declared that Czechoslovakia was the last

[39] **Lockhart, *op. cit.*, p. 644.**

[40] ***New York Herald Tribune*, March 2, 1948.**

step permissible before a line was drawn. In New York the writer of a letter to the ***Herald Tribune*** on March 4 expressed the feeling of many when she cried out: "Oh, come on, America! Get tough! Use the threat of the atom bomb while it's still our secret, and the bomb itself if necessary!"

"***Frenzied War Talk."*** On March 11 Secretary Marshall described the situation as "very, very serious," a statement which led Samuel Grafton to observe that the American people were having their nerves scraped. Public alarm was rising like fever on a hospital chart. Some of our commentators especially were "gushing as if their word arteries had been cut," on the themes "crisis," "action," "military phase approaching," etc. It was "a movement of great depth and breadth," which had suddenly seized hold of articulate America. The angry sounds he thought would only confirm and harden Russian policy, having no more effect upon it than would a Russian threat of war made to stop the Marshall Plan.[41]

On the same day the ***New York Post*** called for a peace treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, declaring that the alternative was war on a global scale in which the first victim would be the free world, since regimentation on a totalitarian scale not dreamed of in World War II would inevitably become a requirement for its prosecution. A call of "Halt!" backed by the threat of war might be greeted as evidence of our courage and strength by the "hot-eyes and hysterical war-at-any-price proponents here and abroad," but it would not be likely to bring about the peaceful settlements which the world so desperately required.

On March 17 President Truman addressed a message to Congress in which he repeated the opening sentiments of his Truman Doctrine speech, blamed Russia for violating the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and directly accused the Soviets of "designs to subjugate the free communities of Europe." To meet the situation he recommended universal military training and a temporary selective service law.[42]

On the 22nd Drew Pearson reported that our war chiefs were studying how we could drop the atomic bomb on strategic Russian cities—"if we have to." If Russia could bite off Italy, then Greece and Arabia, the only air bases she would have to worry about would be in Japan and Alaska, which points they could blanket with interceptor planes. That is "what's behind the currently reported Russian stretch for territory. It's also what's behind the frenzied Washington war talks."[43] In the ***Herald Tribune*** the editor spoke of "the violent waves of emotion that seem to sweep, periodically, through Washington and out into the country at large," and the ultra conservative writer ***Heptisax*** wrote that the Red leaders "undoubtedly feel that the security of the Stalin group's hold on Russia and her environs depends upon the conquest of this country in one way or another."[44]

News Slanted Toward War. Throughout this period most of the American press continued to fan the war fever. Dr. Curtis MacDougall, Professor of

[41] ***New York Post*, March 17, 1948.** [42] **Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 507.**
[43] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 22, 1948.**
[44] ***New York Herald Tribune*, April 4, 1948.**

Journalism at Northwestern University, described the situation accurately when he said to a Colorado audience that the majority of American newspapers and commentators were convincing most Americans that war was the only solution for current national problems. He illustrated one method used to create war sentiment, as follows: "Eddy Gilmore, of the Associated Press, wrote from Moscow a fortnight ago that there was no comparable war fever there at all, but his dispatch was printed on inside pages, if it was used at all. If Gilmore's objective report had been the opposite, it would have been streamer-headline news in every paper subscribing to the Associated Press report."

MacDougall added that the most frightening aspect of the situation was that some people wanted to combat communism by imitating some of its worst features at home. The attacks on our civil liberties were the most disturbing of all, yet instead of combating these anti-democratic trends in the United States a large section of the press was "aiding and abetting the hysteria."[45]

"Blind Hatred" Protested. The Committee on the State of the Church of the Methodist General Conference, in session at Boston, also urged Christian men and women "to resist a mood of despair, blind hatred, hysteria, and hopelessness." Being sure that neither the Russian nor the American peoples wanted war, the committee called upon all of our people "promptly to change the prevailing mood, which we believe conducive to war" and to work for understanding.[46]

Atomic Attack Certain. These, however, were lonely voices. The prevailing mood which the Cold War generated was expressed in its fullest strength by Father Edmund A. Walsh, Vice President of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., who described the "most optimistic" forecast of world affairs as an armed truce between the United States and the Soviet Union, producing a deadlock in which the test would be "who will crack first?" This "long-time student and foe of the Soviet system" predicted that "if they get the atomic bomb—and in quantity—God help us!" They "'would use it in a second,' the Jesuit priest said, snapping his fingers, 'and without warning'."[47]

This expression of irreconcilable distrust was important, coming as it did from the head of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, which pours a steady stream of people into the Foreign Service and State Department of the United States. The assumption that the Russians will wipe out our cities on the first dark night after they are able to do so is the most hostile thesis that any American can lay down. It means that the Soviet Union is so totally lawless that we can only live in cowering fear until it is destroyed—by our atom bombs. This assumption is not only absolutely irreconcilable with peace; it is also the most far fetched that could be produced. So far the Soviets have not used mass destruction as a weapon of war. It is the Americans and British who developed the destruction of cities to the point where one bomb could, and did, wipe out a city. To assume that the Soviets will begin the

[45] ***New York Herald Tribune*, May 2, 1948.**
[46] ***Ibid.*, May 7, 1948.**
[47] ***Ibid.*, May 5, 1948.**

killing of nations with A-bombs is to assume a complete lack of rationality in the Kremlin, a quarter with a considerable reputation for hard-headed realism.

Reaction Active. A disturbing aspect of the situation was also to be found in the way in which reactionary forces at home played a double game. Thomas L. Stokes wrote that the forces of domestic reaction were sweeping in on our domestic affairs. Sections of the South resisted bitterly the granting of civil rights to Negroes, and free elections. In Congress special interests were trying to weaken the social and economic welfare laws which had spread our prosperity somewhat more equitably, and some of the same people were "loudest in the call for arms to spread democracy in other lands."[48]

Looking Ahead. On March 25 two remarkable warnings against a precipitate rush to war were uttered. Walter Lippmann cautioned that a refusal to appease was not the whole of statesmanship. Other fearful mistakes could be made, such as becoming over extended and dispersed, becoming engaged in the wrong place and at the wrong time, and becoming involved in war for "such unlimited and unattainable ends that it can never be concluded and settled," bleeding white the last great power of the Western world.

At the University of Florida, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas warned that war does not destroy abhorrent philosophies or political programs, but only creates conditions that nourish them. "If we visualize the United States the victor in a war with Russia and roll the film ahead ten years, what would we see?" he asked. "We would see a world in ruins—poverty and great illness on every hand—suffering and dislocations of life unequalled in history. That is the environment in which ideas as virulent as fascism and communism flourish."[49]

THE MARSHALL PLAN IN OPERATION

Defense Secretary Forrestal appealed for a revival of the draft and universal military training, March 19th. The next day Secretary of State Marshall declared that we now witnessed "duplication in Europe of the high-handed and calculated procedure of the Nazi regime." A little later the House Armed Services Committee declared that a peace time draft was made imperative by the "new and ominous" possibility that "the Soviet Union may be willing to risk a showdown" with the United States. The Soviet Union might feel that time was running against it. Therefore, "in order to deter any such rash decision on the part of the Soviet Government" the United States had "to transform a reasonable measure of its armed strength from the potential to the active."[50]

These fears reflected faithfully the deadly dynamics under which all great power arms races have moved. A step by one side creates fear and counter move, which in turn generates fear and counter move, until finally few know

[48] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, March 25, 1948.**
[49] ***New York Herald Tribune*, March 25, 1948.**
[50] **The *New York Times*, May 9, 1948.**

how it all began. Only the end is certain, and the logic of any "defensive" step is difficult to deny. In this case the communization of Czechoslovakia had alarmed us, so we must have conscription to make ourselves feel safer and to convince the Soviet Union that we mean business.

Spurred by the fate of Czechoslovakia the House of Representatives passed the six billion dollar foreign aid bill on March 31, by a vote of 329 to 74, aid to Franco Spain included, though this was killed in the conference committee. Realizing the disastrous political effects of a partnership with fascist Spain the State Department was able to eliminate recurring aid-to-Spain amendments until July 1950, when the Senate attached one to the huge 37 billion dollar omnibus appropriation bill which could not be vetoed.

The 1948 aid bill included also $570,000,000 for the corrupt and inept regime of Chiang Kai-shek in China.

The entire appropriation, including the Marshall Plan funds, was signed by the President on April 3, two days after the Russians began to impose restrictions on Berlin communications, and three days before the Russo-Finnish Mutual Assistance pact was signed. On April 17 the fifty-year Western European Union treaty between France, Britain, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg went into effect. This pact had been signed on March 17, under the shadow of the Czech coup. It created an alliance which was without military significance in the absence of powerful backing by the United States, where it was warmly welcomed officially.

To facilitate the administration of the Marshall Plan the sixteen participating European nations formed, on March 15th, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Its American counterpart was the European Cooperation Administration. The act of April 3, 1948, appropriated $4,300,000,000 for grant purposes and up to one billion for loans.
The grants were turned over to the European governments in the form of goods, through private trade channels. The European consumer then paid his government the full price and these "counterpart" funds went into a development account, out of which things like hydro-electric power plants were built, if approved by ECA, which also made outright grants for matching counterpart funds and conditional grants which required the receiver to export the same value of his own goods to another OECA member without receiving direct payment for it. Technical assistance was financed through a special fund.

The Marshall Plan was a four year plan. The funds for grant purposes actually appropriated in 1948 were four billion, to last for fifteen months. Another §4,800,000,000 was appropriated in 1949, to last until mid-1950 and in that year the grants were cut to less than three billions.

In 1950 it was too early to assess the final results of the Marshall Plan. There could not be any doubt that it averted economic disaster in Western Europe. Britain, for example, would have had to sell her capital goods in order to maintain greatly reduced rations. Unemployment would have risen until her position became desperate indeed. Production figures had risen everywhere in Western Europe and highly encouraging investments in capital goods had been made. These averaged twenty per cent of the gross national

product in 1949.[51] The dollar deficit was cut from ten billions to four billions, with the prospect that it could be reduced to three billions by 1952.

The dollar deficit, however, was very tenacious. It had been reduced since 1947 almost entirely by cutting European imports from the dollar area by $2,500,000,000, while expanding exports to it by only $204,000,000.[52]

Social Reform Retarded. One other very essential requirement of viability for Western Europe, real progressive social reform, lagged. We had marked success in enforcing business management. For example, in the Spring of 1948 the French Government asked for a release of counterpart funds, but ECA pointed to the unbalanced budget and three governments collapsed before the Queuille government finally succeeded in securing approval of a balanced budget. Then ECA released some of the money, but only "for two months at a time."[53]

This kind of pressure had succeeded, but in the vital area of social reform the same impact had not been achieved. ECA backed scores of important experiments in social progress, such as housing cooperatives and public power systems,[54] but it had not induced the European governments to make any significant reforms in the social structure. On the contrary, the conservative American business men who in the main managed the ECA program used their influence to discourage social reform. In Italy a former vice president of the National Association of Manufacturers was quite naturally opposed to land reform, one of Italy's crucial needs and perhaps the outstanding way of combating communism in Italy. The net effect in Western Europe had been "to discourage direly needed social changes that alone will keep democracy viable in the next generation."[55]

Nor was this the worst of it. Our influence encouraged the premature abandonment of economic controls and rationing in countries like France, Germany and Italy, where wealth was already maldistributed, and the wide-open return to free enterprise "yielded every advantage to people with wealth and put the workers at great disadvantage."[56] This exploitation of labor in turn lowered production and kept great blocs of workers communist or susceptible to communism.

Socialism Discouraged. The effect of our economic intervention in Europe has been not only to oust the communists from the governments but to put the socialists out or decrease their influence. This was one of the reasons for the near defeat of the British Labor Party in early 1950. Thus the effect of our economic control was to decrease the strength and influence of democratic socialism which the ***New York Herald Tribune***, January 14, 1948, rightly termed "our strongest ally in Europe."

Fascism in Colombia. What happens when the social struggle becomes too raw, and wealth tries to assure its position by force, was illustrated by the

[51] The *New York Times*, February 8, 1950.
[52] John H. Williams, "The Marshall Plan Half Way," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1950, p. 472.
[33] "ECA Can't Do Everything," *Fortune*, February 1949, pp. 184–5.
[54] *New Republic*, January 16, 1950, p. 23.
[53] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 221,404.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 278.

great riots in Bogota, Colombia, which disrupted the Ninth Pan American Conference in April 1948. For sixteen years Colombia had had the reputation of having one of the most democratic and stable governments in Latin America. During this period the Liberal party had consistently won large majorities, but in 1946 it split and the Conservatives obtained the presidency by a minority vote. In February 1948 President Perez ousted the Liberals who had been serving in a coalition cabinet, naming a notorious reactionary, Laureano Gomez, to head the cabinet and serve as Foreign Minister. A reign of terror then followed, Liberals being shot daily until the killed averaged twenty a day at the end of March 1948.[57]

It was in this atmosphere that Dr. Jorge Gaitan, the beloved leader of the Liberals was assassinated on April 9. The news spread like wildfire and bloody rioting flamed through the center of the city instantaneously. The assassin was killed on the spot and his body dumped before the presidential palace. There was such mass anger and such complete anarchy that Laureano Gomez hastily fled to Franco Spain. The Pan American delegates quickly retreated to the outskirts of the city, where they assembled half-heartedly and Secretary of State Marshall issued a statement ascribing the riots to the communists.

It was plausible in the atmosphere of the time to believe that the diabolical men in the Kremlin would try to disrupt the Pan American Conference. There were also a few Communists in Bogota who most probably took part in the riots with gusto, but a communist explanation of the tragedy was far fetched and unnecessary.[58] All the conditions for it were native to Colombia, and the outcome was not communism but fascism.

The Conservatives maintained their hold on the armed forces, packed for the purpose, and on the executive. Gomez, who was an open Falangist, anti-American and pro-German, returned from Spain in October 1949 and announced his candidacy for President. Armed clashes led by the Conservatives then grew in intensity until the Liberal candidate withdrew from the campaign, on the ground that the violence of the Conservatives was overwhelming.[59]

The Conservative government then imposed a full state of siege. Some 1500 Liberals were jailed and on the day of the one-party election the Conservatives announced that they had become the majority party.[60]

Thereafter the rights of the Liberal majority in parliament were ignored, and all constitutional processes frustrated, as Colombia became a fascist dictatorship of the Franco stripe and "part of the Madrid-Buenos Aires Axis." Thus there emerged "a totalitarian state, directly instigated by the Government of Spain on the very frontiers of the Panama Canal."[61]

The fascist seizure of Colombia was far more brutal and had far less

[57] "Behind the Bogota Uprising," *New Republic*, April 26, 1948, p. 31.

[58] Of course the Moscow press replied in kind. The Soviet *Literary Gazette* said: "The Colombian uprising has been plotted by the United States to frighten South American nations into an anti-communist bloc. The United States delegation to the Pan American Conference arranged the shooting of Gaitan to drag out the bugaboo of a communist danger."—The *New York Times*, April 25, 1948.

[59] *Ibid.*, November 9, 1949. **60 *Ibid.*, November 23, 28,1949.**

[61] *Ibid.*, November 18, 19, 1949.

popular support than the communist mastery of Czechoslovakia. In Colombia 500 people were killed and millions of dollars worth of property destroyed during the riots, and many hundreds of others were killed during the gradual mastery of the state. But the advance of fascism to the Panama Canal itself did not cause a wave of anger and fear to sweep through Washington and the West. This was due to two reasons: fascism was not then led by a great power; and, in the main, it preserves the privileges of the upper classes, instead of turning the social structure upside down.[62]

[62] **In November 1949, the same month that democratic government was crushed in Colombia, another Falangist and friend of Mussolini, Amulfo Arias, seized control of Panama itself. So notoriously pro-Axis that he was deposed as President of Panama in 1941, he now came back to power.—See Allan Chase, *Falange, The Axis Secret Army in the Americas*, New York, 1943, pp. 96–9.**

During 1948 conservative revolts had forced democratically elected governments out of power in two other states in the same region. In Peru the excesses and high handed tactics of the left wing APRA party, one of a coalition, supplied real justification for an army-conservative revolt on October 30, 1948, an all military cabinet succeeding.

In Venezuela the army could not tolerate the reforms proposed by the liberal Democratic Action Party, elected on December 14, 1947, "in the fairest and freest election ever held in Venezuela." President Romulo Gallegos was accordingly deposed by the army on November 24, 1948.—Austin F. MacDonald, *Latin American Politics and Government*, New York, 1949, pp. 428–9.

CHAPTER XVIII

FROM THE BERLIN BLOCKADE TO NATO

MARCH 1948–AUGUST 1949

Smith-Molotov Fiasco. The unwillingness of both the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate was illustrated by the abortive Smith-Molotov exchange in early May 1948. On May 4 Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith visited Foreign Minister Molotov and made a serious formal statement, intended to convince the Kremlin that the U.S.A. was united behind resistance to Soviet expansion and that Russia should not count on the Henry Wallace movement and the new Progressive Party to alter that fact. Nor should she take advantage of the presidential campaign and an apparent economic recession in the United States, to make any adventurous moves. Our policy was defensive, but it was firm.[1]

Smith's ***demarche*** ended with a ***pro forma*** statement that "the door is always open for full discussion and the composing of our differences," which Molotov promptly accepted in his reply on May 9, proposing "a discussion and settlement of the existing differences between us."

When these phrases were broadcast on the Moscow radio there was astonishment and some anger in London and Paris, along with confusion in the State Department. President Truman had to disavow any change in our foreign policy, and it had to become known that we had had no idea of negotiating with the Russians.

On their side the Russians would not have published our note so promptly if they had really wanted to negotiate. They would have pushed matters by quiet diplomacy.

Surplus and Deficit Zones in Germany. By this time the two sides had reached an impasse over what to do about Germany. Doubtless this was fore-ordained from the beginning. Walter Lippmann once remarked that if the four occupying powers had all been angels they could not have agreed on the disposition of Germany, and Howard K. Smith brilliantly demonstrated that each of the four powers was driven by hard necessity to pursue policies in Germany which led to deadlock, without anyone intending to dominate Germany.[2]

It had been agreed at Potsdam that Germany should be operated as an economic unit, but France was not present and she proceeded to veto the plan and to organize her zone, both to keep Germany weak and to exact reparations from current production. France was in dire straits after the Germans had drained her of tens of billions of dollars in real wealth. She

[1] **John C. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1948–1949,* p. 26.**

[2] **Howard K. Smith, *The State of Europe,* pp. 101–18.**

was hungry and humiliated, after the long German occupation, the latest of three within a century. Who is to say that she had no right to proceed as she did?

Yet Russia's, need was still more clamant. Her losses at German hands were almost beyond calculation. If ever a nation was entitled to restitution she was. In her German zone, moreover, there was surplus food and industrial plant. She removed the latter for a year until she learned that the shipment of plants did not pay. Then she took from current German production, as the French did, the great winter of 1945–6 having been succeeded by drought which made her need of German goods even more pressing.

Meanwhile, the British and Americans were operating deficit zones, at heavy expense to their own taxpayers. The British were worst off, because they had insisted on having the most populous, industrialized and damaged zone. After the winter crisis they could no longer stand the drain of dollars to buy American food to feed Germany, where people habitually fainted in the streets from hunger. The United States had to shoulder much of the British load in Germany and all the Anglo-Saxons were deeply irked that the surpluses in the other zones did not help to ease their loads, instead going to Francand Russia. They naturally pressed for relief.

Divergent Views Inevitable. No thought of dominating all Germany, and the world, is necessary to explain the activities of any power in Germany in ***f*** the first years. They were all driven by hard necessity, but by degrees both East and West acquired a firm conviction that the other side had "acted from malevolence throughout, with designs to capture Germany as a basis for y widejdominance."[3]

This belief was deepened by the policies which each side naturally pursued in governing its zone. The Russians made short work of the great estates of the Prussian Junkers, the historic nest of German militarism, and they pursued the nationalizing of industry vigorously. In the West the Americans would have none of that and they insisted on placing major power in the German states, thinking that federalism would help counter the rise of a new German danger. The result was to increase the power of the peasants and other conservatives, at the expense of the socialists. Positions hardened until eventually both sides became aware that they dared not let the other camp control all of Germany, for a revived Germany on either side would all too probably mean that that side could dominate the world. The weight of Germany in industry and manpower is so great that both sides had to strive to control it, and failing success, to divide it.

No appeal to Marxian doctrine, nor any conjuring of Russian dreams of world conquest was required to explain Russia's efforts to win Germany. A Tsarist government which had endured two vast German invasions in thirty years would have been just as determined to prevent the consolidation of a new Germany hostile to her. Vice versa, even a communist government in Washington would strive to prevent a German-Russian combination which could not be coped with on the Eurasian continent.

Bizonia. These considerations are basic to an understanding of the Berlin

[3] ***Ibid.***, p. 112.

blockade crisis of 1948–49. Baffled in their efforts to gain relief through the economic unification of Germany, the United States and Britain combined their zones economically on January 1, 1947, and sought to persuade the French to merge their zone also. However, the French, having been defeated on detaching the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany, fought a long delaying action in the hope of achieving real international control of the Ruhr. They feared that General Lucius Clay and other American officials would make the Ruhr the basis of European recovery and then leave its industries in the hands of those who had teamed up with Hitler, but our officials in Germany "remained hostile to the idea of a special regime for the Ruhr as likely to antagonize the Germans and to interfere with plans for economic recovery."[4]

A West German Government. It was accordingly not until June 1948 that the three Western powers and the Benelux nations agreed substantially at London on the formation of a West German government, the decision which precipitated a Russian effort to drive the West out of Berlin.

On the basis of logic the Soviet position was strong. If the West was formally splitting Germany into two parts, then it should abandon its position in Berlin, which was 125 miles deep in the Soviet zone. If partition was accepted, the West should not attempt to maintain an artificial outpost in Soviet Germany. The Soviets argued that the West could not have it both ways. They seemed, moreover, to have the means of expelling the West, since it had no legal rights of surface access to Berlin, though a document did exist giving the Allies three air corridors to Berlin, each twenty miles wide, not subject to Soviet regulation.[5]

On the other hand, the Allies had a clear legal right to be in Berlin, even if they had neglected to reserve means of access. They also valued highly the Berlin window looking into the Soviet East, which allowed favorable

[4] **John C. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 90.**

Walter Lippmann deplored the extent to which our German policy was being fashioned by our officials in Germany. General Clay was the prime mover, seconded by his advisers in Berlin and by his immediate superiors in the Pentagon, Draper and Royall. Secretary Byrnes had permitted Clay to become a pro-consul, like General MacArthur, with whom the State Department could negotiate occasionally, but to whom it could never give orders. This situation had continued under Secretary Marshall.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, July 26, 1948.

After Clay had denied these allegations, Sumner Welles strongly supported the charges. He declared it was "notorious that General Clay has occasionally taken independent action which has shaped policy" and he was still permitted by Washington to retain the initiative in the formulation of policy. This meant control of German policy by army officers and investment bankers who had no real knowledge of European history or of the social and economic forces and national psychologies with which they were dealing. Thus nothing was being done to prevent the rebirth of German nationalism. There had been "no land reforms and no elimination of the persisting concentrations of industrial power." France especially was repeatedly brushed aside and the decisions made in Germany "provoked the present crisis with Moscow."—*Herald Tribune*, August 10, 1948.

Drew Pearson also reported that President Truman was angry with Royall and Draper for their sabotage of White House policies, especially Draper's policy of rebuilding Germany at the expense of her neighbors.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, August 3, 1948.

[5] **See *U.S. News and World Report*, August, 27, 1948.**

standard of living comparisons to be made and offered numerous opportunities to get some information about conditions in Soviet land. Berlin would also be of value if there was to be a final struggle over a unified Germany. There was also a heavy obligation to the 2,000,000 Germans in the Western zones of Berlin who had defied communism under Allied tutelage. However, the really decisive question was prestige. At the beginning of the struggle the evacuation of Berlin might not have involved a grave loss of prestige, but after it got under way it was believed that evacuation would convince the West Germans, and all Europeans, that the Allies would also pull out of Germany, if put under heavy pressure.[6]

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE

Currency Dispute. The Four Power Allied Control Council for Germany conducted negotiations early in 1948 over the admitted need for a new currency in Germany, which would strike a heavy blow at inflation and give a real incentive for work. As usual, divergent plans got nowhere and at the fourth session, on March 20, the Soviet delegates withdrew, after their demand for a full report on the three power negotiations in London had been rejected.[7]

On March 30 General Clay announced a plan for currency reform in the bizonal area and the next day the Russians demanded special clearance and inspection of Western military trains passing through the Soviet-zone_to Berlin. When inspection was refused the U.S.S.R. stopped all railway and river traffic and tightened road blockades. Other driblets of allied military surface traffic were gradually severed, though British barge traffic was resumed on May 1. On May 20 the United States closed the borders of its zone to Soviet traffic, and when the new currency was introduced into the Western parts of Berlin on June 23, the Russians halted all traffic, including food trains for the civilian population. In reply the British zone closed its frontier and the Allies began the famous air lift to Berlin, on June 28, though few were confident that it could perform the miracle of supplying Western Berlin through the winter.

A three power protest of July 6, 1948, to Moscow elicited a full statement of the Soviet position, which seemed to look toward a new session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. A Russian offer to feed the whole population of Berlin was rejected. Allied officials in Berlin favored a show of force, such as an attempt to run an armored train through, and the State Department was reported to be sounding out the British and French on this line of attack.[8]

[6] Drew Pearson reported Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff, as favoring the evacuation of Berlin and Germany.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, September 11,1948.

[7] On March 17, President Truman addressed Congress, charging that "one nation" had prevented the establishment of a "just and honorable peace," ignored and violated agreements made, "persistently obstructed" the United Nations and "destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe." —*Current History*, May 1948, pp. 500–2.

[8] Dispatches from Berlin and Frankfurt, *New York Herald Tribune*, July 18, 19, 1948. A few days later the Soviet commander in Germany, Marshal Vassily D. Sokolovsky, alleged that Russia was blockading Berlin because in June the Americans had first required all Russians going to their zone to have a visa.—*Herald Tribune*, July 23, 1948.

Moscow Negotiations Abortive. The decision was for an attempt to negotiate in Moscow. At the close of a first meeting of the three Western Ambassadors with Stalin on August 2, he proposed the simultaneous introduction in Berlin of the Soviet currency and the removal of all transport restrictions.[9] This was agreed to, with the reservation that Soviet currency in Berlin be subject to some form of quadripartite control, but a series of fruitless draft meetings failed to agree on the conditions.

At a second meeting with Stalin, on August 23, he agreed orally, according to the American version, to direct the removal of the traffic restrictions and place the Soviet-German Bank of Emission under the control of the Four Power Financial Commission, as far as its Berlin operations were concerned.[10] A directive to the four military commanders in Berlin was then worked out, but when they met on August 31, difficulties and deadlock developed. Each side was soon accusing the other of failing to honor the directive agreed upon at Moscow, which "was not as precise as it might have been."[11]

Each side alleged that the other was acting in bad faith, the Soviets accusing the West of trying to disrupt the economy of its zone and "ultimately to force the U.S.S.R. to withdraw therefrom." The United States' reply charged the U.S.S.R. with intent fo "acquire complete control over the city of Berlin."[12]

United Nations Mediation. After these exchanges it was decided to take the question to the UN Security Council. Great Britain and France were reluctant to do so, since it was not practical to proceed under Chapter 6 of the Charter dealing with pacific settlement, under which all four of the disputants would be barred from voting. There was no question, either, of proposing sanctions against Russia under Chapter 7. For these reasons the British and French Governments were slow to invoke the UN, but they were persuaded by the United States that skilful handling would yield a great propaganda value. The strategy was to avoid all talk of sanctions and persuade one of the smaller powers on the Council to present a resolution calling upon the Russians to lift the blockade.

However, the six small-power members of the Council were so impressed with the explosiveness of the situation and in such fear that the action of the Council "might lead to the breakup of the United Nations and to war" that they refused to accept the proposed role and banded together in an attempt to find a solution that both sides would accept. After a month of behind the scenes negotiations they proposed a resolution of their own, on October 22nd,

[9] 'The Berlin Crisis," *Department of State Publication*, Number 3298, Washington, 1948, p. 20.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[11] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 147. On August 14 Madame Kasenkina, a Russian school teacher, jumped from an upstairs window of the Russian consulate in New York to avoid returning to Russia, bringing home to millions of Americans the rigors of life in a police state.

Two months earlier the Russian wife of a British soldier, Nina Makushina, had returned from London to Moscow, warning that life in England was a round of poverty and starvation.—A*lew York Herald Tribune*, June 16, 1948.

[12] "The Berlin Crisis," p. 59.

which was vetoed by Vishinsky because it did not call for simultaneous lifting of the blockade and the introduction of the Soviet currency into Berlin.

The result largely placed upon the Soviet Union the onus which the United States had anticipated, a success which was dimmed partially by the November 13 letter of President Herbert Evatt, of the General Assembly, and Secretary General Trygve Lie urging the four powers to begin conversations looking toward the breaking of the deadlock between them. This initiative was rebuffed and a committee of experts appointed by the President of the Council, Bramuglia of Argentina, worked fruitlessly for several months. The smaller powers were not able to mediate because, once again, neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. would make any important concession.[13]

The Blockade Ended. The Western air lift was steadily expanded until during the winter months it carried an average of 5,500 tons a day into Berlin, mostly coal. On one record day nearly 13,000 tons were delivered and in the Spring the daily average reached 8,000 tons, which was normal intake for the Western zones of Berlin.[14] The incessant roar of its motors across German skies, together with the efficiency with which the whole operation developed and the fact that it kept the Western sectors of Berlin going, grew into a striking psychological and political success for the West.

Early in 1949 there were repeated signs that the Soviet Government would like to call off the blockade. Perhaps as a preliminary Molotov was relieved of his post as Foreign Minister on March 4. He was succeeded by A. Y. Vishinsky and on March 15 a conversation between Philip C. Jessup of the United States and Yakov A. Malik of the U.S.S.R. at the United Nations led to an agreement that the blockade and counter blockade should simultaneously be lifted on May 12 and a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers held in Paris beginning May 23rd.

The Conference was abortive, as usual. The West did not even get any firm guarantees of access to Berlin. Nevertheless, the tension was very considerably lessened and the West had reason to believe that it had won a significant success in holding its own. Western opinion had been strongly solidified against Russia, a Gallup poll showing that 80 per cent of Americans favored staying in Berlin, even if it meant war.[15]

Trusteeship for the Ruhr. Meanwhile, the Western powers had reached an agreement on June 1, 1948, on the principle of an international regime for the Ruhr, that industrial prize in which the Russians had ardently hoped to share up to the Berlin blockade. No decision was reached on the key question of the ownership and management of the Ruhr industries which was to be discussed at a new conference in London on November 11 to work out the

[13] Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 454–63.

[14] General Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, pp. 381–6; London, Heinemann, 1950.

[15] The *Nashville Tennessean*, July 30, 1948. While bitterness reigned in Berlin there was surprising amity and concord between the senior American and Russian occupation officers in Vienna. Dispatches even spoke of "cordiality" and the number of incidents involving American and Russian soldiers decreased.—*Herald Tribune*, August 24, 1948.

statute for the new Ruhr authority. On the day before the conference opened General Clay announced a new law under which the ownership of the Ruhr industries was to be vested in trustees until their final disposition was decided.

This attempt to foreclose the decision of an extremely vital issue naturally produced a tremendous reaction in France. The entire French press assailed the law as an act to cut the ground from under the French position before the negotiations began. President Auriol denounced it as unforgivable, a violation of justice, and a promise of a new German aggression. After strong French diplomatic protests France was given assurance that final decision on the ownership issue would not be made until the peace settlement. Meanwhile, the way was kept open for the recovery of the Ruhr industries by their old German owners.[16]

THE TITO-STALIN RIFT

Danubian Conference. In another conference which opened in Belgrade on July 30, 1948, the United States and its allies were dealt with even more summarily than France had been in the matter of the Ruhr. The conference was held pursuant to a decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1946 to work out a new regime for the Danube. It began by excluding English as an official language and there was no negotiation at any time. The Soviet decision to confine membership of the new Danubian Commission to the riparian states, excluding the Western powers altogether, was forced through without a hitch. The Western delegates had only the satisfaction of demonstrating that they could sit through a conference in which they were outvoted as consistently, and more ruthlessly, than the Soviets were in the United Nations.[17]

Origins of the Rift. The West eyed the Belgrade Conference sharply to see if the ideological rift between Yugoslavia and Russia would extend to the diplomatic field. On June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Soviet dominated Cominform agency, beginning recriminations which at first left the West incredulous, especially since Yugoslavia continued faithfully to support Soviet leadership at the Belgrade Conference and elsewhere.

By degrees it became apparent that a complete breach had occurred between Russia and her strongest satellite and that the friction between them went back to the early days of the war. As loyal communists Tito and his small group of associates began at once to organize a resistance movement against the Germans, which grew steadily until it controlled Yugoslavia by the end of the war, possessing an army of 800,000 men and an organization which was easily transformed into a permanent government. This striking achievement was due to the fact that the communists threw themselves with

[16] The *New York Times*, November 11, 13, 1948. The Ruhr statute agreed upon in December was on its face a victory for the French thesis, though actually the French had gained little.

In his memoirs, General Clay makes it clear that the French had known about the terms of the proposed Law No. 75. He does not explain the relation between the date of its publication and the November conference.—Clay, *op. cit.*, pp. 327–39.

[17] Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–33.

single-minded devotion into organizing resistance and fighting the Germans. Their task was complicated, however, by the fact that the Serbian Government-in-Exile at London had been bom in a burst of patriotic resistance just prior to the German invasion of Yugoslavia in May 1941. This government was recognized by all of the Allies and until late in the war Moscow repeatedly refused to back Tito against it, urging Tito to soft pedal his communism. With her own existence so precariously at stake, Russia was not going to take any step which would jeopardize the war-time alliance. She naturally placed her own survival first.

This emphasis prevented the sending of any aid to Tito, despite repeated promises, and for a long time it prevented the unmasking of Mihailovich's Chetniks as collaborators with the Germans. Eventually, however, the British discovered the true situation and threw their support to Tito, with the result that he got some aid in arms and munitions from the West. Russian aid did not come until the very end of the war and then mainly in the form of troops which occupied Belgrade and left a very bad reputation behind them.[18] The Yugoslavs were aware also that Moscow had divided their country with Great Britain, in a spheres of influence agreement which never materialized, and they were deeply disappointed when Moscow disavowed Tito's impetuous occupation of Trieste. At that time Tito made a rebellious speech which brought a blunt threat of public disavowal by Moscow if there should be any repetition.[19] The war ended, accordingly, with the Yugoslav leaders proud of the tremendous military and political feats which they had accomplished, on their own, and resentful of the lack of support from the fountainhead of communism.

This frame of mind was not improved when it became apparent that in the post-war negotiations Russia was quite unwilling to give consistent support to Yugoslavia's claims at Trieste and on Austrian Carinthia. Yugoslavia was compelled to retreat from her threat not to sign the Italian treaty of peace.[20] Matters were not improved, either, when it became evident that the Russians were using the Yugoslav claims as a bargaining wedge for their own aims.

Exploitation. For the Yugoslavs the crowning disillusionment came in the discovery that Moscow had cast them in their age-old role as poverty stricken suppliers of raw materials. Yugoslavia is a country rich in minerals which had been exploited for ages, first by the Turks, then by the Austro-Hungarians, then by Western capitalists, and finally by the Germans, all of whom took away the mineral wealth of the country without making any compensating investments in it. The Tito Government was determined to end this exploitation by an ambitious program of industrialization, which it had every right to expect would be heartily approved in Moscow. Yet the Moscow planners were quite cold to Yugoslav ambitions. They wished to integrate the entire economy of Eastern Europe and could see no reason why new industries should be established in Yugoslavia, when those of Czechoslovakia and

[18] See Mosha Piyade, *About the Legend that the Yugoslav Uprising Owed Its Existence to Soviet Assistance*, London, Yugoslav Embassy publication, 1950.

[19] Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Tito and Stalin," *The Atlantic*, October 1949, p. 33.

[20] Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 147.

Poland, not to mention Russian industries, were waiting to receive the raw materials of Yugoslavia.

When, therefore, the Yugoslavs proceeded to implement their ambitious five-year plan, announced in 1947, they were dismayed to discover that they got consumer goods of bad quality from Russia when they expected machinery, at retail prices far above those prevailing in Western Europe, where they were not allowed to buy.[21]

The Yugoslavs discovered also that they were subjected to outright exploitation at the hands of the Soviet Union. They permitted the formation of only two joint companies with the Russians, and in both cases discovered that they had furnished nearly all of the capital and paid the great bulk of the expenses. Russian managers and experts also required salaries several times larger than their Yugoslav counterparts, together with luxurious subsistence.[22]

Greater Yugoslavia? On their side, the Russians found the proud Yugoslavs much too ambitious. They proceeded to organize joint Yugoslav-Albanian concerns and to make Albania a satellite, a fit candidate for incorporation into Yugoslavia as another federal republic. Bulgaria was also cast in this role by the Yugoslav planners. The Bulgarians held out for equal status in a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation and the resulting impasse compelled Moscow to arbitrate in January 1945 and to put this premature project on ice until the war was ended. It was not until January 29, 1948, that the Soviet Union definitely turned thumbs down on the Balkan federation idea and urged Eastern Europe to think of "independence" instead. The original Balkan federation idea which had been blessed in Moscow had now become a threat to Russian interests there.[23]

Excommunication. In the Spring of 1948 the accelerated tempo of the Cold War made it seem urgent to Moscow that the satellites be more closely coordinated, especially the wayward Yugoslavia, though all of the governments of the Peoples Democracies had been developing loyalties to their own lands and peoples. The way for a showdown was prepared by a Yugoslav order forbidding the lower echelons of the civil service from giving information to foreigners and by the withdrawal of all Soviet advisers and experts on March 18.

In the animated correspondence which followed, the Yugoslavs were conciliatory but firm in maintaining that "no matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the U.S.S.R., he can, in no case, love his own country less," and when Yugoslavia was hailed before the Cominform she

[21] Cited in "Tito Marches On," *The Economist*, April 16, 1949. p. 700; Milentije Popovic, *On Economic Relations Among Socialist States*, London, Yugoslav Embassy publication, 1950, p. 48.

[22] *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*: *Text of the Published Correspondence*, London, 1948, p. 20; M. S. Handler, the *New York Times*, April 24, 1949, September 3, 1949.

[23] Joseph G. Harrison, the *Christian Science Monitor*, August 14, 1948; Adam B. Ulam, "The Background of the Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute," the *Review of Politics*, January 1951, pp. 55–9, 62.

refused to go. Her leaders were accordingly expelled by a Cominform resolution published June 28, 1948.[24]

Its terms indicated clearly that the Kremlin expected the rank and file of the Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) to rise and overthrow the offending leaders, but nothing of the sort happened. Two Soviet stooges in the cabinet were put out, a disgruntled general was shot while escaping over the border, and that was all. Moscow had grossly overestimated its prestige.

Its charge that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had lost its identity in the Yugoslav Popular Front was true to the extent that the members of the Front had all fought together and developed a brotherhood not dependent on Marxist theories, of which the great majority were quite ignorant. They had been too busy fighting and organizing to study Marx and Lenin. They were all revolutionists against the old sterile order in their country, and they were communists, but in their own way.

Another Soviet charge also had foundation, that the CPY had based itself on the peasants, instead of the industrial workers. This again was the result of the war of liberation and of the 12 to 1 ratio of peasants to workers, just as it was in China.

The Yugoslav leaders were visibly stunned by their outlawry, but they did not yield. They carefully kept the dispute on an ideological basis, gradually taking the position that they were the true practitioners of Marxism-Leninism. The Soviet leaders were the apostates. Two months passed before any hostile word was levelled at the Soviet Government, and for a longer period Belgrade supported all Soviet moves internationally—until all the Cominform states began to cut drastically their shipments of oil, coal, and all other necessities, by degrees forcing Yugoslavia to look to the West for the means of survival. These were granted slowly, as the hostility of the Soviet bloc to Yugoslavia mounted in intensity and it was evident that the breach was firm—and as the fact was appreciated that Tito had the largest and toughest army in Europe, outside the Soviet Union.

Effects on the Cold War. It became increasingly apparent that the Tito-Stalin break was an event of great importance. It was unpalatable to Western capitalists that Yugoslavia was still ardently communist, but their national communism was no threat to the West. The threat lay in the ability of Moscow to control and direct a vast empire of communist states. If this could not be done, then the threat of world communist domination would diminish rapidly.

There was ample evidence, also, that the nationalist virus was present in all the East European satellites. In Poland the Party Secretary, Wladyslaw Gomulka, had to be deposed and everywhere else purges were carried out in all ranks. The Kremlin recognized belatedly that the spread of "Titoism" could be fatal to its control of the entire region.

The parallel with China was also deeply disturbing to Moscow. There too, and on a much vaster scale, communism had triumphed, with no aid from Moscow until very late in the evening. There, also, an able leader, and a host of his lieutenants had come up by their own efforts and won a mighty victory.

[24] *New York Herald Tribune*, June 29, 1948.

Again there was pride, independence, and a peasant basis beneath the Party. Great must have been the relief of the Soviet leaders when the Korean war relieved them of all danger of a Titoist defection of China, for the time being.

It was soon evident that Moscow's effort to regiment Yugoslavia was a colossal blunder. The Yugoslavs had both the spirit and the strength to resist, as well as the necessary protection of distance. A little willingness to meet them as equals, and to cooperate, would have gone a long way to make the dream of a communist world solid. The opposite tactics rent the mantle of communism and provided an example which would make it increasingly difficult to prevent other nationalist "deviations" in the communist world. Therefore nationalism, which became such a holy virtue when the Soviet Union was at the brink of destruction during the war now became the great Red sin. Only communist "internationalism," i.e. submitting to direction from Moscow, was laudable in their eyes.

For the West the Tito schism changed the outlook greatly. We could not undo the wide and deep social revolution which came out of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, any more than we could reverse the same result of the war in China. But we could encourage both nations, and others, to stand on their own feet and trust to time and evolution to move them nearer to practices more acceptable to the West.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

While the Soviet orbit was tom by schism, shaken by purges, and knitted together by a tight skein of bilateral treaties of trade and alliance, the United States strove to weld the nations of the North Atlantic area into a defensive alliance.

When American policy makers pondered the rapid coordination of the Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe, with the significant exception of Yugoslavia, they could not resist the conclusion that they should achieve a similar organisation of Western Europe. This decision was constantly reinforced by the knowledge that the Red Army could sweep quickly to the English Channel at any time it was ordered to do so. Yet the difficulties involved in organizing Western Europe into a powerful defense zone for the United States seemed almost insuperable. No military power worth mentioning existed anywhere on , the continent, and no one could put his finger upon any West European country . in which a powerful army could be expected to arise. Influenced by the afterglow of German military might, West Germany was most often selected as the source of an antidote to the Red Army—a very doubtful expedient lest the two unite to dominate Europe. Perhaps powerful West German forces could be integrated into a great West European army, but there was no West Europe, only an aggregation of helpless states, most of them so debilitated by world wars and occupations that they could not contemplate another similar ordeal.

Still, there were two hundred and seventy-five millions of skilled people in West Europe, and large resources, though inadequate to sustain such populations. The remedy in American minds was for all of these people to get together in one great federal union, on the American model, and become so

strong that the Soviet Union would never dare invade. They should integrate and remove from our minds the nightmare of a communist Eurasia.

Western Union. It was recognized that the age-old welter of national loyalties, traditions and prejudices could not yield easily to this heroic treatment. Therefore the State Department encouraged the countries on the English Channel to make a beginning by signing a defensive alliance among themselves. On March 17, 1948, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed a fifty year treaty of alliance and on the same day President Truman in a message to Congress expressed confidence that the United States would "extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires." Blaming Russia for violating post-war agreements and directly accusing the Soviets of "designs to subjugate the free community of Europe," the President urged the speedy passage of ERP, universal military training and a new selective service law. In the next few days Secretary Marshall found the situation quite similar to the years before 1939 and the President declared that slavery was worse than war.[25]

The Vandenberg Resolution. "Being impotent militarily, the new Western Union was an invitation to trouble rather than an insurance against it, unless the power of the United States was clearly behind it. Members of the new alliance were quick to point this out, but Senator Vandenberg was reluctant to propose a military alliance to the Republican 80th Congress. It was therefore decided that he should sponsor a resolution encouraging "the progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements" for defense and promising to promote the "association of the United States" with such "collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security."[26]

The Vandenberg resolution was passed in the Senate in June 1948 by a vote of 64 to 4 and after many months of confidential discussion the five Western Union states agreed on October 26, 1948, to press for the conclusion of a wider North Atlantic alliance.[27]

Atlantic Alliance. The text of the proposed treaty was signed at Washington on April 4,1949 by twelve North Atlantic nations: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The treaty provided that "an armed attack against one or more of (the parties) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all," and treated accordingly. The treaty was integrated into the United Nations machinery as carefully as possible. To us it was "armor but not a lance; a shield but not a sword." It was greeted by Russians a "weapon of an. aggressive Anglo-American bloc in Europe ... aimed at the establishment of Anglo-American world domination,"[28]

The Soviet Government sent a memorandum to each of the treaty nations

[25] The ***New York Times,*** **March 18, 20, 21, 30, 1948.**

[26] **Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–12.** [27] ***New York Herald Tribune,*** **October 27, 28, 1948.**

[28] ***Department of State Bulletin,*** **March 27, 1949, p. 484; *Soviet Press Translations,* July 1, 1949, p. 401.**

charging that the treaty had an obviously aggressive character, that it was aimed at the U.S.S.R., that it ran counter to the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter, the Anglo-Soviet alliance treaty of 1942, the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. Gromyko added that "the United States and Great Britain are building up a series of military bases and staffs which can only be justified on the basis of aggression."[29]

There is no reason whatever to doubt the sincerity of Premier Paul Henri Spaak of Belgium when he said: "The new pact is purely defensive; it is directed against no one." It is equally certain that throughout history "defensive" alliances have always seemed highly offensive to those at whom they were directed. Nor does the possession of temporary armed superiority make the object of a defensive alliance feel safe and secure, since the growing strength of the new alliance may upset the balance and lead it to assume the offensive. The cycle of developments in all past arms races also offered little assurance that a balance of armed strength satisfactory to both sides would ever be achieved. Likewise the thesis that the Atlantic Pact would strengthen the UN was equally doubtful. Though it was a multilateral treaty, its purpose was the Creation of a balance of power.

The treaty was ratified in the Senate on July 21 by a majority of 82 to 13. On July 25 President Truman sent to Congress the first instalment of the vast arms aid program designed to make Soviet aggression in Western Europe too expensive. The bill requested only $1,450,000,000 for the current fiscal year and the amount applied to the North Atlantic countries was eventually cut to $1,000,000,000 before the bill passed the Senate on September 22. The next day the President announced that an atomic explosion had occurred in the U.S.S.R. and the final form of the arms aid bill was speedily agreed upon.

Was the Threat Military? In the early part of 1948 James P. Warburg visited Europe and toured much of the United States. In his own country he found the people much less afraid than their government which was "deliberately promoting anxiety among the people in order to obtain a mandate for its fear-inspired policies." In Europe he found the people not as frightened of the Soviet Union as most Americans. They were "more aware than we of Russia's weaknesses and needs and less fearful of her power." They were also interested in the North Atlantic Alliance solely as a means of preventing war and not because they thought it would be "of the slightest help to them if war should break out." They also had little thought of thoroughly rearming themselves.[30]

Warburg himself believed that the great American program for arming West Europe was unsound for three reasons: (1) "because no amount of feasible rearmament by Western Europe could stop the Red Army from

[29] *U.S. News and World Report*, April 22, 1949, p. 25; *United Nations Bulletin*, May 1, 1949, p. 410.

[30] James P. Warburg, *Last Call for Common Sense*, pp. 39, 106, 108. Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam of the Methodist Church returned from Europe convinced that the creation of hysteria by press and radio was making the task of statesmen doubly difficult.—*New York Herald Tribune*, September 22, 1948.

marching to the Atlantic seaboard;" (2) because rearmament would place an intolerable burden upon already overstrained economies; and (3) because it would be likely to provoke the very attack against which it was intended to insure, especially if West Germany were included. He feared that "we might be committed beyond the 'point of no return' in a military adventure of rearming Western Europe."[31]

When the Atlantic Pact was published Warburg sent two detailed and cogent memoranda to a hundred members of Congress in which he stated his conviction that the primary threat to West Europe was political rather than military; that the attempt to rearm Western Europe would require a mobilization of man power sufficient to disrupt economic recovery and that we must guard against the Cold War ceasing to be a method of seeking a peace settlement and becoming instead "merely the preparation for an atomic war tacitly assumed to be inevitable." His analysis of the prospects of countering the strength of the Red Army did not indicate much chance of success.[32]

Was Military Defense Feasible or Required? In the autumn of 1950, shortly before his untimely death, the brilliant military critic, Max Werner, wrote a series of articles registering his disbelief in the practicability of defending West Europe against a Soviet attack. Taking up the possibility of another great German army arising, he doubted that any good German general would undertake building a force to combat the Soviets. Such a force would be encircled by near-by Soviet power from the start. German military planners knew that the Soviet Union was stronger now than the combined military power of Russia and Germany in 1939. They knew that 200 German divisions were unable to defend Germany in the last war. They remembered that in one battle, at Kursk, in July 1943, "17 German armored and three motorized divisions plus 18 crack infantry divisions were smashed within three weeks," and that this elite army, saturated with tanks, could fight only because it was supported by 160 other German divisions along the entire front. How then could the Germans believe that forty or fifty or sixty Atlantic divisions could defend Germany? They would be unable to believe in their defense, unless from 100 to 150 American divisions were fully deployed on the European continent before the battle started.

Werner discounted also the mystical idea that Western Europe would become fairly strong by 1952. Hitler had used six years in furious armament, building on fifteen years of meticulous training of the Reichswehr, and any real build-up of military power must include, besides weapons, "skill, experience, education, training, military culture," all things in which the Russians were well supplied.

What practical basis was there for the rearmament plans? Our calculations assumed that the Soviet Army would stand still, whereas an armament race is a two-way affair. The estimated Soviet weapon reserves of 40,000 tanks,

[31] ***Ibid.*, pp. 99, 109.**

[32] ***Ibid.*, pp. 207–27. As a substitute for the Pact he proposed a tri-partite treaty between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union which would guarantee all the nations of Europe between the sea and the Soviet frontier against aggression and apply to them the principle of allocating coal and steel throughout the whole area.**

20,000 planes and 50,000 guns, would be supported by many new quality weapons.

With these facts in mind Werner noted that Western diplomats were tortured by the question, "Why don't the Russians attack now?" Soviet military power in 1950 was "immeasurably superior to that of Hitler in 1939," but the absolute military weakness of Western Europe had not provoked Soviet aggression. Instead of launching her armies Russia was making tremendous investments in long range projects, huge factories, big dams, irrigation, reforestation and the rebuilding of cities—all of it pure waste if the Soviets believed war inevitable in the near future. This decade was "decisive for Soviet industrialization." It was highly unlikely that Soviet leaders would willingly imperil it by invoking the devastations of war, of which they had recent first hand knowledge. Moreover, Soviet military doctrine rejected the blitz idea. It was based on protracted effort in a long war, the kind of war which defeated Napoleon and Hitler. Yet aggression could not "start without belief in a blitz, since it makes no sense to attack in order to wage a long, expensive and dangerous war."[33]

The assembly of these simple facts, mostly accessible to everyone, seemed to constitute a military analysis as conclusive as one could be. We could rearm Western Europe to the point where its several governments could suppress any communist revolution. That would be a very great insurance, and not too expensive. Beyond that we might conceivably hope to amass in Europe enough military power to make the Red Army think twice before advancing, but this amount of military power would probably be back-breaking to be really deterrent. Unless Europe could be pounded into one great sovereignty, and merged economically with North America, the Red Army could overrun Western Europe whenever it was determined to do so.

Some Europeans might feel more secure if they saw a moderate amount of arms in their midst, but the main defense had to be political, including social reform.

Social Progress Indispensable. These conclusions seemed to be buttressed by the events between 1948 and 1951. On April 18, 1948 an election was held in Italy which was quite openly a contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. A tide of American goods flowed into Italy gratis, with speeches at the docks by the American Ambassador. U.S. Naval vessels made good will visits and twenty-nine merchant ships were presented to Italy. The West proposed to return Trieste to Italy and compelled the Soviet Union to veto her entry into the United Nations. American motion picture appeals, radio broadcasts, bulletins and private letters flooded the land. The result was a victory for the Christian Democrats, the Communists and their allies winning only 30–7 per cent of the votes.

In June 1951 local elections were held in Italy and the vote for the Communists and their left wing allies ***increased*** from 31 to 37 per cent. Italian labor had been under heavy attack. Few of the great landed estates

[33] The New York *Daily Compass,* September 17, 28, October 1 , 1 5 and 22, 1950.

had been broken up. Nothing had been done about the suffocating overproduction of people in Italy. Some 41,000 large landowners still held a third of all the usable land.[34] A rising percentage of Italians had no hope short of a communist revolution.

In the summer of 1951 parliamentary elections were held in France. As in Italy, the election law was rigged against the communists. The other parties could combine their votes in any given election district and if they won a majority, take all the seats, except in communist Paris where proportional representation was preserved to protect the democratic minorities. The two-sided election law reduced the number of communist deputies very sharply, from 183 to 101, but the Red popular vote fell only 2–2 per cent, still standing at 26 per cent. French workmen still had to pay a highly disproportionate share of the national tax burden, out of controlled wages. They saw no hope of a better future in the democratic process.[35]

Must Europe Unite? Were we thrown back then upon the integration of Western Europe, to provide both a viable social system and military power? This seemed to be the feeling of General Eisenhower six months after he assumed command of the NATO forces in Europe. In a speech to the English Speaking Union in London, on July 3, 1951, he spoke with a fervor as pronounced as the coolness of his distinguished audience to his message. He was sure that progress was being made, that "the despairing counsel of neutralism appeasement" had been exorcised, and that machines and weapons were coming in a steady stream, but he was almost vehement in his attack upon the "web of customs barriers interlaced with bilateral agreements, multilateral cartels, local shortages, and economic monstrosities. How tragic!" The "patchwork territorial fences ... pyramid every cost with middlemen, tariffs, taxes and overheads. Barred, absolutely, are the efficient division of labor and resources and the easy flow of trade. In the political field, these barriers promote distrust and suspicion. They serve vested interests at the expense of peoples and prevent truly concerted action for Europe's own and obvious good."

This state of affairs appeared to add up to something like hopeless frustration, and Eisenhower was not willing to wait for a long process to soften the age old barriers by degrees. They could not "be attacked successfully by slow infiltration, but only by direct and decisive assault, with all available weapons."[36]

Were Our A-Bombers Enough? As an alternative to the gigantic task of pushing West Europe, including a very reluctant Britain, into federal union, the air power school proposed to leave everything to giant bombers based on North America, and perhaps Britain. This school argued that air bases around the perimeter of the Soviet orbit would soon be taken by the Red Army. Therefore, the only real antidote to Soviet aggression was air power based so securely that it could strike at the industrial heart of Russia.[37]

[34] Frank Gervasi, the *Nashville Tennessean*, December 4, 1949.

[35] *Foreign Policy Bulletin,* July 6, 1951.

[36] The *New York Times,* July 4, 1951; Anne O'Hare McCormick, July 7, 1951.

[37] See Alexander P. de Seversky, *AirPo wer Key to Survival,* New York, 1950; and Marshall Andrews, *Disaster Through Air Power,* New York, 1950.

If successful, this would avoid all the troubles of integrating Europe, including rearming Germany. Aggression could be deterred by the fear of ruin in Russia, and if it occurred it could be defeated by the devastation of the Soviet Union.

This solution was simple, to anyone who could reconcile himself easily to the death of some 30,000,000 Russians and the beggary of the rest, until it was remembered that the Red armies could still fan out over West Europe, capturing its industrial resources, along with the oil-rich Middle East. In that event Russia would equalize with us both its industrial and oil potential, and she might be able to utilize these assets enough to fight a long war, and to compel us to attempt gigantic land operations in Eurasia—without being able to count on Britain as a staging area or aircraft carrier.

Conclusions. These considerations suggested that the defense of Western Europe would require every kind of armed force, in carefully balanced proportions, along with the integration of West Europe, and its armament up to an exceedingly delicate point, one which would not make the social antagonisms of the area irreconcilable.

In 1951 the Soviet Union was pushing an intensive armament program in East Europe, under the stimulus of increasing tension in the East-West Conflict, especially the Korean war and the American arms program in West Europe. In the interval between 1948 and 1951 some sixty divisions were trained and armed in East Europe. Enough had been accomplished to give ample grounds for another big whirl of the arms race spiral in the West.

Western Europe is a legitimate security zone for the United States. That was the bed-rock consideration, but fire power was not the main weapon for its defense. Much more important was the vigorous promotion of social progress, together with the defense of individual freedom in the whole North Atlantic area against attack from the Right, as well as from the Left.

The alleviation of the mutual fears which drove East and West toward a common destruction was also a much more feasible undertaking than the salvage of a world wrecked and barbarized by the time-tested culmination of a spiralling arms race.

CHAPTER XIX

AFTER THE SOVIET A-BOMB

SEPTEMBER 1949–JUNE 1950

No Sharing With Britain. On July 14, 1949, there was a very secret meeting of key members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy with the President at Blair House, to discuss the desire of Britain and Canada for a larger share in the atomic energy program. Since they had aided very notably in the original Oak Ridge project, and since they supplied most of the uranium essential for its continuance, they felt that the tight American monopoly of the atom should be loosened for their benefit.

Soon afterward, members of the Joint Committee began to make public statements attacking any proposal to share atomic bomb secrets. Senator Knowland threatened "intense" opposition if any information was given to the British without Congressional approval. Legislators who believed themselves to be clutching the atomic secrets had no intention of letting them get away.

On July 19 a second meeting was held behind closed doors, "and with window-blinds drawn, in an isolated room just under the edge of the Capitol's great dome." The Joint Committee was meeting with top level executive officials, behind a special guard of Capitol policemen. The official reporter was excluded, and the porter with ice water was not allowed to come in. The result of the meeting was not made known until July 26, when Secretary Acheson assured Congress in effect that there would be no exchange of atomic weapon information with our Allies without the full knowledge and approval of Congress. Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper was "greatly relieved" and Senator Knowland appeared satisfied.[1]

Two months later, on September 21, the Alsops outlined the plan of the strategic planners of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the defense of Western Europe. A minority held that barring a rearmed Germany the defense of Europe was impossible, but a majority believed that, without Germany, 45 to 50 divisions could be created in West Europe by 1954, through an expenditure of 8 to 12 billion dollars, plus a major effort to rearm by the European countries. The date mentioned was important, because 1954 was the year "when Soviet stockpiling of the Beria bomb may be expected to begin."[2]

[1] See the *New York Times*, July 28, for the official statement issued by Chairman McMahon. See also the *Times*, July 21, 1949.

Marquis Childs wrote that General Eisenhower, who favored a real sharing with the British, backed down before Hickenlooper's insistence that the public would never stand for it. Finally, the President, who also favored a full partnership with the British, also gave in.—The *Nashville Tennessean*, December 18, 1949.

[2] Joseph and Stewart Alsop, *New York Herald Tribune*, September 21, 1949. The President's Committee on Universal Military Training, headed by Dr. Karl T. Compton, had estimated in 1947 that our atomic monopoly would end in 1951.—Peter Kihss, *Herald Tribune*, September 24, 1949.

Russia Has the Bomb. Two days later, on September 23, 1949, President Truman issued his epochal announcement that the Russians had achieved an atomic explosion.[3] His announcement stated that nearly four years ago he had pointed out that "scientific opinion appears to be practically unanimous that the essential theoretical knowledge upon which the discovery is based is already widely known. There is also substantial agreement that foreign research can come abreast of our present theoretical knowledge in time."

The President did not add that the scientists had almost unanimously warned that our monopoly would be very short lived. Thus in December 1945 Harrison Brown had written that "three years can be considered a reasonable period for other nations to produce their first atomic bombs," and he warned that this would probably be an upper limit.[4]

The atomic scientists had prepared three separate statements during August and September 1945, without collaboration. The University of Chicago Atomic Scientists said: "Those who advocate that the secret of the atomic bomb be kept, mislead our own people rather than other countries. ***There are no longer any fundamental secrets about the atomic bomb***." Declaring that "the remaining 'secrets' are scientific and engineering details," they predicted flatly that "even those nations with lesser resources than those of the United States will be able to produce atomic bombs within two to five years."

The Atomic Scientists at Los Alamos said firmly: "Being sure of ultimate success other countries will certainly be able to develop the weapon within a few years, even if our detailed technical information is not available to them." The Atomic Scientists at Oak Ridge said, with equal finality: "No individual, group, or nation can keep new scientific discoveries secret. . . . The only remaining 'secrets' are technical and engineering details of processes, plants, and devices." So it was "a practical certainty that ***our efforts can and will be duplicated in other countries within a few years***."[5]

Thus the vast majority of our nuclear scientists warned, in three independent statements, that there were no important secrets left and that the Soviet Union would soon have the A-bomb. However, the politicians and military men refused to believe that the Russians could do it so soon. They were sure that the Soviets did not have the engineering and industrial capacity. So they gave themselves until 1954, or at least 1952, to get Western Europe in a state of defense and when the scientists were proved right, the reaction of the politicians was equally unrealistic.

The Vice-President had an especially hard time getting order in the Senate on the morning of the 23rd until the loud voice of Senator McMahon got through with the words "atomic explosion ... in the U.S.S.R." When these words were heard, Majority leader Scott W. Lucas, of Illinois declared that

[3] A plane operating in the Long Range Detection System had picked up a sample of radio-active air on September 3, and a radio-active cloud was tracked from the North Pacific to the British Isles. The Russian explosion was believed to have been between August 26 and 29, 1949.—Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 306.

[4] Harrison Brown, *Must Destruction Be Our Destiny?* New York, Simon & Schuster, 1946, p. 25.

***Ubid.*, pp. 120–1, 126–7, 130–1.**

"the future of our civilization may hinge" on successful United Nations control of atomic energy and Senator John Foster Dulles, of New York, asserted that "the Baruch plan for United Nations control is more imperative than ever." Neither sought to explain what possible motive the Soviets could have for giving up their freedom to develop both the military and peaceful uses of atomic energy, after success had crowned their efforts to master it.[6]

The non-existent atomic secrets had evaporated, but not before they had contributed heavily to an ever spreading mania about internal security.

The Secrecy Myth Re-created. However, those who had believed in the myth of the secrets soon had an alibi which renewed their faith. In early 1950 Klaus Fuchs, an Austrian-born scientist in the British team which had contributed heavily to the making of the A-bomb, was convicted of espionage in Britain. He had shipped to Russia the most sensitive information about atomic activities and processes, both in the United States and Britain. In September 1950 Bruno Pontecorvo, a nationalized British citizen of Italian birth, disappeared behind the iron curtain with a great deal of information gained in Canada and Britain. In June 1950 David Greenglass, an American-born mechanic, was arrested. He had been in a position to supply Soviet agents with mechanical details of bomb gadgetry through Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were convicted on March 29, 1951, and sentenced to death.[7]

These convictions, together with that of Allan May, British scientist, earlier, in 1946, convinced the believers in secrecy, that they had been right after all, and the public shared their conclusion that the Russians never would have been able to make an A-bomb if the spies had not given them "our" secrets. From this it followed that our military position has been gravely weakened by the spies and that death sentences for them were fully deserved.

Actually the probability was that the spies had speeded up the Soviet A-bomb by only a few months, if at all. It had taken us only a year to perfect the mechanism for detonating the bomb, research which was to a large extent in the field of internal ballistics, "in which Russia has had a more extensive experience than the United States."[8] Such competence, plus the Smyth Report, the knowledge that an A-bomb had been made and a driving determination to succeed—these factors were quite enough to create the Soviet A-bomb in short order. Nevertheless, the long campaign of the scientists to convince us that "scientific knowledge is universal"[9] was undone by the spy trials. The passion for 100 per cent security and secrecy spread to more and more government departments. At great cost the FBI was obliged to investigate minutely "everybody from day labor to director of a nationally known industrial concern," instead of concentrating on a few key and sensitive spots, where secrecy might really be promoted. Thus we moved steadily in the direction of "converting America into a Soviet-style police state with

[6] *New York Herald Tribune,* September 24, 1953.

[7] "Soviet Atomic Espionage," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* May, 1951, pp. 143–5.

[8] Eugene Rabinowitch, "Atomic Spy Trials; Heretical After-thoughts," *B.A.S.*, May» 1951, pp. 139–42.

[9] Dr. John R. Dunning, Columbia University physicist, *New York Herald Tribune,* September 24, 1949.

restriction on everybody's freedom of employment, movement and communication."[10]

The rapidity with which we were moving toward the police state, under the guise of defending ourselves against the Soviet police state, was illustrated by the order issued by the Department of Commerce on March 2, 1951, forbidding the mailing of all technical publications to all countries of the Soviet bloc. Under this order ***The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists***, a periodical devoted to the political, social and military implications of scientific discoveries, was classified as "technical" and denied permission to mail to the iron curtain countries.

The ***B.A.S.*** protested, however, "against the superficial plausibility and fundamental foolishness of the whole business." Such an order protected the Department of Commerce against attacks by security zealots, in and out of Congress, but could not deprive the Soviet scientists and engineers of one iota of information. Yet futility is not the worst aspect of such regulations. They call for investigation and prosecution of breaches of imaginary security barriers and unnecessarily restrict the freedoms they set out to protect. They are self defeating, also, since they plug up the thin flow of Western ideas and ideals to the peoples living under Communist dictatorship.[11]

A Sober Attitude in Russia. The Soviet news agency ***Tass*** issued a statement on September 25, 1949, recalling that Molotov had claimed possession of the secret of the atomic bomb on November 6,1947, and asserting that it was now being used in large scale blasting work. The Soviet press was filled with quotations from the West to develop three themes: that the need for some sort of agreement between the Soviets and the United States was more urgent than ever; that the end of the American atomic monopoly was a "blow against warmongers and strengthens the cause of peace"; and that Soviet production of atomic energy was proof of the "strength of the Socialist system of society." Harrison Salisbury reported that the general atmosphere of comment published by the Soviet press was "sober and serious and fully recognized the great tasks which lie ahead."[12]

American Demands for a Fresh Look at Control. In the United States the General Advisory Committee, composed of leading scientists, was for a fresh look at the problem of international control. The committee proposed that atomic weapons be outlawed, that modified provisions for international inspection be accepted, and a measure of disarmament agreed upon which would protect West Europe against any sudden aggression. Chester I. Barnard, President of the Rockefeller Foundation and one of the authors of the original Acheson-Lilienthal plan, also went on record in favor of changes in American tactics and attitude. He held that the issue of stages was no longer

[10] Rabinowitch, *supra,* p. 141. When the Fuchs spy case irritated us against the British, after the earlier spy revelation had irritated us against Canada, Thomas L. Stokes wrote that by thus "nervously watching the rat holes" we could eventually isolate ourselves.—The *Nashville Tennessean,* February 8, 1950.

[11] "We Can't Play That Game," *B.A.S.*, June, 1951, pp. 162–3.

[12] The *New York Times,* October 2; *Herald Tribune,* October 13, 1949.

so important, and that too much had been made of the veto question, especially in the beginning. The entire veto problem had "no cogent relation ... with the central question at issue." This view was shared also by Walter Lippmann, who urged that in taking a fresh look we should not, as in 1946, overestimate our bargaining power and thus ask for so much that we got nothing at all. Then we had exaggerated the length of our monopoly. Now we should not over estimate the greater size of our stockpile.[13]

These sensible approaches to a compromise with the Russians made no headway. Vishinsky's renewed offer to accept periodic inspection of Russian atomic plants was rejected, because it would not involve constant and universal search in Russia for clandestine atomic works. We still insisted on perfect security or none. Besides, observed the Alsops, "Two-party talks between this country and Russia have long been an objective of Kremlin policy, and their avoidance has long been one of our objectives."[14]

In January, a hint of willingness to negotiate for atomic control, on a fresh basis, was received from Moscow, but to all the compromise proposals the Pentagon made "bitter objections that no such plan could ever afford 'full security' to the United States," and "from Congress have come howls of dissent."[15]

Currently, David E. Lilienthal resigned as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, essentially because he had no inclination to continue as "a manufacturer of weapons of hideous destruction."[16] Lilienthal had also been subject to charges by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, of Colorado, that he was conspiring to turn this country's atomic secrets over to England.

THE H-BOMB

The H-bomb Secret Published. Then on November 1, 1949, Johnson announced on a television show that "our scientists already have created a bomb that has six times the effectiveness (of the war time bomb) and they're not satisfied at all: they want one that has a thousand times the effect." This statement spurred the ***Washington Post*** and the Alsops to dig out the fact that we were considering trying to make a hydrogen bomb which would be infinitely more destructive than the A-bomb. One of the chief watch-dogs of secrecy had published the biggest secret of the current crop.[17]

The H-bomb Ordered. President Truman did not give the order to proceed with the H-bomb until February 1, 1950, but the outcome was never in

[13] *New York Herald Tribune*, October 4, 31, December 2, 1949.
[14] *Ibid.*, December 12, 1949. [15] The Alsops, *Herald Tribune*, January 27, 1950.
[16] Marquis Childs, the *Nashville Tennessean*, December 12, 1949.
[17] *The Spectator*, February 10, 1950, p. 172.

At about the same time Curtis Mitchell, former deputy director of information at the Pentagon published the information that the U.S. stockpiles of A-bombs were located in caves in the Southwest.—Drew Pearson, the *Nashville Tennessean*, December 27, 1949.

The publication of the most critical kind of military secrets then subsided until July 10, 1951, when Representative Dewey Short, of Missouri, extorted from Brigadier General William C. Sweeney the information that we had only 87 "B 36" planes capable of delivering the A-bomb to Russia. This information promptly leaked to the press from the Armed Services Committee.—The *New York Times*, July 12, 1951.

doubt. The majority of the Atomic Energy Commission, and of the scientists opposed the decision to go ahead, but the majority of military men and congressmen wanted to proceed.[18] It was argued that if Russia got the H-bomb first, and was able to kill 1,000,000 people in a 100 square mile area, she could dominate the world merely by givingan ultimatum. On the other hand, the ***Herald Tribune*** cautioned editorially, on February 1, that "we must be wary of the idea that a super-weapon can give us a super-power in the world or relieve us of the hard obligations of intelligent policy and diplomacy, of consistency, integrity and foresight on the basic plane of human relationships."

Renewed Warnings. Once again the atomic scientists did their best to warn the world against impending doom. Some warned that the radioactive clouds from a few H-bombs could conceivably destroy all life on this continent. Others pointed out that H-bombs could be lobbed into all of our great ports from submarines. Dr. Ralph E. Lapp called the hydrogen bomb a greater threat to this country than to Russia, where Moscow would be the only target worth an H-bomb, whereas we had a dozen cities with millions of people in them. On February 4 a group of physicists, headed by Professor Hans A. Bethe of Cornell University, called for a pledge that we would never use the H-bomb unless others attacked with it first. That would make it very difficult for either side to use the new super-weapon, one of which could easily wipe out any city in the world—and still be carried readily in the hold of a ship. They cautioned also that Russia would probably have the H-bomb in less than four years, and the next day the Federation of American scientists urged the President to act without delay in establishing a new commission to re-examine the whole issue of our atomic policy, in an effort to develop "some real hope of breaking the present stubborn deadlock." As long as we attacked atomic energy as an isolated issue we would not get anywhere. We had to "consider it also as a political question to be settled between the United States and Russia, with the possibility of economic concessions on our part in exchange for inspection concessions on theirs."[19]

Warning that through the H-bomb "annihilation of any life on earth" is "within the range of technical possibilities," Dr. Albert Einstein termed the arms race between the United States and Russia "a disastrous illusion." It had now assumed an hysterical character, in which every step appears as the unavoidable consequence of the preceding one. "In the end," he added, "there beckons more and more clearly general annihilation." There was no hope of peace "as long as every single action is taken with a possible future conflict in view."[20]

To underline Einstein's warning eleven British atomic scientists called for a new attempt to ban warfare with atomic bombs. Any solution would have to be acceptable to all nations and all nations would have to be prepared "to sacrifice some of their national interests for a realistic hope of continued peace."[21]

[18] The Alsops, *Herald Tribune*, January 27, 1950.
[19] The *New York Times*, February 5; the *Nashville Tennessean*, February 6, 1950.
[20] The *Nashville Tennessean*, February 13, 1950.
[21] *New York Herald Tribune*, February 22, 1950.

Tydings Rejects Sweating It Out. The same feeling of hopeless drift led Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to suggest that the President call a world disarmament conference. He faced the problem squarely and urged a sustained effort to achieve disarmament down to rifles. It was not reasonable merely to sit down and throw away huge arms expenditures each year, with all the danger involved in piling up the arms. Tydings correctly epitomized the policy of Secretary Acheson, that we "must sit and sweat it out." Rejecting this "mountainous defeatism," Tydings urged Acheson to recognize "the grim facts of life, the grim facts of future war" and unite the nations in a world disarmament conference. Analyzing the policy of George F. Kennan as also one without hope, which closed all doors, he asked the State Department to remember that we are more vulnerable than Russia and to stop playing the deadly checker game with her, with the ultimate prospect of slaughtering more people than had been killed in all previous wars combined. He besought us to leave this highway of death and tell the world that our purpose is peace, made plain in general disarmament. He called for an end both to "the cold war and the hot war," saying: "We cannot win the cold war by dynamic negativism or burying our heads in the sand in the illusion that the enemy will pass by. We can win it by strong, aggressive, imaginative, diplomatic action."[22]

McMahon's Proposal. This same deep concern about the Acheson policy of depending on arms alone impelled Senator Brien McMahon, of Connecticut, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to make a remarkable address in the Senate, on February 2. Two broad policies were open to us. One was to wage the Cold War for a generation, knowing that against "such a policy is 5,000 years of recorded history, which teaches again and again and again that armaments races lead to war—under today's conditions hydrogen war!" The other policy involved "moving heaven and earth to stop the atomic arms race." It was his intense conviction that there must be an immediate initiation of a moral crusade for peace.

As a practical move in this direction, he proposed that we offer to take ten billions annually for five years from our fifteen billion dollar arms expenditure to promote the development of atomic energy everywhere for peace, and for "general economic aid and help to all countries, including Russia," the money to be spent through the United Nations. In return we would ask an effective program for international control of atomic energy and an agreement that all countries would spend two-thirds of their present expenditure upon armaments for constructive purposes.

McMahon had grasped the principle that it is much better to spend a lot in raising the standard of living of other peoples than to spend infinitely more in destroying their lives and livelihoods. This is the principle that the Russians had rejected in the Marshall Plan and that we had rejected in the abrupt end of lend lease, in the refusal to make a large post-war loan to Russia, in the

[22] ***Excerpts from the Speeches of Millard F. Tydings*, February 6, 16, 23, and March 6, 1950.**

killing of UNRRA before its healing mission was completed, and when Henry Wallace had proposed a new fifty billion foreign aid program two years earlier.

McMahon's address had a strong, momentary impact on both the Senate and the country. It "evoked some of the highest praise for 'statesmanship' and 'high thinking' accorded to any Senator by his colleagues in recent times." Yet the address had no constructive result. Walter Lippmann pointed out immediately that it was not a fresh proposal for atomic peace, but an offer of fifty billions to the world if the Soviet Union would accept "the obsolete Baruch plan." This plan had been based on "a complete fallacy—namely, that we had a monopoly on the technical processes and means of producing nuclear fuels." What was required now was not the 'devaluating" of "certain technical phases" of the moribund Baruch plan, but "a deep effort of mind to think out fresh proposals based on the actual fact that there are now two atomic powers in the world."

Obsolete Ideas Frozen? Lippmann thought a re-examination of our global diplomacy and strategy imperatively indicated. The new military situation could not be dealt with by military measures alone. We could not erect impregnable defenses everywhere. The situation would have to be met by diplomacy, for which the mind of the country was not prepared. It had been "fearfully misled and confused by the plausible fallacy of the military containment fallacy—a policy which was plausible only because of our monopoly of atomic weapons." The situation could become irreparable and hopeless, if public opinion remained frozen in the ideas that events had made obsolete.[23]

TOTAL DIPLOMACY

In early 1950 there was undoubtedly a feeling among "millions of Americans that there must be a new approach to the Soviet Union in order to close the horrible vistas" ahead.[24] The time for a real effort to stop the Cold War seemed urgently present. On Russia's side, too, there appeared to be a willingness to negotiate. On February 4, Harrison Salisbury sent a dispatch to the ***New York Times***, censored of course, reporting that some Moscow diplomatic quarters believed that the Soviet Government had been prepared for a year, and still was, to meet the United States in "a two power effort to solve the major problems confronting both countries, including the question of atomic controls."

The demand for an effort to stop the drift toward the incineration of our urban civilization was so strong that American policy makers had to take some position toward it. They had had four months to weigh the collapse of

[23] *New York Herald Tribune*, February 2, 6, 1950. Nearly two years later, in July 1951, we were proceeding still on the line of erecting impregnable defenses everywhere. A big arms program in Europe, an expensive war in Korea, 50 billions for arms annually. Then the Russians unveiled a new B 36 type bomber, which "could only be intended to drop A-bombs on our cities" and cries went up for a 150 group air force, costing another 10 billions a year. We must control the skies everywhere.

[24] Editorial, *New York Herald Tribune*, February 7, 1950.

their strategy of global containment, based on our atomic monopoly, and on February 9, 1950, the decision was announced that nothing had happened to make negotiation necessary.

No Negotiation from Weakness. Secretary of State Acheson took cognizance of the strong demand for negotiations at his press conference. He explained that the Soviet regime "is incompatible with the present achievement of a world situation which is based on peace and the maintenance of national independence and freedom." However, it could adjust itself to facts when facts exist, as in Berlin and Greece. Only when confronted with powerful facts were agreements with the Soviet Union of much use. It was therefore our basic policy "to create strength instead of the weakness which exists in many quarters." This road "is a very long one and a very difficult one. It takes purpose, continuity of purpose, perseverance, sacrifice and it takes, more than almost anything else, very steady nerves."

Wherever there was a situation of weakness in Asia or Europe it was "an irresistible invitation for the Soviet Government to fish in those troubled waters." There was no use asking them not to fish. "You can't argue with a river, it is going to flow." You could only try "to extend the area of possible agreement with the Soviet Union by creating situations so strong that they can be recognized and out of them agreement can grow." We must therefore not reproach ourselves and never waver in the pursuit of the goal of peace.

In other words, Mr. Acheson's mind had frozen in the classic mould of power politics. He would not negotiate with the Russians about anything anywhere until he could do so from strength, instead of current weakness. The making of bombs and super-bombs would go on until we had proved our nerves to be the steadiest.

Renewed Demands for Negotiation. In the form of a letter to Mr. T., Walter Lippmann replied to this line of reasoning in one of the greatest articles of his long career. Recalling that we had been the first to make an atomic bomb, the first to use it and the first to announce that we would make the hydrogen bomb, he declared:

> "There is no way the American people can divest themselves of the duty to search for a decent and an honorable alternative to a war of extermination. They cannot sit down, fold their hands across their stomachs, saying that their search has ended, that they have reached the limits of their wisdom, and that there is nothing more they can do except to make more and bigger bombs.
>
> "The day we did that would mark the death of the American spirit. Though our cities escaped destruction and our bodies remained alive, we should have renounced our hopes, resigned our role, surrendered in the battle. Whether we won or lost the race of armaments, we should have lost the struggle for men's souls, and the right to their trust and their faith, and we should have lost our own self respect.
>
> "To such depths of inertia and spiritual decay and intellectual defeatism we have not sunk, and no one can push us into those depths, while we are

> alive and kicking. This nation has a destiny which is not yet fulfilled. Our people will not shrink from the labor of thought and the searching of their own souls which their awful responsibility demands."

Even if we had no way of compelling the Russians to act in good faith we still had to keep faith with ourselves, Lippmann concluded. Two days later he observed that important agreements between any sovereign states did not endure unless they registered "an existing situation of fact."[25]

On February 17 Winston Churchill closing his campaign to be returned to power by the British voters, called again for a conference of the heads of state to try to control the atomic arms race and end the cold war. Two years before he had told the House of Commons that the best chance of avoiding war lay in bringing "matters to a head with the Soviet Government and by formal diplomatic processes, with all their privacy and gravity, to arrive at a lasting settlement. There is certainly enough for the interests of all if such a settlement could be reached."[26]

On February 18 Harold E. Stassen proposed a mid-century conference of U.S. and Soviet leaders, in an effort to avert a third world war, and Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, expressed the hope that a meeting of the foreign ministers might soon be possible.[27] In Britain the Archbishop of York pleaded for immediate negotiations, saying: "There is no time for delay. While the United States and Russia are making these bombs, dark clouds of fear will spread over mankind; presently the terror of things to come will become intolerable and the bombs will be used."[28] This cycle of demands for negotiations was completed by Senator McMahon who asked on March 1 for an immediate meeting of the Atlantic Council, to be followed by a session of the United Nations Assembly in Moscow. He rejected as vain the current policy of "containment" of Russia.[29]

These pleas produced no result. Both the President and the Secretary of State in their press conferences gave the impression that they had slammed the door on negotiations. The door remained closed to Britain and Canada, also, in the matter of partnership in the atomic development. The talks broke down and were adjourned on February 27. The British went ahead to make their own atomic bomb.[30]

Our Objectives in the Cold War. On March 9, 1950, the State Department released a speech by Secretary Acheson in which he called for "total diplomacy" in United States foreign policy, especially in regard to the Soviet Union. The only way to deal with the Soviets was to "create situations of strength." On March 16 Acheson made a major address at Berkeley, California, in which he declared that if the two systems are to coexist the points of greatest difference must "sooner or later be reconciled." These were:

> "(1) Agreement on peace settlements for Germany, Austria, and Japan

[25] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, February 12, 14, 1950.**
[26] ***New York Herald Tribune*, February 16, 18, 1950.**
[27] **The *New York Times*, February 19, 1950.**
[28] ***Herald Tribune*, March 1, 1951.**
[29] ***Ibid.*, March 2, 1950.**
[30] ***New York Herald Tribune*, February 28, 1950.**

that would not make them satellites of the Soviet Union; (2) Withdrawal of Soviet military and police forces from the Eastern European satellite countries and the holding of elections therein in which the 'true will' of the people could be expressed; (3) Abandonment of the Soviet policy of obstruction in the United Nations; (4) Agreement and 'realistic and effective' arrangements for control of atomic weapons. . . .; (5) Desisting from the use of communist apparatus to undermine and overthrow established governments; (6) Co-operation in assuring the 'proper treatment' of diplomatic representatives; and (7) Stopping the distortion of motives of others through false propaganda that speaks of a 'capitalist encirclement' and of the United States craftily and systematically plotting another world war."[31]

This address had received long and careful preparation in the State Department for many weeks. All of the top State Department political officials contributed to it.[32] Acheson's seven points may therefore be taken to comprise the long term objectives of the State Department in the Cold War.

The Russian reaction in a ***Pravda*** editorial the next day was that "All of Acheson's speeches prove one thing—the absence of any concrete proposals for strengthening the peace. Total diplomacy does not differ materially from atomic diplomacy—diplomacy based on naked force with the use of pressure, intimidation and threats." A writer in the Soviet ***Literary Gazette*** termed the speech "an insolent ultimatum."[33]

In form, the Acheson speech was not an ultimatum. It was phrased as things the Soviets could do voluntarily to establish peace. In essence the seven points could well mean the total loss of the Cold War by the Russians, even to the loss of their control of East Europe, where the Cold War started. The seven points appeared to lay down authoritatively the objectives of our total diplomacy, objectives to be sought as positions of strength were created. Also if the Russians accepted them "they would virtually cease to be Communists."[34]

"Invincible Pessimism." Lacking in a positive program which would appeal to the American people, the State Department itself became the victim of one of the most vicious political campaigns in anyone's memory, the McCarthy crusade to convict it of communism. The initiative was lost to McCarthy, but there "persisted a strong undercurrent of discontent with the policy which had frankly lost faith in negotiation and seemed content to leave the psychological initiative to the Russians. Many Americans, and even more foreigners,

[31] Brookings Institution, *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy*, Vol. Ill, No. 8, March, 1950, p. 1.

[32] TTie *New York Times*, March 19, 1950.

[33] *Ibid.*, March 19; *Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1950.

[34] James Reston, the *New York Times*, March 19, 1950. The *New York Times*, "News of the Week in Review" for March 26 thought the Berkeley speech had been intended "to get the U.S. off the spot as the nation that refused to discuss a settlement—and put Russia on that same spot."

obviously failed to share the Administration's invincible pessimism regarding the outlook of the Politburo."[35]

MCCARTHYISM

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Junior Senator from Wisconsin, wanted to be re-elected. Asking his friends for an issue, he was advised by Father Edmund A. Walsh, of Georgetown University, that any senator who consistently attacked communism would have a great appeal for the voters.[36]

McCarthy fixed upon the State Department as the focus of his attacks, for two reasons: (1) it enabled him to attack the men in the Department who, despairing of saving Chiang Kai-shek's regime had sought some other way of keeping some of our influence in China; (2) the Alger Hiss case gave a background which could be played upon. Hiss was convicted of peijury for denying that he had supplied State Department documents to a confessed ex-communist courier, Whittaker Chambers, in 1938.

This is a case which still sits uneasily on the American conscience. Hiss had been a fairly high official in the State Department, of strong New Deal views, and was currently President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Secretary Acheson had also declared that he did "not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss," who had been his friend over a long period.

McCarthy began his crusade in a speech delivered on February 9 at Wheeling, West Virginia, saying: "I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals (in the State Department) who would appear to be either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist party, but who nevertheless are helping to shape our foreign policy." For several weeks he juggled figures skilfully. One time he claimed there were 205 suspects in the State Department, then 81. He long avoided naming names, finally accusing Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador-at-Large, as being a "voice" for Owen Lattimore, a writer on Far Eastern affairs who had early recognized the futility of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Jessup was at once endorsed by General George C. Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Jessup denounced McCarthy's charges as "not only false, but utterly irresponsible." He noted that he had recently been attacked by two sources, ***Izvestia*** and Senator McCarthy, and that "any one who believes in the concept of guilt by association might draw some startling conclusions from this fact."[37]

[35] Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs, 1950,* New York, 1951, p. 72.

David Lawrence wrote that "the truth is that the Democratic administration by its intransigent attitude is failing to grasp the opportunities for a constructive peace settlement, while the Republicans are, if anything, doing more to harden the Administration against an understanding with Russia. . . ."—*Herald Tribune,* April 3, 1950.

James Reston added that "the official line now is that the Soviet Union is not merely an annoyance but a pestilence; and while nobody quite admits it, the Iron Curtain is slowly but surely being drawn across quite a few influential minds."—The *New York Times,* April 30, 1950.

[36] Drew Pearson said later that Walsh "first planted the idea in Joe's mind, first told him that the man who focused on Communists in the State Department would become a national hero. My attorney, Bill Roberts, was present when Father Walsh and Joe first talked."—The *Nashville Tennessean*, May 7, 1957.

[37] *New York Herald Tribune*, March 21, 1950.

Russia's "Top Secret Agent." Finally, on March 21, McCarthy named a man in closed session of the Investigating Committee on whom, he said, his whole case would stand or fall. He alleged that this man "has a desk in the State Department and has access to the files." He was also a one time boss of the Hiss "espionage ring."

On March 26 it came out that Owen Lattimore was the man charged with being Russia's "top secret agent" in the United States. Lattimore quickly returned from Afghanistan, where he was on a United Nations mission, and made a full defense of his life and record, which included 11 books and some 100 articles, all open to public scrutiny.

The charge that Lattimore was the architect of our Far Eastern policy was based partly upon a well balanced memorandum which he had submitted to the State Department on October 18, 1949, in connection with a Round Table on Far Eastern policy. The central theme of the memorandum was that "the aim of the United States policy should be to enable the countries of the Far East to do without Russia to the maximum extent. This is a much more modest aim than insistence on an organization of hostility to Russia; but it is an attainable aim, and the other is not."

Lattimore also believed that "the kind of policy that failed in support of so great a figure as Chiang Kai-shek cannot possibly succeed if it is applied to a scattering of 'little Chiang Kai-sheks' in China or elsewhere in Asia." Applying this principle to South Korea, the Lattimore memorandum said: "South Korea is more of a liability than an asset to the interests and policy of the United States. It is doubtful how long the present regime in South Korea can be kept alive, and the mere effort to keep it alive is a bad advertisement, which continually draws attention to a band of little-and-inferior Chiang Kai-sheks who are the scorn of the Communists and have lost the respect of democratic and would-be democratic groups and movements throughout Asia."[38]

On April 4 Lattimore denounced McCarthy to a standing-room-only audience in the Senate caucus room as a "base and contemptible ''liar, in a remarkable statement nearly two hours long, and received an ovation from the crowd at the end of his statement. The FBI had also cleared him.[39]

Louis F. Budenz, another ex-communist, was then brought in to testify that Lattimore had been a member of a communist cell, though he offered no concrete evidence to support his charge. In reply, Lattimore made another smashing attack upon his accusers, in which he attempted "to establish beyond question ... the right of American scholars and authors to think, talk and write freely and honestly, without the paralyzing fear of the kind of attack to which I have been subjected." His loyalty was also supported by Brigadier

[38] ***Ibid.*, April 4, 1950.**

[39] ***Ibid.*, April 7, 1950.**

Speaking at Passaic, New Jersey, on April 8, where he did not enjoy Congressional immunity, McCarthy greatly softened his charges. He referred to Lattimore as dangerous, instead of calling him a spy, a performance which led Assistant Secretary of State, John E. Peurifoy, to say: "Senator McCarthy roared like a lion when he wore the cloak of congressional immunity. Now he discards his immunity, strikes the pose of a hero and bleats like a lamb. When he dropped his cloak of immunity he also dropped the substance of his first charges."—The *Nashville Tennessean,* April *9,* 1950.

General E. R. Thorpe, former Chief of Counter Intelligence for General Mac Arthur, who testified that in three investigations of Lattimore he found nothing but "hearsay evidence, most of it obviously vindictive in character."[40]

Lattimore's Offense. Lattimore had put his finger accurately upon the heart of the attack upon him. He was a foremost advocate of a policy of trying to work with the great social forces running in Asia, instead of trying to throttle them by supporting feudalistic rulers. Since those who were disgruntled with our Far Eastern policy believed that these same rulers could have been kept in power, if only we had given them a little more aid at this point or that, Lattimore's writings were anathema to them. They believed he had been influential and they set out to destroy him, as well as to strike at the State Department and the Administration.

Lattimore had never been a member of the State Department, except as a consultant on one or two occasions, and three Secretaries of State—Hull, Byrnes and Marshall—all issued statements saying that he had had no influence upon our policy, but he had had a wide public hearing and his accusers believed that he had influenced policy, indirectly at least.

He was also a man of courage and vision. Questioned by the Senate Committee about his views on our policy he replied that the basic conflict in the world is due to the post World War II weakening of Britain and France as great powers, and that we could not correct the balance by placing emphasis on "holding points," such as Formosa, Korea and Indo China. Instead, we should be pouring "real resources" into India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, to support and assist those nations before they, too, become "holding points" in turn.[41]

There might be some virtue in holding exposed points, but surely it is long range statesmanship to look to the main bastions in time.

Effective Smoke. For nearly two months McCarthy managed to stay in the headlines much of the time, by twisting and turning, always making some new accusation. His charges obviously petered out, to anyone who followed the testimony, but nevertheless he convinced a great many people that there must be some communism in the State Department. Surely where there was so much smoke there must be at least a little fire.

In the senatorial elections of 1950 such able and respected senators as Tydings, of Maryland, and Thomas, of Utah, were defeated, partly by the miasma of suspicion left over and partly by the appearance of McCarthy in the flesh, making his lurid attacks in person, aided by the shameless faking of composite photographs and bandying of "communist" allegations.

The effect on the public service was equally damaging. Government officials were so terrorized that a member of the State Department hardly dared tell anyone the time of day. In the Department man after man who had had any responsible connection with China was hounded until in self defense the Department retired him to some innocuous position. Thus the reward of honest, fearless service came to be oblivion. The effect on other officials was obvious. Why put things into your reports from abroad that the

[40] *Herald Tribune*, April 21, May 3, 1950.

[41] *New York Herald Tribune*, May 3, 1950.

McCarthyites would seize upon? It was soon noted that returned Foreign Service officers talked more freely orally about conditions abroad than they had in their official reports.

The drive against men who had done their duty was reinforced by the great power of Senator McCarran of Nevada over Senate appropriations and Senate inquisitions. In July 1951 John Paton Davies, who had been an adviser to General Stil well in China in 1942–3 had to undergo another security investigation, just as he was ready to depart on an assignment to Germany. Believing that Chiang's regime was too rotten to save, he had supported Stilwell in a "long squalid struggle in Chungking" to give some American aid to the Chinese Communists, in order to have some influence with China's future rulers and in the hope of keeping them out of Russian control. In other words, he was working for Titoism before Tito, as Joseph Alsop testified in a poignant, first person column of July 26,1951.

Alsop had fought Davies on the spot as an adviser to T. V. Soong and General Chennault. He had been on the winning side then. Now Alsop believed that if Davies' policy had been followed "he would have been proven right." Now Davies had "to make a burnt offering with a sweet savor in the peculiar nostrils of Senator McCarthy and Senator McCarran." As he reviewed the past it struck Alsop that "we would be much wiser to start loyalty investigations of the politicians who are now working all-out to destroy the last vestiges of decency and fair play in our public life."[42]

The demoralizing effect upon the Department of having to fight for its life day by day in the Spring of 1950 was also felt abroad. The other Western peoples simply could not understand how such a disastrous circus could go on—and on. Of course it was a delight to the Communist world.

Counterattack. Finally the incredible performance was temporarily slowed down by a number of outraged protests. On May 13, Senator Dennis Chavez, himself a Roman Catholic, made a sustained assault on the informer Budenz, declaring that Budenz was using the Church "as a shield and a cloak to purvey un-American, un-Christian dubious testimony." Noting that Budenz was a bigamist, and worse, that he had been arrested 21 times and "admits engaging in conspiracies to commit murder and espionage," Chavez declared he would not believe him, "no matter how many Bibles he swore on." He protested against "providing a platform from which every unreliable and discredited individual can proclaim to the world that the United States is rotten with subversives," from which everyone is "made aware of the public flogging awaiting individuals accused of the reckless crime of thinking." We were establishing a situation "where there can be only two opinions—the Communist and the anti-Communist." We were elevating the Communists "to the tremendous prestige of being the single opposition."[43]

The Washington Post's Indictment. Then a week later, on May 22, 1950, the ***Washington Post*** published one of the most powerful editorials of its distinguished career under the long ownership of Eugene Meyer. It filled a full page and began: "For weeks the Capital has been seized and convulsed by a

[42] **The *Nashville Tennessean*, July 26, 1951.** [43] ***Herald Tribune*, May 13, 1950.**

terror." There had been a rising distrust, a "roaring bitterness, the ranging of Americans against Americans, the assault on freedom of inquiry, the intolerance of opposition."

The ***Post*** recognized that there was a danger, the "cancerous evil of totalitarianism," controlling a great world power and confronting us for the first time with a secret conspiratorial force in our midst. Yet to fight this evil it would be "burning down the house of the American way of life in order to get the rats in it" if we now reversed our law and put the burden of proof on the accused.

It was as "foolish to reckon the witch-hunters the true foes of communism as to reckon lynch mobs the true foes of the sex maniac." Moreover, the witch hunters were weakening our front line soldiers in the cold war. George F. Kennan had stated somberly that the atmosphere in Washington would not have to deteriorate much further "to produce a situation in which very few of our more quiet and sensitive and gifted people will be able to continue in government." Witch hunting, the ***Post*** continued, "would drive out of Government the very brains which alone can give us victory in the cold war." This kind of onslaught on character would give us "a Government of spineless mediocrities," like the fearful men abroad who did not dare to tell their totalitarian leaders the truth. "Witch hunting tears our unity apart and lowers the discussion of real problems to the level of the gutter."

Characterizing "McCarthy's Goebbels-Vishinsky technique" as "the lie followed by the ever-bigger lie", the ***Post*** explained that witch hunting repelled our allies and defeated itself. "The mad-dog quality of McCarthyism" had become so apparent that it had probably spent its force, but "it would be reckless to ignore the circumstances that permitted this escapade and this aberration to paralyze American diplomacy and to thrust fears and doubts in the minds of our people."

Urging a national commission to survey the major aspects of national security, the ***Post*** reasoned that "our liberty minded institutions can meet the threat without throwing our liberties away."

Senator Margaret Smith's Recoil. On June 1, Senator Margaret Chase Smith, of Maine, made a simple, deeply effective speech in the Senate to "a hushed chamber." She spoke as a Republican who regretted that the Senate had recently been too often "debased to the level of a forum of hate and character assassination, sheltered by the shield of Congressional immunity." She thought it was "high time for the United States Senate and its members to do some soul-searching." Whether it be "a criminal prosecution in court or a character prosecution in the Senate, there is little practical distinction when the life of a person has been ruined." Those who shouted the loudest about Americanism in making character assassinations also ignored such basic principles of Americanism as the right to criticize, to hold unpopular beliefs, to protest and to think independently.

The exercise of these rights "should not cost one single American citizen his reputation or his right to a livelihood, nor should he be in danger of losing his reputation or livelihood merely because he happens to know some one

who holds unpopular beliefs. Who of us doesn't? Otherwise none of us could call our souls our own." The American people were "sick and tired of being afraid to speak their minds, lest they be smeared as 'Communists' or 'Fascists' by their opponents," and of "seeing innocent people smeared and guilty people whitewashed."

The nation sorely needed a Republican victory, but she did not "want to see the Republican party ride to political victory on the four horsemen of calumny—fear, ignorance, bigotry and smear."

A Republican "Declaration of Conscience." With these thoughts in mind, she had drafted "a declaration of conscience" which was signed also by Senators Irving M. Ives, of New York; Robert C. Hendrickson, of New Jersey; Charles Tobey, of New Hampshire; George D. Aiken, of Vermont; Wayne L. Morse, of Oregon; and Edward J. Thye of Minnesota. Senator H. Alexander Smith, of New Jersey, immediately associated himself with the declaration, making with Senator Margaret Smith an honor roll of eight Republican Senators who sought to save American freedom from being crushed in the name of anti-communism.

The declaration of conscience condemned the Democratic administration for its lack of effective leadership, and many other things. Then noting that certain elements of the Republican party sought to ride in to victory on the "exploitation of fear, bigotry, ignorance and intolerance," the statement closed as follows: "It is high time that we stopped thinking politically as Republicans and Democrats about elections and started thinking patriotically as Americans about national security based on individual freedom. It is high time that we all stopped being tools and victims of totalitarian techniques—techniques that, if continued here unchecked, will surely end what we have come to cherish as the American way of life."[44]

STEADY NERVES

These impressive protests against McCarthyism put it in abeyance for the time being, though it was too virulent to be more than arrested. The warlike attitude maintained by official Washington also continued to give it the atmosphere in which to grow.

On April 19,1950, it was announced that several thousand industrial plants now had explicit go-ahead agreements for production of war materials the instant war should be declared. The number would be doubled by September 1 st. On the 23rd Secretary Acheson made an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors warning that Russian Communism was a threat to the existence of our nation and our civilization which could be met only by the total application of faith, unity, strength and resourcefulness. Only a strong United States stood "between the Kremlin and dominion over the entire world."

Peaceful Coexistence. On the same day in Moscow, the eightieth anniversary of Lenin's birth, almost every newspaper published Lenin's words of thirty years ago: "Let American capitalists not touch us; we will not touch them." This quotation was coupled with the reiteration in nearly every Soviet

[44] ***New York Herald Tribune*, June 2, 1950.**

organ of the Leninist-Stalinist premise, as ***Pravda*** phrased it, of "the possibility and necessity for the peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union and countries of capitalism." The Moscow journals stressed that the people of the Soviet Union did not want war and did not need it. It was only the ideologists and politicians of Anglo-American imperialism trying to justify the aggressive policy of their rulers who talked about the fatal inevitability of war.[45]

Disband the UN—Hoover. A few days later, on April 28, Herbert Hoover made an address to the American Newspaper Publishers Association in which he proposed the expulsion of the communist nations from the United Nations and the formation of "a new united front of those who disavow Communism." Hoover's speech was greeted by what the ***Herald Tribune*** called a "thunderous, almost impassioned ovation."

Pondering over the event, Walter Lippmann thought it solved the puzzle presented by the conduct of the old guard Republicans—how "to reconcile their warlike and crusading fervor against communism and Soviet Russia with their growing opposition to ERP, military aid, Point 4 and all the other measures of that sort." The old guard Republicans in the Senate talked as if they were about to advocate a declaration of war, but they showed an increasing disposition to vote as isolationists. Hoover's speech provided the key to the paradox. They wished to retire into isolation "during a great roar of anti-communist noises."[46]

Consumer Goods for Moscow. Contemporaneously, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie visited Moscow and did not detect any atmosphere of overwhelming preparation for war. On May 17 he issued a statement describing his fifth visit to Moscow, in which he said: "I am very much impressed by the state of repair of the streets and houses and by the new buildings. I have never seen so many new automobiles, street cars and buses. In many respects it is like a new capital. The people I have seen and the children look healthier than at any time before. I am surprised that so much progress has been achieved as regards an abundance of clothing and shoes for women and children."[47]

Russians Human. A few days later, George F. Kennan, counsellor of the State Department and one of the authors of the Truman Doctrine, warned that the current witch hunting had blinded Americans to everything but black and white and had a tendency to stamp all Russians as our enemies. Actually, the Russian people were deeply saturated with liberal and moral concepts. They still believed profoundly in "decency, honesty, kindliness, and loyalty in the relations between individuals." It was a grim commentary on the national state of mind that Kennan found it necessary to remind us that the Russian people are human beings after all.[48]

The next day Secretary Acheson returned from a Foreign Ministers Conference of the Western powers, reporting that their armed forces would be merged under an American general, and that a North Atlantic planning board for ocean shipping would be created to draw up plans for war mobilization.

[45] **The *New York Times*, April 23, 1950.**
[46] ***New York Herald Tribune*, April 29; the *Nashville Tennessean*, May 1, 1950.**
[47] ***New York Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1950.** [48] **The *New York Times*, May 28, 1950.**

Damnable Obsession. On May 31st Acheson addressed an informal joint meeting of Congress in the Library of Congress concerning his trip to Europe. He reported that not one of the Atlantic Council's twelve Foreign Ministers believed there was any immediate threat of war, but that they all agreed a dangerous situation was developing, because Russia was devoting so much of its resources to military purposes.[49]

Under the caption "The Damnable Obsession" Walter Lippmann wrote the next day that no close observer in Washington could fail to feel that for a variety of reasons—objective, psychological, personal and partisan—"the Administration's foreign policy has during the past year created the impression, here and abroad, that it places virtually complete dependence on military and material power." This had created a world wide loss of confidence in our wisdom, and even in our motives, the depth of which we had not begun to understand. It was our official theory that we must not let the Russians think we wished to negotiate until the Atlantic community was stronger. Yet we could not make it stronger unless we could convince the European peoples that we were organizing for peace. Actually, we had allowed ourselves to "become identified with the idea that war is inevitable."[50]

***Soviet* "*Aggression*."** On June 10 President Truman's address in St. Louis was headlined "Denouncing Aggression of Soviet Russia." The President denounced the Soviet leaders for devoting a massive share of their resources to the acquisition of further military strength, far beyond any defense needs, instead of using their resources to improve the well being of their people. We must, however, not become hysterical and "we must remain cool, determined and steady."[51]

Three days later Secretary Acheson speaking in Texas charged that Russia was using its armed might and communist plotting in other countries as a "poised bludgeon to intimidate the weak." The United States would continue to follow a realistic policy of peaceful negotiation. There was no immediate danger, and we must not have a preventive war, but appeasement of Soviet ambitions would "encourage Soviet aggression."[52]

"The Dinning Emphasis on Arms." On June 20 Thomas L. Stokes wrote from White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, where the annual conference of the Governors of the forty-eight states was meeting, that it was "refreshing to get away from the angry, tortured, bewildered spirit of Washington these days." After talking at the conference with people from all parts of the country he got the impression "that the attitude of our people is not truly expressed in the crisis atmosphere about our national capital—the noisy, dinning emphasis on arms, arms, arms and the vengefulness of the witch hunt."[53]

On the same day that Stokes drew this encouragement from the grass roots, Secretary Acheson addressed a two-hour closed session of the Governors' conference in which he told them that the United States faces a "tough and grim" but by no means hopeless fight against communist expansion in Europe.

[49] ***New York Herald Tribune,* June 1, 1950.**
[50] ***Herald Tribune,* June 1, 1950.**
[51] ***Ibid.*, June 11, 1950.**
[52] ***Ibid.*, June 14, 1950.**
[53] **The *Nashville Tennessean,* June 21, 1950.**

A great military effort was required, both at home and abroad. One Governor reported afterwards that Acheson's summation of the situation in Europe "scared hell out of us," and another observed that his statement "swept the room."[54]

The Secretary had successfully communicated the spirit of Washington to the governors, with its "dinning emphasis on arms" and the peril of Russia.

"The Hair-raising Calculated Risk" On June 22, 1951, Stewart Alsop stated as concisely as he could the choice which the American Government had made after the announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion on September 23, 1949.

A preventive atomic war upon the Soviet Union had been rejected, because it would cement the Soviet peoples around that regime, alienate the rest of the world, and lead to the destruction of our allies, in addition to being alien to our political system.

The alternative adopted had been embodied in "the now famous state paper NSC 68" which called for such a rapid build-up of armed strength by this country and its allies "that a sort of nervous balance of power can be maintained." Peace was not hoped for, but "a terribly precarious yet lasting truce ... a hair-raising calculated risk," to be alleviated "in the very long run" by a change in the Soviet regime.

This seems to be an accurate description of the policy which the United States pursued in the nine months between the Soviet A-bomb and the Korean war. There was to be no negotiation, no effort to start afresh in seeking armaments control, no belief that any agreement could be made with the Soviet Union until we had become the stronger. There was nothing to do but keep steady nerves and arm.

The premises upon which this policy was based also seem to have been fairly stated by Alsop in the same article. They were: (1) a powerful nation, "aggressive and expansionist by its very nature, unalterably and intensely hostile to the United States;" (2) this potential enemy soon able "to wound this country most savagely, perhaps mortally;" (3) the United States able to do the same to the Soviet Union; and (4) the conquest and virtual destruction by the Soviets of the ancient civilization of the whole Eurasian continent, if war comes.[55]

Everything, of course, depended upon the acceptance of the first assumption. This is the way that another strong group of people has always looked to its rivals since time began. It is the premise upon which every balance of power arms race has been built. Never before, either, had a razor edge point of armed preparedness on both sides kept the peace. A true balance of forces had never been maintained hitherto more than a very short time.

This was the situation on June 25, 1950, when the North Korean Army startled the world by plunging over the 38th parallel into South Korea. For the second time in ten years war had erupted behind us in Asia while we were intent on the defense of Western Europe in front of us.

[54] The *Nashville Tennessean*, June 21, 1950. **55 *Ibid.*, June 22, 1951.**

END OF VOLUME ONE